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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Whilst minority nationalism and migration have been intensely studied in relative isolation 
from one another, research examining their mutual relationship is still scarce. This 
dissertation aims to fill this gap in the literature by exploring how migration politics are being 
fought over not only across society but also across territory in two well-researched cases of 
protracted nationalist mobilisation, Catalonia and Scotland. It meets three objectives: First, it 
introduces a theoretical framework accounting for sub-state elites’ and administrations’ 
boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants. Second, it systematically 
compares the evolution of boundary-making strategies in Catalonia and Scotland, prior to and 
after the establishment of self-governing institutions. Third, it identifies the circumstances 
under which nationalists came to adopt a predominantly territorial conception of national 
membership, privileging the inclusion of immigrants over that of emigrant populations. 
The main hypothesis states that minority nationalists have a vested interest in emphasizing 
residency as a significant criterion of national membership irrespectively of one’s place of 
birth and degree of attachment to the land in order to enhance their internal and external 
legitimacy. In addition, the location of the membership boundary depends upon the relative 
openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which comprises three dimensions: the 
formal distribution of migration-related competencies, the initial boundary and its 
implications for later developments, and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level.  
The empirical analysis shows that the attitudes of political elites in Scotland and Catalonia 
towards immigrants and emigrants have been shifting through time. This illustrates how 
nations are constantly constructed and reconstructed through processes of boundary-building, 
in a context also shaped by state-wide nationalism. The findings corroborate to a considerable 
extent the main hypothesis and show that dynamics of party competition have played a greater 
role in affecting boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants than 
historical path dependencies or the formal distribution of competencies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In April 2010, the residents of 200 Catalan municipalities were given the opportunity to 
pronounce themselves over the Catalan people’s right to self-determination in a non-
binding referendum initiated by pro-independence civil society associations. The 
consultation was the second of its kind to be organized in less than a year and reflects 
the growing popularity of outright independence in a country where support for 
secession has been traditionally weak, despite a fervent and diffuse national sentiment. 
The referendum was held three months before the Spanish Constitutional Court struck 
down some of the most contentious articles of the Catalan Statute, approved four years 
earlier by 89% of Catalan MPs and 74% of Catalan voters. Although the new Statute 
considerably expanded the Generalitat’s means of self-government in a broad spectrum 
of public policy fields, notably in fiscal matters, its most controversial dispositions were 
to be found in the symbolic realm. The preamble in which Catalonia is defined as a 
nation reawakened deeply-rooted disputes over the very nature of the Spanish state and 
showed how, for better or worse, identity questions remain at the forefront of 
contemporary European politics. In some European capitals, this was interpreted as the 
ultimate manifestation of the “Catalan malaise”1, the latest “querelles de clocher” in a 
long series of sterile disputes aggravated by a blatant nationalist rhetoric. For the French 
intellectual Michel Onfray, regional languages are no less than the “Trojan horse of 
xenophobia,” and keeping them alive is as absurd as intending to “reintroduce dinosaurs 
in Saint-Germain des Prés.”2 Yet successive referenda in Catalonia have challenged the 
almost universal rule limiting the right to vote to citizenship holders by expanding the 
electoral franchise to ‘every resident aged 16 or older’, thus including undocumented 
and legally resident aliens whose names figure on the local registry. The ‘Nous 
Catalans’, whether born in the rest of the Spanish state or beyond, were expected to 
express their views over the right of the Catalan people to self-determination.  
At the same time, at the northern end of Western Europe, the SNP government 
published its much-awaited Draft Referendum Bill over the independence of Scotland. 
                                               
1. For a striking illustration, see for instance the Editorial of Le Monde, December 12, 2009, entitled Le ‘Mal’ 
Catalan. The article also refers to Spain’s endless “querelles de clocher”.  
2. Michel Onfray, ‘Les deux bouts de la langue’, in Le Monde, July 10, 2010.  
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The re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, which was meant to “kill the 
nationalists stone dead”3, has neither undermined the SNP’s seemingly irresistible 
ascent, nor its secessionist ambitions. But as in Catalonia, the boundaries of the electoral 
franchise as defined in the bill were based on residency and not ethnicity, thus 
excluding those who were born in Scotland and lived elsewhere in the UK, while 
including British citizens born in England and EU citizens residing in Scotland. Again, 
the ‘New Scots’, whether born in the rest of the British state or beyond, were invited to 
cast their ballot in a still hypothetical referendum over the Scottish people’s right to 
self-determination.     
 
The right of people to self-determination is enshrined in international law, although the 
membership and territorial boundaries delimiting the space over which this right can be 
exercised are almost always contested. Protracted migrations and the intermingling of 
nationalities across a single geographical space have often meant that one nation-
building project could not be achieved without undermining another. These precedents 
have given some credence to those who believe that an oppressed nationality, once 
having acquired territorial means of self-government, would then subjugate those 
constructed as aliens, who in turn would have no other option but to seek to establish a 
state on their own, thus mechanically dividing the world into ever smaller independent 
units. As emigration and immigration provoke a mismatch between population and 
geographical boundaries, between the people and the homeland, nationalists would have 
no other option but to retain ties with emigrants to preserve the nation’s strength, and 
segregate immigrants to safeguard its cultural integrity. Seen from this perspective, the 
latest evolutions in Catalonia and Scotland evoke a paradox. As nationalists sought to 
acquire further autonomy from their respective states, they predominantly defined the 
people as the sum of individuals residing within their territorial jurisdiction, but hardly 
beyond. Rising popular support for self-government, if not outright independence, has 
not translated into an upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiments, but on the contrary went 
hand-in-hand with an elite-driven strategy to expand the national boundary to those who 
came, but not to those who left. As the significance of the territorial boundary with the 
rest of the state was being strengthened, so was the perceived need to blur ethnic 
boundaries within the homeland. However, far from being a Catalan or Scottish 
                                               
3. George Robertson, then Secretary of State for Scotland, famously declared in 1995 that “devolution would kill the 
nationalists stone dead.” 
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idiosyncrasy, these seemingly contradictory trends can be observed to varying degrees 
in other well known cases of protracted nationalist mobilization, such as in the Basque 
Country or Québec. 
 
Whilst minority nationalism and migration have been intensely studied in relative 
isolation from one another, research examining their mutual relationship is still scarce. 
This dissertation intends to fill this gap in the literature by uncovering what I  call the 
territorial politics of migration, which in its broadest sense refers to the consequences of 
human mobility on how migration politics are organized and fought out not only across 
society, but also across territory. It proceeds from the observation that political 
entrepreneurs making claims upon the centre on behalf of a people and a homeland 
which do not coincide with state and national boundaries have had to cope with the fact 
that a varying proportion of those who were born there have left to, and of those who 
reside there have come from, the rest of the state and beyond. In that context, this 
dissertation meets three objectives. First, it introduces a theoretical framework 
accounting for sub-state elites and governments’ boundary-making strategies in relation 
to immigrants and emigrants. Second, it systematically compares boundary-making 
strategies in Catalonia and Scotland, today and in the past. Third, it identifies the 
circumstances under which minority nationalists come to adopt a predominantly 
territorial conception of national membership, privileging the inclusion of immigrants 
over that of emigrant populations. 
 
The explanatory framework comprises a main hypothesis emphasizing agents’ interests 
and identifies three dimensions of the territorial environment which affect sub-state 
elites and governments’ boundary-making strategies towards immigrants and emigrants 
in a systematic way.   
The main hypothesis states that minority nationalists have a vested interest in 
emphasizing residency as a significant criterion of national membership in order to 
enhance their internal and external legitimacy. By expanding the membership boundary 
to immigrants, nationalists who seek to establish, maintain, and expand a stable 
structure of power over a specific geographical space acquire internal legitimacy for 
their rule over the totality of the resident population and defuse counter claims of self-
determination within the homeland. On the other hand, polishing their external 
legitimacy enables them to break the state’s monopoly over the constitutional 
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establishment of liberal democratic norms, and to discourage reluctant elites from using 
internal divisions as a means to oppose their claims. In consequence, it becomes much 
harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building project the legitimacy of which is 
not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but grounded in a culturally plural 
population inhabiting a common homeland. Whilst they may also seek to expand the 
membership boundary to emigrants and their descendants for a cultural, symbolic, 
economic or electoral purpose, they would nonetheless be more reluctant to give a 
prominent voice in homeland politics to individuals residing in a foreign land over 
which they do not claim sovereignty, and whose interests can hardly be reconciled with 
the nation-building project being pursued in the homeland. 
In addition, the location of the membership boundary depends upon the relative 
openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which designates the ever-evolving 
political context in which sub-state elites operate. It comprises three interrelated 
dimensions: the formal distribution of migration-related competencies; the initial 
boundary and its implications for later development; and the dynamics of party 
competition at sub-state level.  
 
In order to evaluate the strength of the explanatory framework, I systematically compare 
empirical developments in Catalonia and Scotland along four analytical dimensions. 
First, I explore boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective. The attitudes of 
nationalist elites’ towards immigrants and emigrants prior to the establishment of self-
governing institutions appear critical insofar as they set a path for later developments. I 
then shift to the contemporary period and examine the evolution of migration-related 
policy-making and associated discourses between 2000 and 2010. Immigration policies 
designate the set of rules establishing the conditions of aliens’ entry into the territory for 
long-term stay and settlement. Immigrant policies comprise both citizenship policies, 
regulating the citizenship rights of non-citizens and the formal rules of acquisition of 
citizenship; and integration policies, institutionalizing immigration-induced pluralism 
and determining the degree of cultural convergence an individual or a community is 
expected to achieve in order to be considered as a full and equal member of the political 
community. Lastly, emigrant policies are meant to create, influence, maintain or 
conversely weaken the set of political, economic and cultural links with specific groups 
of emigrants and their descendants. Admittedly, sub-state governments enjoy limited 
room for manoeuvre to implement public policies that depart markedly from their 
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respective central states that have retained a strong grip over most migration-related 
competencies. However, they are able to contest decisions taken by the central 
administration, use their competencies to take initiatives that show variations and 
consolidate a normative frame differing more or less markedly from the state-wide 
framework. While the historical sections rely extensively on the existing literature, the 
analysis of immigration, immigrant, and emigrant policies is based on a broad range of 
primary sources, including policy drafts, party manifestos, parliamentary transcripts, 
migration-related legislations and semi-structured elite interviews conducted in each 
case between January 2009 and May 2010.  
 
The results show that, like sovereign nation states, the Catalan and Scottish 
governments have sought to exercise some control over the number and provenance of 
immigrants entering their territorial jurisdiction. They have devised policies and 
institutions meant to integrate those who came into their own national community and 
established formal economic, social and cultural ties with those who left and their 
descendants. However, they did not use their self-governing competencies as a means of 
building impenetrable fences around the homeland, to contract the membership 
boundary towards immigrants and to expand it to emigrants on the sole basis of an 
alleged shared ethnicity. Instead, they sought to reconcile migration-related concerns 
with their strategy of economic development, which sees immigrants bringing desirable 
skills as essential for generating endogenous growth, and emigrants as a key resource to 
break into overseas markets. Although this did not come without tremendous 
difficulties, mainstream Catalan and Scottish nationalists sought to accommodate 
immigration-induced pluralism by promoting an over-arching national identity 
constructed around a common territorial interest, thus blurring political boundaries 
within the homeland. While they selectively expanded the membership boundary to 
specific categories of emigrants and their descendants for cultural and economic 
purposes, they have nonetheless been more reluctant to give them a prominent voice in 
homeland politics. By categorizing, naming, and counting individuals as immigrants 
and emigrants and debating and institutionalizing their terms of membership into their 
own imagined national communities, sub-state governments and political elites 
consistently incorporated migration-related concerns into their broader nation-building 
projects. Catalan and Scottish nationalists have not only challenged the wider state’s 
capacity to define political boundaries, but also contested its hegemony in its own 
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liberal and democratic normative space. Far from being paradoxical, these 
developments corroborate to a considerable extent the main hypothesis. The results also 
show that dynamics of party competition have played a greater role than historical path 
dependencies or the formal distribution of competencies in affecting boundary-making 
strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants.  
 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter I delineates the puzzle, discusses the 
main concepts and introduces an explanatory framework accounting for sub-state elites 
and government boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and emigrants. 
Chapter II specifies the units of analysis, briefly explores the territorial politics of 
migration in the case of Québec and introduces the comparative framework. Chapters 
III and IV look at the intersection between territorial structuring and migration in a 
historical perspective. I then shift to the contemporary period and study the evolution of 
boundary-making strategies between 2000 and 2010. Chapter V examines the process 
through which the Catalan and Scottish governments sought to gain further leverage to 
regulate immigration into their jurisdiction and how these demands were largely 
unfulfilled. Chapter VI and VII review public policies and associated discourses 
concerned with immigrant integration and citizenship, against the background of state-
wide developments. Chapter VIII compares the evolution of emigrant engagement 
policies in both cases. The Conclusion briefly summarizes and contrasts the findings, 
evaluates the strength of the explanatory framework and opens an agenda for future 
research.   
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I 
 
 
1. Conceptual and Explanatory Framework 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Migrations, stateless nations, and the state 
 
 
Although migration-induced and national pluralism are conceptually distinct, they share 
a family resemblance. Indeed, they both challenge the myth of the isomorphism 
between nation and state, of the congruence between the territorial boundaries of the 
homeland and the membership boundaries of the nation. Accordingly, they have been 
increasingly examined within a common ‘multicultural’ analytical framework. 
However, the conceptual differences between them have not always been stressed 
clearly enough, providing good reasons as to why they were kept separate in the first 
place. I first briefly review the main arguments raised in the multicultural debate in 
normative political theory, and show why a culturalist perspective fails to provide a 
satisfying account of what makes them distinct. It is instead more fruitful to distinguish 
them on the basis of the challenge that they mount to an international system constituted 
by mutually exclusive territorial nation-states. In this light, they can no longer be 
considered as categories of analysis but of political practice, a by-product of the 
institution of the nation-state.  
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1.1.1. The multicultural perspective and its limits 
 
 
Both phenomena gained currency – at least in their contemporary form – in the wake of 
modernity. Ernest Gellner’s famous assertion (1983: 17) that “nationalism is a 
phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but 
with its uneven diffusion” could equally account for the acceleration of migration flows 
in the wake of the industrial revolution (Zolberg 2006b). Marxist scholars have also 
highlighted some similarities among them, arguing that migrations and minority 
nationalism both stemmed from profound dislocations brought about by capitalist 
penetration into peripheral territories. Building on Wallerstein’s world system theory 
(1974), the argument contends that the exploitation of peripheries by the Western core 
created an uprooted proletariat prone to move abroad, and economically subjugated 
ethnonational groups forming a homogenous underclass. Although the Marxist 
paradigm is no longer as popular as it was, the concept of uneven economic 
development has survived in the study of nationalism, and the core/periphery model 
gave way to the less value-laden ‘push and pull’ and ‘migration system’ theories in 
mainstream scholarship of international migrations (Massey et al. 1998, Fawcett 1989). 
But the most ambitious attempt to build a link between both forms of diversity arose out 
of the multicultural debate in normative political theory which gained momentum in the 
1990s in Canada, where the national question is never far from the surface of politics. 
Like Australia and to a lesser extent Britain and the Netherlands, Canada adopted 
multiculturalism as its official doctrine for immigrant integration in the early-1970s, 
although this decision has been primarily driven by pragmatic rather than normative 
considerations. Indeed, the simultaneous challenges of the Quiet Revolution in Québec 
and sustained immigration against the backdrop of increasingly vocal indigenous claims 
put the question of national identity at the top of the agenda and forced federal elites to 
reinvent the Canadian nation (Gagnon 2009).   
 
In his plea in favour of ‘multicultural citizenship’, Will Kymlicka (1995) combined 
‘ethnic immigrants’, ‘national minorities’, and ‘indigenous groups’ within a common 
normative theory of minority rights in liberal democracies4. The traditional liberal 
                                               
4. Kymlicka’s framework builds upon Charles Taylor’s understanding of ‘deep diversity’, encompassing indigenous 
groups and Québec within Canada (1994).   
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perspective conceived of society as the gathering of free and rational individuals, which 
presupposes the effective ethnic, cultural, religious and racial neutrality of the state 
(Walzer 1983). But some have questioned this ideal of neutrality on liberal grounds, 
arguing that it is a legitimate function of the state to promote the national culture within 
its borders, insofar as it contributes to the realization and preservation of liberal 
democratic values (Tamir 1993), and to sustain feelings of trust and solidarities 
underpinning the welfare state (Miller 1995). Turning this argument on its head, 
Kymlicka (1995, 2001) showed how the presumed neutrality of the liberal state is but a 
myth, and that, although the strength of the link between state and culture varies greatly, 
it has always remained in one form or the other. Even in France and the United States – 
often regarded as archetypes of neutrality – the system is heavily weighted in favour of 
the majority: “it is the majority’s language that is used in public institutions; the 
majority’s holidays that are recognized in the public calendar; the majority’s history that 
is taught in school; and so on” (2001: 43). Some have retorted that cultural diversity 
constitutes a provisional anomaly that is soon corrected by the assimilationist machinery 
of the state. However, beside the practical difficulties this entails, a number of 
prominent scholars have argued that such groups have a valid claim not only to non-
discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation and recognition, which can only be 
achieved through group-differentiated rights.  
 
Advocates of a multicultural citizenship share the view that culture is central to 
individual self-realization, although the reasons as to why this is so diverge from one 
author to the other. For some, cultural minority rights provide an answer to individuals’ 
needs to have their identity recognized (Taylor 1994), while others have emphasized 
their instrumental value. Kymlicka, for instance, argued that cultural pluralism could be 
reconciled with liberalism as culture fosters individual autonomy by determining the 
boundaries of the imaginable. In a similar fashion, although with strong communitarian 
overtones, Joseph Raz observed that “individuals find in them a culture which shapes to 
a large degree their tastes and opportunities, and which provides an anchor for their self-
identification and the safety of effortless, secure belonging” (1994: 118). Chaim Gans 
(2003) provided a thicker version of the instrumental argument. In his view, cultural 
rights ought to be complemented with a right to cultural preservation, as a people’s 
belief that a memory of their endeavours will remain after they have died constitutes a 
potent catalyst for self-realization. Others have claimed that culture has an intrinsic 
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value. This is the position of communitarians like Bhikhu Parekh (2000), who see 
cultural diversity as adding to the variety of life and wielding aesthetic significance, 
whilst not requiring an overarching liberal framework in order to operate. From this 
perspective, national minorities and ethnic immigrants are equally subjects to state-
driven nation-building projects striving to make cultural and political boundaries 
congruent. This line of reasoning has had some policy implications. For instance, 
European policy-makers have sought to encourage research linking integration policy 
research on the position of migrants and national minorities with the aim of enforcing 
legal standards of minority rights in Eastern Europe (Favell 2001: 370). The Council of 
Europe deliberately made some connections between migrants’ integration and national 
minorities, thus forcing Eastern European Candidates to “accept minority rights and 
citizenship guarantees as part of the Agenda 2000 package” (ibid.).  
 
Ephraim Nimni (2005) went so far as to argue that the model of National-Cultural 
Autonomy (NCA), combining constitutionally guaranteed collective rights with wide 
cultural autonomy and cultural (non-territorial) self-determination could redress the 
deficiencies of the liberal democratic order and be applied to both categories. Yet, most 
would agree that their similarities do not preclude a distinct remedy. Kymlicka and 
others advocate a right to ‘territorial self-government’ for national minorities, unlike 
immigrants who have a valid claim to ‘polyethnic rights’, respectful of their cultural 
specificities, but are nonetheless expected to integrate into the mainstream society of 
settlement, which mirrors the constitutional consensus in Canada. Kymlicka legitimizes 
this differential treatment on two grounds: the argument of consent, and the argument of 
asymmetrical capabilities. First, national minorities were incorporated involuntarily and 
collectively into a state where they do not constitute the majority. By contrast, 
immigrants came voluntarily and individually to live in liberal democracies, thus 
wilfully ‘waiving’ their right to their culture of origin. However, the argument of 
consent is inconsistent with Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship, which 
conceives of cultural belonging as essential to individual autonomy. Besides, arguing 
that national minorities were incorporated against their will into a state is often 
empirically wrong, as the 1707 Act of Union between Scotland and England5 or the 
1469 alliance of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon illustrate. Second, national 
                                               
5. The historical circumstances under which the 1707 Act of Union came about are subject to controversies in British 
historiography. See Keating (2009b).  
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minorities, because they are territorially concentrated, are capable of sustaining what 
Kymlicka calls a “societal culture, providing its members with meaningful ways of life 
across a full range of human activities” (1995: 76). On the contrary, ethnic immigrants 
“have left behind the set of institutionalized practices, conducted in their mother tongue, 
which actually provided culturally significant ways of life to people in their original 
homeland” (ibid. 77). But here again, Kymlicka takes the ability of national minorities  
to sustain a societal culture and immigrants’ inability to do so as essential givens, 
neglecting how this is in fact largely conditioned by the relative openness of their 
respective institutional environment. Hence, the capability argument is tautological, as it 
suggests providing national minorities with the means to develop their societal culture 
on the grounds that they do have one, whilst denying it to immigrants on the basis that 
they do not.  
 
Gans’ demonstration (2003) is more persuasive. In his view, immigrants can adhere to 
their culture of origin within the host society through polyethnic rights, while their long-
term endeavours to have their culture preserved over subsequent generations are being 
satisfied in their country of origin if the latter is self-governing. Immigrants voluntarily 
choose their second-best choice, i.e. integration on reasonable terms, because their 
country of immigration better suits their other interests. On the other hand, national 
minorities, because they do not have a state of their own, have no alternative to preserve 
their culture but to establish self-governing institutions. However, assuming that self-
government would be immigrants’ first choice is not supported by empirical evidence. 
Besides, limiting nationality claims to the cultural realm fails to acknowledge that 
nationalists are more often than not eager to stress cultural differences as a means to 
achieve self-government rather than the other way around (Bauböck 2001). While some 
suggested substituting the vertical hierarchy of rights by a horizontal continuum that 
could accommodate a broader spectrum of categories6 (Carens 2000), others rejected it 
altogether, pointing to the “multinational bias” supposedly embedded in Kymlicka’s 
theory that “reflects the author’s own political concerns with Native North Americans 
and Québecois” (Modood 2008: 34). Hence, a strictly culturalist perspective fails to 
provide a convincing answer as to why national and migration-induced pluralism are 
distinct, and thus should be accommodated differently. While Kymlicka’s framework 
                                               
6. A suggestion that was later endorsed by Will Kymlicka (2001).  
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does account reasonably well for the idiosyncrasies of contemporary Canada, it can 
hardly travel through time or space without being significantly altered (Keating 2001c).  
 
Rainer Bauböck offers a political alternative, which takes the international order as a 
starting point from which he derives a theory of minority rights giving prominence to 
political membership, insofar as “cultural rootlessness is a more viable option for some, 
although certainly not for all, individuals in our world than living without attachment to 
any political community” (2007: 98). He points to the detrimental consequences of the 
traditional conception of sovereignty, which cannot apprehend national minorities and 
migrants as anything  but  'anomalies' or ‘misfits’ provoking a mismatch between 
territorial and membership boundaries. Henceforth, national minorities can either be 
assimilated into the state(s) in which they do not represent the majority, be eradicated 
through genocidal means, or seek to establish a state of their own, a solution that is 
undermined by the inherent difficulty of making cultural and territorial boundaries 
congruent. As for migrants, this leaves them with no alternative but to renounce their 
nationality of origin when acquiring that of the country in which they live, while being 
imposed a precarious legal status in between (Hammar 19907). Again, this solution, 
however unsatisfactory, is made difficult in practice as states, because they jealously 
retained the sovereign right to define the terms of membership to their political 
community, have to cope with a varying proportion of aliens living within their borders, 
and of citizens abroad. As a result, Bauböck contends, the normative foundations of the 
international system ought to acknowledge the existence of nested, shifting, and 
overlapping political boundaries as legitimate forms of political membership, on the 
grounds that individuals have a “fundamental right to membership in self-governing 
communities that entails a correlative collective right to self-government” (ibid. 102). 
 
On the one hand, “interlocking nation-building projects” resulting from the mismatch 
between territorial and national boundaries can be accommodated through the 
generalization of national minority right to self government (Bauböck 2002: 10). On the 
other hand, migrants’ stake in several political communities resulting from their ties and 
                                               
7. Hammar (1990) coined the expression ‘denizenship’ to stress how migrants in Western Europe have increasingly 
enjoyed similar rights as citizens without becoming fully-fledged members of the political community. However, 
only citizens enjoy full active and passive political rights and an unconditional right to abode. Besides, recent 
developments in EU member states reflect states’ willingness to downgrade migrant status and draw a sharper line 
between citizens and aliens (Guild et al. 2009) 
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bonds spanning across borders ought to be acknowledged through a general right to 
transnational citizenship. But given the territorial nature of self-government, 
immigrants who “import rights of self-government into a receiving society would be 
invaders” (Bauböck 2001: 343), an anachronistic equivalent to what colonial settlers did 
in the Americas, New Zealand and elsewhere.  
 
Bauböck’s approach has various strengths, not least because it carefully avoids treating 
national minorities and migrants as essentially given categories existing in isolation 
from the political context in which they came about. Instead, they can only be 
differentiated on the basis of the challenge that they mount to a world constituted by a 
system of states that recognize international boundaries as significant dividers between 
national territories, and acknowledge each other’s sovereignty over a particular 
population of citizens. However, while his theory is built upon a more sophisticated 
sociological premise acknowledging their constructedness, his normative agenda 
precludes a more elaborate inquiry into the making and unmaking of these categories, a 
task which requires leaving the world of ideas to enter that of politics. I now examine 
how they are in fact the by-product of ongoing processes of nation-building, the 
unintended consequences of the institution of the modern nation state.  
 
1.1.2. The nationality question 
 
 
I have so far used the term ‘national minorities’ to refer to the territorially-bounded 
people which do not have a state of their own, and on behalf of whom a claim of self-
determination is made.  However, a variety of alternatives can be found in the literature, 
illustrating the inherent difficulty of defining a phenomenon that seldom finds 
recognition in international law, is highly contentious in all its manifestations, and 
encompasses a variety of cases that do not fit so easily into procrustean categories.  
 
‘Minority nations’ (Norman 2006, Zapata-Barrero 2009), ‘stateless nations’ (Keating 
2001a, b), ‘nations without a state’ (Guibernau 1999), ‘nested nations’ (Miller 2000), 
‘ethnonationalities’ (Conversi 1997) are some of the most widely-used terms, although 
other authors have sought to empty the concept of its normative substance, loosely 
referring to ‘sub-state communities’ (Barker 2007) or ‘regional nationalities’ (Barbosa 
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1996). Those less sympathetic to their claims have deliberately employed a regional 
idiom to stress their disdain for a matter they perceive to be a mere anachronism. One 
way around it might be to resurrect8 the nineteenth century ‘nationalities question’, 
which presents the advantage of both highlighting the resilience of the phenomenon, as 
well as mitigating its militant overtones. However, this runs into other difficulties, as 
using an umbrella term means abandoning any attempt to discriminate one case from 
the other. This nonetheless invites us to reflect upon the reasons as to why the 
‘nationality question' arose at the very time simultaneous processes of state-formation 
and nation-building were reaching a peak in Europe. This does not suggest that proto-
national conflicts and territorial tensions were literally absent prior to the French 
Revolution. But the collapse of the Ancien Régime and the diffusion of the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty provided incentives for elites to homogenize their population, and 
claim exclusive control over a more or less contested homeland. The claim to speak on 
behalf of national majorities originated counter-claims made on behalf of national 
minorities, “turning the logic of national representativity on its head” (Wimmer 2008a: 
991). In other words, one cannot exist without the other, and both are the by-products of 
the territorial nation state, whose legitimacy is rooted in most instances in the chimerical 
congruence of political and cultural boundaries. Derek Urwin (1982b: 429) made a 
similar point, arguing that regional and national movements are  the “creatures of the 
national revolution”, which by bringing further administrative centralization and 
cultural standardization, put considerable strain upon existing arrangements and 
encouraged the “organization in the territorial arena of parties for the protection of 
minority or territorial interests.” 
 
For Michael Keating, a ‘stateless nation’ has no independent homeland, whereas a 
‘national minority’ is linked to an external kin-state where its nation-building project is 
established as the dominant one (2001b: 24). Hence according to his typology, 
Catalonia and Scotland belong to the first category whereas ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania or Slovakia are to be considered as national minorities. However, this is 
further complicated by the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Instead, 
they can overlap in more or less tidy ways, shift over time, and in the overwhelming 
                                               
8. Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish constitution formally acknowledged the existence of “historic nationalities”. The 
constitutional court struck down the preamble of the 2006 reform of the Catalan Estatut in which Catalonia was 
defined as a nation in July 2010.  
15 
 
majority of cases be internally as well as externally contested. For instance, the 
German-speaking minority in South-Tyrol was simultaneously placed under the 
protection of Austria until the Autonomy Statute was passed in the 1970s while 
enjoying significant autonomy from the Italian state (Markusse 1997: 79-81). Ethnic 
Hungarians living in Transylvania have interacted with their Hungarian kin-state as well 
as the Romanian host-state, such a constellation being rather the norm than the 
exception in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (Brubaker 1996, 2007). Some have 
pointed out too that a national minority could also refer to a distinct national group 
which finds itself in an inferior position within the state in which it is established 
(Bauböck, 2002: 4), the term ‘minority’ referring here to a power asymmetry rather than 
a demographic reality. But despite their singularities, all these cases have in common 
the fact that a claim of self-determination is made on their behalf by political 
entrepreneurs enjoying significant support among their population. Here, self-
determination shall not be understood as necessarily implying secession, but supposes at 
least that the people should be considered as the subject rather than the object of 
constitutional change (Keating 2009b), which in practice has taken various forms. In 
most instances, this has been translated into a federal-like arrangement combining 
territorial autonomy in the periphery and power-sharing at the centre, according to the 
logic of self-rule and shared-rule (Elazar 1987). Admittedly, agreeing upon a territorial 
boundary has sometimes been a hopeless task, especially in cases where political elites 
make self-determination claims over the same geographical space in the name of two 
groups politically constructed as mutually exclusive, as in Northern Ireland or in 
Israel/Palestine. In some instances, this inherent difficulty has been addressed by the 
introduction of a consociational system, whereby group-representation is guaranteed on 
a non-territorial basis (Lijphart 2004).  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the empirical investigation is limited to two cases – 
Catalonia and Scotland which I shall refer to as ‘stateless nations’ – while bearing in 
mind the numerous difficulties that this entails. The latest constitutional row in 
Catalonia shows how much the national idiom in Spain remains a polarizing issue, 
whereas it is almost unchallenged in Scotland9, given the openly multinational self-
                                               
9. Actually, Scotland is by now usually referred to as a ‘nation’ in the literature (see McCrone 2001, who explains in 
the preface why he dropped the adjective ‘stateless’ in the second edition of his book – Scotland: the Sociology of a 
[stateless] Nation).  
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understanding of the British Union state. This by no means suggests that either one or 
the other can be objectively described as such, nor that they possess immutable 
characteristics that can be observed independently of the broader political context in 
which they operate. But the term stateless nation has an obvious strength, as it supposes 
that what makes them distinct from nation states is not their nationness, but their 
statelessness. In other words, the absence of an independent state is the constitutive 
element of stateless nations, which are no less imagined than nation states, and also 
have their share of “ideological habits which enable them to be reproduced” (Billig 
1995: 6). Referring to them as nations does not necessarily entail reifying them, nor 
overlooking their constructedness, but presents the advantage of dissociating the 
concepts of nations and states that are so enduringly imbricated in the social sciences. 
Furthermore, the object of inquiry can be narrowed down by defining Catalonia and 
Scotland as nations located within plurinational democracies, as opposed to 
multilingual democracies such as Switzerland10, and plurinational autocracies such as 
China. James Tully (2001) defines multinational democracies as contemporary states 
composed of two or more nations where citizens are recognized as full and equal 
members of the political community. In his view, contemporary states such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain constitute good examples of multinational 
democracies. However multinationalism supposes the coexistence of “discreet and 
separate national groupings within a polity” (Keating 2001a: 25), which is empirically 
inaccurate. Hence, the term plurinational is more appropriate to define democracies that 
exhibit three commonalities at institutional, sociological and political levels which have 
far-reaching implications in relation to immigrants and emigrants:  
 
a) Nested institutions. Territorial relations are constitutionally mediated, and the 
arrangement generally comprises territorial autonomy at the periphery and power-
sharing at the centre. As a result, migration-related competences are distributed 
across multiple tiers of government;  
b) Nested identities. More than one national identity can pertain to a single group or 
even an individual, which in consequence may be nested, overlap and shift in more 
or less tidy ways (Keating 2001a: 26). Migrants can have a stake in both political 
communities, in addition to their ties with their home country, thus opening the 
                                               
10. Although Kymlicka sees Switzerland as a multinational state, others would argue that it is rather multilingual and 
multisecular (Kriesi et al. 2008).  
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possibility for them to have multiple national affiliations that are not necessarily 
conflicting with one another;  
c) Nested nation-building projects. The different tiers of government are engaged in 
rival nation-building projects whereby they compete for the hearts and allegiance of 
the same people (Norman 2006). This must be seen as a form of politics, which is 
not necessarily incompatible with liberal democratic norms, but can hardly ever be 
resolved once and for all.   
 
1.1.3. The migration question 
 
 
The transnational paradigm emerged in the 1990s in reaction to the tendency of 
migration students to consider the nation state as a hermetic container of social 
processes, an unproblematic unit of analysis dividing world space into mutually 
exclusive groups, each distinguished by a unique culture, internally bounded by mutual 
solidarities and sharing a common identity (Glick-Schiller et al. 200211). In the 
transnational light, international migrations are no longer a perennial phenomenon 
destroying the putative congruence between nations and states. Instead, they ought to be 
considered as a recent political construction, which gained currency when modern 
nationalizing states started to police their borders and issue passports separating the 
national wheat from the alien chaff. By doing so, states acquired a monopoly over “the 
legitimate ‘means of movement’, particularly though by no means exclusively across 
international boundaries” (Torpey 1999: 4). Similarly, Adrian Favell observed that “the 
very process by which collectivities manage movers by naming and counting them, and 
thereby distinguishing them from non-movers or residents, is the fundamental way in 
which the territorial nation-state society constitutes itself in the first place” (Favell 
2006: 271). These assertions invite us to rethink the conceptual differences between 
‘immigrants’, ‘emigrants’ and ‘migrants’. While seen from Mars international and 
internal migrations are indistinguishable, the difference between them can only be 
understood in the context of an international order predominantly made of territorial 
nation states recognizing the borders separating one another as meaningful. According 
to the definition adopted by the United Nations Population Division (UNPD), 
                                               
11. For an insightful account of the enduring legacy of Herder’s social ontology in contemporary immigration 
research, see Andreas Wimmer (2009).  
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individuals who cross an international border and remain in a country other than the one 
in which they were born for a period of at least twelve months belong to the category of 
international migrants. The term emigrant embraces the perspective of the sending 
country, and immigrant, that of the country of destination. This comes as no surprise 
from an organization based from its very conception on “the sovereign equality of all its 
members.”12 However, these space and time criteria are far from being universally 
applied, and the considerable variations that can be found across states – which by the 
way makes their systematic comparison all the more difficult – also illustrate the 
contingent nature of these categories as well as their intimate relationship with nation-
building processes. By contrast, references to internal migrants are virtually never 
preceded with the Latin prefix in nor ex, suggesting that they are neither entering, nor 
exiting. If their mobility is not aimless, the very fact that they do not cross an 
international border, although they may sometimes travel very long distances within the 
confines of the state, draws a sharp conceptual line between them and their international 
peers. Accordingly, the transfer across jurisdiction is the ‘constitutive element’ of 
international migration, distinguishing it from migration, the mobility of citizens within 
the boundaries of an established state (Zolberg 2006a: 64). According to UNPD 
estimates, there were 214 million international migrants in 2009, a figure which pales in 
comparison with the 740 million internal movers who, because they have resettled 
within the boundaries of the state in which they were born, are largely ignored (Withol 
de Wenden 2010: Chapter 1). Hence, Castles and Miller (2003) were perhaps right to 
describe the beginning of the new millennium as the ‘Age of Migration’, although their 
assertion would have certainly gained considerable strength were it not limited to the 
admittedly more spectacular movement of people across sovereign states.  
 
The distinction between these categories is not always clear, and shifts over time 
according to changes in the configuration of political boundaries. Hence, French 
emigrants to Algeria13 at the time of colonization were regarded from the perspective of 
the colonial power as internal migrants, citizens relocating from one administrative 
division to another and entitled to an identical bundle of rights. However, this changed 
dramatically with the independence of Algeria in 1962, when citizens/settlers turned 
                                               
12. 1945 Charter of the United Nations, art. 2.1.  
13. French emigration to Algeria accelerated in the 1880s. When Algeria gained its independence in 1962, a million 
pieds-noirs were “repatriated” to the métropole in a matter of weeks.   
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into unwanted aliens and were subsequently expelled. Similarly, Commonwealth 
citizens until 1962 shared many similarities with intra-state movers, enjoying the right 
of free mobility and entitled to vote and stand for elections in the United Kingdom on 
the basis of residency. Likewise, the free mobility of EU citizens across member states 
enshrined in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the gradual equalization of citizenship 
rights encouraged some to interpret intra-EU mobility as a form of internal migration, a 
politically unrecognized and invisible act (Recchi et al. 2009). However, the ‘Polish 
plumber’ controversy in France and the Netherlands that contributed to the large 
popular rejection of the Constitution in 2005 made the fragilities of European 
citizenship all the more apparent (Aarts et al. 2006). Migrants themselves possess 
meaningful agency, and are able to make strategic use of these categories to advance 
their aims: Commonwealth citizens have stressed their emotional attachment to a 
common political community, the former British Empire, in order to differentiate 
themselves from mere aliens (Modood 2008). On the other hand, EU-citizens can 
invoke their Europeanness to mark their distance from Third-Country Nationals (TCN), 
while pieds-noirs were to some extent able to negotiate the terms of their return with the 
French state on the basis of their legal status, as well as their ethnicity.  
 
Ultimately, one can question the relevance of such categories in a plurinational context, 
wherein individuals can cross an inter-national border while remaining within the same 
state. As the meaning and hierarchical order of jurisdictional boundaries are essentially 
contested, the transfer of jurisdiction that is the constitutive element of international 
migration is itself problematic. In Catalonia, immigrants from the rest of the Spanish  
state have since the late nineteenth century been constructed as ‘immigrants’, and are 
since the 1980s counted in official statistics as ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’14. In 
Scotland, the large settlement of Irish-born British subjects in the nineteenth century 
occurred prior to the independence of Ireland in 1922. While they were formally 
internal migrants, this did not prevent them from being constructed as the significant 
other and provoking fears about the potential ‘Irishisation’ of Scotland. On the other 
hand, Italian citizens from the South relocating to the North have been stigmatized as 
‘terroni’ and socially constructed as aliens, a phenomenon which has been politically 
exploited by the Lega Nord. The Belgian case provides the most compelling example. 
                                               
14. IDESCAT. The official category in Catalan is ‘Immigrants procedent de la resta d'Espanya’. 
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The presence of Francophones in the electoral district of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde – the 
last remnant of bilingual Belgium since the 1962 fixation of linguistic borders, 
comprising the 19 communes of Brussels-Capital and 35 communes of the Flemish 
Brabant – has become the recurring target of Dutch-speaking parties. The crisis reached 
a momentum in 2007, when all Dutch-speaking MPs but the Greens  voted in favour of 
a bill opening the way for the split of the electoral district in order to prevent further 
immigration of Francophones and impose the exclusive use of the Dutch language 
(Sinardet 2010: 347). Eventually, the vote provoked enormous turmoil and precipitated 
the country into a political crisis that at the time of writing shows no sign of 
improvement15.  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, immigrants and emigrants shall be defined 
contextually, retracing how they are being constructed as categories of practice, 
discursively articulated and institutionally entrenched in the Catalan and Scottish 
political arenas. These categories, far from being immutable, are subject to constant 
contestations, can be imposed or propagated more or less forcefully, and shift at specific 
critical junctures. However, their constructedness does not make them less real, as they 
are embedded in social institutions that have far-reaching implications for those who are 
thus categorized.   
 
1.2.  The puzzle: the territorial politics of migration 
 
 
In the previous section, I argued that stateless nations, immigrants and emigrants can 
best be understood as categories of political practice embedded in relatively stable 
social and political institutions. On the one hand, minority nationalists claim to speak on 
behalf of territories and groups which do not coincide with state boundaries and 
populations. On the other hand, international migrations create a mismatch between 
territorial and membership boundaries, whereby states find themselves with a 
significant proportion of aliens within their frontiers, and of citizens abroad. However, 
                                               
15. In the Yugoslav federation, internal migrants retained the citizenship of the Republic in which they were born 
while they were entitled to the same citizenship rights as natives when taking up residence, an institutional 
arrangement that proved particularly harmful when the need came for newly-independent states to define the 
boundaries of their citizenry. 
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they do not only represent parallel challenges to the nation state, but also intersect: 
indeed, minority nationalists formulate their claims on behalf of a people whose 
homeland is crossed by individuals migrating to and from the rest of the state and 
beyond. 
 
1.2.1. The root causes of migration: a territorial politics perspective 
 
 
The extraordinary set of factors encouraging individuals to move away from their 
family and community and settle down in an alien land in search of a hypothetical 
improvement of their living conditions have been identified and discussed within a 
variety of disciplines. Once combined, they provide a reasonably exhaustive framework 
for understanding the driving forces of international and, although it is rarely 
acknowledged, internal migrations. The ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors theory derived from 
neo-classical economics stresses that people seek to improve their economic well-being 
by selling their labour in markets in which demand and wages are higher. In the long-
run, this provokes a better allocation of resources between capital and labour, thus 
improving market efficiency in both areas of origin and destination. Shifting the unit of 
analysis away from the individual to the household level, some have emphasized how 
families use migration as an instrument of risk management (Stark et al. 1985). By 
diversifying their means of subsistence, members of a single household residing in 
locations where welfare provision is almost non-existent enhance their capacity to cope 
with risks and overcome market failures. It complements the previous one by adding a 
twist to the rational motivation of actors who no longer operate individually, but as a 
group bounded together by kin ties. Focusing exclusively on economic conditions in the 
area of destination, other authors have examined the changing nature of the labour 
market in post-industrial societies. As native populations in advanced economies are 
increasingly educated, they are no longer willing to accept poorly-paid low-skilled jobs, 
which subsequently lead to a bifurcation of the labour market (Piore 1971). Against the 
popular orthodoxy, it suggests that migrants do not compete with native workers but 
complement their activity, to the benefit of all. A more controversial paradigm is 
derived from Wallerstein’s World System Theory (1974), according to which the 
modern world system is a product of the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe 
and its diffusion to the rest of the world. Here, the rapid penetration of the market 
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economy in pre-market societies put considerable strain upon existing social and 
economic arrangements, and created a precarious population of workers who have no 
other option but to move to earn an income. Lastly, social network theory indicates that 
once a migration pattern is initiated between one location and another, the consolidation 
of migrant networks creates a phenomenon of chain migration that tends to be self-
perpetuating (Waldorf 1996, Palloni et al. 2001). Instead of accounting for the initial 
phase of migration, it explains why flows are sustained through time, relatively 
independent of market conditions. These additions to the neo-classical paradigm suggest 
that migration is not solely the product of an economic mechanism driven by relative 
inequalities among territories, originating extensive movements of labour from deprived 
areas to others that are economically better endowed (Massey et al. 2006/1998). Indeed, 
the persistence of emigration flows after countries have reached a reasonable level of 
development, as reflected in the large number of Western-European and North-
American citizens still seizing their right to ‘exit’ militates against such a parsimonious 
account emptied of social, political and cultural considerations.  
 
While these theories point to different causal relations to explain human mobility, they 
can equally shed light on the driving forces of international and internal migration16. 
Each of them acknowledges that human mobility, whether individuals trespass an 
international border or not, is not only caused by factors operating across countries, but 
also within them. Labour migrations from the Scottish Highlands to the Lowlands in the 
nineteenth century were part of a broader household strategy, and remain so in 
contemporary Senegal, where internal mobility from rural areas to the Dakar region is 
used as a means to mitigate crop risk (Sakho et al. 2010). The protracted migration of 
Bretons to Paris in the twentieth century has not only been driven by economic push and 
pull factors, but also by the strengths of social networks located in the capital city. They 
were first limited to families and friends, and later increasingly institutionalized and 
encompassing the broader imagined community of Bretons, whose bonds were no 
longer built upon face-to-face interactions but on a common geographical origin (Prado 
1980).  Patterns of internal migration were incorporated into Michael Hechter’s ‘internal 
colonialism’ interpretation of British national development (1975) to highlight how the 
English core presumably developed itself at the expense of the Celtic fringe, whereby 
                                               
16. E.G. Ravenstein (1889), in one of the first systematic scientific attempt to uncover the ‘the Laws of Migration’, did 
not distinguish internal and international flows but assumed that they obeyed the same rules.  
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the survival of ethnic distinctiveness among internal migrants is said to rest upon a 
cultural division of labour. The bifurcation of the labour market in large cities has also 
attracted internal migrants from economically ailing regions willing to accept poorly-
paid jobs natives no longer want to do, as the case of enduring Italian South-North 
migration illustrate.  
 
My purpose here is not to give a definitive answer as to which theory best explains 
human mobility, a task that falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I merely 
contend that the multiple root causes of human mobility identified in the literature do 
not operate only across countries but also within them and transcend state borders. In 
accordance with Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller’s (2002) path-breaking 
critique of methodological nationalism in the social sciences, it seems that the analytical 
divide between internal and international migrants is more the consequence of an 
epistemic bias than a substantial distinction. They compellingly show how the 
assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the 
modern world has had a considerable influence on migration scholarship. Hence, they 
conclude that the study of transnational communities offers a promising avenue to 
overcome the self-imposed analytical limits of methodological nationalism. Whilst I 
share their diagnosis, their remedy is also coloured with questionable assumptions and 
leaves room for alternative approaches. At least since the turn of the century, adopting a 
transnational perspective has almost become a pre-requisite for those seeking to join the 
ever-expanding circle of migration studies. Whilst this greatly contributed to the 
revision of established paradigms and the exploration of unknown areas, its original 
purpose of challenging the nation state as the main unit of analysis has been only 
partially met. Paradoxically, it may even have reinforced its predominance, as the very 
term ‘transnationalism’ suggests that nations and states are coterminous units, 
“neglecting the numerous distinctive forms of territorial communities within and across 
state boundaries” (Jeffery et al. 2010: 173, my emphasis). By locating migration flows 
within a transnational context, sociologists have been able to cast a new light on 
‘transnational social spaces’, the circular flow of persons, goods, information and 
symbols across countries that have been triggered in the course of international 
migrations (Portes 2000, Faist 2009). Political scientists sought to interpret countries’ 
responses beyond domestic idiosyncrasies by examining the incidence of supranational 
institutions (Soysal 1994, Sassen 1996, Sassen 2006) and countries of origin on 
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migration-related policy-making in destination countries17. However, while the 
approach successfully sheds light on trans-state economic, cultural and political 
practices connecting migrants and featuring institutions spanning countries, it has little 
to say about what happens within the state, nor how other forms of territorial 
community have apprehended migration flows and their consequences.  
 
To be fair, this statement is only partially true. In particular, the burgeoning literature on 
migration politics at the local level has successfully moved away from a state-centric 
perspective and showed how cities, as the main recipients of international and internal 
flows and operating in an increasingly globalized environment, have found innovative 
ways of addressing the consequences of immigration. (Ireland 1994, Rogers & Tillie 
2001, Penninx 2010). Besides, in recent years there has been a growing interest in trans-
local studies of migration, examining how emigrants played a prominent role in local 
politics both in their city of origin and residence (Østergaard-Nielsen 2011, Robert 
Smith 1998, 2008). However, much less attention has been given to meso-level 
governments, in spite of the fact that they have increasingly turned into prominent loci 
of authority and political arenas at least since the 1970s (Jeffery 2008). This is even 
more so in plurinational democracies where decentralization processes have not only 
been driven from the top18, but also from the bottom in the wake of the resurgence of 
nationalist movements.  
 
1.2.2. The territorial politics of migration 
 
 
To date, research examining the intersection of territorial politics and migration politics 
is still scarce. I intend to fill this gap in the literature by uncovering what I call the 
territorial politics of migration, which in its broadest sense refers to the consequences 
                                               
17. Rainer Bauböck (2003: 702) rightly argued that political transnationalism is not “only about direct or indirect 
participation in sending states from outside their borders, but also about the impact of migrants’ external political ties 
on the political institutions of the host country.” In many respects, Sassen and Soysal are rather internationalist than 
transnationalist scholars per se. Nevertheless, Sassen’s impressive historical inquiry into the interaction between 
territory, authority and rights betrays her inclination towards a transnational approach (2006).  
18. Charlie Jeffery explains how the highly centralized states that emerged after World War II were encouraged to 
strengthen, and at times create, meso-level governments on rationalist grounds, in order to cope with the emergence 
of new functions addressing new needs. This occurred against the background of a paradigmatic shift from neo-
Keynesianism to neo-liberalism, and in a broader context of increasingly scarce resources (2008-547).   
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of human mobility on how politics are organized and fought out across territory19. 
Whilst this research agenda can be expanded to all kinds of meso-level governments, 
the scope of this dissertation is limited to cases of stateless nations as defined in the 
previous section. It proceeds from the observation that political entrepreneurs making 
claims upon the centre on behalf of a people and a homeland which do not coincide with 
state and national boundaries have had to cope with the fact that a varying proportion of 
those who were born there have left to and of those who reside there have come from the 
rest of the state and beyond.  
 
Adopting a territorial lens challenges a pervasive assumption of most of the state-centric 
literature, which cannot be fully overcome by embracing a transnational perspective. 
The volume and composition of migrant stocks are not only unevenly distributed across 
states, but also within them, a phenomenon which can only be understood in the light of 
their respective territorial structuring resulting from historical processes of state-
formation and nation-building. Uneven spatial patterns of human mobility across a 
single state place considerable cultural and economic strain upon existing territorial 
arrangements, and have been an enduring political concern at the centre, in the 
periphery, and in their mutual interactions. However, while this is an important concern, 
it is certainly not the main one. Indeed, minority nationalism is a phenomenon that 
erupts, evolves, gains, or loses significance over time for a variety of reasons that are 
relatively independent of migration flows. It is therefore essential to distinguish between 
what nationalists want and what they do to get it, and their attitude towards immigrants 
and emigrants; between the territorial politics of nation-building, and the politics of 
boundary-making. On the one hand, I define nation-building as the process through 
which political entrepreneurs seek to create, maintain and expand a stable structure of 
power over a territory and a population. The territorial politics of nation-building refers 
to the way in which two or more nation-building projects interlocked within the same 
state interact with one another. Although it has significant administrative, cultural and 
economic ramifications, the phenomenon is essentially political. On the other hand, the 
politics of boundary-making designates the phenomenon through which political 
entrepreneurs respond to migration flows and their consequences by discursively 
articulating and institutionally entrenching a boundary between members and non-
                                               
19. Here, I am building on Tarrow’s definition of territorial politics which does “not intend to analyze politics about 
territory but rather politics about other issues that are fought out across territory” (1978: 1, underlined in the original).  
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members. My contention is that elite attitudes towards immigrants and emigrants is to a 
considerable extent conditioned by interests that far exceed migration-related issues, 
and yet have a profound impact on how they are being perceived and addressed. 
Henceforth my purpose is not to examine how patterns of boundary-making constitute 
in themselves an instrument of nation-building, but rather to explore how and the extent 
to which they are being organized and fought out within broader patterns of nation-
building. In the remainder of this chapter, I further unpack the concepts mentioned 
above by proceeding in two stages. First I examine the politics of boundary-making in 
relation to immigrants and emigrants, and introduce a heuristic tool distinguishing 
between territorializing and ethnicizing boundary-making strategies. I then establish an 
explanatory framework specifying a main hypothesis and identifying dimensions of the 
territorial environment that contribute to shape nationalist attitudes towards immigrants 
and emigrants.  
 
1.3.  The making and unmaking of political boundaries 
 
 
1.3.1. Civic or ethnic?: between ambiguities and normative bias 
 
 
Students of nationalism have long sought to distinguish nations and varieties of 
nationalism according to their terms of membership. While some typologies are 
extremely elaborate20, the most popular distinctions have tended to be binary and 
dichotomous and overlap to a great extent (Brubaker 1999: 133). The one that has 
received most attention and resonates the most within and beyond academic circles 
today is that first introduced by German intellectuals in the nineteenth century and then 
popularized by Hans Kohn in a lengthy book published shortly before the end of World 
War II, in which he draws a line between ethnic and civic kinds of nationalism. He 
opposed Western nationalism, derived from “a rational and universal concept of 
political liberty and the rights of man, looking towards the city of the future”, to the 
evils of Eastern nationalism, “basically founded on history, on monuments and 
graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and tribal solidarity” 
                                               
20. See for instance A.D. Smith who classified nationalism by the formal criteria of ‘intensity’ and ‘achievement’ and 
the substantive criteria of ‘independence’ and ‘distinctiveness’, leading to a framework of 39 types for which he 
found corresponding historical examples (A.D. Smith, 1986) 
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(Kohn 1944: 574). This distinction has inspired a variety of seminal studies, (Brubaker 
1992, Ignatieff 1993, Keating 2001a, Greenfeld 1992), and contributed to making the 
discipline more widely intelligible beyond the limited circles of pundits. Whilst its 
simplicity has made it a very appealing tool for conceptualizing the Janus-like faces of 
nationalism (Nairn 1997), it came under such criticism that some have suggested 
abandoning it altogether (Kuzio 2002, Brubaker 1999, Yacks 1996). However, pointing 
at its limits proved to be an easier task than finding a coherent and consensual 
substitute21. Kohn’s original distinction between Eastern and Western kinds of 
nationalism, the former then encompassing Germany, seemed particularly questionable 
and is no longer used22. It became increasingly consensual among scholars to avoid 
seeing these categories as mutually exclusive but to conceive of them as two ends of a 
continuum in constant flux, with culture falling somewhere in between and leaving a 
broad scope for context-specific interpretation (Kymlicka 2001). As Anthony Smith put 
it, “no nation, no nationalism, can be seen as purely the one or the other, even if at 
certain moments one or other of these elements predominates in the ensemble of 
components of national identity” (Smith 2000: 25). One important issue, however, is to 
discern whether it is meant to be an analytical instrument empirically differentiating 
terms of national membership across space and time, a normative tool distinguishing 
good and bad varieties of nationalism, or a category of practice enabling self-
proclaimed civic nationalists to pursue their varied aims in a normative space leaving no 
room for outright ethnic claims.  
 
After World War II, modernization theory assumed that nation states were the product 
of the gradual emergence of a common market, the diffusion of a common culture, and 
the consolidation of nationally-based political parties mediating electoral competition 
across the totality of their territories23. They were then able to develop and sustain plural 
and civic institutions that are essential to the functioning of complex societies (Sartori 
1997). There may have been some revolts in the periphery during a transition period 
                                               
21. For instance, Brubaker (1999) skillfully draws the lists of its pitfalls, but then fail to propose a useful alternative. 
His suggestion to substitute it by  distinguishing between ‘state-framed’ and ‘state-seeking nationalism’ brings further 
confusion to the existing literature, especially as minority nationalists do not necessarily seek to establish a state of 
their own (Keating 2001b).  
22. For Kuzio (2002) Kohn’s framework disregards any anti-democratic forms of nationalist ideology that have 
existed in the West, and carefully avoids cases that contradict his argument in the East, such as Czechoslovakia in the 
inter-war years. 
23. Karl Deutsch (1966), writing two years before the 1968 student protests, came close to this conclusion. Giovanni 
Sartori (1997) attributes the development of civic institutions in European states to the gradual acceptance of 
toleration in the aftermath of the wars of religion.  
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but, ultimately, integrative forces won out and made political, cultural and economic 
boundaries congruent, diffusing the liberal ideas of the centre to the deep end of its 
territory until it met the resistance of another centre. Rokkan saw the advent of mass 
democracy in respective Western European states as closely intertwined with 
concomitant processes of state-formation and nation-building, which, by limiting exit 
options and channelling voices inward, facilitated the development of territorially 
homogeneous democratic institutions (Rokkan 1999). But the resurgence of peripheral 
nationalism in the 1960s forced the scholarly community to rethink the underlying 
assumptions of modernization theory. Rokkan and Urwin argued that the reactivation of 
territorial identities within European states marked an unfreezing of cleavage structures 
and “shook to the core the concept, held for much of the twentieth century, of the nation 
state as the norm for territorial organization” (1982: 3).24 It appeared that some 
peripheries had made their way into modernity while conserving some cultural markers 
and a subjective sense of territorial distinctiveness. Although movements exploiting 
these differences for a political purpose challenged the legitimacy of existing states, 
there was prima facie no reason to qualify them as fundamentally ethnic. The Italian 
Lega Nord provides one of the most compelling examples of the limits and 
contradictions of equating the existence of civic institutions with a civic kind of 
nationalism. Indeed, against the common orthodoxy, the most virulent and successful 
anti-immigrant political party in post-1945 Italy has not erupted in the South, where 
“regions are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and 
isolation, and a culture of distrust” (Putnam et al. 1994: 15). Instead, the movement was 
engendered and gained prominence in Lombardy, a region “blessed with vibrant 
networks and norms of civic engagement” (ibid.), the origin of which, according to 
Robert Putnam, can be traced as far back as the Middle-Ages.  
 
Ultimately, it seems that disregarding minority nationalism as a remnant from the past 
or extolling it as a legitimate reaction to an oppressive and impersonal state bureaucracy 
has too often been driven by normative inclinations rather than empirically informed 
analysis. For Celia Applegate (1999: 5), “the devaluation of regions and their pasts […] 
emerged naturally alongside the triumph of the national historiographies”, and drew on 
                                               
24. For Rokkan, “the great wave of reaction against the anonymity of modern urban society that began in the 1960s 
found many alternative forms of expression: in the call for a return to the local community, in the cult of smallness, in 
the ecological nostalgia for simpler forms of life, and also in the accentuation of origins, dialects, distinctiveness.” 
(Peter Flora et al. 1999: 206). 
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“a rich vocabulary – common to all European bourgeois elites since the Enlightenment 
– stigmatizing the provincial, the particular, the parochial.”25 Thomas Franck (1997: 
153), for instance, disqualified all forms of minority nationalism as ‘tribal romanticism’, 
an anachronistic resurgence of ethnic particularisms that cannot be reconciled with the 
challenges facing modern societies. Conversely, some have taken at face value the 
claims of minority nationalists who, in order to gain legitimacy, have adapted their 
discourse in accordance with the changing winds of international norms. In the inter-
war years, most legitimized their claims on ethnonational grounds, in line with the 
dominant paradigm of the time. By contrast, in the wake of decolonization, many 
embraced a colonial frame, drawing a parallel between their experiences of subjugation 
within long-established states with that of colonized peoples (Laffont 1968). In the 
1980s, the secular dream of a ‘Europe of the People’ was resurrected against the 
backdrop of rapid European integration by those who wanted to enhance the role of 
meso-level governments in a changing continent coming to terms with the evils of state-
framed hostile nationalism. Ultimately, while acknowledging that nationalism is an 
essentially normative phenomenon, the civic/ethnic distinction fails to draw a clear line 
between its empirical manifestations and the normative challenges they raise.  
 
1.3.2. A more promising avenue: the boundary-making approach 
 
 
The boundary-making paradigm proceeds from the premise that national boundaries are 
primarily social and political constructions cast along lines that are perceived as relevant 
and acquire political salience, and yet do not constitute the sum of all objective cultural 
differences than can be observed from the outside (Zolberg et al. 1999).  
 
Ernest Renan argued long ago that selective readings of the past were an essential 
component of how national consciousness arises and is sustained through time. In his 
view, the progress made in historical studies, a comment made in the 1880s, the high 
point of nationalist historiographies in Europe, endangered the very fabric of the 
national community by shedding light on atrocities committed by ancestors and turning 
                                               
25. Of course, minority nationalists are usually eager to distinguish themselves from regionalists, who make no claims 
to self-determination. However, the virtual impossibility of agreeing on a common idiom to define the phenomenon, 
as well as the vacillation of some movements that alternately label themselves as one or the other – such as in 
Flanders or Brittany – shows how thin the line between the two is, especially when seen from the government 
chambers of European capitals. 
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past glories into collective shames. But if nation-building still requires today as much 
collective amnesia as remembrance, it also relies heavily on a highly questionable 
sociological understanding of the present, neglecting the inherent complexity of the 
social world and the plurality of experiences of individuals who together make up a 
political community. To put it more bluntly, political entrepreneurs need bad sociology 
as much as they need bad history, insofar as political boundaries are made and remade 
on the basis of reification processes that do not stand up to any reasonably thorough 
sociological inquiry. Elite discourses are predominantly meant to serve a political 
purpose by confining immigrants and emigrants into narrow categories that hardly 
account for complex sociological phenomena. 
 
Rogers Brubaker (2004) warned against the danger of treating nations as internally 
homogeneous and externally hermetic groups, as real entities to which common 
interests and purposes can be attributed. To be sure, this fallacy is never as pronounced 
as in the mouths of nationalists themselves, and protagonists tend to internalize these 
categories as essential and natural givens of their environment, over which they can 
disagree without ever being entirely able to escape their cognitive influence. But 
scholars working in the field should neither downgrade the significance of this 
phenomenon as a mere nationalist folklore on the grounds that nations are de facto 
socially and politically constructed, nor embrace it as an unproblematic unit of analysis. 
Rather it should be apprehended as a fundamental feature of the way nations work, as 
opposed to what nations are. Although this reification process may be little more than a 
subtle stratagem that cannot stand up to objective sociological or historical analysis, it 
should nonetheless be taken seriously, as “it is central to the practice of politicized 
ethnicity” (ibid. 66, original emphasis). The study of the making and unmaking of 
political boundaries can be approached in one of two ways: from below, by examining 
“the ways in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade, or transform 
the categories that are imposed on them”, or from above, by scrutinizing the ways in 
which political boundaries are “proposed, propagated, imposed, institutionalized, 
discursively articulated, organizationally entrenched, etc…(ibid: 38)” While not 
downgrading the academic value of observing the phenomenon from below, this 
dissertation is primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with elites and the way political 
boundaries in relation to immigrants and emigrants are being discursively articulated 
and institutionally entrenched. Admittedly, in today’s complex democracies, the power 
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to influence people’s beliefs and self-conceptions in any sense is much more atomized 
and decentralised than ever before (Norman 2006). Consequently, the capacity of 
political elites to unilaterally shape political boundaries has considerably diminished. 
However, there is little doubt that because their power relation with the population on 
whose behalf they speak is highly asymmetric, they are left with considerable scope to 
shape, influence and transform senses of nationhood. While the underlying mechanism 
of boundary-making is strikingly similar across space and time, they can serve 
diametrically-opposed purposes, alternately seeking to expand, retract, or blur the 
membership boundary in relation to immigrants and emigrants. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I distinguish two forms of boundary-making strategies26: territorializing 
and ethnicizing. These non-mutually exclusive ideal-types correspond to two ways of 
(re)constructing a people in response to the incongruence of territorial and membership 
boundaries resulting from migration flows. 
 
1.3.3. Boundary-making strategies: territorializing and ethnicizing 
 
 
This section elaborates a typology of strategies of boundary-making in relation to 
immigrants and emigrants building extensively on previous works by Bauböck et al. 
(1998), Zolberg et al. (1999) and Wimmer (2007, 2008a,b).  
 
In relation to those who came:  
 
a) Expanding the boundary consists in creating a more encompassing boundary 
including immigrants and their descendants. This can be achieved by making the gate to 
citizenship easier to cross for foreign-born residents and equalizing the rights of foreign 
nationals with that of citizens. 
 
b) Contracting the boundary consists in narrowing down the pool of eligible members 
by drawing a sharper line between natives and immigrants. This can be achieved by 
downgrading the rights of foreign residents and strengthening the rules of acquisition of 
citizenship. 
                                               
26. These two ideal-types far from exhaust all the possibilities, and are merely meant to address the purpose of the 
dissertation. For an exhaustive list of boundary-making strategies, see Wimmer (2008b: 1025:1055).  
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c) Blurring the boundary consists in reducing the salience of the boundary between 
natives and immigrants by overcoming ethnicity as the dominant form of categorization 
(Wimmer 2008: 989), or by tolerating multiple affiliations “hitherto thought to be 
separate and mutually exclusive” (Zolberg et al. 1999: 21). This can be achieved by 
appealing to another form of classification, such as class or residency, or by 
institutionalizing immigration-induced pluralism and recognizing multiple affiliations as 
a legitimate form of full and equal membership in the political community. 
 
A territorializing boundary-making strategy consists in blurring ethnic boundaries 
within the homeland and expanding the membership boundary to immigrants and their 
descendants. Conversely, an ethnicizing boundary-building strategy consists in 
contracting the membership boundary, mechanically excluding foreign-born residents 
and their descendants.  
 
In relation to those who left: 
 
a) Expanding the boundary consists in creating a more encompassing boundary 
including emigrants and their descendants. This can be achieved by upgrading the rights 
of non-resident citizens or modifying the rules of acquisition of citizenship by 
reinforcing jus sanguinis provisions.  
 
b) Contracting the boundary consists in narrowing down the pool of eligible members 
by drawing a sharper line between internal and external citizens. This can be achieved 
by excluding non-resident citizens from the electoral franchise or weakening jus 
sanguinis provisions in order to limit the right of expatriates to pass their citizenship 
over to their descendants.   
 
 
c) Blurring the boundary consists in reducing the political salience of the ethnic bonds 
and ties with emigrants and their descendants by overcoming ethnicity as the dominant 
form of categorization or tolerating multiple affiliations. This can be achieved by 
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appealing to another form of classification such as class or residence, or by encouraging 
emigrants’ full incorporation in the host country. 
 
A territorializing boundary-building strategy consists in blurring and ultimately 
contracting the membership boundary in relation to emigrants and their descendants. 
Conversely, an ethnicizing boundary-building strategy consists in expanding the 
membership boundary to expatriates and/or their descendants, on the basis of a putative 
shared ethnicity. 
 
The tables below illustrate the different boundary-making strategies along the four units 
of analysis to which I apply the conceptual and explanatory framework by contrasting 
the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. The list is far from being exhaustive and the 
examples can in many ways be challenged and contradicted. However, they are merely 
meant to provide the reader with a general idea of boundary-making strategies and their 
empirical manifestations. 
  
 
Table 1: Examples of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants 
 
 
Boundary-
making 
Strategies 
Boundary blurring  
 
Boundary contraction 
 
Boundary expansion 
 
Prior to Self-
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
Legitimizing claims for self-
determination on other grounds 
than putative national differences, 
such as democratic aspirations.  
 
 
E.g.: intimate link made between 
the struggle for political autonomy 
and anti-Francoism in 1970s 
Catalonia. 
 
 
 
Promoting a narrow category of 
membership de facto excluding 
significant sections of the 
foreign-born resident population.  
 
 
E.g.: Rising antagonism between 
recently-settled ethnic Arabs and 
Sahraouian in Western Sahara.  
 
 
 
Promoting a more encompassing 
category of membership – such as 
territory – and seeking support 
among foreign-born residents.  
 
 
E.g.: The shift from a discourse 
emphasizing ethnic descent to one 
emphasizing residence as the main 
criterion of national membership in 
the Basque Country in the 1970s. 
 
Immigration 
Policies 
 
 
 
 
Selecting immigrants according to 
another form of classification such 
as skills and socio-economic status. 
 
 E.g.: the current Canadian points-
based system giving prominence to 
skills and linguistic criteria. 
 
 
Selecting immigrants on the 
basis on cultural/ racial/ ethnic/ 
religious affinities.  
 
E.g.: the "White Australia 
Policy" discriminating against 
Asian and Black immigrants 
until 1969. 
 
Emptying the immigration 
legislation of ethnic and cultural 
criteria.  
 
E.g.: In the US, abrogation in 1964 
of the Asian Exclusion Act adopted 
in 1924. 
 
 
Immigrant 
Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appealing to another form of 
classification transcending ethnic 
boundaries such as socio-economic 
considerations or individuals' equal 
moral worth. This can also be 
achieved through state-promoted 
multicultural policies.  
 
E.g. The 2008 reform of the points-
based system in Britain that gives 
privileged access to nationality for 
highly-skilled and skilled migrants 
and introduces fast-track access to 
those who can justify having been 
engaged in "community work". 
 
 
 
Downgrading the rights of 
foreign residents and making the 
gate to full membership harder to 
penetrate. 
 
 
 
 
E.g.: The proliferation of an 
ever-more demanding ‘path to 
citizenship’ in Europe, Denmark 
and the Netherlands being the 
most striking examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
Expanding the boundary of the 
citizenry to foreign-born residents 
(formal equality). 
  
 
 
 
 
E.g.: Gradual loosening of the rules 
of naturalization for resident aliens 
in Germany, culminating in 2000; 
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Table 2: Examples of boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants 
 
 
Boundary-  
building 
Strategies 
Boundary blurring  
 
Boundary contraction 
  
Boundary expansion 
 
 
 
 
Prior to Self-
government 
 
 
 
 
 
Emphasizing residence as the 
main criterion of membership 
 
 
 
E.g.: the gradual loosening of 
ties between French Canadian 
associations and Québécois 
nationalists in the 1960s.  
 
 
 
 
Deliberately pushing aside diaspora 
and transnational organizations 
from the national movement.  
 
 
E.g.: Repeated attempts by 
moderate nationalists in Northern 
Ireland to insulate homeland politics 
from the influence of members of 
the diaspora settled in the USA.  
 
 
 
 
Seeking political and economic 
support among expatriates and their 
descendants.  
 
 
E.g.: the reactivation of the ethnic 
Albanian Kosovo diaspora from the 
1999 War to the independence of 
Kosovo in 2008.   
 
 
 
 
Immigration 
Policies 
 
 
 
 
Selecting immigrants 
according to non-ethnic 
criteria.  
 
E.g.: The Swedish government 
policy in the 1990s taking in a 
relatively large number of 
asylum seekers and refugees 
on humanitarian grounds.  
 
Reforming immigration policies so 
that co-ethnics no longer enjoy a 
privileged right to abode. 
 
E.g.: the introduction of visa 
requirements for Latin American 
nationals in Spain in 2005.  
 
 
 
 
Privileging right of entry for ‘co-
ethnics’. 
 
 
E.g: The Israeli  Law of return for 
individuals who can justify having 
at least one Jewish grand-parent to 
‘return’ and be entitled to financial 
and logistical assistance. 
 
Emigrant 
 Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Providing a fast-track access 
to citizenship for categories of 
applicants who do not fall into 
the co-ethnic category.  
 
 
E.g.: Fast-track acquisition of 
Spanish citizenship for 
refugees and victims of 
persecution (5 years of 
residence instead of ten). 
 
 
 
 
 
Curtailing the citizenship rights of 
non-resident citizens; tightening up 
jus sanguinis provisions in the 
nationality code; 
 
 
 E.g.: Gradual abrogation of 
preferential access to nationality in 
Germany for Aussiedler throughout 
the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening jus sanguinis 
provisions in the nationality code, 
upgrading the rights of non-resident 
citizens,  
 
 
E.g. Creation of the Italian ministry 
for Italians abroad and extension of 
electoral suffrage to non-resident 
Italian citizens in 2001 ; the Spanish 
‘Historical Memory Act’ extending 
citizenship to emigrants and their 
descendants up to the third 
generation.  
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1.4. Explanatory framework 
 
 
This section introduces a theoretical framework determining which strategies of 
boundary-making nationalists are more likely to adopt. The main hypothesis states that 
nationalists seeking control over a territory have a vested interest in expanding the 
membership boundary to immigrants while contracting it towards emigrants as they 
will, by doing so, increase their internal and external legitimacy. While the main 
hypothesis emphasizes agential factors, actors’ capacity to articulate and institutionally 
entrench a terrorializing boundary-making strategy is also affected by the relative 
openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which comprises three dimensions: 
the formal distribution of migration-related competencies, the initial boundary and its 
implications for later developments, and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state 
level. The first dimension stresses how nationalists are more likely to expand the 
boundary to immigrants if given the institutional means to regulate immigration and 
integrate immigrants into their own political community. As the devolution of 
migration-related powers weakens the importance of ethnic affiliations, so does the 
perceived need to maintain a strong link with emigrants and their descendants. The 
second dimension suggests that the way the boundary was initially created in relation to 
immigrants and emigrants provides an institutional and discursive path that conditions 
later developments to a considerable extent. Lastly, the third dimension emphasizes how 
the way in which the nationalist cleavage overlaps and cuts across ideological cleavages 
shapes the struggle over the making and unmaking of the boundaries.  
 
1.4.1. Main hypothesis 
 
 
Michael Billig pointed out that in both popular and academic writing, nationalism is 
associated with those who struggle to create new states or with extreme-right politics. 
However, he found that there was something misleading about this accepted use of the 
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word27, which “always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery. (…). In 
consequence, those in established nations – at the centre of things – are led to see 
nationalism as the property of others, not of ‘us’ [thus] overlooking the nationalism of 
the West’s nation-state” (1995: 5-6). Prominent scholars are not immune from this 
assumption, forcefully restated by Michael Hechter in a book published as late as 2000: 
“There is no motive for nationalism when the boundaries of the nation and the 
governance unit are congruent, for then the nation already has self-determination” 
(2000: 26, original emphasis). In a similar vein, there is an enduring tendency in  the 
literature to refer to all political parties speaking on behalf of stateless nations as ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ (Tursan et al 1998), or ‘ethnonationalists’ (Connor 199428, Conversi, 
1997), neglecting the fact that they may equally be seen as territorial entrepreneurs.  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I understand stateless nation-building as an elite-
driven political project the aim of which is to establish, maintain, or expand a stable 
structure of power over a territory and a population. To be sure, nation-building cannot 
be understood in strictly instrumental terms, as a mere manipulation of elites inventing 
traditions from scratch and appealing to individuals’ narcissistic predispositions with the 
sole aim of increasing their relative power (Hechter 200029). But while objective 
differences and historical experiences do provide the necessary raw material to 
legitimize a claim of self-determination, they must necessarily be translated into a 
political project articulated in national terms, a task usually undertaken by political 
elites. Besides, the literature has long suffered from the tendency to reduce nationality 
claims to their economic dimension, ignoring the fact that they are primarily a response 
to ‘relative political deprivation’ (Connor 2001), and that claims of self-determination 
are above all about people’s fundamental interest in membership in a self-governed 
political community (Bauböck 2006). Likewise ‘the return of the ethnic’ (Smith 1991), 
perhaps more pronounced in the social sciences than in the real world, replaced 
economic reductionism with cultural reductionism, no less problematic than the former, 
                                               
27. Likewise, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller have argued that “nationalism appears as a force foreign to the history of 
Western state-building” (2002: 167). 
28. Walker Conner (1994) also warned his peers against the danger of under-estimating the passionate nature of 
‘ethnonationalist claims’, in his view largely detached from the rational motivations driving elites’ behaviour in 
normal politics.  
29. Michael Hechter (2000) defends a strictly instrumental approach to the study of nationalism, which leaves almost 
no space for objective cultural and historical factors. However, the presence of objective differences is essential for 
any nationalist mobilization to succeed, and although the understanding of the past can be stretched to a considerable 
extent, claims must nonetheless be credible enough and resonate among an increasingly-educated population (Evans 
1997). 
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which attempted to limit the phenomenon to its cultural manifestations. In its worst 
materialization, this was translated into cultural determinism and an approach 
permeated by the Herderian belief that “if each nation had remained in its place, one 
could have perceived the world as a garden, where this human nation-plant flourished 
here and another one there, each following its own Bildung and nature” (Herder 
1968:326, quoted in Wimmer 2007: 3).  
Affirming the prevalence of political motives over cultural and economic ones does not 
mean dismissing their significance altogether. It merely contends that the fundamental 
aim of minority nationalists is to advance their autonomy goals and all other concerns, 
albeit not negligible, are subordinated to this broader objective. Accordingly, they select 
the frame of reference that is most suitable to the pursuit of their perceived interest. 
Hence, nationalists who seek to establish, maintain or expand a stable structure of 
power over a specific geographical space have a vested interest in expanding the 
membership boundary to immigrants in order to gain internal legitimacy over the 
totality of the resident population and defuse counter claims of self-determination 
within the homeland. On the other hand, polishing their external legitimacy enables 
them to break the state’s monopoly over the enforcement of liberal democratic norms, 
and to discourage reluctant elites from using internal divisions as a means of opposing 
their claims. As the democratic and liberal environment in which they are embedded 
discredits coercive means to make their territorial and membership boundaries 
congruent, emphasizing residency as a significant criterion of national membership is 
among the most effective ways of achieving their autonomy goals through democratic 
means. Whilst they may also seek to expand the membership boundary to emigrants and 
their descendants for a cultural, economic or electoral purpose, they would nonetheless 
be more reluctant to give a prominent voice in homeland politics to individuals residing 
in a foreign land over which they do not claim sovereignty, and whose interests can 
hardly be reconciled with the nation-building project being pursued in the homeland. 
Ultimately, it becomes much harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building 
project the legitimacy of which is not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but 
grounded in a culturally plural population inhabiting a common homeland. 
 
This can be contrasted with other kinds of claims which put the emphasis on the 
membership space and were later translated into non-territorial constitutional 
arrangements, or in some cases mutated into protracted and seemingly intractable 
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conflicts involving physical violence and coercion. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive and multiple kinds of claims can be simultaneously deployed. Besides, 
predominantly territorial claims can shift over time, either because the territorial project 
has failed or because actors’ perceived interests have evolved as a result of 
environmental changes. 
 
a) Non-Territorial Claims: claims that are meant to gain greater representation in central 
institutions and advance the autonomy of a territorially-dispersed population. 
Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue an ethnicizing boundary-
making strategy in relation to emigrants and emigrants, in order to increase their 
demographic weight and relative power within the territory in which they operate.   
 
b) Claims over Disputed Territories: rival claims that are meant to gain exclusive 
control over a territory in the name of two populations constructed as mutually 
exclusive. Again, political entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue an ethnicizing 
boundary-building strategy for the same reasons as claims made on behalf of non-
territorialized groups, although the implications are likely to be far more dramatic. 
Indeed, political elites first need to establish a demographic majority within the disputed 
territory, which may involve ethnic cleansing and resettlement in extreme cases.  
 
c) Irredentist Claims: Claims made on behalf of a ‘national minority’ seeking 
incorporation or at least a rapprochement with an ‘external national homeland’ are more 
likely to pursue an ethnicizing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants and 
emigrants, in order to reinforce their demographic weight within their portion of 
territory, and their legitimacy vis-à-vis the ‘external national homeland’. Reciprocally, 
claims made on behalf of an ‘external national homeland’ are more likely to adopt an 
ethnicizing boundary-making strategy, in order to polish their ethnic credentials vis-à-
vis their putative kin-minority.  
 
Evidently, this does not come without difficulties, not least because minority 
nationalism brings political boundaries closer to the surface of politics and is too 
complex a phenomenon to be exclusively driven by merely rational calculations. 
Brubaker listed among his six “pernicious postulates” of the literature on nationalism 
the “architectonic illusion” according to which nationality claims could be solved once 
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and for all with a single remedy which can be applied to all cases, irrespective of the 
broader environment in which claims are formulated (1978: 274). The main hypothesis 
introduced above emphasizes agential factors over structural determinants and can 
easily be dismissed by a brief examination of empirical developments in a variety of 
cases. Hence, my contention is that the capacity of nationalist elites to articulate and 
institutionally entrench a terrorializing boundary-making strategy is also affected by the 
ever-evolving political context in which they are embedded. Therefore, this is 
contingent upon the relative openness of the Territorial Opportunity Structure, which 
designates the dimensions of the environment that provides actors with incentives and 
constraints to undertake actions.  
 
1.4.2. The territorial opportunity structure 
 
 
The territorial Opportunity Structure comprises three interrelated dimensions that, in 
theory, shape the struggle over the making of the boundary: the formal distribution of 
migration-related competencies; the initial boundary and its implications for later 
development; and the dynamics of party competition at sub-state level. 
 
The distribution of migration-related competencies 
 
For Kymlicka, ‘national minorities’ can adopt a ‘post-ethnic’ identity and a 
‘multicultural’ approach to immigrant integration under two necessary conditions. First, 
they must have some control over the volume and composition of immigration in order 
to exorcize the fear becoming a minority “within their own traditional territory.” 
Second, they must have some leverage to decide upon the terms of immigrant 
integration “in order to mitigate the strong temptation for immigrants to integrate into 
the dominant culture (which usually offers greater mobility and economic 
opportunities)” (2001: 67). According to this line of reasoning, minority nationalists 
would mainly, if not exclusively, be concerned with the preservation of the national 
culture and would be willing to expand the membership boundary to newcomers only 
insofar as the latter would be subject to the patchwork of policies supposedly 
constituting a coherent integration model and guaranteeing national survival over 
subsequent generations. According to Kymlicka, the shift from boundary contraction to 
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boundary expansion towards immigrants follows an incremental path correlated with 
the gradual devolution of migration-related competencies. While Kymlicka does not 
specifically address the question of emigrants, his argument suggests that political 
elites’ boundary-making strategy towards those who left would follow a diametrically 
opposed path. As the ethnic bond loses its significance in the wake of devolution, so 
does the link with emigrants and their descendants.  
 
Kymlicka proceeds from the accurate premise that encouraging human mobility can be 
used as an instrument of territorial management aiming at homogenizing a culturally 
diverse population. For instance, the Moroccan government has encouraged the 
resettlement of ethnic Arabs to the Western Sahara in order to weaken the cultural basis 
of the Sahraouian movement (Petithomme 2010). On the other hand, historical 
occurrences of central elites using human mobility as a tool to mitigate peripheral 
dissent are plenty. One obvious example is the USSR, where both internal mobility and 
emigration were severely constrained, the explicit economic rationale conflating with 
the implicit aim of moderating secessionist tensions in the periphery (Torpey 2007). The 
mass-deportations of Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars and Chechens from their homeland to 
the Kazakh SSR (later Kazakhstan) in 1944 are only some of the many examples that 
can be drawn from the Soviet case. Some authoritarian regimes have also sought to 
stimulate inflows of co-ethnics for a similar purpose. In the 1990s, the Serbian president 
Slobodan Milosevic encouraged ethnic Serbians living in Croatia to settle in Kosovo 
where ethnic Albanians represented the majority, with the illusory hope that this would 
tip the demographic balance in the contested territory.  
 
However, Kymlicka’s hypothesis suffers from at least two flaws. First it relies on an 
essentially culturalist understanding of minority nationalism, an ontological bias which 
has already been discussed at length in previous sections30. Second, it is based on a 
naïve understanding of institutions and the way they mediate actors’ behaviour in a 
plurinational context. If institutions do matter, their incidence is much more complex 
and subtle than Kymlicka seems to acknowledge. From a territorial politics perspective, 
the struggle over the distribution of competences across multiple tiers of government is 
not only driven by good governance and normative considerations, but also by the more 
                                               
30. As Andreas Wimmer put it, “Kymlicka’s world is made of state-bound societies composed of ethnic groups, each 
of which is endowed with its own culture and naturally inclined to in-group solidarity” (2009: 249). 
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trivial logic of blame-shifting. A number of scholars have for instance noted how the 
devolution of welfare competencies to regional and local administrations came about in 
a context of welfare retrenchment, necessitating the adoption of unpopular reforms, and 
financial strains, requiring drastic budgetary cuts and difficult trade-offs in the 
allocation of scarce resources. From this perspective, the decision can also be 
interpreted as a crafty way of “devolving deficits” and shifting the burden of 
responsibility for chronically under-funded public provision to other tiers of government 
(Keating 2009c). To be sure, blame-shifting is not the exclusive property of the centre, 
and minority nationalists miss few opportunities to blame it for all the evils occurring 
within their territory. As Derek Urwin (1982: 228) put it, “regionalist mobilization is 
much easier when hostility prevails: otherwise, the problem for regionalist protagonists 
is to break the benignancy of the relationship.”  
As for migration-related competencies, states have admittedly been reluctant to give 
away powers they consider strategically relevant and closely associated to their 
sovereignty, either beyond to supranational institutions, or below to regional 
governments.  The European Commission learned this lesson the hard way, after several 
frustrated attempts to harmonize immigration policies and naturalization procedures 
across the European Union, in spite of compelling evidence that the absence of 
coordination between member-states was counter-productive, especially since internal 
border controls were suppressed by virtue of the 1985 Schengen agreement and the 
Citizenship of the European Union introduced by the 1992 Maastricht treaty31. But a 
territorial politics perspective cast doubts on the simplistic assumption according to 
which the conquest of competences constitutes an end in itself. Bearing this in mind, the 
systematic comparison of empirical developments in Scotland and Catalonia provides a 
fertile ground to evaluate the strengths of Kymlicka’s hypothesis. 
 
The initial boundary and path-dependency 
 
While nationalists may have a fundamental interest in stressing residency as the main 
criterion of membership, they are nonetheless constrained by the way in which the 
                                               
31. Unlike most federations, in which the federal level enjoys legislative powers over the acquisition and loss of the 
status of full and equal membership, European citizenship is acquired automatically, as it is derived from member-
state nationality. In effect, this complex institutional architecture multiplies the anomalies generated by the non-
cooperative behaviour of sovereign states (Bauböck 2006). A similar mechanism is at play with the harmonization of 
immigration policies within the Schengen area, and the open-method of coordination has to date largely failed to 
deliver (Caviedes 2004).  
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boundary was initially created and its evolution over time. Historical institutionalists 
tend to emphasize continuity over change, on the grounds that institutional patterns tend 
to reproduce themselves and mould politics over extensive periods of time according to 
the logic of path dependency (Peters 2005). There is indeed evidence that states have 
responded to immigration-induced pluralism following the cognitive channels 
established by past experiences with national, religious, ethnic or territorial pluralism. In 
France, they  were apprehended with the very same ‘one and indivisible’ Republican 
frame while in Britain, the large discretion traditionally granted to peripheral elites in 
Wales and Scotland heavily influenced the way in which ‘race relations’ came to be 
managed from the 1960s onwards (Bulpitt 1986). Likewise, the multiculturalist doctrine 
in Canada was built upon the pre-existing historical compromise between the two 
‘founding nations’ (Winter 2008), while the Dutch management of religious pluralism 
known as Verzuiling was for a time replicated in response to post-colonial immigration 
(Penninx & Schrover 2002). Yet, this phenomenon has sometimes been over-estimated. 
In his oft-cited historical comparison of nationality laws in France and Germany, 
Brubaker (1992) attributed their supposed stability over the past two centuries to the 
resilience of cultural idioms, well-entrenched conceptions of nationhood that can be 
traced far back in the past and have conditioned the state’s attitude towards immigrants 
to the present. However, Brubaker himself revised it later and gradually came to adopt a 
radical constructivist posture, stressing how national boundaries can shift over a short 
period of time according to changing political circumstances. Ultimately, between those 
proclaiming path dependency as a supreme principle occurring irrespective of 
environmental changes and radical constructivism, there remains considerable scope for 
a more tempered and contextual approach. There is no contradiction in acknowledging 
that political boundaries can be remarkably stable and outlive the purpose for which 
they were initially created, producing unintended effects constraining actors’ ability to 
address new challenges as they can shift at specific critical junctures or gradually evolve 
over extensive periods of time (Steinmo 2008). As Rogers Smith put it, “because no 
political community is simply neutral and all are products of contestation and 
compromise, the politics of people-making, involving both force and story, is always an 
ongoing as well as competitive politics, even within apparently well-established unified 
political communities” (Rogers Smith 2003: 42).  
Would-be leaders and new entrants are encouraged to comply to varying degrees with 
the pre-established frame, while being left with sufficient room for altering, modifying, 
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and in turn be influenced by it. Let us consider for instance the case of the ‘one-drop-of-
blood’ rule in the United States, which was initially enforced to segregate and subjugate 
the locally born Black population. The 1960s Civil Rights movement marked a critical 
juncture, although the rule did not disappear altogether but rather re-oriented public 
policies and institutions in a diametrically-opposed direction. Through a mechanism of 
boundary-inversion, the norm of negative discrimination was replaced by that of 
positive discrimination without fundamentally affecting the location of the boundary 
(Wimmer 2008b). Closer to the purpose of this dissertation, the ethnic or even racial 
boundary initially established by early Basque ideologues in the late nineteenth century 
was eventually abandoned after World War II  (Diez Medrano 1994). Nevertheless, it 
influenced later developments and fed the antagonism between natives and immigrants 
from the rest of Spain, in spite of the fact that the national movement in the pre-Franco 
period emphasized residency as the main criterion of national membership (Linz 1981). 
Likewise, in the Belgian case, Patrick Loobuyck and Dirk Jacobs attributed the 
contrasted approaches to immigrant integration in Wallonia and Flanders to their 
distinct national history and sensitivities. In their words, “it is not by accident that in 
Flanders there is a lot of emphasis on language competence and the importance of 
ethnic cultural identities – two issues which have had a prominent role in the history of 
the Flemish nationalist movement” (2009: 113).  
 
Boundary-making strategies in relation to emigrants are fraught with similar 
ambiguities. On the one hand, the membership boundary can be expanded relatively 
easily, as the 1990s U-turn of the Mexican federal state in relation to Mexican nationals 
settled north of the border illustrates (Robert Smith 2003). However, boundary 
contraction is likely to be a much more protracted and contested process, as dismantling 
the existing web of institutions connecting the homeland with specific segments of its 
population abroad is a necessarily harder task than establishing it. Besides, groups and 
organizations enjoying a privileged voice in homeland politics, or privileged access to 
economic or cultural resources, are less likely to renounce it so easily. Hence, 
contracting the boundary in relation to emigrants is usually preceded by a more or less 
extensive period of boundary blurring. In Galicia for instance, political parties have 
been heavily dependent on the electoral support of overseas-voters settled in South 
America at least since 1980 and the establishment of a democratically-elected Galician 
Parliament. In 2010, the Spanish Parliament passed a law reducing the scope of the 
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electoral franchise at local elections to resident citizens only and a similar reform in 
regard to meso-level elections is also being considered. Yet, the negotiations have been 
particularly difficult and brought to the surface a variety of competing interests, both in 
the homeland and overseas32.  
 
Party system and dynamics of party competition at sub-state level 
 
Radical right wing nationalist parties, operating at state-wide level and defending anti-
immigrant positions, and minority nationalist parties are often amalgamated as two sides 
of the same coin. In a careful analysis of what makes them distinct, Cass Mudde found 
that minority nationalist parties could embrace a variety of ideologies, covering the 
entire political spectrum. He nonetheless found that the numerous labels used in the 
literature  – autonomist, regional nationalist, ethnonationalist, non-state-wide parties, 
moderate nationalist – made their commonalities particularly hard to establish (Mudde 
2007: 28). In an equally ambiguous way, Seymour Lipset listed them among his ‘revolts 
against modernity’. However, he also acknowledged that, in stark contrast with the pre-
war period when most of them were “identified with rightist socioeconomic politics, 
sometimes fascist ones, and often had strong links to the church” (1981: 464), the 1960s 
saw the development of territorial movements associated with “larger forms of post-
industrial protest which characterized New Left politics” (1981: 464). To be sure, the 
Lega Nord in Italy and Vlaams Belang in Belgium illustrate how minority nationalist 
claims can go hand-in-hand with a virulently racist rhetoric, equally attacking 
immigrants coming from other parts of the state and beyond. However, the exaltation of 
ethnic particularisms, if frequent, is far from being the privilege of minority nationalist 
parties, as the proliferation and rising popularity of state-wide radical right wing parties 
across Europe illustrates.  
 
In one of the few studies examining minority nationalist’ attitudes towards immigrants, 
Gershon Shafir (1996) contrasted historical developments in the Catalan, Basque, 
Latvian and Estonian cases and attributed the variations in outcomes to their distinct 
routes to modernization. In his view, hostility towards immigrants is rooted in the 
danger they once posed to the privileges of economic, cultural and political elites 
already destabilized by the tidal wave of modernity. Admittedly, some traditional elites 
                                               
32. The Galician case is further examined in Chapter II, section 2.1.4.  
 46 
 
in the periphery have been threatened by industrialization and subsequently turned to 
ethnic nationalism, the early days of the Basque movement being a classic example. 
However, Shafir reduces minority nationalism to a political device created and 
controlled by a narrowly-defined privileged class pursuing its self-interest, failing to 
acknowledge that it overlaps and cuts across other cleavages. In stateless nations, 
political parties are encouraged to position themselves on both the centre-periphery and 
left-right axes and defend positions that are more or less polarized along both lines of 
differentiation, be they competing across the whole state or only in the territory over 
which they lay claim. In Flanders, support for outright independence is stronger among 
right-of-centre and far-right parties, whereas in Québec, the Parti Québécois combines 
its secessionist aspirations with a social-democratic agenda. In Corsica, the highly 
fragmented nationalist political space never managed to develop a clear socio-economic 
doctrine, although the movement leans towards the left and comprises a potent 
ecological wing. Hence, the way in which support for nationalism overlaps with socio-
economic and ideological cleavages varies from one case to the other. One 
phenomenon, however, remains constant across cases. The sub-state party system and 
associated patterns of party competition considerably influences the struggle over the 
making and unmaking of membership boundaries. There is now a growing body of 
literature examining the incidence of party systems and dynamics of party competition 
on migration-related policy-making.  
 
As far as immigrants are concerned, parties can either compete for the vote of 
immigrants, or for the anti-immigrant vote. Although this assertion is not equally valid 
in all settings, left-of-centre parties have privileged the first option, notably by blurring 
boundaries in the name of class solidarity and/or equality, whereas right-of-centre 
parties have rather flirted with the second one (Thranhärdt 1994, Bell 2008). Hence, we 
may reasonably expect that if support for nationalism strongly overlaps with a left-of-
centre ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to seek support among immigrants. 
Conversely, if the nationalist cleavage is primarily associated with a conservative 
ideology, nationalist parties are more likely to compete for the anti-immigrant vote. 
As for emigrants entitled to vote in their province of origin, political parties’ ideological 
identities have not systematically impacted upon their willingness to compete for the 
votes of expatriates. However, a growing body of literature suggests that patterns of 
party competition in the homeland do affect strategies of boundary-making in relation to 
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those who left (Lafleur 2011). As expatriates tend to adopt more volatile electoral 
behaviour than domestic voters and parties have limited knowledge of their 
characteristics, actors usually rely on preconceived ideas that are often far from reality. 
The Italian example shows that the decision to expand the boundaries of the franchise 
may turn against those who took it with the belief that they would be electorally 
rewarded for it. In 2001, the Italian Parliament extended the constitutional right to vote 
to Italian citizens abroad, an initiative that proved to be decisive in the 2006 centre-left 
coalition victory. Ironically, the reform was proposed by the neo-fascist MP Mirko 
Tremaglia – who became in 2001 the first ‘Minister for Italians in the World’ (Choate 
2007: 729) – and passed with the unconditional support of the Northern League which 
was equally outvoted. In Belgium, the development of the ethnic conflict in the 
homeland over the past forty years has led to the parallel division of Belgian political 
opinion abroad. Indeed, Belgian expatriates, especially from Flanders, have gradually 
turned to nationalist parties, following the deterioration of the political climate in the 
homeland (Lafleur 2011b). However, Belgian political parties have been reluctant to 
instrumentalize them as a means to export the ethnic conflict beyond their borders, and 
the Flemish government has mainly used Vlamingen in de Wereld, the most influential 
Flemish association abroad, as a cultural and economic resource rather than an electoral 
one. On the other hand, emigrants and self-identified members of the diaspora have 
sometimes played a role that goes beyond homeland parties' electoral strategies. In some 
cases, they themselves instigated and constructed the national movements’ ideological 
identity and drew the initial boundaries of the people (Vertovec 2007). In Corsica, the 
intellectual underpinnings of the national movement were initiated and formalized on 
the benches of the University of Nice and later imported into the homeland, a 
phenomenon which goes far in explaining its romantic undertones. Ultimately, no 
general hypothesis can be formulated in regard to the incidence of the party system in 
boundary-making strategies vis-à-vis emigrants. It seems, however, that specific parties 
are more likely to seek their support, on the basis of a more or less accurate perception 
that they will be electorally rewarded for it.  
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II 
 
 
 
2. Analytical and Comparative Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Analytical framework 
 
 
This section introduces the four analytical dimensions along which I intend to apply the 
explanatory framework by contrasting empirical developments in Catalonia and 
Scotland. First, I explore boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective. I then 
shift to the contemporary period and discuss three fields of public policy-making that 
are related in practice and yet are meant to address distinct concerns. Immigration 
policies designate the set of rules establishing the conditions of aliens’ entry into the 
territory for long-term stay and settlement. Immigrant policies comprise both citizenship 
policies, regulating the citizenship rights of non-citizens and the formal rules of 
acquisition of citizenship, and integration policies, institutionalizing immigration-
induced pluralism and determining the degree of cultural convergence an individual or a 
community is expected to achieve in order to be considered as a full and equal member 
of the political community. Finally, emigrant policies are meant to create, influence, 
maintain or conversely weaken the set of political, economic and cultural links with 
specific groups of emigrants and their descendants. I am mainly concerned with 
discursive and public-policy frames, the patterns of boundary-making they bring to the 
surface of politics, and how they relate to the Catalan and Scottish nation-building 
projects.  
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2.1.1. Boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective 
 
 
As Rod Rhodes put it, the study of territorial politics has too often been an “exercise in 
‘upper class journalism’, or, to be less tendentious, over-preoccupied with current 
affairs” (1987: 3). Like Bulpitt (1983) and Rokkan (1999), he contended that examining 
the way in which politics is fought out and organized across territory could not be 
properly done without locating present events in their historical context and should 
ideally “encompass the formation of the modern state in the nineteenth century” (ibid.: 
5). This sub-section is divided into three parts. The first examines how the rise of the 
modern nation state increased the salience of and institutionally entrenched the 
categories of resident aliens and expatriates. The second explores the relationship 
between territorial structuring and migration. The last contends that examining the way 
the boundary was initially constructed is critical insofar as it establishes a path for later 
developments.  
 
Nation state building, expatriates, and foreign residents 
 
While human mobility is a fundamental feature of European history, modernity-induced 
migrations marked a quantitative turn, as the phenomenon gained formidable vigour, 
and a qualitative one, as the average distance of migration increased dramatically 
(Zolberg 2006b: 141). Likewise, while the origins of nations have long been a subject of 
controversy between perennialists and modernists, there is little doubt that the territorial 
nation state as we know it today began its irresistible ascent at roughly the same time. 
With as many as 55 million persons leaving European countries between 1815 and 1939 
and a large number moving within and across them, mobility was more than ever “a 
demographic fact of life during Europe’s great age of nationalism” (Gabaccia et al. 
2007: 63). The fact that both phenomena have occurred simultaneously can be attributed 
to three intertwined and equally fundamental normative changes occurring in the 
political, cultural and economic realms.  
 
In the political realm, the spread of liberal ideas across Europe in the wake of the 
French Revolution is often taken as the vehicle for the gradual demise of the bonds of 
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serfdom that had hereditarily tied peasants to the land (Torpey 2007: 69). Among the 
revolutionary novelties figured the right to move freely, within the state but also 
beyond, a liberty enshrined in the 1791 Constitution. Admittedly, mobility was already 
permitted or even encouraged in a number of countries or for some categories of 
subjects prior to the late eighteenth century (Bade 2003: 1-33). However, it has 
gradually been expanded to all social strata on liberal grounds. The fact that illiberal 
states such as the USSR and China have systematically constrained mobility highlights 
its intimate link with the underlying values of the liberal state33. In the economic realm, 
the diffusion of free trade ideas in the course of the Industrial Revolution brought in its 
wake the belief that free mobility of labour, capital, and goods would ultimately 
maximize the allocation of resources, and in consequence should not be constrained 
(Zolberg 2007). Hence, the emergence of a new political doctrine – liberalism – and a 
new economic paradigm – free trade – mutually reinforced the belief that individual 
freedom to come and go as one pleases was both a fundamental right and a catalyst for 
economic development. However, the period also saw the expansion of another ideal, 
intimately connected with the previous two and yet considerably limiting their scope. 
Now that sovereignty was meant to lie in the people, the urge to define and construct the 
sum of their individual members and draw membership boundaries around them became 
more pressing.  
The ‘National Revolution’ is sometimes wrongly associated with closure, whereas the 
concomitant processes of nation-building and state formation that spanned Europe were 
equally driven by mechanisms of boundary opening and boundary closing (Rokkan 
1999: 44-47). As tariff barriers within the state were gradually abolished, others were 
erected or strengthened at the frontier. As railway networks were mushrooming and 
cross-ruling the territory of existing states, cross-border connections were deliberately 
made difficult. As democratization was gaining ground through successive expansions 
of the electoral suffrage, the dividing line between members and non-members became 
sharper. In other words, nation-building processes facilitated the propagation of the 
economic and political ideals of free mobility, but only partially, within the confines of 
the territorial nation state in-the-making. Beyond, citizens turned into aliens, subject to 
the entry requirements and membership regulations of another state (Torpey 1999). This 
phenomenon is the consequence of the transition from the Ancien Régime, where 
                                               
33. The right to internal mobility for certain categories of citizens has been constrained from 1932 to 1990 in the 
USSR and from 1955 to the present in the Democratic Republic of China (Torpey 2007).  
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“borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one 
another,” to a world made of territorial nation states (Anderson 1983: 25). As 
citizenship was converted into a “device to divide up the world’s population” (Hammar 
1990: 31), migrants became simultaneously categorized as resident aliens who came to 
live in a state other than their own, and expatriates who left their homeland.  
 
Migration and territorial structuring 
 
While this accounts reasonably well for the process of boundary-making in established 
states, it says little about how other forms of territorial communities have responded to 
the acceleration of migration flows. Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 13)34 drew an insightful 
distinction between ‘polycephalic’ states, characterized by a marked dispersion of 
political, economic and cultural resources across the territory, and ‘monocephalic’ states 
where all resources tend to be concentrated within a specific location, thus conferring 
upon it a clear advantage over the periphery. In polycephalic states, migration flows, 
whether external or internal, can come from and be directed to multiple locations. To a 
reasonable extent, they could be distributed evenly across the territory, one area 
predominating at a time, without ever succeeding in maintaining its hegemony over the 
long run. By contrast, in monocephalic states, they have tended to be unidirectional and 
enduring, paralleling the consolidation of a clearly identified centre and in turn 
reinforcing its domination. Hence, human mobility is closely dependent upon the 
specific territorial structuring of a given state and can mitigate or exacerbate conflicts 
between the centre and its periphery. However, while migration patterns are driven as 
much as they impact upon the cultural, economic and political aspects of centre-
periphery relations, they are, in most instances, not their main determinant. It is 
probably more appropriate at this stage to provide some brief examples examining this 
phenomenon in practice.   
 
In France, the rural exodus from the countryside to the Ile-de-France in the wake of 
industrialization reflected the supremacy of Paris over the Province. Yet, France was the 
first country to experience a serious decline in its fertility rate (Braudel 1986a: 167) 
which, combined with the resilience of a sizeable, if unproductive, agricultural sector 
                                               
34. Surprisingly, Rokkan did not link this typology with migration flows in his work on the resilience of territorial 
distinctiveness across Europe (Rokkan 1983). Nevertheless, he did touch upon the issue of mass migration and 
conquest in the Middle-Ages to account for the ‘peopling’ of Europe.  
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providing jobs in rural areas (Zolberg 2007), mitigated the rush to the city. However, 
this uneven pattern did fuel peripheral unrest when it became clear that the Province 
was being inexorably emptied of its forces vives. The publication in 1947 of Jean-
François Gravier’s pamphlet Paris et le désert français marked a watershed in the 
territorial politics of migration in France, which in turn considerably informed the 
decentralization process initiated in the 1960s. Large cities, particularly Paris but also 
Marseille and Lyon, were accused of “devouring the human resources of the periphery” 
(Gravier 1947: 13). In Gravier’s view, the “tentacular grip of the capital” was also 
responsible for the expanding settlements of Poles, Italians and Spaniards, that he saw 
as a substitute to the children that “discouraged Frenchmen no longer want to have” 
(ibid.: 67). While imbued of a parochial vision of rural France that has long inspired 
radical right wing movements (Winock et al 1994), Gravier’s inquiry shed light on long-
standing and accelerating demographic imbalances that have remained a subject of 
concern to policy-makers ever since.  
 
On at least one occasion, they constituted a catalyst for regionalist mobilization. 
Corsicans have migrated to mainland France ever since the territory was incorporated in 
1769. The phenomenon gained considerable vigour during the Napoleonic era, 
reinforcing the presence of native Corsicans, and their descendants who often retained 
an exceptionally strong ethnic identity across several generations, in the administration, 
setting a pattern which has lasted to the present day. By the 1940s, Marseille was the 
‘biggest Corsican city’, although the most adventurous islanders were moving much 
further to the confines of the French Empire, where they were over-represented in the 
colonial administration35 (Follorou et al. 2004: 14). However, the collapse of the Empire 
meant that many of them returned to their homeland, thus placing additional strain on 
the labour market of an economically backward territory. At the same time, the mass 
repatriation of pieds-noirs in the aftermath of the Algerian war pressed the government 
to relocate some of them in scarcely populated areas. Up to 17,000 were relocated to the 
Eastern Plain of Corsica and were granted large subventions to modernize and exploit 
the local agriculture (De la Calle et al 2010: 399-400). In 1975, the movement Action 
Régionaliste Corse (ARC) occupied the cooperative of a winegrower of pied-noir origin 
                                               
35. Although estimating the size of the ‘Corsican Diaspora’ is admittedly hard to evaluate and above all inconsistent 
with the constructivist approach defended in this dissertation, Harguindéguy and Cole (2009: 950) found there were 
at least 500,000 self-identified Corsicans living in France, especially in Provence and Ile-de-France, and 1,000,000 
residing overseas, against a resident population on the island of 261,000 in 1999.  
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to protest against what it saw as unfair competition on the labour market. The police 
intervened and the assault soon degenerated, prompting the creation of the terrorist-
group Front de Libération Nationale de La Corse (FLNC), which has multiplied violent 
attacks against state and foreign-owned interests throughout the past three decades 
under the slogan ‘vivre et travailler chez nous’. While shifting migration patterns are 
certainly not the main driving force behind the resurgence of Corsican nationalism, they 
nonetheless provided the spark that enabled an initially small group of individuals to 
gain legitimacy and aggregate widespread discontent among the resident population. In 
the 1990s, Corsica became the second region after the Ile-de-France with the highest 
proportion of foreign-born residents, representing 10% of the population in 2001, a 
figure which does not take into account internal migrants. Besides, the last decade saw a 
sharp rise of immigration pulled into the region by the real estate and construction boom 
(Michaux et al. 2004). While the number of racist crimes per capita is significantly 
higher than in the rest of the country and graffiti such as ‘Francesi Fora’ and ‘Arabi 
fora’ have long been visible on walls and public signs across the island, the main 
nationalist parties came to embrace a territorial conception of membership, a strategy 
that is consistent with the main hypothesis. However, the initial construction of the 
boundary has precluded the emergence of networks and solidarities cutting across ethnic 
lines.  
By contrast, the French state has been more fortunate in other territories, the fate of 
Occitania being perhaps the most compelling example. The region, which could have 
potentially evolved into an alternative centre in the late Middle-Ages, failed to acquire a 
critical size and to expand its power. The consolidation of a national labour market and 
the mass emigration it induced further weakened what was left of Occitan culture, and 
the territory that once upon a time could compete with the Ile-de-France has long ceased 
to represent a threat to the territorial integrity of the state (Rokkan 1983).As in Corsica, 
the 1960s rallying cry of Occitan nationalists was ‘Volem vivre al Païs’ in response to 
the new wave of mass emigration that accompanied the Trente Glorieuses in the 
aftermath of World War II (Aymard 1986).  In either case, migrations have not been the 
main determinant of centre-periphery relations. Yet, they played a role that is as 
significant as it is over-looked in the literature of territorial politics. 
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The significance of the initial boundary 
 
This brief overview of the relationship between territorial structuring and human 
mobility does not do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon, nor to its multiple 
manifestations across space and time. Minority nationalism turns specific aspects of 
territorial pluralism into politically salient boundaries, which in turn bring legitimacy to 
claims of self-determination. Whilst the main hypothesis contends that nationalists have 
a vested interest in defining membership on territorial grounds, the definition of a 
common territorial identity transcending other social divisions may be undermined by 
the way the boundary was initially created. An obvious example is the state of Israel 
where the permanence of an ethno-religious boundary has encouraged political elites to 
both contract the membership boundary in relation to non-Jewish immigrants and 
autochthonous minorities and to expand the boundary to the diaspora. In the Belgian 
case, the prevalence of the linguistic boundary has not made the territorial division of 
the state too difficult in the overwhelmingly monolingual regions of Wallonia and 
Flanders. But the propagation of the linguistic conflict to the bilingual region of 
Brussels institutionally entrenched a boundary between Dutch speakers and 
Francophones. Local elites have tended to identify with the city, which could potentially 
offer the possibility of blurring political boundaries by emphasizing local community 
bonds (Wimmer 2008b: 1041-42). However, they have been instrumentalized by the 
neighbouring regions that have acted as external national homelands, and by doing so 
reinforced the salience of the boundary36. In consequence, migration-related issues in 
the Brussels region cannot be dissociated from the salience of administrative linguistic 
categories, immigrants being “de facto considered as either Francophones or Flemish” 
(Bousetta 2009: 95). Hence, in most instances, the boundary-making strategy, be it 
ethnicizing or territorialising, is more likely to maintain and reproduce itself once it has 
been harnessed in relatively stable institutions. An in-depth inquiry into its initial 
construction is therefore essential to understand later developments.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
36. As Hassan Bousetta put it, “Brussels is actually dependent on the balance of power between Francophones and 
Flemish at the federal level and that is precisely one of its main problems” (2009: 94).  
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2.1.2. Immigration policies: those who will come 
 
 
For Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party (BNP), Britain should urgently 
“close the door to more because this is the most overcrowded country in Europe and is 
way beyond its proper carrying capacity in population terms.”37 Likewise, the French 
Minister of Immigration and National Identity [sic] legitimized the need to introduce 
stricter border control on the grounds that “France’s hosting capacity is simply limited”, 
which requires putting an end to the “migratory chaos which consists in accepting 
migrants without restrictions.”38 Comparable arguments have regularly been deployed 
in Germany, the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and many other countries where 
the supposedly uncontrollable influx of immigrants has been presented as exceeding the 
nation’s capacity to cope with the consequences. But does the BNP leader refer to the 
London conurbation, where inward flows have indeed been considerable since 1945, or 
to the English Midlands, Scotland or Cornwall, where the main concern has been 
protracted emigration? Is Brice Hortefeux solely concerned with the situation in the Ile-
de-France and the Bouches-du-Rhône, or with the notorious diagonale du vide 
stretching from the Meuse to the Landes, where the population density barely exceeds 
30 inhabitants per km2, a heritage of the nineteenth and twentieth century rural exodus? 
Does the right-wing slogan ‘America is full’ encompass the empty lands of the 
Midwest, or is it meant to halt the ongoing inflow to the five greater metropolitan areas 
concentrating 60% of all immigrants in the country39?  
 
Immigration policies at regional level of government 
 
By shifting the unit of analysis from state to regional level, migration trends can shift 
dramatically, not only in quantitative terms, but also in regard to the cultural and socio-
economic composition of migrant stocks. In consequence, the costs and benefits of 
migration flows, be they internal or external, are unevenly distributed across the 
territory of a single sovereign state, a phenomenon which may reinforce existing 
regional inequalities or create new ones (Ballesteros 2005). Yet, immigration policies 
have generally been considered “a part of national foreign relations and as such to 
                                               
37. Nick Griffin, quoted in MidDay.com, June 14, 2009.  
38. Brice Hortefeux, speaking at the French National Assembly, September 18, 2007.  
39. According to Wright and Ellis (2000), 60% of all immigrants residing in the United States in 1997 were 
concentrated in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Miami.  
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require ultimate central government control” (Spiro 2001: 6). As a result, meso-level 
governments have traditionally played a marginal role in immigration policy-making, 
even in relatively loose federations. However, the devolution of immigration 
competencies paves the way for a greater degree of preference satisfaction among sub-
state units, insofar as sub-state administrations are, at least in theory, in a privileged 
position to assess their needs. Besides, this could also improve administrative 
procedures by decongesting overcrowded central offices (ibid 2001: 9). Such arguments 
greatly influenced the introduction in 1973 of the Australian points-based system, which 
has a strong territorial component. Like the Canadian Provincial Nominee Programme, 
the Australian Regional Skilled Migration Scheme (RSMS) allows employers in low 
population growth areas of Australia to run an autonomous immigration policy. 
Conversely, some expressed their fear that multi-layered immigration schemes could be 
counterproductive in highly integrated labour markets and inconsistent with the liberal 
doctrine of workers’ free mobility. According to this line of reasoning, market forces, 
the interplay between push and pull factors, once freed from institutional constraints, are 
deemed to optimize the allocation of labour throughout the territory. The Schengen 
agreements, later incorporated into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, provided for the 
removal of systematic border controls between the participating countries under the 
assumption that all would benefit. This, however, eventually sparked intense 
controversy at EU level40.  
 
Now these polemics mainly stem from the literature on mechanical federalism, and do 
not specifically address the case of plurinational states. In this strand of the literature, 
the debate has taken a more explicitly normative connotation, and has been closely 
connected to the issue of self-government and the accommodation of national pluralism 
(Kymlicka 2001). The underlying questions have been whether the governments of 
stateless nations should be entitled to regulate the conditions of alien entry for long term 
stay and permanent settlement, and the reasons as to why this is so. A nationalist 
perspective contends that, as immigration irreversibly transforms the composition of the 
political community, regulating it is a matter of self-determination. On the other hand, a 
culturalist perspective operates from the premise that immigration places additional 
                                               
40. The new EU member-states voiced their concerns in terms of brain-drain, while countries of destination feared that 
this sudden influx of cheap labour – epitomized by the potent image of the ‘Polish plumber’ successfully mobilized 
as a scarecrow during the 2005 EU-constitution referendum campaign in France and the Netherlands – could place 
additional strain on the domestic labour market and welfare provisions (Galgoczi, Leschke & Watt 2009).  
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strain on the national culture. Therefore, control over immigration policies is critical to 
guarantee its long-term survival. The Canadian immigration policy is territorially-
differentiated and provides the Québec government with far-reaching autonomy to 
select immigrants on the basis of their ability to speak French. However, in practice, the 
cultural dimension has to a great extent been overshadowed by economic and political 
concerns. In Belgium for instance, the government of the Flemish Region did seek to 
gain greater leverage to control the volume and composition of immigration. But this 
initiative has hardly been driven by cultural considerations, as tapping into the narrow 
pool of Dutch speakers was not a realistic alternative. Instead, its primary purpose has 
been to attract skilled migrants irrespective of their geographical origin in order to 
remedy labour shortages in specific sectors of its economy and to contain the rise of 
anti-immigrant parties by tightening the entry requirements for those applying within 
the framework of family reunification (Loobuyck et al. 2009: 108). Indeed, irrespective 
of their anxieties about cultural conformity, nationalists have to convince their 
constituencies that further political autonomy from the centre would not undermine their 
economic prospects41, against the background of a shift in the dominant paradigm of 
regional development since the 1980s giving a prominent role to endogenous growth 
and the promotion of human capital.  
 
Immigration and economic growth in the age of competitive advantages 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, uneven patterns of economic development could be 
mitigated through mechanisms of inter-regional redistribution, enthusiastically 
promoted by the central state eager to maintain territorial cohesion. Wealthier regions 
were willing to cooperate, as in this positive sum game, diversionary policies could 
alleviate inflationary pressures in fast-growing territories while providing them with a 
protected market in which to sell their goods. Every region was given a chance to 
develop a comparative advantage, so that, in theory at least, there should be no losers 
(Keating 1998: 47). This was also seen as an efficient means to contain internal 
migration and the detrimental consequences of a rural exodus combined with 
uncontrolled growth in urban areas. 
                                               
41. For instance, in the 1970s the SNP committed to turn ‘poor Britons into rich Scots’, a slogan that resonated well 
after the discovery of North Sea Oil.  
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But by the late-1970s, this mode of territorial management came under severe strain. In 
Europe, the commitment to free trade culminated with the creation of the single market 
in 1986 and was simultaneously expanded worldwide through successive GATT (later 
WTO) rounds. As wealthier regions could no longer count on protectionist measures to 
enjoy privileged access to the domestic market, redistributive mechanisms came to be 
perceived as a burden, damaging their capacity to remain competitive vis-à-vis other 
regions within the state, on the European stage and beyond. For Stefano Bartolini, this 
process of boundary-opening meant no less than the “demise of the nation state 
Keynesian policy capacity”, in functional as well as in spatial terms (2000: 21). In this 
new context, socio-economic development became increasingly contingent upon the 
zero-sum logic of the quest for a competitive advantage, encouraging regional 
administrations to maximize their competitiveness, and thereby undermining the 
redistributive rationale that had prevailed in the era of comparative advantages (Omhae 
1995). In consequence, economic development became increasingly contingent upon 
the region’s capacity to generate endogenous growth (Keating 1998: 72-78). In order to 
do so, regional governments must be able to retain home-grown labour while at the 
same time attracting preferably skilled immigrants. Indeed, by closing their doors to 
immigrants, sub-state administrations would inhibit economic growth, which in turn 
would mechanically fuel emigration. Sub-state administrations can pursue a ‘nation-
building strategy’ whereby the pursuit of economic growth goes hand-in-hand with the 
aim of acquiring further autonomy from the central state. In the same way as “support 
for free trade can be part of a political strategy by nationalist leaders seeking further 
autonomy or outright independence” (Meadwell et al. 1996: 80, see also Hamilton 
2004), immigration can be incorporated within a broader nation-building strategy, 
connecting the territory with transnational flows of labour in order to bolster economic 
growth.  
 
The other side of the coin 
 
To be sure, ethnicizing the boundary can also be part of an economic strategy seeking to 
use immigrants as a docile and cheap workforce, concentrated in economic activities 
native workers no longer wish to do and highly sensitive to wage variations. This 
eventually leads to the segmentation of the labour market along ethnic lines. In regions 
where the cost of abandoning unproductive sectors proves too high, sub-state 
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governments may be tempted to use immigration as a means of maintaining economic 
activities that would otherwise disappear. The agriculturally rich regions of southern 
Spain and Italy, which have recently attracted a considerable number of seasonal 
workers coming from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, provide a striking example. In 
January 2010, the town of Rosarno in Calabria suffered a night of violence after two 
migrant workers from Africa were shot and two more were beaten. The investigation 
soon made clear that like many of their peers hired for the labour-intensive harvesting of 
citrus and clementines, their living conditions were particularly harsh. In regions unable 
to keep up with the requirements of an increasingly open economy, the rationale for 
exploiting immigrants by maintaining them in a subordinated status is twofold. First, as 
immigrants are concentrated in the least-rewarding sectors and have little or no 
opportunity for upward social mobility, they complement rather than compete with 
native workers on the labour market. Second, it can be seen as a way of boosting 
economic growth without having to go through the admittedly difficult process of 
upgrading human capital and stimulating innovation through ambitious structural 
reforms. Such a strategy, however, is unlikely to serve nationalists’ interest in acquiring 
further support for autonomy in the long-run, notably because economic sectors with 
low added-value are necessarily more vulnerable to external shocks. Thus, they require 
the protection of a more potent and diversified economy, broadening the scope of 
intervention at the bottom of economic cycles.   
 
In most instances, both strategies are not mutually exclusive but co-exist, legal 
provisions and discourses underlying them varying from one category of migrants to 
another. In California, the backlash against irregular migrants that culminated with the 
1995 SOS initiative (see below), stigmatized a much broader population, ‘Latinos’ to 
use the official census category, and was put into perspective by reference to the 
presumed danger that an invasion of Spanish-speakers represented for the permanence 
of a culturally plural yet monolingual America (Zolberg et al. 1999). However, highly 
skilled immigrants working in the Silicon Valley, whichever country they came from, 
have rarely if ever been constructed as anything but an economic asset. Ultimately, this 
suggests that ethnic boundaries cut across and overlap with class and socio-economic 
divisions. 
 
 61 
 
2.1.3. Immigrant policies: those who came 
 
 
In a migration perspective, the citizenship rights of non-citizens, the formal rules of 
acquisition of citizenship, and integration policies mark the distinction between citizens 
and resident aliens. The establishment of a federal-like system creates the conditions for 
individuals to hold two citizenships at the same time. Unlike multiple citizenship that is 
a consequence of a person’s belonging to two or more territorially distinct sovereign 
states, they are nested in that “they are related to one another, in some cases may derive 
from one another, and function toward each other via a clear hierarchy of legal norms” 
(Jackson 2001: 160). As such, federal systems open the way for people to enjoy 
differentiated rights according to the province they inhabit. In some rare instances, sub-
state governments can intervene in the regulation of the citizenship rights of resident 
aliens. In others, even rarer, they can have a say in the rules of acquisition of 
citizenship. More compellingly, territorial self-government implies that sub-state 
administrations enjoy legislative and executive powers over a number of public policy 
fields that cut across and overlap with immigrant integration.  
 
The citizenship rights of non-citizens 
 
The multiplication of forms of membership and the upgrading of rights for non-citizen 
residents have blurred the once clear-cut divide separating aliens from citizens 
(Hammar 1990). Some have gone so far as to argue that the consolidation of an 
international human rights regime had made the very concept of citizenship redundant, 
as liberal states have been increasingly constrained to approximate the status of resident 
aliens with that of citizens (Sassen 1996, Soysal 1994). But at the turn of the century, 
governments across Europe sought to draw a brighter line between citizens and aliens, 
by downgrading the rights of foreign nationals while simultaneously reasserting the 
value of citizenship (Joppke et al, 2003). For some, this is only the most visible part of a 
worrying influx of “illiberal practices among states that are supposed to bestow and 
adhere to the principles of liberalism and the rule of law” (Elspeth Guild et al, 2009: 1). 
However, how these changes have come about in plurinational democracies, where 
membership boundaries are internally challenged and subject to ongoing contestations, 
has not been systematically explored.  
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Here again, the distribution of competencies across multiple levels of government in 
federal states has had far-reaching implications for the regulation of alien status. In the 
United States, proposition 187, (better known as the Save our State (SOS) initiative), 
was passed in California in 1995, following a referendum that saw 61% of voters  
supporting the legislation, the most controversial aspect of which was the right given to 
government agents who suspect a person of violating immigration law to investigate the 
claimant’s immigration status. This in turn would have considerably limited 
undocumented residents’ access to social services. Eventually, the law was later found 
unconstitutional by the federal court on the grounds that it infringed upon the federal 
government’s competence. Conversely, sub-state governments have at times militated to 
upgrade the rights of non-citizens, as in the case of the Land of Hamburg which 
approved in 1989 local voting-rights for aliens who could document 8 years of legal 
residency. However, the legislation was later struck down by the German Constitutional 
court in 1990 on the grounds that elections must be representative of the ‘people’, 
restrictively understood as the German citizens resident on the territory of that 
administrative unit (Lansbergen et al. 2010). The Belgian case is also instructive in this 
respect. While French-speaking elites have actively militated to enfranchise foreign 
residents for local elections, Flemish-speaking parties have been more reluctant to do 
so, not least because they feared this would weaken their electoral position in Brussels 
and its periphery (Bousetta 2009: 115). 
 
The rules of acquisition of citizenship 
 
Unlike internal migrants who in most instances acquire provincial citizenship by taking 
up residence, resident aliens have to comply with a more or less demanding set of rules 
in order to become fully-fledged citizens. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
central state is exclusively competent in setting the rules of naturalization, although 
some significant exceptions are worth mentioning. In the US, it has historically been 
made difficult by the dualism of state and national citizenship. As naturalized citizens in 
one state enjoyed the rights associated with citizenship in all other states, “states with 
the most open provisions thereby imposed their views on all others” (Zolberg 2006c: 
85). The issue was partially solved in 1868 with the 14th amendment adopted shortly 
after the Civil War. While naturalization by birth became a federal competence in order 
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to prevent the Supreme Court from striking down the 1868 Civil Rights Act, 
naturalization on the basis of residence remained a state prerogative and the procedure 
continued to show significant territorial variations until the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
The most prominent European example is Switzerland where communes and cantons 
are responsible for naturalization matters, although the federal government lays down 
relevant criteria. Hence, Swiss citizenship is only acquired by those applicants who, 
after obtaining the federal naturalization permit, have also been naturalized by their 
communities and cantons. As a rule, there is no legally protected right to naturalization 
by a community and a canton (Acherman et al. 2010). In Germany, the federal 
government monopolizes legislative powers over naturalization, while executive powers 
are devolved to the Lander. As a result, the procedure has been considerably more 
demanding in some states than in others and affected naturalization rates accordingly. In 
2006, the government of Baden-Wurttemberg made the acquisition of German 
citizenship conditional upon the completion of a formalized test in the form of an 
interview guide that was soon labeled the ‘Muslim test’ for its clear bias against Turkish 
applicants (Van Oers et al 2010: 74-7).   
 
Again, the challenge mounted by sub-state units to the central state’s supremacy in 
determining the rules of acquisition of citizenship can work both ways. Sub-state units 
can either seek to retract the membership boundary on the grounds that the state-wide 
framework is not strict enough, or manifest their opposition to a legislation perceived as 
too restrictive by seeking to expand the formal membership boundary to all residents. 
Alternatively, they may seek to modify the rules if the latter are seen as not taking into 
account sufficiently the plurinational nature of the state. In Wales, for instance, 
nationalists sought and gained the (highly symbolic) right for applicants to British 
citizenship to pronounce the oath of allegiance and take the newly-introduced 
citizenship test in Welsh.  
 
Integration policies 
 
Sub-state governments are competent over a number of public-policy fields cutting 
across and overlapping with immigrant integration policies. The emergence of a ‘liberal 
multiculturalist consensus’ foreseen by Kymlicka in 2001 was short-lived, and the 
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subsequent academic debate paralleled empirical developments in liberal democracies 
which rediscovered the virtues of liberalism’s “old privatization strategy” (Barry 2001, 
Joppke et al. 2003, Joppke 2007). Although I share the view of a number of scholars 
who have questioned the existence of fully-fledged ‘integration models’ (Freeman 2003, 
Joppke 2007, Favell 2006), there remain significant variations in the way integration is 
being framed across political arenas which closely correlates with the dominant 
understanding of nationhood at a given point in time (Roux et al, 2010, Jacobs et al. 
2007). In a plurinational context, the establishment of a federal-like system opens the 
way for people to enjoy distinct cultural rights across the territory of a single state. 
While nationalist demands are primarily political, self-government also implies that 
sub-state governments enjoy the means to ensure the reproduction of the national 
culture over subsequent generations. Again, this does not concern the sum of all 
objective cultural markers making up the national community but specific cultural 
elements that became politically salient and entrenched in self-governing institutions. In 
many instances, linguistic arrangements have played a central role in the resolution of 
nationality claims, although they are by no means the only meaningful boundary. In 
consequence, this enables immigration-induced pluralism to be institutionalized in 
different ways and framed in different terms across levels of government. Here my main 
purpose is not so much to review all integration policies and identify an ‘integration 
model’, stable through time and functioning relatively independently of immigrant 
claims and state-wide developments. Instead, I examine how integration policies enable 
sub-state governments and political elites to reflect upon the meaning of the political 
community, and how this relates to their nation-building project. While actual 
institutional variations may be minor, sub-state governments can take the opportunity to 
challenge the state in its own normative space, and by doing so enhance their legitimacy 
in an environment that leaves little room for outright ethnic claims.  
 
2.1.4. Emigrant policies: those who left 
 
Eusko Jaurlaritza, the government of the Basque Autonomous Community, regularly 
refers in official documents and discourses to the community of ‘nine million Basques 
worldwide’. Besides encompassing the populations of the province of Bizkaia, 
Gipuzkoa and Araba, the count includes the inhabitants of the French Basque Country, 
the Spanish autonomous province of Navarra, as well as the “six million members of the 
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Basque Diaspora dispersed across the globe” (Douglas 2007: 113).  This assertion is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, it includes many residents of the jurisdiction 
of the Basque administration who do not identify as Basques. Second, it makes a 
territorial claim over kin-minorities located in a neighbouring autonomous community – 
Navarra – and state – France. Third, it relies on a gross approximation of the number of 
individuals who once resided in the contested homeland and their descendants over 
several generations. This provides a telling example of governments’ willingness to 
construct their political community irrespective of territorial boundaries, and actively 
engage the alleged national community residing outside its frontiers.  
 
In the past decades, considerable attention has been given to receiving state’s attitude 
towards immigrants, in sharp contrast with the benign neglect for the role played by 
sending states in retaining or loosening ties with their expatriates (Massey 1999). While 
this uneven level of interest comes as no surprise in the archetypal immigrant societies 
of North America, the European case is more puzzling. In the thirty years of 
unprecedented prosperity that immediately followed World War II, the relatively large-
scale settlements of labour migrants from the European periphery and what was then 
called the Third World soon overshadowed the fact that the continent had been for a 
long time the indisputable champion of emigration in all its forms. From the rush to the 
New World and imperial settlements to the mass-displacements and ethnic cleansing of 
the first half of the twentieth century, European states have historically been lands from 
which one leaves (Bade 2003). This diagnosis, however, is much less valid today, a 
decade or so after the transnational revolution that saw the proliferation of research on 
diaspora, shifting the disciplinary focus away from those who came to those who left, 
embracing both the perspective of sending and receiving countries, and witnessing the 
emergence of self-sustaining networks connecting individuals across them. But however 
dramatic this change may have been, it brought in its wake much of the epistemological 
assumption of methodological nationalism, treating ‘diasporas’ and ‘transnational 
communities’ in the same way as others had taken the existence of national and ethnic 
‘groups’ as essentially given categories (Brubaker 2006).  
 
Early scholarship on transnationalism was imbued with militant overtones, celebrating 
the declining capacity of the nation state to exercise control over citizens residing 
beyond its borders and of resident aliens. However, past the initial ecstasy for a 
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paradigmatic shift away from the essentially host society-centric literature, the scholarly 
community came to realize that transnational ties, by virtue of which “individuals 
residing beyond the frontiers may nonetheless consider themselves as fully-fledged 
members of the community” (Vertovec 2007: 7), were not a new phenomenon. Instead, 
some emphasized how they had been an important feature of the great migrations of the 
nineteenth century, characterized by high rates of return and sustained interactions 
bringing together individuals and communities living on both sides of the Atlantic 
(Bade 2003: 160-163). Others rightly observed too that the increase in transnational 
practices was not an indication of the gradual demise of the nation state as the most 
prominent locus of authority. The initial belief that the state was being overwhelmed by 
the consequences of a ‘globalization from below’ (Portes 2000), with movers creating 
dense networks connecting people irrespective of territorial borders and relying 
extensively on technological changes, was soon disappointed. Indeed, a number of 
recent studies have shed light on state-led transnational engagement policies in the 
contemporary era (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003) but also in the past (Weil & Greer 2007), 
revealing striking similarities in states’ attitudes towards their nationals abroad across 
space and time, which  recreate “citizen-sovereign relationships with expatriates, thus 
transnationalising governmentality” (Gamlen 2006: 4). From this perspective, far from 
undermining a state’s control over its population, individuals and communities residing 
beyond their frontiers have been actively and deliberately channelled, instrumentalized, 
involved or pushed aside through state-driven initiatives.  
 
While the phenomenon can be approached in a variety of ways, my intention here is to 
limit the scope of the analysis to ‘homeland-led emigrant engagement policies’ and 
examine how they relate to the broader nation-building project. As such, institutions and 
initiatives undertaken by self-identified members and their descendants across multiple 
areas of settlement are a secondary concern and shall be integrated into the analysis only 
insofar as homeland elites intervene through policies and institutions aiming at co-
opting, transforming or actively seeking to reduce their voice. Besides, I focus on 
initiatives and discourses underlying them undertaken by meso-level governments 
enjoying a large array of prerogatives in domestic politics and yet have limited room to 
intervene beyond their borders, either in the rest of the state or in the international 
realm.  
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I contend that initiatives undertaken by sub-state administrations are contingent upon 
the perceived interests of homeland governments that carefully avoid taking actions that 
could possibly undermine them. Here, I adopt the view of Myra Waterbury, according 
to which administrations “increase their engagement with specific external populations 
because it serves a specific political and strategic purpose”, as they may be perceived as 
“a set of unique cultural, material and political resources which homeland elites come to 
recognise and seek to capture” (2010: 135, my emphasis). Let me now briefly review 
the distinct resources and liabilities in the economic, cultural, and political realms that 
provide incentives as well as constraints for sub-state administrations to engage with 
their populations abroad and construct diasporas or transnational communities as 
meaningful discursive and institutional categories.  
 
Emigrants as an economic resource 
 
Governments across the world have long realized that specific groups of individuals 
residing beyond their frontiers potentially represented a formidable economic resource 
which can be channelled and incorporated into a broader strategy of socioeconomic 
development. In developing countries, the Philippines being perhaps the most telling 
example today (Castles 2004), this was translated into institutions and policies meant to 
facilitate emigration and channel the remittances of economic migrants which represent 
the country’s main source of revenue. 
  
While virtually all governments eager to strengthen their ties with specific populations 
abroad have embraced a global discourse encompassing all emigrants and their 
descendants irrespective of their socio-economic status and place of residence, actual 
initiatives have targeted a much narrower category, perceived as constituting a strategic 
resource. Hence, the all-encompassing discursive category of the ‘20 million strong 
Indian diaspora disseminated across 70 countries’ obscures the fact that diaspora 
engagement policies undertaken by the government are exclusively addressed to the 
much narrower pool of highly-skilled expatriates employed in knowledge-intensive 
sectors in the United States, and to a lesser extent Britain (Pandey et al. 2006). On the 
other hand, it intentionally excludes low-skilled expatriates settled in South East Asia 
and nationals residing in politically sensitive neighbouring countries such as Pakistan. 
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In the economic realm, sub-state administrations can institutionalize international 
networks gathering self-identified members of the community and acting as a bridge 
between homeland businesses and foreign markets. The burgeoning literature on the 
link between emigration and development suggests that communities of expatriates and 
their descendants can be mobilized around a common economic project and stimulate 
domestic growth through knowledge transfers, business networks, or philanthropic 
initiatives (Kutznetsov et al 2006). The transnational perspective has gradually become 
the dominant paradigm in international organizations eager to promote the positive 
aspects associated with emigration, which for long had been almost exclusively 
envisaged as detrimental to sending territories emptied of their forces vives.    
 
The cultural dilemma 
 
Sub-state governments may also have a perceived interest in formalizing and 
strengthening their relationship with specific sections of their populations abroad in 
order to diffuse, increase and strengthen the visibility of the national culture. However, 
transnational communities may represent a liability rather than a resource for homeland 
elites pursuing a territorial-nation building project in the homeland. Indeed, emigrants 
and their descendants develop a distinct identity which, because it cannot be sustained 
by a complex and potent linkage of territorially-based institutions, is disconnected from 
the experience of everyday life in the homeland. Although this phenomenon is by no 
means universal, individuals interested in cultivating their hyphenated identity are more 
likely to emphasize traditional and folkloric artefacts imbued with ethnic undertones 
rather than develop interest in the vibrant cultural scene the homeland government is 
desperately trying to promote. Gloria Totoricaguëna found for instance that the 
overwhelming majority of Basque institutions abroad have promoted “a conservative, 
traditional delineation focusing on ancestry, quite nostalgic and folkloric and centered 
on cultural traditions and history” (2007: 239). In consequence, their interests can 
hardly be reconciled with the goals of the Basque government which seeks to project the 
Basque Country “in its post-Franco ultramodern presence” as a “post-modern service-
industry society” (ibid. 253) while at the same time actively defending a territorial 
conception of membership in order to defuse residual tensions along ethnic and 
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linguistic lines in the homeland42. Besides, the resources needed to maintain distinct 
cultural markers among territorially-dispersed emigrants, whether through language 
training, cultural associations or schools abroad, are necessarily high and the outcome 
uncertain, which militates against a homeland-driven project. Instead, these activities 
are often undertaken by emigrants themselves through civil society associations, the 
importance of which depends upon their ability to mobilize resources, their degree of 
attachment to their homeland, and the tangible benefits that maintaining a distinct 
culture can entail in their country of residence as well as in their relationship with 
homeland institutions.  
 
Political engagement: opening Pandora’s Box 
 
More importantly for our purpose, political elites and governments can also actively 
seek to engage specific sections of the diaspora in homeland politics. In countries where 
expatriates are entitled to vote at local or meso-level elections, political parties have an 
incentive to compete for their votes by campaigning abroad, although emigrants tend to 
adopt more volatile electoral behaviour. They rarely pay taxes in the homeland, are not 
directly subject to most of the decisions undertaken there, as they only apply within a 
territorially-defined jurisdiction, and are likely to be more concerned with the prestige 
and tangible benefits they may acquire from political parties that sought their support 
rather than by actual socio-political developments in the homeland (Osteergard-Nielsen 
2003).  
 
In some instances, emigrants have literally hijacked local and meso-level elections, 
tipping the balance in favour of political parties that failed to attract a majority of 
resident voters. Until the 2010 electoral reform in Spain, close to 350,000 Spanish 
citizens living abroad whose ultimate locality of residence (or that of their ascendants in 
the case of second and third generation emigrants) was in the Autonomous Community 
of Galicia were entitled to vote in local elections, representing up to 15% of the 
electoral registry43, a figure which rose to 45% in certain localities. The state-wide 
centre-right party Partido popular, which enjoys considerable resources and well-
                                               
42. This point is further developed in chapter VIII, Section 8.2.1. where I contrast the Catalan and Basque approaches 
to citizenship in relation to immigrants.  
43. ‘El censo electoral Gallego crece a un ritmo de 1650 emigrantes al mes’ in La Voz de Galicia, March 8, 2011. 
More than a 100,000 voters registered on the Galician electoral census live in Argentina, and the latter is commonly 
referred to as “the fifth Galician province”. 
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established networks overseas, has benefited disproportionately from the vote of 
Galician citizens abroad, whereas the nationalist party BNG has been adversely 
affected. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, president of the Galician government between 1990 
and 2005 and former minister of the Franco government, cultivated strong links with the 
‘Community of 10 million Gallegos’. He has animated a dense clientelist network 
spanning mainly but not only Latin American countries. There are, however, strong 
incentives for elites pursuing a territorial nation-building project not to expand, and in 
some circumstances actively seek to contract, the membership boundary with specific 
sections of their populations abroad. This can be either because they have diverging 
political interests, or because the cost of retaining ties with them proves too high. 
Regarding the first factor, the case of Québec discussed at length in the next section 
shows that the rise of a territorial nation-building project in the 1960s came at the price 
of loosening ties with French Canadian elites and institutions located in the rest of the 
state, whose interest in preserving the myth of two territorially-dispersed founding 
nations could hardly be reconciled with the Québec territorial project. As for the second 
argument, the Galician example is quite telling. The recent decision of the Spanish 
Parliament to curtail non-resident citizens’ electoral rights was actually supported by 
large sections of homeland elites, who perceived the cost of maintaining extensive ties 
for mere electoral calculations as being excessively high, especially in an adverse 
economic climate44.  
 
2.2.  Comparative framework 
 
 
 
2.2.1. The territorial politics of migration in Québec 
 
 
Québec was selected as a shadow case for two reasons: First, the migration/nationalism 
nexus in the Canadian province has been particularly well covered, and the broad 
patterns of its historical and contemporary development can be briefly reviewed by 
relying exclusively on secondary sources. Second, the Québec case is instructive insofar 
as political boundaries have shifted dramatically over the past fifty years, from 
                                               
44. Manuel Friga Iraberne provided financial assistance to those established in Argentina during the 2001 economic 
crisis, in spite of the fact that the Autonomous Community of Galicia figures among the least economically 
developed Spanish regions. 
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embracing all French Canadians irrespective of their province of residence, to a 
primarily territorial conception of membership, encompassing the resident population of 
the Québec state. While the conflict opposing the province to the central administration 
has not lost any of its intensity and the Parti Québécois (PQ) has not put aside its 
secessionist ambitions, the ethnic and exclusionary overtones of early nationalist claims 
have gradually faded away, even though the commitment of Québec elites to a territorial 
nation-building project still competes with an ethnic core inherited from the 
movement’s conservative origins. 
 
Boundary-making strategies in a historical perspective 
 
In the past fifty years, the basis of national identity has shifted from that of French 
Canadian, underpinned by the Catholic Church, the Parish and language, to that of 
Québécois, territorially-based (Keating 2001a). The 1960s Quiet Revolution has often 
been wrongly interpreted as Québec’s delayed entry into modernity, neglecting the fact 
that modernization processes were already well advanced beforehand. More accurately, 
the national question was then monopolized by conservative forces, which saw the 
preservation of a predominantly rural society as the only way of avoiding unilateral 
assimilation, and subsequent loss of a collective identity, in the overwhelmingly 
English-speaking industrial and business sectors. Indeed, Francophones living in 
Québec and beyond in the rest of Canada have been historically subject to 
discrimination, notably in the realms of education, employment and language, and could 
not rely on state institutions to advance their sectional interests (Rocher 2002). 
Following the conquest of New France by British troops after the Seven Years War 
(1760), provincial institutions were dismantled. After having flirted with the idea of 
forced assimilation, the Parliament of Great Britain issued the Québec Act in 1770 re-
establishing the official use of French as well as French Civil Law. Yet, despite 
subsequent legislative recognition and accommodation of Québec’s French heritage, 
Canadian trade and political elites were still overwhelmingly Anglophone until the 
second half of the twentieth century, including in Québec, and most especially in 
Montréal45.  
 
                                               
45. See Pierre Drouilly’s volume (1996) L’espace social de Montréal (1951-1991) for an exhaustive account of the 
transformation of the constellation of linguistic, social, and economic cleavages in the Québec Capital since the 
resurgence of the national question.  
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Since the nineteenth century, the most pervasive issue for French Canadian elites has 
been emigration, whereas their Anglophone homologues have primarily been concerned 
with overseas immigration. Writing in 1961, the demographer Albert Faucher saw 
“emigration as the most significant event in nineteenth century French-Canadian 
history.”46 In 1840, the overall population of British North America amounted to 750, 
000, about half of whom were French-speaking and Roman Catholics (Zolberg 2007: 
47). By 2001, the proportion of self-identified Francophones barely represented 22% of 
the overall population, a steady decline nurtured by uneven immigration and emigration 
patterns. The strong sense of peoplehood that bound French Canadians together made 
the issue of emigration more pervasive than among their Anglophone fellow-
countrymen. The colonization of Quebec by “brothers and sisters” living in exile has 
been a long-standing concern of the provincial government, which saw the considerable 
flow of Francophones to the economically booming United States between 1890 and 
1940 as a “threat to the living forces of our race” (Ramirez 2007: 216). While the flow 
considerably diminished in the wake of the Great Depression, it never entirely dried out 
and has remained until today a contentious issue. Besides, it was common among 
Québec intellectuals to accuse the federal government of intending to overwhelm the 
homeland with English-speaking immigrants. Although these grievances have gradually 
disappeared as the province has gained more leverage to run its own immigration 
policy, the belief that English-speaking Canada acquired its demographic predominance 
over Francophones through immigration has left a profound imprint on public debates 
and policy-making over past decades (Winter 2008).  
 
As a paradigmatic settlers’ society, Canada never ceased to attract large numbers of 
immigrants, especially as the economic gap between former British North America 
and the United States progressively narrowed. In 2006, those officially categorized as 
members of ‘visible minorities’ amounted to 16.2% of the total population, against 
13.4% five years earlier (Canadian Census figures, 2006). By 2031, the foreign-born 
population is expected to rise to 28%, with a higher proportion in Western provinces, 
and notably British Columbia where inflows from Asian countries have been 
particularly vigorous in recent decades (Beaujot et al. 2007).  But this has not always 
been so, as until 1962, the federal government pursued an immigration policy 
                                               
46. Quoted in Paquet and Smith (1983: 423), my translation.  
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discriminating against Asians, Blacks and later Jews, on similar lines as the notorious 
White Australia Policy.47 Non-racial selection criteria were then adopted and by 1967, 
a points-based system was introduced in order to maximize ‘Skills Matching’ between 
prospective migrants and labour market needs, and thus mitigate the detrimental 
economic consequences of a long-standing pattern whereby the most skilled migrants 
from Europe opted for the US. Therefore, the migration question in Canada has been 
framed against the backdrop of a settlers’ society controlling an immense territory, 
whose capacity to attract immigrants has historically been undermined by its 
geographic proximity to an economic giant. Accordingly, federal elites’ immigration 
strategy has primarily been guided by pragmatic considerations, the so-called ‘cost and 
benefit’ rationale underlying policy-making at federal level since the 1960s. In relative 
terms, the drain of the forces vives from Québec has been historically much more 
pronounced than in the rest of Canada, and its perceived cost not limited to the 
economic realm. Instead, it has been portrayed as a threat to the very survivance of the 
fait français in North America and until the Quiet Revolution contributed to maintain 
an ethnicized French Canadian identity, left with no option but to cultivate a pre-
modern lifestyle, as upward socio-economic mobility almost necessarily meant 
assimilating into the Anglophone mainstream.  
 
Immigration policies: controlling the territorial boundary 
 
Things began to change in 1960, when the victory of the Liberal party challenged 
Maurice Duplessis’ ideology imbued with a parochial and rural vision of French 
Canadian identity. The Liberal government initiated an ambitious state-building strategy 
aiming at modernizing the province and inverting the economic domination of 
Anglophones, an objective well encapsulated in the slogan ‘devenir maîtres chez nous’. 
A corollary concern was to jugulate the growth of the number of Anglophones in the 
province, either in the form of continued immigration or through the deliberate switch 
of rationally-motivated native French-speakers abandoning their language or refraining 
from passing it to their descendants in order to enhance their socio-economic status 
(Arel 2001, see also Laitin 200748). But the complete closure of the territorial boundary 
                                               
47. Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact sheet 8: Abolition of the White 
Australia Policy, [consulted on line on April 20, 2010].   
48. In chapter II of his book Nations, State and Violence published in 2007, David Laitin applied Schelling’s tipping 
point model to linguistic patterns for ‘Russians in the Near Abroad’ and ‘internal migrants’ in Catalonia. As 
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was not even considered, as Québec’s road to economic expansion was seen both as the 
most effective solution to limit the haemorrhage of natives and was closely dependent 
upon attracting foreign labour. Second, apart from the institutional difficulties it 
entailed, complete closure would have undermined the Liberal party’s progressive 
agenda, and subsequent efforts to turn cultural decay into a viable political project. As a 
result, the provincial government sought to stimulate inward flows of preferably skilled 
French-speaking workers with the aim of reconciling its economic and cultural 
aspirations.  
 
The outcome was the creation in 1967 of a Québec Ministry of Immigration, and a 
series of federal-provincial agreements designed to enable Québec to exercise greater 
control over the selection and recruitment of immigrants. The conquest of immigration 
competencies was initiated in 1971, deepened in 1978 and culminated in 1991 with the 
Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens. 
The latter officially aimed to guarantee “the preservation of Québec’s demographic 
importance within Canada and the integration of immigrants to that province in a 
manner that respects the distinct identity of Québec.”49 Within the Canadian points-
based immigration framework, the government of Québec has been able to modulate the 
selection criteria, thereby giving prominent weight to applicants’ ability to speak French 
while downgrading the relative significance of skills and education. This strategy was 
complemented by a dense and well-funded network of provincial offices abroad, 
reminiscent of Canadian recruiting agents travelling through Europe in search of 
potential settlers in the 1920s (Harper 1998). But the positive impact of a sustained 
influx remained counterbalanced by enduring emigration of natives and immigrants 
alike to the rest of Canada and to a lesser degree the United States. Indeed, immigrants 
in Québec are more likely to leave in the first year after their arrival than in Ontario, and 
Québec-born movers to speak English only (Devoretz et al. 2008). Besides, the number 
of exits far exceeded the number of entries between Québec and the rest of Canada 
between 1962 and 1998, 1988 being the only year when the net migration balance came 
                                                                                                                                                   
individuals expect others to invest in new attributes (i.e. the ability to speak Catalan), they feel the urge to do the 
same in order to upgrade or at least maintain their socio-economic status. Whilst in my view Laitin’s model is fairly 
disconnected from the Catalan experience, there is some truth in the assertion that language shifts in multilingual 
societies are partly driven by actors’ strategic calculations. This point shall be discussed more extensively in chapter 
IV, section 4.3.  
49. Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of aliens, Gouvernement du Québec, 
p. 2.  
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close to zero. Over the entire period, Québec’s net loss of residents to the rest of the 
country amounted to more than 610,000 people, the times of greatest net outflows 
corresponding to the “periodic flare-ups in Québec’s cultural laws and referenda on 
sovereignty, with the overall peak occurring during the passage of the first language 
laws, and the 1980 referendum” (Stevenson 2000: 64).50  
 
The consequences for the Québec national movement have been twofold. First, it has 
constituted a net loss of painfully-acquired human capital. This in turn calls for further 
opening of entry channels from abroad, thus increasing the risk of reawakening a native 
backlash instrumentalizing the culturally-rooted fear of ‘minorization’ (Arel 2001). 
Second, the relatively higher rate of emigration from Anglophones is but one 
manifestation of the resilient conflict opposing the Québec Francophone majority to 
internal minorities. To a considerable extent, the term ‘Québécois’ once synonymous 
with French-Canadians living in Québec has acquired a territorial dimension, 
encompassing Anglophone minorities re-labeled as ‘Anglo-Quebeckers’. But opinion 
polls carried out in the run-up to the 1995 referendum over independence indicated that 
merely 6% of Anglo-Quebeckers intended to vote Yes, against 14.5% of Allophones 
(Gagné et al. 2003: 36). In this respect, Québec looks rather like a consociation, in 
which a sizeable linguistic minority enjoys a wide array of cultural rights but does not 
identify with the national project and manifests its disagreement either through exit 
(emigration) or voice (opposition to independence). The proportion of self-reported 
Anglophones in Québec decreased from 13.8% in 1951 to 8.5% in 1996 and that of 
Allophones represented 9.3% of the population in 1996. In 2001 the Québec 
government published a three-year plan for immigration which pursues the objective of 
increasing the share of highly skilled and French-speaking immigrants, and the most 
recent developments suggest that this aim has been met (Blad et al. 2009).  
 
Immigrants into Québécois 
 
By contrast with its far-reaching competencies in regulating immigration, Québec has 
no control over the gate to citizenship, the status of full and equal membership in the 
province being conditional upon the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. The federal 
                                               
50. This statement corroborates Caldwell and Obermeir’s study (1978) which found that between 1971 and 1976, 
some 33% of Anglophone youth emigrated, a figure much higher than the proportion of Allophones (19%). 
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government has skillfully used this prerogative to build allegiance to the Canadian 
nation among new citizens. The minimum length of residence required to become a 
citizen is only four years, among the lowest in industrialized countries. In addition, 
immigrants have to swear a Citizenship oath51 to Canada, which can be pronounced 
either in French or in English, and “virtually all of them have highlighted the emotion 
they felt during the ceremony, although they did not necessarily expect it” (Gagnon 
2009: 46). Following the failure of the 1995 referendum – notoriously attributed by the 
Québec Prime Minister Jacques Parizeau to “money and the ethnic vote”52 – the 
Ministry of Relations with Citizens and Immigration was created in order to dismiss 
residual ambiguities regarding the inclusiveness of the nation-building project. The 
notion of Québec citizenship gradually gained currency in political discourses, 
promoting a more individualistic mode of belonging and pursuing the objective of 
instilling a common purpose and fostering solidarity among Québec’s increasingly 
diverse population. The Provincial Assembly adopted its own Charte des droits et 
libertés de la personne in 1976, six years before the federal state adopted a pan-
Canadian Charter of Rights, providing internal minorities with constitutional 
guarantees, including in the case of independence. Besides, there is evidence that 
provincial elites have sought to upgrade the rights of non-citizens who receive more 
subsidized human capital benefits in the form of education, language training, and skills 
certification than in any other province in Canada (Devoretz et al. 2008: 364).  
 
Linguistic divisions within the homeland have influenced considerably public debates 
and policies over immigrant integration in Québec. In 1977, the infamous Bill 101 (Loi 
101), adopted under the leadership of the PQ, imposed French as the only language of 
education in public schools for immigrants and their descendants, except for those 
whose children were already enrolled in English-speaking schools. The legislation was 
perceived by some as an unfortunate necessity to preserve the fait français in North 
America and by others as another illustration of nationalist intransigence (Magnet 
1990). Besides, this differential treatment of autochthonous ‘Anglo-Quebeckers’ and 
                                               
51. The oath reads as follows: “I swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth 
II, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfill my 
duties as a Canadian citizen.” 
52. Jacques Parizeau, unable to contain his disappointment, declared : « C’est vrai qu’on a été battus, au fond, par 
quoi? Par l’argent et le vote ethnique, essentiellement. Alors cela veut dire que la prochaine fois, au lieu d’être 60 ou 
61% à voter OUI, on sera 63 ou 64%, et que cela suffira. N’oubliez pas que les trois cinquièmes de ce que nous 
sommes ont voté OUI » (quoted in Lecours 2000 : 163, my emphasis). 
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‘immigrants’ shows the extent to which categories inform political practices, distinct 
groups being entitled to distinct rights according to how they are being categorized. On 
the one hand, the Québécois nation-building project could not be achieved at the 
expense of Anglophone minorities, not so much by virtue of their ancestors having 
inhabited the land for centuries, the reason officially invoked, but rather as a result of a 
collective identity pre-dating the Quiet Revolution, their exceptional organizational 
resources and privileged relationship with the federal government53. By contrast, newly-
established immigrants have been expected to ‘integrate’ into the pre-existing political 
community, most of the controversy stemming from the latter’s contentious definition 
and boundaries54. The resident population of Québec is therefore made up of a complex 
mosaic of distinct categories that have progressively been institutionalized and 
condition the individual’s relationship to the different tiers of government. 
 
The most interesting dimension of the migration-nationalism nexus in Québec has to do 
with the rival frames of integration forcefully propagated by both levels of government. 
In Canada, multiculturalism was adopted as the official doctrine in 1971 in order to 
promote a pan-Canadian national identity based on the pluralism of the country. 
Indigenous groups and Québecois nationalists were initially fiercely opposed to 
multiculturalism which they saw as a means to dilute their specificity and an attempt by 
the federal state to co-opt immigrants into an English-speaking majority. In response, 
the Québec government sought to create its own model of integration, based on the 
premise that “a clear affirmation of the French-speaking community and institutions as 
the pivot for the integration of newcomers is essential if the enduring reality of the 
French fact is to be assured in Québec.”55 The term ‘interculturalism’ emerged at this 
time to stress how pre-existing ethno-cultural norms should serve as the dominant social 
context into which immigrants must integrate, by contrast with Canadian 
multiculturalism, which places more emphasis on the recognition of cultural pluralism 
(Rocher et al. 2007: 40). In other words, it pursues the difficult task of maintaining a 
distinct French cultural foundation while at the same time promoting immigration-
induced pluralism. For Joseph Carens (2000) the only distinctive cultural commitment 
                                               
53. Tens of thousands of American Loyalists fled to Québec following US independence.  
54. Bill 101 was not retroactive and entitled immigrants already settled in Québec whose children were already 
enrolled in English-speaking schools to retain the right to choose. 
55.  Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble : énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et d’intégration, Ministère des 
Communautés Culturelles et de l’Immigration, Gouvernement du Québec, p. 17. This Policy plan was preceded by 
Autant de façons d’être Québécois, published as early as 1981.   
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that Québec requires of immigrants for full social membership is knowledge of French. 
Hence, immigrants can be full members of Québec’s distinct society even if they “look 
and act differently from the substantial segment of the population whose ancestors 
inhabited Québec and even if they do not in any way alter their own customs (…) so 
long as they act within the confines of the law” (ibid.: 125). After 2003 and the election 
of the federalist PLQ, the Québec intercultural policy has adopted a more explicitly 
communitarian dimension, embracing the idiom of cultural communities (Labelle et al. 
2009). For instance, the celebrations of ‘Citizenship Week’ formerly introduced by the 
PQ government have given way to the ‘Intercultural Week’56, French language apart, 
strikingly similar to Canadian multiculturalism. To be sure, the so-called ‘intercultural 
model’ so vocally defended by the Québec government does not come without problems 
in a society which has long feared for its ‘survivance’. In 2006, the Québec Prime 
Minister, confronted with rising social tensions, and the sudden breakthrough of a 
populist party, launched the Taylor-Bouchard commission,57 charged with the difficult 
task of examining the ‘accommodements raisonnables’ that ought to be accorded on 
religious or cultural grounds. The adoption by the French Parliament in May 2010 of a 
law prohibiting the wearing of the integral veil, more colloquially referred to as the 
Burqa, in public spaces reignited the controversy in Québec, although legislative 
changes have to date not been undertaken58. Overall, it seems that the debate in Québec 
has been framed in a way that is more akin to Continental Europe than the rest of 
Canada.  
 
‘French Canadians’ into ‘dead ducks’ 
 
There is a dense literature on the Québec government’s paradiplomatic activities, which 
have important ramifications in the economic, cultural and political realms and are 
closely associated with the broader territorial nation-building project (Keating 2001a, 
Lecours 2000, Lachappelle 2003). The government successfully sought to use its 
competencies in order to develop extensive relations with international organizations, 
French-speaking countries (notably through the preponderant role of Québec in the 
Organisation International de la Francophonie) and other self-proclaimed stateless 
                                               
56. Literally « Semaine québécoise des rencontres interculturelles. »  
57. Officially, the  Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodement reliées aux différences 
culturelles.   
58. Philippe Munch, ‘Lever le voile’, in Le devoir (Montréal), January 28, 2010.   
 79 
 
nations and federated governments, chiefly the Catalan Generalitat and the Flemish 
regional government. By contrast, emigrants and/or their descendants residing beyond 
the frontiers of the Canadian state have not been targeted through a comprehensive set 
of policies constituting a genuine diaspora strategy. Indeed, retaining ties with 
expatriates does not figure among the aims and objectives of the Ministère des Relations 
Internationales, the strategy of which being mainly elite-oriented59 and focusing on 
traditional diplomatic channels. To be sure, the Ambassade de la Délégation Générale 
du Québec in Paris constitutes a powerful interface with citizens living in what was 
once considered as a kin-state.  
 
But the evolution of the relationship between the Québec government and organizations 
defending the interests of French-Canadians or emigrants from Québec residing 
elsewhere in Canada is far more instructive. French Canadians, territorially-dispersed 
across provinces, are evidently not all emigrants or descendants of emigrants born in 
Québec, but today’s manifestation of historical patterns of colonial settlement across 
North America. They tend to be concentrated in a few provinces, representing, 
according to census figures for 2001, 11.6% of the population in British Columbia, 
11.2% in Ontario and 16.2% in Nova Scotia, against 75% in Québec. In the nineteenth 
century, up to 900,000 Francophones migrated to the United States, mainly to New 
England, but were gradually assimilated into the Anglophone mainstream. However, 
Québec has long played the symbolic and political role of a motherland where French-
speakers represented a critical mass and were therefore in a privileged position to ensure 
the survival and continuity of the fait français in North America. As argued earlier, the 
national movement from the late nineteenth century until the 1960s sought to protect the 
rights of French-speakers irrespective of their province of residence, with elites based in 
Québec playing a preponderant role in the national struggle. The period was marked by 
intense solidarity and close ties between elites across Québec, the state of Ontario, and 
to a lesser extent beyond. This was reflected in the development of a French Canadian 
institutional apparatus, the purpose of which being to defend and promote the rights of 
                                               
59. The main aim of the Québec Ministère des Relations Internationales is “to promote and defend Québec’s interests 
internationally while ensuring respect for its authority and the consistency of government activities”, with an explicit 
focus on “international organizations” and “other governments and influential networks of nations, federated states, 
or priority regions.” (Mission statement, ministère des relations internationales du Québec, www.gouv.qc.ca, 
[consulted online on January 15, 2011].  
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‘French Canadians’, a category coined and propagated in the nineteenth century by 
French-speaking elites.  
 
However, the situation changed radically with the Quiet Revolution and the victory of 
the Liberal party which brought to power self-proclaimed neo-nationalists who 
deliberately shifted from a pan-Canadian non-territorial strategy to a territorial project 
confined to the Québec state. Gradually, yesterday’s ‘sisters and brothers’ and 
privileged partners in their crusade for the recognition of the rights of all French 
Canadians turned into ‘dead ducks’ and the ‘cadavres encore chauds’ of the 
confederation, ‘tombeau des minorités’ (Martel 1997: 18). As the boundaries of the 
nation were being contracted from the whole of Canada to what became in the 1960s the 
state of Québec, the interests of those who spoke in the name of French Canadians and 
Québécois started to diverge, until they literally clashed and became durably 
irreconcilable. As long as Francophone elites were struggling for the survival of the 
French language over subsequent generations, the alliance between homeland elites in 
Québec and the representatives of territorially-dispersed Francophones was perceived as 
a necessity. These ties were embedded in well-funded institutions such as the Conseil de 
la survivance de la vie francaise en Amérique, which was then dissolved in 1962 when 
the Québec government, its main financial contributor, stepped out of the initiative. The 
Council militated for state-wide bilingualism, an objective that was increasingly at odds 
with the Québec government’s strategy of turning Québec into a primarily French-
speaking territory, even if this came with the price of abandoning bilingualism in the 
rest of Canada. Francophone elites in Ontario were particularly concerned with the 
gradual emancipation of Québec and the neo-nationalist project, “downgrading the myth 
according to which Canada was born on a pact made between two equal non-territorial 
nations sharing a single state” and substituting it with the one of “two territorially-based 
nation-states” (ibid. 162). The conflict between Francophone communities and Québec 
nationalists became more prominent in the late-1980s, was exacerbated by the tense 
negotiations over the 1987 Meech Lake agreements and reached a climax in 1995 on the 
eve of the referendum over independence, when the Federation of Francophone and 
Acadian Communities in Canada launched a large-scale campaign reiterating its 
attachment to the confederation and fierce opposition to secession. For the advocates of 
independence, the federation was not only pursuing divergent objectives but was also 
the ally of the federal government, accused of funding the campaign. These tensions 
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were made particularly acute by the memory of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who 
sought to strengthen the use of the French language in federal institutions in order to 
stimulate bilingualism and counter the Québec nationalist claim to constitute the only 
viable Francophone enclave. 
 
Nowadays, representatives of Francophone minorities primarily address their claims to 
the federal government and promote an identity which is increasingly associated with 
the province they inhabit, Franco-Columbians, Franco-Manitobans, Franco-Ontarians 
etc having a different flag and relating to distinct tiers of government through distinct 
institutional arrangements according to the relative openness of the opportunity 
structure in each arena (Schmachtel 2003).   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This brief review of the territorial politics of migration in Québec corroborates to a great 
extent our hypothesis. Québec nationalists have indeed sought to reconcile migration-
related concerns with their aim of acquiring further territorial autonomy from the federal 
state and in the case of PQ, outright independence. Immigrants have been “solicited, 
politicized and ultimately instrumentalized by politicians who use them for their own 
aims of consolidating the identity within their respective spaces” (Labelle et al. 2009: 
75). Likewise, the development of the territorial project in Québec came at the price of 
abandoning the historical link with representatives of French Canada who pursued 
diverging interests. The provincial government has used migration-related policies as a 
means to gain further internal legitimacy, by rallying immigrants to their cause and 
neutralizing potential claims to self-determination by internal minorities, and external 
legitimacy, by challenging the federal state in its own normative space. By couching 
their demands in civic terms, and providing internal minorities with constitutional 
guarantees akin to the most advanced liberal democracies, they mitigated considerably 
inter-ethnic tensions within the homeland, although support for independence remains 
much more popular among the Québécois de souche than ethno-cultural minorities. 
 
While it appears evident that nationalist elites have consciously acted as territorial 
entrepreneurs, they have competed with a state-wide nation-building project that proved 
to be particularly effective. The multicultural doctrine adopted at federal level has 
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constituted an attractive option for immigrants, be they in Québec or in the rest of 
Canada. Besides, recent developments suggest that Québec’s balancing act between the 
preservation of its French heritage and the promotion of cultural pluralism does not 
come without difficulties, manifest in the sudden breakthrough of Action Démocratique 
du Québec which combines an autonomist middle-ground between PLQ federalists and 
PQ sovereignists with a tougher stance on migration-related issues and an ambitious 
pro-natality agenda as a substitute for the current immigration policy60. The Parti 
Québécois, that presents itself as social-democratic has been able to gain some support 
among immigrants and internal minorities on ideological grounds. However, its 
uncompromising commitment to independence has encouraged the party to stress 
cultural markers in its definition of national boundaries and to construct Québécois and 
Canadian identities as mutually exclusive. In consequence, electoral data show that 
there is still a strong correlation between ‘PQ voters’ and ‘French as a mother tongue’ 
(Lecours 2000: 161). By contrast, the federalist PLQ currently in office has been better 
able to articulate consistently a territorial conception of nationhood, and therefore to 
attract a considerable share of the ‘ethnic vote’. Ultimately, ethnic cleavages associated 
to the national question cut across social and cultural cleavages, which singularly 
mitigates opposition related to the definition of the political community, a phenomenon 
which can be largely attributed to the consolidation of territorially-bounded institutions 
that turned Québec into a “quasi-nation-state” (Gagné et al. 2003: 7). 
 
2.2.2. Scotland and Catalonia compared 
 
 
In Catalonia and Scotland, the emergence, diffusion and consolidation of a nation-
building project has been accompanied, at least since the 1970s, with an elite-driven 
conscious attempt to accommodate immigration-induced pluralism by promoting an 
overarching identity constructed around a common territorial interest. This attitude is 
underpinned by the myth of the ‘Terra de Pas’ in Catalonia and that of the ‘Mongrel 
Nation’ in Scotland, relayed and diffused by journalists and intellectuals alike and 
permeating the public debate. Nationalist leaders in both instances have polished their 
                                               
60. Party Manifesto, available on www.adq.qc.ca, [consulted online on January 12, 2011]. Although the party has 
often been accused of populism and racism by its competitors, it is far from constituting a radical right-wing party as 
defined by Mudde (2008), and can by no means be compared with the French Front National, the British BNP, or for 
that matter any of the radical right-wing parties that have proliferated and encountered growing success across a 
number of European states over the past decade.  
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civic credentials, although the salience of the linguistic boundary in Catalonia has made 
its cultural manifestations more explicit. They are by no means the most difficult cases 
of protracted nationalist mobilization, and I do not contend that they constitute a 
blueprint for examining the nationalism/migration nexus across time and space. 
However, an in-depth comparison of empirical developments in both cases provides 
fertile ground to identify the favourable factors conducive to a predominantly 
territorializing boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants and emigrants.  
 
They share a number of similarities that facilitate their systematic comparison. For 
Rokkan, they both constituted clear examples of “failed-centre peripheries that tried to 
build up their own core structures but fell victim to more effective drives of 
incorporation launched by other centres” (1983: 28). They are both self-proclaimed 
stateless nations with identities which find their roots in the Middle-Ages, and 
nationalist cleavages that cut across socioeconomic and ideological lines. They have 
been leaders of processes of devolution that have had profound constitutional 
implications and affected the rest of their respective states. In their domestic politics, 
they treat themselves as similar, with leaders showing interest in one another, 
conferences and public events focusing on each other, their media regularly covering 
their respective news and political developments. Since 2002, government officials and 
experts have met regularly and cooperated on a variety of public-policy fields through a 
number of official and unofficial networks. In 2008, a meeting of representatives from 
Flanders, Québec, Scotland and Catalonia was held with the aim of sharing good 
practices and discussing mutual experiences in matters of immigration. This was 
formalized in 2009, through the creation of an official framework whereby their 
respective governments agreed to meet on a regular basis to exchange information about 
immigration and integration policies.  
 
Today, the Scottish government and the Generalitat enjoy similar competences in a 
broad spectrum of domestic policies and have much more limited room to manoeuvre in 
the international realm. The formal distribution of migration-related competencies 
between the different tiers of government in a devolved Scotland and Catalonia reflects 
a similar pattern. In the past decade, sub-state administrations have sought to gain some 
leverage in immigration policies, but were firmly rebuffed by their respective central 
states which jealously retained control over what they interpreted as acts of sovereignty.  
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Likewise, the rules of acquisition of citizenship and the regulation of alien status have 
remained the exclusive competence of the central administration. By contrast, 
immigrant integration policies cut across a number of policy areas that are devolved 
such as education, lifelong learning, health, social care services and housing, which 
provides considerable scope for policy divergence. Besides, while they have no control 
over emigrants’ formal status, they are both engaged in paradiplomatic activities 
providing them with opportunities to maintain meaningful ties with their expatriates and 
their descendants through transnational policies with ramifications in the cultural, 
economic and political realms (Adelcoa et al. 1999). 
 
Their respective states also share a number of similarities. In geographic terms, the 
Iberian Peninsula and Britain are equally isolated from Continental Europe and neither's 
territory today covers the totality of their respective geographic spaces. Indeed, the 
Republic of Ireland gained its independence in the 1920s and Portugal recovered its 
sovereignty in 1668, eighty years after the creation of the Iberian Union. They both 
share a glorious imperial past which left a lasting imprint on the world as it is today as 
well as on their current foreign policy and respective nationality legislation. Rokkan61 
(1982) defined the United Kingdom and Spain as paradigmatic Union states, 
distinguishing them from unitary states, although acknowledging that the Spanish centre 
pursued a much more aggressive nation-building project than Britain. While the 
conditions under which the Union came about are in some respects comparable, later 
developments in the relationship of Catalonia and Scotland with their respective states 
followed radically different paths. While the 1707 Act of Union enabled the Scots to 
conceive of themselves as minor partners in dominating the British Empire, the Catalans 
were militarily vanquished in 1714 and the territory was incorporated into a formally 
centralized state until 1978, with some brief periods of political autonomy in between. 
Unlike Scottish devolution which came about under the auspices of a long-established 
parliamentary democracy, the Spanish decentralization process ran in parallel with the 
democratic transition following forty years of dictatorship. While the United Kingdom 
was in the front line of two solidarity-forging world wars and the post-1945 
                                               
61. “A union state is not the result of straightforward dynastic conquest. Incorporation of at least parts of its territory 
has been achieved through personal dynastic union, for example by treaty, marriage or inheritance. Integration is less 
than perfect. While administrative standardization prevails over most of the territory, the consequences of personal 
union entail the survival in some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which preserve some 
degree of regional autonomy and serve as agencies of indigenous elite recruitment” (Rokkan & Urwin, 1982: 11).  
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consolidation of the welfare state, the Spaniards saw feelings of mutual trust severely 
damaged by the experience of the Civil War and subsequent decades of dictatorship.  
 
Importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, their experience of migration flows 
could hardly be more different, illustrating territorially uneven patterns of economic 
development since the nineteenth century. Spain has long conceived of itself as a 
country from which one leaves, and the UK as one to which one comes. On the 
contrary, shifting the unit of analysis from the state to the sub-state level reverses this 
trend, as Catalonia has since the late nineteenth century been subject to intense waves of 
internal influx, whereas Scotland has historically been a land of protracted emigration. 
In relative terms, the Catalan population went from representing 11% of that of Spain as 
a whole in 1900 to 16% in 2010. In sharp contrast, the resident population of Scotland 
shrank from representing 12% of the UK in 1901 to 8% today.  
 
Between 1911 and 1930, 600,000 people settled in Catalonia from other parts of Spain. 
Between 1950 and 1975, this figure reached 1.4 million, the majority coming from 
Andalusia, Murcia and Galicia, so that by 1975, 38% of the Catalan resident population 
was born elsewhere in Spain. The influx almost completely dried out between 1975 and 
1990, the net migration balance throughout this period being consistently negative. 
However, it began again by the middle of the decade and gained considerable vigour at 
the turn of the century. Unlike in earlier periods, immigrants no longer came from the 
rest of Spain but from a variety of countries. By 2010, the proportion of foreign-born 
residents amounted to 16.2% of the population, against 2% a decade earlier. Out of the 
1.2 million foreign residents, almost a quarter come from Africa, another quarter from 
Latin America, and another 15% from Asia.  The same year, official figures released by 
IDESCAT revealed that 19.7% of the population residing in Catalonia was born in 
another part of Spain and 17.4% in another country. Hence, at that date, the proportion 
of Catalan-born residents represented merely 63.5% of the entire population. On the 
other hand, Catalan history also saw sporadic waves of emigration, to the Caribbean in 
the second half of the nineteenth century and to France and Latin America following the 
military defeat of the Republicans in 1939. However, the scale of the phenomenon pales 
in comparison with other Spanish territories, although the memory of the ‘exile’ still 
serves a symbolic purpose. In 2010, there were 171.000 Catalans registered in Spanish 
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consulates abroad. In addition, 398,000 individuals born in Catalonia resided in another 
Autonomous Community62.   
 
As Scotland’s population remained remarkably stable in the past hundred years, the 
population of England rose from 29 to 56 million (Lisenkova et al 2008). Whilst uneven 
fertility and mortality rates did play a role in the relative demographic decline of 
Scotland, distinct historical records of migration flows account for most of the 
discrepancy. Some 2 million people emigrated from Scotland in the nineteenth century, 
and as many did so in the twentieth (McCrone 2001). On the basis of the 2001 Census 
figures, the Scottish government Social research estimated that 835,000 individuals born 
in Scotland resided elsewhere in the UK, while another 250,000 lived overseas63. On the 
other hand, the major influx of Irish immigrants to the Western Lowlands declined after 
1914. Since the 1950s, a growing number of individuals born in England have migrated 
to Scotland, their proportion of the total population rising to 8.1% in 2001. Since the 
EU-enlargement in 2004, inward flows to Scotland have grown considerably, mainly 
proceeding from Poland, so that between 2001 and 2010, the General Office for 
Statistics in Scotland registered a population increase of 230,000, almost exclusively 
attributed to immigration. In 2009, 6% of the Scottish population was born outside the 
United Kingdom. Among them, 67% self-identified as white, 16% as Asian, 5% as 
Black and 4% as Chinese64.  
 
Catalonia and Scotland’s distinct historical experiences with migration flows have 
nurtured and moulded distinct norms that are embedded in today’s policies and 
institutions, and the discourses underlying them. Whether in the form of emigration or 
immigration, the discrepancy between population and territorial boundaries has been, is, 
and most likely will remain a fundamental aspect of Catalan and Scottish politics. 
Ultimately, despite the extraordinary number of people dispersed across the world 
claiming a blood link with Scotland, and the impressive number of people living in 
Catalonia who cannot do so, residency has consistently been promoted as a significant 
                                               
62. Padrón de residentes en el Extranjero (PERE), published by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, June 1, 2011.   
63. Scotland’s diaspora and overseas-born population, Scottish Government Social Research, the Scottish 
government. Report prepared by Julie Carr and Luke Cavanagh, 2009, p. 8.  
64. Regional Characteristics of foreign-born people living in the United Kingdom, Office of National Statistics, report 
prepared by Alice Reid and Caroline Miller, 2010.  
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criterion of membership in the nation. This has not always been so, has been shifting 
over time and is still in many ways internally and externally contested.  
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III 
 
 
 
 
3. The Mongrel Nation 
 
 
 
What purpose would there be in our getting a 
Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh if it has to 
administer an emigration system, a glorified poor 
Law and a desert? 
 
 
          – Tom Johnston, Memories 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In 1992, the Glaswegian novelist William McIlvanney yelled from a bus in an 
Edinburgh home-rule rally gathering 25,000 people: “NEVER forget that we are the 
bastard people of a mongrel nation!” Two years later, Alex Salmond replied to those 
who accused the SNP of being imbued with anti-English sentiments: “We are proud to 
be part of what Willie McIlvanney called our 'mongrel nation’. In fact, our biggest 
problem is not immigration, but emigration. Every year we lose talented Scots and we 
welcome any talented replacements from wherever they come.”65 While the allusion to 
the ‘bastard people’ was quickly forgotten, the reference to the “glorious diversity of 
our mongrel nation”66 survived and gradually turned into a national credo cutting across 
                                               
65. Alex Salmond quoted in The Independent on Sunday, ‘SNP’s tartan embrace of the ‘sooth mooths’, September 25, 
1994.   
66.  ‘The Glorious diversity of our Mongrel Nation’ in Scotland on Sunday, January 5, 2008. .  
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party lines. It is usually accompanied with a no less vibrant celebration of the New 
Scots’ contribution to the nation, an expression first coined by the Pakistani-born 
Glaswegian figure Bashir Maan in 1992, and soon incorporated into the mainstream 
political idiom.  
 
Yet this has not always been the case, as conceptions of Scottishness have considerably 
evolved in the course of the twentieth century. Today, to say that “one is Scottish is to 
say that one has left-of-centre values; and to say that one is British is to assert distinctly 
more right-of-centre views, largely the opposite of the meaning in England” (McCrone 
2001: 27). This contrasts strikingly with a century earlier, when “being a Protestant, a 
unionist and proud of Empire confirmed an identity which treated Scottish and British 
as complements of each other” (ibid. 13). In this chapter, I reconstruct the broad 
patterns of emigration from and immigration to Scotland in a historical perspective by 
distinguishing three periods: 1800 - 1914: the Workshop of the Empire; 1914 -1 960: 
The years of lead; 1960 - 1997: A nation reborn. My ambition is not to dismiss the 
historical foundation of the dominant understanding of the past in the Scottish national 
movement. Rather, I intend to show that the gradual embrace of a territorializing 
boundary-making strategy, underpinned by the myth of the Mongrel Nation, served an 
instrumental purpose. Indeed, a narrowly-defined ethnic claim would have been 
internally divisive in a country which – although the proportion of residents born abroad 
has been relatively low compared to Catalonia – encompasses a fundamentally plural 
population. With a relatively large and geographically diverse territory, a network of 
medium-sized cities without a clear hegemon, extensive rural areas, and a multilingual 
and multi-secular society, the intrinsic pluralism of the Scottish people can hardly be 
accommodated without an overlapping territorial identity. In addition, I argue that this 
was facilitated by the emergence of favourable factors in the political opportunity 
structure from the 1960s onwards. First, the nationalist movement leaned increasingly 
towards the left of the electoral spectrum, conflating class and national identity. Second, 
the ‘democratic deficit’, and the subsequent perceived need to revise the current 
institutional arrangement, enabled the emergence of a broad home-rule coalition cutting 
across religious and ethnic lines.  
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3.1. 1800 - 1914: the Workshop of the Empire 
 
 
 
Scotland is one of the few countries in nineteenth century Europe whose impressive 
migration outflows were almost matched by inflows. While the eighteenth century 
Scottish enlightenment represents an intellectual Golden Age, the nineteenth century 
resembles more a Gold Rush. The formidable industrialization of England rapidly 
spilled over to Scotland which, strong of a genuine educational advantage and zealously 
playing its part as a junior partner in the Empire, had become by 1850 the second most 
urbanized country in Europe, exceeded only by its southern neighbour (Brock 1999). 
Fighting on the front line of the ‘Great transformation’, Scotland was then the 
“workshop of the Empire”, its textile and later naval sectors providing jobs to an ever-
expanding working class and wealth to its autochthonous industrial captains. This 
section provides an overview of migration flows from, within and to Scotland, 
throughout a period characterized by profound economic, cultural and political 
transformation.  
 
3.1.1. Highland clearances and Lowlands lure of opportunity 
 
 
 “Rats, lice, and Scotsmen: you find them the whole world over”67, the French medieval 
proverb goes. In the late Middle-Ages, Continental Europe was by far the main 
destination of Scottish emigrants. But the 1707 Act of Union, which entitled Scots to 
“full freedom and intercourse of trade and navigation to and from the Dominions and 
plantations,” gave the phenomenon a new impetus by reorienting the flow to what had 
now become a fully British Empire. Nowadays, the belief that most nineteenth century 
Scottish emigrants were evicted from their homeland by avid landlords and forced to 
renounce their ancestral lifestyle is enduring, especially among Diaspora-Scots. In the 
Canadian province of Nova Scotia, established as a Scottish settlement in the early 
seventeenth century, a sense of Scottishness has survived until today, primarily as a 
romanticized version of a Highland identity, due to the “resilience of a powerful victim 
imagery highlighting the plight of Highlanders and downgrading the contribution of 
Lowland skilled migrants” (Harper et al 1999: 17). Indeed the eviction of Highlanders 
from their homes reached a peak in the 1840s. The Emigration Act of 1851, together 
                                               
67. Quoted in David Armitage, (2005: 225). 
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with the creation of the Highland and Island Society, facilitated landlords’ strategy of 
clearing the poorest from their land and replacing them with crofters who could afford 
to pay the rent. However, the attitude of the state was more ambivalent than commonly 
acknowledged in nationalist historiographies, especially as the Highland population had 
long been seen as a source of military recruitment. Besides, the depopulation of the 
Highlands had started about a century earlier, when Highlanders were already migrating 
en masse to the West Central Lowlands, where they could fill urban jobs or take 
advantage of the earlier harvests in the south-east in order to maintain their existing 
lifestyle (Brock 1999: Chapter 1). The lack of opportunities in large portions of the 
Scottish territory meant that by 1800, Scotland was already a “mobile society” 
(Campbell 1985: 45). Henceforth, external flows were the prolongation of internal ones 
rather than a distinct phenomenon altogether. The emergence of new industries, from 
textile to steel-making, shipbuilding and heavy engineering, provided jobs for those 
who stayed. On the other hand, the rapid decline of other industries and concomitant 
collapse of the agricultural sector68 encouraged others to move, “not necessarily within 
a nationally-bound labour market but also beyond to the Empire” (ibid. 46). The 
haemorrhage did not slow down despite the promulgation of the 1886 Crofter’s Holding 
Act officially putting an end to the clearances. Between 1831 and 1931, the Highlands 
went from representing 8.5% of the population of Scotland to merely 2.7%.  
 
Hence, what remained of Highland culture after the Jacobite rebellions were crushed in 
1745 was further weakened by mass emigration, which is itself mainly the consequence 
of broader economic transformations within the British Isles rather than a forced exile. 
Gaelic ultimately lost out because the local resources were too weak to stem the tide of 
emigration, while its symbolic heritage was taken over as part of a Scottish identity that 
accepted English as the basic standard (Rokkan 1982: 96).  The Highland clearances did 
not trigger a profound wave of sympathy among nineteenth century Lowland Scots who 
for the most part were reaping the economic benefits of the Union, although the land 
reform movement was closely associated with the Liberals. In Christopher Harvie’s 
powerful prose, “it was Scots landlords and factors who forced the Highlanders on to 
the emigrant ships” (1977: 72). Although by 1891 merely 6% of the population could 
still speak Gaelic, Highland symbols were by then popular among bekilted Lowland 
                                               
68. According to Campbell (1985), the agricultural sector employed no more than 10% of the active Scottish 
population in 1910.  
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Scots taking pride in their largely fantasized Celtic past, fomenting in turn a pan-
Scottish identity. Tartan and bagpipes had been fully incorporated into Lowland 
Scottish identity, and “Highlandism”69 had turned into the most recognizable marker of 
Scottishness. Some have used this “invention of tradition” as a way of discrediting the 
cultural façade of Scottish nationalism, and there is a large literature on whether Tartan 
was a nineteenth century English invention, an ancestral Highland dress, or a 
combination of both70. But these historiographical quarrels are of secondary importance, 
as romantic interpretations of the past were common in a nineteenth century Europe 
destabilised by the tidal wave of modernization (Hobsbawn et al 1983).  Gaelic speakers 
have ever since been nostalgically portrayed as relics of a distant past. But unlike in 
Wales, where were numerous enough to constitute the basis of the national movement, 
they merely represent one aspect of Scottish identity, symbolically important but 
numerically insignificant. Ultimately, “the quasi-destruction of a nationality” (Nairn 
2003: 122) facilitated the permeability of the natural border between the Highlands and 
the Lowlands. This in turn paved the way for the emergence of a common nationality 
encompassing the entire territory, which was paradoxically more similar to England 
than ever before and yet was now able to stress its differences with its southern 
neighbour.  
 
Despite the resilient tendency to associate emigration with the Highland clearances 
today, the overwhelming majority of those who left Scotland after 1850 came from the 
towns and cities of the Lowlands (Devine 2006a: 468). Historian Tom Devine refers to 
this phenomenon as the ‘emigration paradox’: how could early-industrialized and 
relatively wealthy nineteenth century Scotland experience such a spectacular level of 
outward migration? Part of the answer lay in the difficulties of everyday life in the fast-
growing cities of the Lowlands. Indeed, the evils of the industrial revolution were 
especially acute in Scotland where living standards among the working class were even 
lower than south of the border (Riggs 1994). For many Scots, the choice of destination 
was between the Glasgow slums and overseas, depicted in letters received from peers as 
                                               
69. ‘Highlandism’ is the expression used by Tom Devine (2006) to designate the appropriation of Highland symbols 
by Lowlanders between 1770 and 1850. Tom Nairn (2003/1977) uses the term ‘Tartanry’ to stress his contempt for 
what he sees as the main impediment to Scotland’s embrace of modernity  while McCrone (1995) speaks of the 
‘Making of the Scottish Brand’ to highlight its continued relevance in today’s market economy.    
70. Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983) in a highly controversial essay entitled The Invention of Tradition: The Highlander 
Tradition of Scotland argues that the sartorial myth of Tartan and the kilt was largely invented but rapidly sanctified 
by the people of Scotland who felt the need to stress their moral superiority over other peoples inhabiting the British 
Isles. See Keating (2009b) for a critique of British historiography.  
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well as in the propaganda of recruiting agents as a safe haven (Harper 1998, Ramirez 
2007). For Aristide Zolberg (2007), emigration from the Celtic fringes was also 
orchestrated from London, where it was seen as a way of turning the culturally 
heterogeneous United Kingdom into a fully-fledged nation-state while increasing the 
relative demographic weight of England in the British Isles. But even if this was 
potentially a concern – especially in the case of Ireland – emigration was if anything 
rather constrained than encouraged by the state until 1918 (Feldman & Baldwin 2007). 
Until that date, the state proved reluctant to intervene, as the cost of state-sponsored 
emigration was perceived as greater than its benefits. Furthermore, Scottish emigration 
could not be characterized as the flight of the poor71. Unlike the Irish who were 
incontestably cleared out of their lands by starvation or extreme poverty,72 Scottish 
emigrants were rather driven by pull factors in destination countries than push factors at 
home. The rapid development of the Empire created irresistible incentives to emigrate. 
Relatively well educated, English-speaking and Protestant, the Scots working men saw 
emigration as “the road to freedom, the realization of the libertarian impulses of Burns” 
(Harvie 1977: 177). Even though a pan-British identity never entirely overshadowed 
pre-Union national identities, the Empire was unquestionably British and allowed the 
constituent parts of the United Kingdom73 to take great pride in and reap the benefits of 
its expansion (Colley 1992). Unlike the Catalans who were barred from trading with the 
colonies until the second half of the eighteenth century, the Scots were over-represented 
in the imperial administration and were given the opportunity to fully exploit their 
potential away from their homeland. Indeed, the Empire was the means through which 
the Scottish nationality could emphasize its equal partnership with England (Devine 
2006b: 165).  
 
Although the United States remained their privileged destination before and after 
independence, Canada and Australia were also important recipients of adventurous 
Scots. Besides, Scottish emigrants did not only seek a better life in the confines of the 
                                               
71. This is consistent with contemporary migration patterns from poorer countries, which reflect how emigrants from 
developing countries belong to the middle classes, as poorer households do not have sufficient resources to move.  
72. In his book The Great Irish Potato Famine (2001), James Donnelly provides a frightening account of this episode, 
which he attributes more to internal conditions in Ireland than to the unwillingness of the British state to assist the 
population.  
73. The bitter hostility endured by Irish emigrants in the US provides a stark contrast with the Scottish case, and goes 
far in explaining the sustained involvement of the diaspora in the Anglo-Irish and later Northern Irish conflict, 
successively as peace-wreckers (especially during the 1919-1921 war of independence), and more recently as peace-
builders with the Good Friday agreement through intensively lobbying the Clinton administration. For a full account 
of the participation of Irish Americans in the pursuit of Irish independence, see Harris (2009: 123-53)   
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Empire, but also south of the border, at the heart of an increasingly monocephalic state, 
so that it already seemed in the late eighteenth century that “the noblest prospect which 
a Scotchman ever sees, is the high road that leads him to England.”74 While this point 
has sometimes been over-stressed, there is some truth in the assertion that Scottish elites 
traded off their right to a separate state and renounced the consolidation of an alternative 
centre in Edinburgh against the advantages of integration with the English economy and 
a privileged position in the Empire (Rokkan 1983: 88). The potent forces pushing 
towards further integration with England meant that emigration, in this period of great 
transformation, was perceived positively, as a privileged exit option and a safety valve 
at a time when Malthusian anxieties were exacerbated by spectacular rates of 
demographic growth75.  
 
3.1.2. The Irish exodus 
 
 
Between 1800 and 1914, waves of Irish, Italians, Jews and Lithuanians, settled in 
Scotland. Most Lithuanian immigrants were working in coal mines and were received 
with bitter hostility by native workers, who feared that foreigners might drive down 
wages and reduce the power of the unions. Besides, the Lithuanian community, 10,000 
members strong in 1914, was at times stigmatized for its fervent practice of the Catholic 
faith (Dzialtuvaite 2006: 80). Many chose to anglicize their names, so that second-
generation migrants became virtually invisible. As for the Italians, they were committed 
to the catering trade and had emerged as an identifiable community in the eve of World 
War I, although they barely amounted to 5,000 people. Because they were not employed 
in the industrial sector, they complemented rather than competed with native workers on 
the labour market, and resentment towards them remained limited. Of a much greater 
magnitude, the uninterrupted settlement of Irish immigrants between 1850 and the 
outbreak of World War I left a profound imprint on Scottish society and politics. Until 
the creation of the Irish Free State in 1923, Irish immigrants from the south were 
formally internal migrants, although they were crossing an inter-national border 
between two constitutive countries of a multinational state. Despite partition, citizens of 
                                               
74. Dr Johnstone in 1767, quoted in Brock 1999: chapter 1. This quote is actually widely-used and well-known among 
Scottish academics.  
75. Fears of a Malthusian crisis were particularly acute in the United Kingdom after 1830 (Zolberg 2007, Campbell 
1985). In Scotland, the population increased from merely 1.3 million in 1800 to 2.9 in 1851, and up to 4.5 million by 
1900. 
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the Republic of Ireland living in the United Kingdom are still entitled to political rights, 
a privilege now reciprocated to British citizens living in Ireland under the 1998 Anglo-
Irish agreement (Lansbergen et al. 2010). Leaving aside the sensitive and complex case 
of Northern Ireland, these elements further undermine the stark distinction commonly 
made between international and internal migrations. 
 
Twelve miles of water separates the Northern end of Ireland from the Western shores of 
Scotland. Unsurprisingly, migration flows directed to one side or the other of the North 
Channel according to shifting economic and political circumstances take their roots far 
back in history. Between the opening of the Anglo-Scottish Ulster plantation in 1609 
and the 1641 uprising, tens of thousands of Lowland Scots settled in Ulster, setting the 
stage for one of the most enduring ethnic conflicts in Europe76. While significant 
inflows from Ireland occurred before the 1848 potato Famine, the phenomenon gained 
considerable vigour from then on and showed no sign of weakening until 1914. In 
relative terms, Irish immigration to Scotland was much more substantial and steady than 
to England and Wales77. In 1901, there were 205,000 Irish-born residents in Scotland, 
mainly concentrated in the Western urban areas, similar to the 207,000 of half a century 
earlier (Collins 1991: 1). This constant influx over subsequent generations contributed 
to renew and at times reinforce a common bond among Irish settlers. However, the 
population of immigrants was itself heterogeneous and internally divided. Around one-
fifth of them were Ulster Protestants, often of a distant Scottish stock, which eased their 
(re)incorporation into the dominant society as much as it impeded that of their Catholic 
peers (Walker 1991). Initially, the Liberal Party, which had dominated Scottish politics 
since 1832, also enjoyed some support among Irish Catholics. But the vast majority 
were still excluded from the electoral suffrage, despite successive reforms gradually 
widening the franchise in 1832, 1868 and 1884.  
 
Their relative isolation from mainstream politics meant that their concerns were 
primarily directed towards the political turmoil in their homeland. To a greater degree 
than those settled in England, they were profoundly committed to the Irish nationalist 
cause. Hence, their support for the Liberals declined sharply after the latter split in 1886 
                                               
76. Most of today’s Protestants in Ulster are descendants of Scottish colonists, small tenant farmers from Ayrshire and 
Galloway, Argyll and Fife who settled in Ireland in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
77. In 1851, The Irish-born population stood at 7.2% in Scotland, against 2.9% in England and Wales. 
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over the issue of Irish Home Rule and the subsequently-founded Liberal Unionist party 
aligned itself with the Conservatives. The Irish Home rule crisis was increasingly 
turning into an open conflict threatening to spill over to Scotland, where the fear of 
‘Rome-rule’ had a profound impact on Protestant working-class communities78. Indeed 
Calvinism was perhaps of all the varieties of Protestantism the most antipathetic to 
Catholicism, an aversion that was reinforced by the immigration of Ulster Protestants: 
by 1900 there were more Orange lodges than anywhere in the rest of Britain but in 
Ireland (Hutchinson 2006: 188). On top of this, the scarce resources of Catholic schools 
severely limited their prospects for upward social mobility. The 1872 Education 
(Scotland) Act made education compulsory for all children and created a state-funded 
secular system in which religious education was facultative. But Catholic schools 
refused to be incorporated into the scheme, so that by 1914 the gap in educational 
achievement between denominational and non-denominational schools had considerably 
widened (C. Brown 1987).  
 
3.2.  1914-1960: The years of lead 
 
 
In the inter-war years, the Scottish economy went through an unprecedented recession 
the consequences of which were twofold. First it triggered a massive wave of 
emigration that was now widely perceived as a symptom of Scotland’s industrial decay. 
Second, it exacerbated inter-religious tensions, which reached a peak in 1936 but were 
then (at least temporarily) diluted in the cross-cutting wave of patriotism that brought 
together the entire British people against a common enemy during World War II. This 
section successively examines the shifting perception of emigration in Scottish politics 
and rising sectarian tensions between the Catholic and Protestant communities, although 
paradoxically, inflows from Ireland had almost dried up by 1918.  
 
3.2.1. From opportunity to exile 
 
 
Scotland paid a heavy tribute during World War I and human losses on the battlefield 
were relatively higher than in England or Wales. In theory, such a rise in male mortality 
                                               
78. Especially among Irish Protestant migrants, who settled in Glasgow and represented an ever increasing proportion 
of Irish immigration after 1880.  
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and subsequent demographic gap should have been translated into a labour shortage79. 
Yet, the 1920s saw a recrudescence of emigration. The 1931 census recorded for the 
first time a net loss of population since its creation in 1855, despite the post-war 
increase of the fertility rate. Unlike the previous period when high rates of emigration 
went hand-in-hand with economic expansion, the inter-war years were marked by 
economic decline and social conservatism in the homeland. The Scots were then fleeing 
the consequences of the collapse of a once great industrial economy no longer able to 
provide its relatively well-educated workforce with rewarding opportunities80. In the 
shipbuilding industries – until then the jewel in the crown of the Scottish economy – 
employment collapsed from 100,000 in 1920 to 10,000 in 1932 (Harper 1998: 91). The 
country entered a period of prolonged depression, aggravated by the rise of 
protectionism in the 1930s, making its export-dominated sectors increasingly fragile 
(Keating 2001a: 244). Concurrently, the long-standing laissez-faire attitude of the state 
towards emigration shifted in 1921 with the promulgation of the Empire Settlement Act 
(ESA). Unlike earlier legislations which only targeted the Highlands, it was now 
extended to the whole of Scotland (Harper 1998: 38). As the government’s promise of 
providing ‘homes fit for heroes’ after the War proved far-fetched in a receding context, 
the programme of state-funded emigration came to be seen in imperialist circles as a 
way of simultaneously mitigating unemployment in the homeland and boosting 
economic and demographic growth in the Dominions. By contrast, the Labour Party 
claimed that resources should rather be invested in social reforms and in modernizing 
domestic industries, while the nationalists attributed the flight of Scotland’s most 
enterprising spirits to the absence of self-government.  
 
The impact of this new wave of emigration in Scotland was ambivalent. On the one 
hand, it constituted a safety valve in a time of recession, by allowing ambitious youth to 
seize the opportunities it could no longer find at home. On the other, it inhibited the 
development of a domestic market for the increasingly consumer-oriented economy of 
the twentieth century (Harvie 1977: 169). The transition to a Fordist industrial model, 
the purpose of which being to increase wages in order to stimulate domestic 
                                               
79. In France and Russia for instance, this was translated into a dramatic rise in female employment.  
80. Touring Scotland in the 1930s, the poet Edward Muir captured well the dominant mood of the time: “My main 
impression is that Scotland is gradually being emptied of its population, its spirit, wealth, industry, art, intellect and 
innate character. If a country exports its most enterprising spirits and best minds years afters years, (…) some result 
will inevitably follow.”   
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consumption, was made difficult in a country where natural demographic growth was 
severely undermined by emigration. This in turn further intensified the recession, which 
instead of triggering a violent reaction against the centre increased reliance on England. 
Although already bending, the Empire still represented an appealing exit option. 
Emigration was then mainly directed to the cities of Canada, relatively less affected by 
the great depression than its southern neighbour and acting as a potent magnet for semi-
skilled and skilled Scottish workers (Ramirez 2007). While unionists could still claim 
that Scotland would be (even) worse off outside the British realm, nationalists could not 
use the widespread discontentment that economic downturns usually entail as a catalyst 
for change. Besides, the myth of the ‘community of twenty million’, bridging together 
homeland and diaspora Scots, provided a sentiment of continuity and a potent 
justification to the Conservative strand of Unionism. Although Scotland had become by 
any standards a periphery in the British Isles, the protracted outflow of Scots to the 
confines of the Empire  still furnished the “image of Scotland as a metropolis, a mother-
country; as centre and not as periphery” (McKenzie 1981: 157).  
 
To be sure, the ‘haemorrhage’ from Scotland did figure among the concerns of British 
policy-makers anxious to provide incentives for talented Scots to stay, despite the 
severe economic downturn. The inter-war years saw the first, and somewhat 
rudimentary, territorial development plans and Edinburgh was designated as a Special 
Area as early as 1934. Another way to do so was to strengthen the responsibilities of the 
Scottish Office and consolidate a web of depoliticized public institutions able to 
incorporate a sizeable number of home-grown skilled workers into an expanding civil 
service, which also presented the advantage of reinforcing their allegiance to the state. 
In 1939, the Conservative government, following the Gilmour report recommendations, 
agreed to deepen administrative devolution by relocating the Scottish office and its 
increasing number of departments in order to “transfer people and power to Scotland.” 
The Reorganization of Offices (Scotland) Act led to the creation of a “mini-White Hall 
with almost all under one roof”, the great bulk of civil servants being hosted in the 
recently-opened St Andrew’s House in Edinburgh (Mitchell 2009: 21).  
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3.2.2. The ‘menace to the Scottish race’ 
 
 
As for Irish immigrants and their descendants, the period began on a positive note, not 
least because the 1918 Education (Scotland) Act made “the country’s Catholic schools 
the first in a predominantly non-Catholic nation to be incorporated into a state-system” 
(C. Brown, 1987: 201). In exchange for agreeing to the transfer of their schools, 
Catholic authorities were assured that religious instruction would be maintained at 
existing levels and that only teachers acceptable to the Church in regard to religious 
faith and character could be appointed. The reform was brought forward by the Liberal 
party with the support of the Labour Party, against the background of rising hostility in 
Ireland and fierce opposition of the Church of Scotland. Its purpose was to nationalize 
the ‘Scoto-Irish’ Catholics in Scotland by dragging them into mainstream Scottish 
society. Meanwhile, the 1918 Representation of the People Act broadened the scope of 
the franchise by abolishing all property qualifications. Labour greatly benefited from the 
reform as the electorate tripled and most new voters were drawn from the working class. 
The Irish Catholic community in Scotland shifted en masse to the Labour party, which, 
besides being more supportive of the Irish Republican movement, had become 
“synonymous with the defence of council housing, jobs in heavy industry and sectarian 
schools” (Smout 1986: 270).  
Arguably, class solidarity was sometimes undermined by Irish-born workers who were 
competing with natives in a ruthless labour market, providing industrial leaders with the 
opportunity to lower wages and break strikes. While this is to a degree true, others have 
stressed the patterns of shared class interests between native Protestants and Irish 
Catholic workers and their sustained cooperation within the union movements (M. 
Mitchell 1999)81. This notwithstanding, Labour greatly contributed to the integration of 
Irish immigrants and their descendants into mainstream society, not so much because of 
the rather limited material gains it brought ordinary Catholics, but “because such an 
involvement set a lot of them on the road to integration” (Gallagher 1991: 28). 
Reciprocally they wholeheartedly gave their votes to the Labour party, which was 
committed to promoting Irish Catholic sectional interests in return for electoral support. 
Hence, they played a crucial role in its consolidation in the western urban areas and 
                                               
81. There has long been a strain between the Skilled Workers’ Union in which most members were native Scots and 
Protestants, and the Labourers’ Union, with a higher Irish Catholic presence, as well as less visible strains within the 
Labour party.  
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subsequently as the dominant political formation in Scotland in the second half of the 
twentieth century (McCaffrey 1991).  
 
However, the process through which Catholics came to embrace a Scottish identity 
compatible with their faith stretched over several decades. In 1912, the Scottish 
Conservative party became the Scottish Unionist party, in an effort to stress its 
opposition to Irish home-rule and its determination to preserve Scotland’s Protestant 
heritage82. Fears of a Rome-led ‘Irishisation’ of Britain, already widespread in Victorian 
England, gained momentum in Scotland during the inter-war years. Paradoxically, this 
occurred at a time when Irish immigration had almost dried out after a century of 
sustained inflows. The Church of Scotland moved to the right of the political spectrum 
and in 1923 approved a report purposively entitled the Menace of the Irish Race to our 
Scottish Nationality83. Interestingly for our purposes, this fear was exacerbated by 
protracted emigration: “The Scot, who as a colonist is eagerly sought by all the 
Dominions and by America, is being driven from his own shores, and his place taken by 
an immigrant who makes a very much less satisfactory citizen.”84 Some extremist 
groups such as the Scottish Protestant League were formed and made some inroads into 
the working class vote in Glasgow and Edinburgh, while calls were made to 
disenfranchise the Roman Catholics. Although Glasgow never quite reached the same 
degree of spatial segregation and systematic discrimination as Belfast, sectarianism 
nonetheless had some political implications. Indeed, the Unionist party could rely as late 
as 1955 – (when it was elected with 51% of the vote, an impressive result never 
matched again by any party in subsequent elections) – on the support of the medium-
skilled Protestant working class. Unlike in Wales, the Conservative party squeezed the 
support of the Liberal party even further in its traditional rural strongholds, “as the 
‘Scottish periphery’ had to choose between being anti-London or anti-Glasgow” (Urwin 
1982: 47).  Since the Union, the Church of Scotland had served as a surrogate 
Parliament which spoke for the country in social and political matters, retaining a potent 
moral grip over the population at a time when secularization was already well-advanced 
south of the border (Harvie 1977: 207). To be sure, its influence had already been 
                                               
82. The name of the party was changed again in 1964, when it became the Scottish Conservative Party. For some, this 
shift illustrated a loss of autonomy and alignment with the British Conservative Party.  
83. The report exempted the Orange population from its grievances: “They are of the same race as ourselves and of the 
same Faith and are readily assimilated.” 
84. Church and Nation Committee Report - 1926, quoted in Harper (1998: 200).  
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eroded by the 1843 Disruption and long-standing conflicts among the different strands 
of the Protestant faith, compared to which sectarianism seemed at times a secondary 
concern. Nonetheless, the Church of Scotland was reunited in 1929 and its membership 
reached an all-time high in the 1950s (Devine 2006b: 167). Until then, class politics 
were subject to the resilience of religious cleavages, the Tories attracting a 
disproportionate number of Protestants and Labour almost monopolizing the Catholic 
vote.  
 
The period from 1918 to 1960 is often considered to be one of gradual homogenization 
of the British state’s constitutive parts. The convergence in voting patterns between 
Scotland and England is commonly perceived as an illustration of Rokkan’s 
nationalization thesis, whereby the freezing of cleavage structures facilitated the 
emergence of a class-based form of politics in which territorial differences no longer 
mattered and consecrated the consolidation of a unitary nation state. Indeed at no time 
throughout these four decades did the periphery mount a serious challenge to 
Westminster’s authority. But this period of “peripheral docility” was above all the 
consequence of the “decline of peripheral dissidents, and the domination of territorial 
conservatives favourable to the existing state of the Union” (Bulpitt 1983: 63). This was 
reflected in the unusual popularity of the Unionist-Conservatives and declining support 
for Home-rule among Labour ranks, the party setting aside its commitment to bringing 
about a Scottish Parliament in the 1920s, before officially renouncing it in 1958 
(Keating & Jones 1985). Hence, the creation of the SNP in 1934 was  a response to the 
decline of nationalist forces among mainstream parties rather than evidence of an 
upsurge of political nationalism, which was if anything much weaker than in the years 
preceding World War I. In 1914 home-rule agitation among the working-class and the 
highland crofters’ movement forced the Westminster Parliament to seriously consider  a 
‘home-rule all round scenario’.85 Scottish nationalism was indeed on the rise. However, 
this was not the kind of nationalism that was to re-emerge more forcefully in the 1960s 
with the first electoral breakthrough of the SNP, territorially based and directed against 
the British state. Instead, the period saw the heyday of the Conservative strand of 
nationalism, for which Scotland’s national destiny lay in the union with England and 
was cemented by the Protestant faith and Empire.  
                                               
85. Nationalism grew steadily from the 1850s onwards, so that in 1885, the Scottish Office was established because a 
“growing body of Scots felt that Scottish distinctiveness was being ignored” (Mitchell 2009: 19).  
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3.3.  1960 – 1997: A nation reborn?  
 
 
The formidable persistence of emigration combined with scarce immigration since the 
large inflows from Ireland considerably diminished after 1914 have nurtured the 
impression that Scotland was primarily a country from which one leaves, and not one to 
which one comes. While the population of Scotland has remained remarkably stable 
since 1900, that of England almost doubled over the same period, consolidating its self-
understanding as a potent cultural, economic, and political magnet. Between 1914 and 
1991, net migration in Scotland has systematically been negative, exceeding at times (-) 
20,000 a year (McQuaid et al 2008: 9).  
 
 
Table 3: Populations of Scotland, England and Wales, and UK (1900-1991) 
 
Year UK 
England & 
Wales Scotland % Scotland/UK 
1901 38228 32612 4479 12% 
1911 42138 36136 4751 11% 
1921 44072 37932 4882 11% 
1931 46074 39888 4843 11% 
1941 48216 41748 5160 11% 
1951 50290 43815 5102 10% 
1961 52807 46196 5184 10% 
1971 55928 49152 5236 9% 
1981 56352 49634 5180 9% 
1991 57808 51099 5107 9% 
 
Source: My own compilation from the General Register Office for 
Scotland (GROS).  
 
 
Historian Murray Pittock summarized in a very illustrative way the shifting position of 
Scotland within the United Kingdom, “from an economic power-house of native 
industry to an also-ran assembly plant for US and Asian multinationals” (2001: 103). 
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The period that stretches from the 1960s onwards saw a recrudescence of political 
nationalism which brought constitutional issues to the fore of politics. In this section, I 
first briefly discuss the decline of sectarianism, and the simultaneous migration of 
highly-skilled Scots to England, and less economically-active Englanders to Scotland. I 
show how the SNP has consistently sought to polish its civic credentials and to gain 
support among internal minorities. The last part examines the long road to home-rule 
and shows how the combined effect of a party system that leans towards the left of the 
electoral spectrum and the reason invoked by home-rulers to legitimate their claims – in 
the name of a ‘democratic deficit’ – facilitated the constitution of a broad coalition of 
support cutting across religious and ethnic lines and territorially based against an 
England dominated state.  
  
3.3.1. The twilight of sectarian Scotland 
 
 
The decline of sectarianism in Scotland is usually attributed to the rise of secularism 
from the 1960s onwards. Indeed, it is only from then that the loosening of religious and 
class cleavages and inter-marriage have significantly weakened inter-religious tensions 
(McCrone 2001: 25). But other factors have also been determinant. Aside from the fact 
that the gradual domination of Labour gave them more visibility, the 1918 Education 
settlement was, after two generations, beginning to deliver. As descendants of Irish 
Catholics were now able to climb the social ladder, the socio-economic gap between 
religious communities was finally being plugged. Irish Catholics and their descendants 
proved to be efficient institution-builders, establishing a well-organized parish system, 
charities and schools, as well as a football club – Celtic – which won the European 
Championship in 1967. The accommodation of Irish Catholics and their descendants 
shares some similarities with the Dutch tradition of institutionalized pluralism known as 
‘pillarisation’, which lost much of its significance as a result of individualization and 
secularization (Lijphart 2004). By the advent of devolution in 1997, instances of 
discrimination and violence on religious grounds were seldom, although whether 
sectarianism is a fact or a myth is still subject to controversy (Devine et al. 2000). 
Patricia Walls and Rory Williams (2003) conducted 72 interviews with descendants of 
Irish Catholics and found continuing experience of discrimination, especially in the 
labour market. But others concluded that this could equally be read as evidence of the 
“power of social myths” (Bruce et al. 2005: 151). Despite the major economic crisis of 
 105 
 
the 1980s, there has not been a return to the 1930s religious tensions. Admittedly, a 
community feeling among the descendants of Irish Catholic migrants has been sustained 
by prominent institutions and may sporadically be strengthened by residual tensions 
with the Protestant majority. Joseph Bradley (2006) found that it is primarily through 
football that an Irish Catholic identity is manifest in Scotland and that their experience 
and perception of continued prejudice is more apparent. This phenomenon is epitomized 
in the long-standing Celtic versus Rangers rivalry in Glasgow. However, this has more 
to do with hooliganism that with racism per se, and is largely detached from nationality.  
 
Besides, these residual tensions at grassroots level are not reflected in the party system. 
Indeed, the role of Labour in managing and mitigating tensions within its own party 
structure sets the Scottish case apart. It shares some commonalities with the socialist 
party PSC in Catalonia, which, as we shall see in chapter IV, contributed greatly to 
blurring the antagonism between native Catalans and internal immigrants in the 
aftermath of the democratic transition by appealing to common class interests. From 
1964 onwards, the gradual decline of the Conservatives significantly diminished the 
visibility of an uncompromising form of unionism, which was the main ideological 
barrier to the incorporation of the Catholics into a revamped Scottish national identity, 
no longer equated with Protestantism but increasingly territorially-defined. 
 
In the 1990s, the SNP explicitly intended to reach out to the Catholic vote, in order to 
challenge the Labour party in its Glaswegian strongholds, but also in response to anti-
Catholic accusations made against the party after the 1994 Monklands East by-election 
(Lynch 2002: 212). The 1994 campaign took place against the background of rising 
sectarian tensions in this electoral district of the Strathclyde region. Although the SNP 
was founded in 1934 out of the fusion of the Scottish Party, which comprised a strong 
element of anti-Catholic bigotry and anti-Irish racism, and the National Party of 
Scotland that was impregnated by a Pan-Celtic ideology, its sectarian heritage had been 
deliberately abandoned by the 1960s (Mitchell 1996). The SNP initiated a campaign to 
repeal the Act of Settlement, a 300 year-old law that excludes Catholics from the line of 
succession to the throne. In addition, the party sought the support of Catholic bishops by 
vocally backing Catholic schooling. A statistical breakdown of the 1997 Westminster 
elections results showed that Labour attracted 66% of the Catholic vote, while only 8% 
went to the SNP, 4% for the Conservatives, and 21% to the Liberals (Denver 1997). But 
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the Catholic hierarchy, who participated on an equal footing with the Church of 
Scotland to the 1989 Scottish Convention, proved to be a fervent supporter of 
devolution, as the introduction of a Scottish political arena could in no circumstances 
undermine its relative power (Steven 2007).  
 
3.3.2. ‘Fresh talents’ against ‘white settlers’ 
 
 
Since the 1960s, the main concern of British policy-makers regarding immigration has 
been to cope with the sizeable proportion of Commonwealth citizens coming from the 
Indian sub-continent and, for many of them, what became after the 1948 partition the 
state of Pakistan. But this proved to be mainly an English concern, as Commonwealth 
immigration to Wales and Scotland remained relatively much lower. In 2001, there were 
only 42,577 self-identified Muslims in Scotland, against 1,524,887 in England (GROS 
2001). Unlike the Catholics, Muslims in Scotland are a young community, concentrated 
in the Glasgow area and relatively much less numerous than in the city belt of Northern 
England. While the Labour party has long relied on their indefectible support (Maan 
1992), the association Asian-Scots for Independence, funded by and affiliated to the 
SNP, was created as much for bolstering the party’s self-conscious civic positioning as 
for an electoral purpose. Indeed, although the Muslim community is relatively small, its 
high concentration in a few constituencies gives it a political weight that largely exceeds 
its actual size. The association’s convenor Bashir Ahmed – who became in 2007 the 
first Pakistani-born MSP – gave his own version of civic nationalism at a 1995 SNP 
rally in terms that historians may find puzzling: “[a]t the time of Robert the Bruce, the 
drive for Scottish independence involved people from all backgrounds and nationalities, 
who shared a common vision of humanity in Scotland. That is our vision too.”86  The 
predominance of constitutional issues and the limited size of Asian and Black 
communities have led to an absence of a “racialization process in Scotland since 1945, 
rather than an absence of racism per se” (Miles & Dunlop 1987: 119). In one of the few 
systematic studies dedicated to the subject in Scotland before devolution, Miles and 
Dunlop also stressed the construction of the increasing number of English-born 
immigrants living in Scotland as the ‘significant other’, taking over the role until then 
occupied by the Catholic community in the national imaginary87.  
                                               
86. Quoted in the Sunday Herald, ‘SNP hits back after Billy Connolly brands party anti-English’, June 27, 1999.  
87. See also McIntosh et al. (2004) for a sociological account of grassroots anti-English racism in Scotland.  
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While there is a widespread belief that the Irish constitute the single largest 
immigration-induced minority in Scotland’s contemporary history, census data suggests 
that as early as 1921, they had been overtaken by the English. First generation migrants 
born in England came to represent 8.1% of the population of Scotland in 2001, against 
7% in 1991, after four decades of a steady increase88. Yet the issue is barely ever 
discussed in Scottish politics, which led some to speak of an ‘invisible’ and yet 
‘audible’ minority89, an immigration by stealth, a constant and quiet inflow of English 
nationals to the northern end of the Union. The phenomenon has not drawn significant 
scholarly attention either, the first comprehensive study of it having been published as 
late as 200390. This lack of interest is reflected in the persistence of myths and 
preconceived ideas that are often  far from reality. The common wisdom assimilates 
English migrants with middle-class pensioners relocating in the rural Highlands. But 
Murray Watson (2003) convincingly showed that the overwhelming majority of them 
actually lived in the Lowlands urban belt and presented similar socio-economic 
characteristics as the native population. Yet, “incomers are sometimes explicitly 
vilified, as outsiders with imperialist aspirations to subjugate and destroy local lifestyles 
and culture, described as ‘white settlers’. [the English], defined by an apparently clear – 
if vaguely specified – identity, has to some extent come to symbolize the negative 
popular perspective placed on cultural and social change associated with migration, 
throughout Scotland and specifically on rural Scotland” (Short & Stockdale 1999: 177-
78).  
 
To be sure, counter-urbanization trends are a well-documented aspect of late-modernity 
resulting from the increasing salience of post-materialist values. The ‘White settlers’ 
phenomenon in Scotland is no exception and tensions arising from it have been mainly 
of an urban versus rural kind. But the very term is reminiscent of a colonial idiom which 
                                               
88. Report on Scotland’s population in 2001, General Register Office for Scotland, 2002. These figures should 
nevertheless be handled carefully, as they are only based on the place of birth and do not distinguish the (numerous) 
cases of returned Scots born in England and second generation English immigrants. These complex migration 
patterns illustrate the extent to which the Scottish and English peoples, bounded by a common state for three 
centuries, have been intertwined.   
89. The concept of the ‘audible minority’ coined by Bond, Charsley and Grundy (2009) to designate ‘English 
immigrants’ living in Scotland captures well the important role played by speakers’ accents in the UK in general and 
in Scotland in particular. Indeed McCrone et al (2006) have shown that having a Scottish accent was, with birth, the 
most significant marker of Scottish identity.  
90. Cf. Watson, 2003.  
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was common in European regionalist debates in the 1960s91 and struck a sensitive chord 
in Scotland. Explicitly anti-English groupuscules like White Settlers or Settlers Watch92 
were set up, and although they never gathered more than a few hundred members, 
spurred the interest of the media that took the opportunity to speculate on the “warnings 
that Scotland’s patient nationalism could turn nasty.”93 Neil Ascherson reporting for the 
Independent in 1993 captured this fear in a telling way: “[s]lowly and almost 
indefinably, the climate in Scotland is changing. To be a child with an English accent in 
a Scottish school yard was never an easy ride, but these days it is markedly rougher. 
Unexpected people will now talk of ‘white settlers’ or of ‘rich folk from down South’, 
and there is a new edge in their voice. This anxiety crystallizes around the idea of 
English immigration.”94 Successive rows over the intake of English students and the 
appointment of English staff in Scottish universities provided those denouncing the 
ethnic undertones of Scottish nationalism with further legitimacy. 
 
However, while anti-English sentiments may be diffuse at grassroots level, none of the 
political parties ever intended to instrumentalize them for an electoral purpose. In 1994, 
the SNP clearly distanced itself from Scottish Watch, founded by a former SNP activist 
with the aim of “cleansing Scotland of English white-settler exploitation.”95 The 
association New Scots for Independence, affiliated to the SNP that at its height gathered 
several hundred individuals, was founded to reassure non Scottish-born residents that 
they would not be discriminated against in an independent Scotland. In 1995, the party 
won an injunction against the extreme anti-English group Settler Watch to stop issuing 
pamphlets urging support for the SNP96. Furthermore, English-born residents are not 
geographically concentrated, nor do they constitute a clearly identifiable community 
living on the margin of Scottish society. The ‘Scottishing effect’ (Dickson 1994), 
                                               
91. For the French case, see Robert Laffont’s influential essay La revolution régionaliste (1967) and the even more 
eloquent Décoloniser en France (1971). The colonial idiom was especially popular among regionalist movements in 
the 1960s, when people’s right to self-determination was re-interpreted in order to include former colonies. However, 
this became old-fashioned in the 1990s and is hardly ever used today. In the British context, the term White Settlers 
refers more specifically to British settlers in Kenya and Rhodesia, who were a block to colonial independence.  
92. These groups only gathered a few hundred members and never managed to enjoy broad appeal (Watson 2003). 
93. An opinion piece published in the Independent ‘The warnings that Scotland’s patient nationalism could turn 
nasty’ authored by Neil Ascherson, November 21, 1993.   
94. Irvine Welsh’s hero in Trainspotting (1993) put the 1990s Scottish malaise in a more telling if vulgar way: “Ah 
hate cunts like that… Cunts that are intae baseball-batting every fucker that’s different, pakis, poofs, n what huv ye. 
Fucking failures in a country ay failures. It’s nae good blaming the English for colonizing us. Ah don’t hate the 
English. They’re just wankers. We are colonized by wankers. We can’t even pick a decent, vibrant, healthy culture to 
be colonized by. No. We’re ruled by effete arseholes. What does that make us?... The most wretched, servile, 
miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat intae creation.” 
95. Quoted in the Observer ‘SNP’s tartan embrace of the sooth mooth’, November 4, 1999.  
96. See UNHCR, Minorities at Risk Project (2004). 
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through which English-born migrants become rapidly incorporated into Scottish society, 
reflects how, for better or worse, Scotland shares numerous similarities with its 
Southern neighbour. English immigrants never attempted to constitute a distinct 
political party on ethnic lines in order to defend their interests, nor have they tried to 
establish specific sections within existing parties, nor sought to gain recognition as a 
culturally distinct minority. Reciprocally, Scottish emigrants living in England are 
equally invisible and the SNP never seriously considered them as a potential electoral 
resource. Unlike in Québec where the English-speaking community sought recognition 
– and was encouraged to do so by the federal government – as a distinct group, nothing 
similar occured in Scotland, where Britishness still provides an overlapping identity, 
and hence a back door to inter-ethnic tensions.  
 
In fact, rising hostility towards English-born residents cannot be understood 
independently of the broader political and economic context of the 1980s. This was not 
so much the result of Scottish nationalism turning ‘nasty’ as the consequence of two 
changes.  
 
First, the boundary between English and Scots residing in Scotland was far from being 
clear-cut. As support for nationalism increasingly overlapped with and reinforced the 
class cleavage, the ‘others’ were not so much the ‘English’, a discursive category that is 
particularly at odds with the sociological patterns of a territorially dispersed and loosely 
connected population. Instead, the national boundary increasingly excluded the native 
upper class, an “internal periphery strongly addicted to the symbols of Scottish 
‘patriotism’” and yet well integrated into the England-dominated British state 
(McKenzie 1981: 162-63). Although this category is equally far from representing a 
socio-demographic reality, it nonetheless suggests that the boundary shift through 
contraction was rather a class than an ethnic mechanism per se.  
 
The second factor has to do with the seemingly inexorable economic decline of 
Scotland, which found its expression in the recrudescence of emigration now mainly 
directed to the South-East of England. By 2001, 735,000 people born in Scotland were 
living in England alone – on average younger and more skilled that their English-born 
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peers living in Scotland – while merely 250.000 were residing overseas97. The recovery 
brought about by the war-related industries during World War II proved to be short-
lived, and the 1950s saw a further decline of Scottish traditional industries. A series of 
regional development policies were introduced by successive Labour and Conservative 
governments during the heyday of the welfare state. In spatial and social terms, the state 
committed itself to providing assistance and care to Britons ‘from cradle to grave’, 
wherever they happened to reside across the territory. Apart from mitigating peripheral 
dissent by diverting resources from the centre, it was meant to reduce the incentives for 
emigration by creating employment opportunities in economically ailing areas. The 
1960s saw the creation of more sophisticated growth poles and major industrial 
developments were relocated to Scotland (Keating 2001a: 245). A Development Office 
for Scotland was set up in 1961, followed in 1964 by the Highland and Islands 
Development Board. However, this period of state-funded reindustrialization came to an 
end in the 1970s, when the priority shifted from mitigating within-state territorial 
inequalities to encouraging endogenous growth (Keating 1998: 27). The relative failure 
of post-war territorial management through diversionary policies in the context of an 
increasingly open economy encouraged the Thatcher-led Conservative government to 
advance its neo-liberal agenda north of the border. The potion proved to be particularly 
bitter in Scotland, where a sharp rise in unemployment combined with the prevalence of 
foreign-owned branch factories (Mitchell 1997) – more vulnerable to adverse economic 
conditions – provoked a new wave of skilled emigration from the Lowlands. Between 
1981 and 1991, some 250,000 people fled the economically depressed region (Armitage 
2005). The phenomenon came to be referred to as the ‘Lowland Clearances’, building a 
link between the “nineteenth century depopulation of the Highlands with the late 
twentieth-century depopulation induced by the collapse of heavy industry, coal mine 
and car production in the urban Lowlands” (Harper & Vance 1999: 17). The SNP 
emphasis on relative economic deprivation98 was perfectly in tune with the increasing 
perception that emigration was but another symptom of the Union. More than ever 
before, home-grown talents educated in Scottish universities took their skills elsewhere 
and increasingly to the South-East of England, in sharp contrast with earlier periods 
when Scottish nationalists could at least take pride in their sons and daughters roaming 
                                               
97. Scotland’s diaspora and overseas-born population, Scottish Government Social Research, 2009.  
98. Peter Jones and Christopher Harvie (2000) in their book The Road to Home Rule made a link between the 
destruction of working class communities brought about by the ‘Lowland clearances’ in the 1980s – that dislocated 
traditional voting patterns – and the rise of support for the SNP.  
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the earth. The demise of the Empire and the concomitant emergence of the South East 
of England as emigrants’ main destination gave some substance to the nationalist claim 
that Scotland would be better off once emancipated from London.  
 
As British elites saw no other option but to manage decline, Scotland faced the choice 
between remaining a managed periphery or profoundly revising the terms of the Union 
with the hope of a new distinctly Scottish impulse. This dilemma was well understood 
by H.J. Hanham, writing in 1969: “Now that the Empire is dead many Scots feel 
cramped and restricted at home. They chafe at the provincialism of much of Scottish life 
and at the slowness of Scottish economic growth, which is related to that provincialism. 
To give themselves an opening to a wider world the Scots need some sort of outlet, and 
the choice appears at the moment to be between emigration and re-creating the Scottish 
nation at home” (quoted in Devine 2006b, my emphasis). This touches upon another 
fundamental aspect of centre-periphery relations in the United Kingdom, which for a 
time mitigated peripheral dissent as centripetal forces were powerful enough, but 
ultimately could no longer stem the tide. The geographical frontier between England 
and Scotland has remained unchanged since the thirteenth century, which makes it one 
of the oldest borders in Europe. After 1707, the symbolic significance of the border 
remained, although by then, the numerous Scots who crossed it were no longer in a 
foreign land inhabited by their Auld Enemy99, but on the way to the political, economic 
and cultural centre of the British nation/Empire in the making. Yet, by the 1980s, the 
case that the mariage de raison with England was still a positive-sum operation from 
which all could benefit was put under severe strain, at least within the current 
institutional arrangements.  
 
3.4. Internal minorities and the road to devolution 
 
 
As in Catalonia, support for nationalism in Scotland cuts across and overlaps with 
religious, class, and ethnic cleavages. However, because of the idiosyncratic structure of 
the Union state, the recognition of Scotland as a nation has rarely been subject to 
controversy. As a result, Unionists and Nationalists alike have been able to pull the 
                                               
99. To be accurate, Scots-born subjects were no longer considered as aliens on English soil since the Union of the 
Crowns a century earlier. This point is further developed in Chapter VI, section 6.1.  
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nationalist string, while conceiving constitutional issues in a radically different way. 
The question of Scotland’s constitutional status has been sporadically debated ever 
since 1707, although it never came to the fore of the political debate until the 1970s. At 
least since the creation of the Scottish Home-rule Association in 1886, constitutional 
change has been discussed and advocated by umbrella organizations seeking to create a 
broad coalition of support, aggregating groups and individuals with distinct ideological 
inclinations and yet united in their common objective to reform the Union-state. The 
period from 1918 to 1964 saw the consolidation of a two-party system in Britain 
organized along class cleavages, although, as I showed earlier, class divisions competed 
with religious ones in Scotland throughout the entire period.  
 
The first breakthrough of the SNP in the 1967 Hamilton by-elections marked an 
important shift in Scottish politics, as the class cleavage for four decades to come would 
no longer be superseded by religious affiliations, but by divergences over Scotland’s 
constitutional status, “at times cutting across and at other times reinforcing the class 
cleavage” (Mitchell 2009: 33). Scottish nationalism has historically been associated 
with the Liberals and the Labour party, which emerged as an autochthonous force in the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Keating & Bleiman 1979). The main reason for 
its hegemony north of the border, apart from following the regional pattern of 
industrialization, lies in the party’s successful balancing act between class and national 
interests. For a long time, this consisted in tapping resources from the centre rather than 
seeking partial exit in the form of political autonomy. In the 1970s, the Labour party’s 
renewed interest in devolution did not stem from a genuine ideological shift but came 
primarily in response to the SNP electoral threat. With 21.9% of the vote in 1974, the 
SNP was challenging the Labour party in its old Scottish bastion and forced the Labour 
leadership to reconsider its position. However, its reluctance to do so was manifest in 
the profound internal dissensions that ultimately contributed greatly to the referendum 
failure and subsequent fall of the Labour government100. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
100. Although a majority of Scottish voters supported the devolution Bill, the result fell short of reaching the 40% 
electorate threshold, an amendment passed to appease anti-devolutionists within Labour ranks. 
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Table 4: UK General election results in Scotland (1951-1997) 
 
Parties Cons Labour Lib-Dem SNP Other 
1951 48.6 47.9 2.7 0.3 0.5 
1955 50.1 46.7 1.9 0.5 0.8 
1959 47.2 46.7 4.1 0.8 1.2 
1964 40.6 48.7 7.6 2.4 0.7 
1966 37.7 49.9 6.8 5 0.6 
1970 38 44.5 5.5 11.4 0.6 
1974 24.7 36.3 8.3 30.4 0.3 
1979 31.4 41.5 9 17.3 0.8 
1983 28.4 35.1 24.5 11.8 0.3 
1987 24 42.4 19.2 14 0.3 
1992 256 39 13.1 21.5 0.8 
1997 17.5 45.6 13 22.1 1.9 
 
Sources: my own compilation from Hassan and Lynch, 2001: 349-352.  
 
 
But in the 1980s, successive victories of the Conservatives in general elections acquired 
an ever-growing territorial dimension. While quasi-hegemonic in the South-East of 
England, the party lost its ability to mobilize its traditional electorate in the periphery, 
and especially in Scotland where its vote share went down to 24% and 10 seats in 1987, 
against 42.5% and 50 seats for Labour. In her notorious Sermon of the Mound in 1988 
at the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Margaret Thatcher vainly attempted 
to reconcile her neo-liberal agenda with what she saw as a deeply rooted Scottish 
religious ethos101. However, clergymen and pundits alike received her intervention with 
scepticism, the Conservatives’ steady electoral decline being the consequence of the 
party’s inability to deliver economic growth in Scotland, the secularization of Scottish 
Protestantism and the rise of political nationalism (Mitchell & Bennie, 1996). 
  
Besides, the decade saw the development of another phenomenon that was to have 
crucial consequences for the evolution of Scottish nationalism. As Labour was adopting 
a more explicitly nationalist discourse and coming to terms with its internal divisions 
                                               
101. In the words of Margaret Thatcher, the Scottish religious ethos was “about spiritual redemption, not social 
reform.” 
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over devolution, the Conservatives, whose uncompromising unionism had been 
reinvigorated under the influence of Margaret Thatcher, became markedly anti-
devolutionist. More than ever before, constitutional and class cleavages in Scotland 
overlapped and reinforced one another, the nationalist struggle taking a clear anti-Tory 
dimension (Mitchell 1998). For the Conservatives, Scotland’s national destiny now lay 
in the exaltation of private enterprise and the eradication of the Scots’ ‘dependency 
culture’ through the dismantling of the welfare state in an increasingly centralized state. 
In stark contrast, home-rulers, despite their ideological divergences, shared the view that 
Scottish national identity was primarily territorial, leaning towards the left of centre, and 
necessitating a profound revision of Scotland’s current constitutional status. Electoral 
breakdowns of the 1979 referendum clearly show that support for devolution was 
mainly dragged from working class and Catholic voters and geographically 
concentrated in the West Central Lowlands.102  
 
The decline of the Conservatives, combined with evidence that the reserves of potential 
electors were to be found on the left of the political spectrum, encouraged the SNP to 
become explicitly left-wing in the 1980s, following a long period throughout which the 
party had been reluctant to position itself on the ideological axis (Lynch 2002)103. In the 
1970s, Scottish Labour sought to counter the rise of the SNP by accusing it of being the 
‘Tartan Tories’, hostile to working class interests. However, this seemed increasingly 
far-fetched now that the party was clearly hunting on Labour’s territory. 
  
By the late-1980s, Labour endorsed the idea of cross-party campaigning for devolution 
and participated in the Scottish Constitutional convention, together with the Liberal 
Democrats, the Churches, Trade Unions and a number of civil society associations. The 
SNP, torn apart by internal dissensions between fundamentalists and gradualists, 
remained at the margin of the initiative without entirely disqualifying it. The subsequent 
                                               
102. The widespread belief that the 1978 Scotland Act was meant to entrench a Catholic-friendly Labour domination 
in Scotland through an assembly elected by the first-past-the-post system goes a long way to explain the referendum 
failure (McKenzie 1981). This is of course not the only factor that has been invoked. However, the decision to 
introduce proportional representation for elections at the Scottish Parliament in the 1997 Scotland Act was partly 
taken in order to dissipate these doubts.  
103. In 1979, a group of party members – the 79 Group – created an internal faction and sought to persuade the SNP 
leadership to take an actively left-wing orientation. Although they were expelled in 1982, the party nonetheless 
evolved towards a more left-wing strategy, following the changing winds of Scottish politics and surfing on the 
widespread opposition to Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda.  
 115 
 
release of the Scottish Bill of Rights104 illustrates the expansion of political nationalism, 
not limited to the SNP but covering the entire political spectrum apart from the 
Conservatives. The important difference from the previous decade is the intimate link 
built between devolution and democracy, or more precisely, between self-determination 
and the 'democratic deficit' engendered by the decline of the Conservatives, portrayed as 
having ‘no mandate in Scotland’ (Mitchell et al. 1998). Although the Catalan case was 
admittedly more problematic in the 1970s, the Scottish road to devolution also 
associated political autonomy with democratic legitimacy, undermined by the declining 
support of the Scottish electorate for the Westminster government and the development 
of an increasingly distinct party system. The 1997 referendum – imposed by Labour 
party backbenchers and endorsed by Tony Blair – illustrated the changing mood of the 
Scottish electorate who, after 17 years of Conservative rule, voted en masse in favour of 
the bill.  
 
However, electoral breakdowns show significant variations along ideological, class and 
religious lines. While merely 8% of Conservative voters registered a double-yes vote, 
85% of Labour voters and 90% of SNP voters did so. Class divisions show a similar 
pattern: 46% of middle class voters supported the scheme against 74% of lower class 
voters. More strikingly, the overwhelming majority of Roman Catholics (83%) 
registered a double-yes vote, while no more than 59% of Church of Scotland members 
did so (Denver 2002). These figures are sufficiently compelling to conclude that the re-
establishment of the Scottish parliament marked the decline of the Conservative strand 
of unionism, and a concomitant rise of a territorially-defined national identity, asserting 
more left-of centre values, and cutting across religious and ethnic lines. On the eve of 
devolution, the national boundary was more than ever before territorialized. In 1995, the 
SNP former MP and future MSP George Reid was able to span a thousand years of 
Scottish history to give his own teleological vision of contemporary Scottish national 
identity, “built on the commonwealth of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the 
Calvinists, the social concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement, 
and the civic nationalism of today.”105 
                                               
104. The Statement of the Scottish Bill of Rights reads: “We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do 
hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to 
their needs, and do hereby declare and pledge that in all our actions and deliberations their interests shall be 
paramount.” 
105. Georges Reid speaking at the Donaldson lecture, 1995. 
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IV 
 
 
 
4. The Terra de Pas 
 
 
 
 
Low fertility is the eternal problem of decadent 
people, whose members privilege the satisfaction 
of their immediate interests to the long-term fate 
of their fatherland. 
 
 
      –José Antonio Vandellos, Catalunya: Poble Decadent 
 
   
 
Jaume Vicens Vives, the most famous Catalan historian of the twentieth century, 
characterized Catalonia as a “passage across cultures and continents”, and the Catalan 
people as the “fruit of diverse yeasts” (1959: 56-59). The reference to the 'Terra de Pas' 
has a long historical pedigree in Catalan historiography, and served an instrumental 
purpose when nationalists became confronted to the need in the 1970s to reconstruct the 
Catalan people on a basis that could accommodate internal immigrants who came from 
other parts of Spain, and represented close to 40% of the population in 1975. It provided 
a potent justification to those who defended a territorial conception of national 
membership, and contributed to avoid the emergence of institutionally-entrenched 
divisions on ethnic or linguistic lines in the homeland. Those who spoke in the name of 
the Catalan people before and after the democratic transition turned this sociohistorical 
observation into an almost unchallenged category of political practice. Hence, for the 
former president of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol, “Catalonia has received Castilian 
immigrants since the Middle Ages, great numbers of Frenchmen in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Many people of Europe, at one time or another, have passed 
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through Catalonia, a country linking the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe, a 
natural gate of entry” (1976: 104-05). His assertion that “everyone who lives and work 
in Catalonia is to be considered a Catalan” gradually turned into a national credo 
celebrating the inclusive character of the Catalan nation-building project.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the territorial politics of migration in Catalonia in a historical 
perspective. I pay particular attention to political elites’ boundary-making strategies in 
relation to internal immigrants throughout the period that preceded and followed the 
democratic transition and the re-establishment of political autonomy in 1979. Prior to 
the transition, the large proportion of residents who were born outside Catalonia 
encouraged nationalists to define national membership in territorial terms. This 
boundary-making strategy fulfilled two objectives. First, it enabled them to acquire 
further internal legitimacy by not providing immigrants with incentives for opposing the 
national project. Second, it strengthened their external legitimacy, thus limiting 
opportunities for reluctant central elites to exacerbate internal divisions along linguistic 
or ethnic lines. The 1979 Statute conferred  legal substance on this claim by defining 
Catalan citizenship on the basis of residency, thus translating a conception of political 
membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of birth and 
their degree of attachment to the land. Accordingly, those who were born elsewhere in 
Spain could become political Catalans. After the re-establishment of the Generalitat, 
Catalan nation-builders have conceived of integration in an ambivalent way. While the 
institutional framework officially entrenched bilingualism, it also actively gave 
preference to the Catalan language and conferred a clear advantage on those who could 
speak it. Catalan nationalists have pursued an ambitious and far-reaching strategy of 
'linguistic normalization’, while carefully preventing the linguistic conflict from 
becoming politicized and the language from turning into a salient membership 
boundary.  
 
Both boundary-making strategies did not come without difficulties, have been 
challenged and questioned on several occasions, without ever being significantly 
altered. I contend that this outcome can best be understood when seen as the 
consequence of a self-conscious elite strategy, facilitated by favourable dimensions of 
the opportunity structure. The first dimension concerns the politico-institutional context 
in which actors have been embedded. In the years preceding the democratic transition, 
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repression organized by a highly centralized and authoritarian state provided incentives 
for fragmented and ideologically divided opposition groups to achieve minimal 
consensus, equating the democratic struggle with the quest for political autonomy. After 
the transition, the re-establishment of the Generalitat provided a favourable 
environment, where divisive issues could be mediated in a liberal democratic context. 
  
The second dimension stresses the role of parties on the left, which established strong 
links with immigrants who were over-represented among the working class, and 
dragged them into the national movement. The communist party PSUC was particularly 
instrumental in this respect during the pre-transition period, but this role was gradually 
taken over by PSC in the 1980s, as communist parties, in Catalonia as elsewhere in 
Western Europe, lost their appeal. Both parties, while maintaining an ambiguous 
relationship with the Catalan nation-building project, have contributed to blurring ethnic 
boundaries within the homeland, providing a link with the rest of the state and fusing 
working class and national claims.  
 
4.1. The historical origins of the ‘immigrant question’ in 
Catalonia 
 
 
Catalonia's political trajectory has to be examined in the light of the historical vagaries 
of the Spanish state-building process (Linz 1973). In the United Kingdom, 
democratization has followed an incremental path which continuously, although to a 
variegated degree, enabled the maintenance of distinct institutions in Scotland. The low 
penetration of the British administration until 1945, combined with the consolidation of 
the Scottish Office throughout the twentieth century, enabled Scottish political elites to 
enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy and Scotland to retain distinct institutional 
features, in spite of the ever more pronounced concentration of power at the centre. 
Spanish unity was achieved as the successive and asymmetric union of several 
kingdoms, who put aside their long-standing enmities for the higher purpose of the 
Reconquista. In 1469, the formal union of the crowns of Aragon and Castilia did not 
seriously affect Catalonia’s political autonomy. But this changed dramatically in the 
aftermath of the war of the Spanish succession which ended in 1714. The new context 
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provided the new king of Spain with the opportunity to rationalize the administrative 
patchwork inherited from the asymmetric alliances of the Union state106. The territories 
of the Crown of Aragon were not the only ones to be affected by this centralizing turn. 
Indeed, the promulgation of the Nueva Planta decrees in 1715 also put an end to the 
organization of Castilia into distinct kingdoms and abrogated most of the privileges and 
liberties of localities. But Catalonia paid a particularly high price for its alliance with 
the defeated coalition led by the Austrian emperor. The abolition of the Corts and of the 
Consell de Cent went hand-in-hand with the suppression of the Catalan language from 
the administration that, for two centuries, would function exclusively in Castilian 
(Gimenez Lopez et al. 1994). To be fair, this occurred at a time when the Principat had 
entered a period of decline, torn apart by internal conflicts opposing the agrarian 
peripheries and the urban core, economically ailing and registering sharp demographic 
decline107. In spite of the brutal circumstances under which centralism came about and 
the genuine efforts to resist it in Catalonia, the forces vives were for a time successfully 
integrated into a clearly-identifiable centre, which ultimately strengthened the territorial 
legitimacy of the state (Vilar 2006: 112-15). In 1778, the gates to the colonies were 
finally opened to Catalan merchants, a privilege until then reserved to the territories 
under the rule of the Castilian Crown. The eighteenth century saw marked population 
growth, in Catalonia as well as in the whole of Spain, the number of residents increasing 
respectively from 407,000 to 900,000 and from 6 to 11 million between 1716 and 1789 
(Vilar 1976: 447-450).  
 
4.1.1. Migration and territorial structuring 
  
 
While the eighteenth century was a period of progressive state-building, the project of 
constructing a single nation out of a variety of peoples inhabiting the same state became 
a major concern in the nineteenth century. The 1812 Cadiz Constitution represents a 
cornerstone in the history of Spanish liberalism. This frustrated attempt to turn Spain 
into a democratic nation state came to symbolize the struggle of enlightened forces 
                                               
106. Rokkan sees some similarities with the Swiss fight against the German emperors, with the important difference 
that by the end of the fifteenth century Castile had become the dominant player as a result of the Conquista and the 
opening of the Atlantic trade route, while simultaneously the Aragonese federation was losing ground in the 
Mediterranean (Peter Flora et al. 1999: 183-84).  Pierre Vilar makes a similar point: between 1333 and 1450, the 
volume of external trade in Barcelona was divided by five (2008: 46-52).  
107. Between 1654 and 1660, the plague was responsible for the death of up to 1/5th of the Catalan population (Tarrés 
1969: 40-1). 
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against absolutism (Perez-Garzón 2007). The discussions over the territorial 
organization of the state that the Constitution was meant to establish evinced important 
dissensions within the liberal camp. The disagreement opposed the advocates of the 
rationalist and universalist ideals that brought legitimacy to the 1789 division of France 
into quasi-geometrical départements irrespective of historical precedents, and what was 
then referred to as “the spirit of provincialism”, concerned with the preservation of 
historical divisions inherited from the Union state of the Reconquista, and only partially 
destroyed in 1715. For the Catalan deputy Felip Aner, aggregating existing territories 
without any consideration for their customs and languages would not “make Catalans 
forget that they are Catalans”, a concern to which the president of the court replied: “we 
are speaking of territorial divisions as if there would be no communication whatsoever 
among provinces, an impenetrable wall like the one separating the Tartar world from 
China […]. But what difference would it make for a citizen moving from one province 
to another? Well, none; he would just move from one room of the paternal house to 
another, and be subject to the same rules, not to a foreign and hostile land where no one 
would be concerned with his well-being (quoted in Garcia Alvarez 2003: 76).”  
 
By 1900, what was merely a parliamentary quarrel over a hypothetical phenomenon in 
Cadiz turned into a salient political issue in Barcelona, where the rise of Catalan 
nationalism corresponded with a period of significant immigration from the rest of 
Spain. The Catalan capital had become in the second half of the nineteenth century a 
major recipient of internal migration pulled into its buoyant industries. At that date, 
28% of the population was born in another part of Spain, a figure that rose to 31.5% a 
decade later108. In 1887, immigrants represented merely 1.2% of the population of the 
four Catalan provinces, increasing to 4.2% in 1900, 5.4% in 1910, and up to 14% in 
1920 (Termes 1984: 180-89). Besides, the period was marked by formidable 
movements of populations within the boundaries of Catalonia itself, from the rural 
peripheries of the hinterlands and the Pyrenees, which suffered a 30% absolute 
demographic decline between 1875 and 1900, to the province of Barcelona. The 
consequences bear some similarities with nineteenth century Scotland, where internal 
migration resulting from radical economic transformations broke the geographical 
border between the Highlands and the Lowlands and reinforced a sense of territorial 
                                               
108. While immigration from the rest of Spain was significant in Barcelona, the other provinces were almost entirely 
unaffected.  
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identity109. Likewise, in Catalonia, the rural exodus considerably diffused the awareness 
of a territorial identity, encompassing the four provinces with Barcelona at its core, as 
“the duality and opposition between the mountain and the plain, the hinterlands and the 
coast, that had divided Catalonia ever since the thirteenth century until the third Carlist 
War, were now overcome” (Balcells 1977a: 88). Hence, natives of other parts of Spain 
increasingly found themselves in an environment where Catalans were more than ever 
aware of their collective identity. But more importantly for our purpose, regional elites 
were increasingly eager to assert this fet diferencial and translate it into a claim of self-
determination. In consequence, Spanish citizens migrating from one province to another 
turned into immigrants in a contested territory, wherein two nation-building projects 
were to compete with one another.  
 
By then, there was little doubt that the project envisaged in Cadiz of turning Spain into a 
modern nation state had politically, culturally, and economically failed. The 
administrative penetration of the state into the periphery had done little but reveal its 
organizational weakness and the bureaucratic deficiencies of a corrupt system. In 1900, 
the literacy rate barely reached 30%, with important territorial variations (de Gabriel 
1998: 37). The process of cultural homogenization had been if anything counter-
productive, especially in Catalonia where the rise of a romantic movement known as the 
Renaixenca had revitalized the Catalan language, boosted interest in historiography, and 
provided peripheral elites with a rich usable past on which to build their claim. Perhaps 
more importantly, in spite of the fact that monetary and fiscal unification had been 
formally achieved, Spain as a nation in the nineteenth century sense of the term, as a 
‘nation-market’, organized around a fully-fledged bourgeoisie, had failed (Vilar 1976: 
79).”110 The industrialization of Catalonia, and later of the Basque Country, provoked a 
territorially uneven pattern of economic development. In spite of the concentration of 
administrative and cultural resources at the centre, the northern peripheries became 
economically more powerful, turning Spain into a polycephalic state. The series of 
political crises that punctuated the century culminated in 1898 with the humiliating loss 
                                               
109. There is however an important distinction with the Scottish case, where emigration was the continuation of 
internal movements in the wake of industrialization. In Catalonia, emigration remained limited, especially by contrast 
with the rest of Spain, except perhaps to Cuba and Puerto Rico where Catalan merchants and navigators settled and 
maintained strong commercial and political links with the homeland. While they did play a significant role in 
homeland politics at the turn of the century, this point shall be discussed in chapter 8, section 8.2.1   
110. Vicens Vives summarized the reasons for this failure  in compelling terms: “Impoverished by internal wars, the 
selfishness of her ruling class, and the backwardness of her masses, Spain only achieved an underdeveloped stage of 
capitalism during the 19th century” (1995: 7). 
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of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the last remnants of the Empire. This traumatic event cast 
serious doubts on the viability of the Spanish state which, combined with the limited 
rewards entailed for Catalan industrialists in privileged access to a state-wide market 
protected from external competition by high tariff barriers, provided strong impetus to 
the national movement. 
 
4.1.2. 1900-1936: from the Lerrouxist peril to the Civil War 
 
 
In 1901, the Lliga Regionalista was founded and was to dominate the Catalan political 
scene until the advent of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship in 1923. The Lliga was both 
nurtured by the social conservatism of the Carlist movement and the romantic ideas of 
the Renaixenca. It was equally committed to intervene in Spanish politics and transform 
the atavistic state from the centre so as to acquire further autonomy in the periphery 
(Ellrich 2004). It relied on the firm support of Catalan industrialists, who were opposed 
to progressive labour reforms which could undermine their competitiveness and 
opportunistically used the repressive apparatus of the state to police an increasingly 
agitated working class (Balcells 1976b: 5). Besides, immigration from the rest of Spain 
provided a seemingly infinite resource of cheap labour, which was used as a means to 
break strikes and weaken class solidarity. But by trying to empty the Catalan movement 
of its progressive components, the Lliga mechanically reinforced the legitimacy of 
Alejandro Lerroux, a young and charismatic politician who was charged with the task of 
reinvigorating Spanish Republicanism in the turbulent region. He successfully 
capitalized on a working class backlash by presenting Catalanism as an essentially 
bourgeois ideology, hostile to their interests: “The Castilians, who represent one third of 
the inhabitants of this city, do not even dare to speak loudly on the Ramblas, because 
the separatist beast mocks their language with cynicism…”111 His demagoguery  
resonated well among an uprooted proletariat, clustered in the overcrowded slums of 
Barcelona, whose living conditions were in all respects extremely difficult and 
separated from the native population along self-reinforcing linguistic and 
socioeconomic lines. However, while Lerroux did make significant inroads in some 
neighbourhoods with a high concentration of immigrants, the hostile attitude of the 
                                               
111. Alejandro Lerroux in a speech from 1905, quoted in Ellrich, 2004: 158.  
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central government towards the working class gave new vigour to the more progressive 
components of Catalan nationalism. 
 
 In 1923, the Lliga, concerned with the radicalization of the class struggle exacerbated 
by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and adverse economic conditions, did not 
oppose General Primo de Rivera’s coup d’état. But the belief that Primo de Rivera was 
a providential figure, able to re-establish social order and expand the self-governing 
institutions they failed to obtain through parliamentary means, was soon disappointed. 
Indeed, the Mancomunitat was abolished in 1925. Besides, the authoritarian regime he 
imposed cast serious doubts on the Lliga’s capacity to articulate a territorial interest 
beyond the defence of the bourgeoisie’s privileges. The period saw the resurgence of 
immigration as a result of large-scale state-funded investment in infrastructure, public 
works, and preparations for the 1930 International exposition in Montjuic (Candel 1964: 
39). The net migration rate rose sharply to 32,000 on average per year, so that close to 
25% of the Catalan population was born elsewhere in Spain in 1930. Yet national and 
working class interests increasingly conflated into common opposition to the 
authoritarian central state, thus enabling the Catalanist left to begin the following 
decade as the dominant political force. The party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC), founded in 1930, was able to build a broad coalition of support and retained an 
almost hegemonic position until 1936. After ERC’s large victory at the 1930 local 
elections, its leader Francesc Maciá proclaimed the ‘free Catalan Republic’ within a 
chimerical ‘Iberic federation’, a few days before the Second Republic was officially 
founded. But the new institutional context encouraged him to negotiate with Madrid and 
compromise for a solution that fell short of federalism, as Spain was constitutionally 
meant to remain an ‘integral state’,112 and yet enabled provinces to organize themselves 
into Autonomous Communities. In 1931, 99% of the Catalan electorate voted in favour 
of the Statute resurrecting the Generalitat more than two centuries after its dissolution, 
with an exceptionally high turnout of 75%. In the city of Barcelona, merely 3,000 voters 
opposed it, although 37% of its million inhabitants were born elsewhere in Spain 
(Balcells 1976b: 23-25). The change was considerable when compared to twenty years 
earlier when the Lerrouxist peril had threatened the cohesion of the Catalanist 
movement. In 1932, Francesc Maciá, then President of the Catalan Parliament, was well 
                                               
112. 1931 Constitution of the Spanish Republic, article 1.  
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aware of the necessity to ground the legitimacy of the autonomous government in the 
entire resident population. He addressed the Catalan people with words that 
emphatically appealed to a territorial identity in-the-making: [a]ll Catalans – whether of 
blood, language, birth or residence – shall reap the benefits of political autonomy. We 
consider as Catalans – and I believe it is important to stress this – everyone who lives on 
our land and feels penetrated by our desires and ideals.”113 
 
Between 1930 and 1936, not a single MP elected at successive elections for the Catalan 
Parliament was born outside of Catalonia, although immigrants represented up to 25% 
of the Catalan population (Pitarch 1980: 80). From 1936 onwards, Spain and Catalonia 
were drawn into a revolutionary spiral, which found its denouement in 1938 with the 
imminent victory of the Franco army over the Republican troops besieged in Barcelona. 
In Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell relates his experience as a member of the 
International Brigades. In spite of his rudimentary Spanish, he was able to capture how 
the “Catalans professed to look down on the Andalusians as a race of semi-savages, (…) 
rustic-looking men, with faces deeply stained by the ferocious sun of further south,” 
which in turn fed rivalries among the Republican camp itself (2000: 84-85). But 
ultimately, the divide between immigrants and natives at a time of exceptionally high 
polarization was overshadowed by the prevalence and salience of mutually reinforcing 
ideological and religious cleavages. This precipitated the country into a Hobbesian war, 
wherein the extraordinary level of violence achieved on both sides was not directed 
towards alleged strangers, but fellow-countrymen.  
 
4.2. 1950-1978: the ‘New Catalans’ at the time of anti-
Francoist mobilization 
 
 
This section examines the political developments that led to the definition of Catalan 
citizenship based on residency in the 1979 Statute of autonomy, irrespective of 
geographical origin and linguistic criteria. I successively show how the outcome has 
been facilitated by the politico-institutional context, solidifying a united front of 
                                               
113. A locution of President Maciá, published in the daily newspaper La Publicitat on December 4, 1932. The original 
text is available in Ismael Pitarch (ed.) El President Maciá, el Parlament de Catalunya, Parlament de Catalunya, 
2009, p.82.  
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ideologically divided actors agreeing on a minimal consensus equating the democratic 
struggle with the recovery of political autonomy, and by the role of the Catalanist left, 
and PSUC in particular in bridging immigrants’ social demands and nationalist 
aspirations. 
 
4.2.1. The pacific invasion 
 
 
Between 1950 and 1975, the population of the four Catalan provinces increased from 
3.2 to 5.6 million, mainly as a result of the influx of 1,400,000 migrants coming from 
other parts of Spain. In 1975, the year Franco died, an estimated 38% of the Catalan 
population was born elsewhere in Spain and most immigrants were concentrated in the 
fast-deteriorating neighbourhoods of Barcelona’s outskirts. Hence, they amounted to 
85% of the resident population in Cornella de Llobregat, 84% in Santa Coloma de 
Gramanet and el Prat de Llobregat, 77% in Hospitalet de Llobregat, and 75% in 
Sabadell. 
 
Table 5: Net migration - rest of Spain and abroad, (1941-1980) 
 
Decade 
Net Migration/rest of 
Spain 
Net 
Migration/abroad Total Population 
1941-50 194,617 7,519 2,792,235 
1951-60 497,857 21 3,164,197 
1961-70 684,675 16,572 3,890,710 
1971-80 306,081 6,115 5,041,205                 
   
Source: Pablo Alcaide Guindo et al. (2007) 
 
 
The circumstances under which what some referred to as a ‘pacific invasion’ came 
about are still subject to controversies in the Catalan historiography. For Albert Balcells, 
the Franco regime purposely encouraged immigration, with the aim of weakening the 
Catalan working class associative tradition and achieving a “Castilianization from the 
bottom to the top, progressive and constant, facilitated by industrialisation and uneven 
fertility rates” (2004: 72). However, the government was equally concerned with the 
rapid and endogenous industrialization of the Northern peripheries, which it saw as a 
potential source of instability, as with their cultural homogenization. Internal migrations 
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gained considerable vigour in the wake of the Plan de Estabilización (stabilisation 
plan), initiated in 1959 by the new generation of bureaucrats who had recently replaced 
the old guard at the head of the state. While this initiative marked the end of autarchy 
and the opening of Spain to foreign investments, it also raised a number of concerns, as 
it provoked the desertification of the Castilian hinterlands and Southern peripheries and 
a massive rural exodus directed  to the provinces of Barcelona, Vizkaya, and beyond to 
France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany (Gonzalez Temprano 1975). The 
government sought to mitigate this through the creation of state-planned development 
poles (polos de desarollo), in order to stimulate industrialization in other provinces, by 
channelling investment in economically deprived areas (Cuadrado-Roura 2009). These 
measures cast doubt on the belief, still widespread in nationalist circles, that 
immigration was part of a broader conspiracy orchestrated by the state to turn the 
Catalan people into a minority within its homeland114. 
 
But whether or not immigration was deliberately encouraged by the state, the 
consequence of uneven patterns of industrialization, or a combination or both is of 
secondary importance, as this occurred at a time where Catalan institutions had been 
virtually suppressed. The 1932 Catalan Statute was formally abrogated and “in 
accordance with the principle of patriotic unity”, the four Catalan provinces recovered 
the “honour of being governed on an equal step with their sisters from the rest of 
Spain.”115 Besides, the repression went beyond the abrogation of self-governing 
institutions and was accompanied, especially in the early years, by the systematic 
persecution of political opponents, forced into exile, parked in concentration camps, 
summarily executed or imprisoned (Richards 1998: 40-7). The inseparable wall evoked 
by the President of the Cadiz Court in 1812 had been crossed and dismantled. Yet, this 
was not achieved in the name of liberty and democracy, but marked the beginning of a 
dictatorship that was to last for four decades.  
The government used all the instruments of a modern state to pursue an 
uncompromising nation-building project – the “reespañolización cultural de 
Cataluña”116 –, banishing the flag and changing street names, forbidding the national 
                                               
114. The concept of ‘cultural genocide’ was popularized in the Catalan context by Josep Benet, 1995. 
115. Bill issued and signed by General Franco himself on April 5, 1938 abrogating the 1932 Statute, my emphasis. The 
original text is available at http://www.xtec.es/~jrovira6/gcivil1/estatut.htm. It is interesting to contrast it with the 
reply of the President of the Cadiz Court in 1812, for whom Spain was a ‘paternal house’. 
116. These are the words of the civil governor of Barcelona appointed by the Regime in 1939, quoted in Benet, (1978: 
290). 
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anthem, and prohibiting the use of the Catalan language in the public sphere. Besides, 
internal migrants settling in Catalonia were not, as it is sometimes wrongly assumed, all 
working class, but also included an indeterminate number of Civil War veterans acting 
as the representatives of the state and occupying key positions in the Church, the army 
and the administration. Together with some sections of the autochthonous upper-
bourgeoisie, they formed a small but cohesive elite who remained to the end loyal to the 
regime (Guibernau 2004). They were those who Francisco Candel, in his famous 
pamphlet published in 1964, called the “other immigrants”, who “unlike the kind of 
poor immigrants who represent a hope for our country, have the mind of a 
conquistador” (Candel 1972: 292). Jordi Pujol  drew a similar line between the 
numerically small yet powerful group of those who “possess a pure Castilian mentality, 
central Castilian” and the poor and “uprooted” immigrants who came to seek a better 
life (1976: 124). As in Scotland, the upper bourgeoisie was criticized for its promiscuity 
with the regime, assimilation into a Castilian identity, and lack of support for the 
Catalan cause. Hence, the national boundary was not built on strictly ethnic or linguistic 
lines, but overlapped with class divisions and excluded members of a dominant class, 
whether they were born and bred in Catalonia, or came to 'colonize' it. Nevertheless, as 
immigrants were over-represented in lower-status occupations, class divisions 
overlapped with and reinforced linguistic and ethnic ones117.  This created a potentially 
explosive situation, characterized by two antagonistic nation-building projects laying 
claim to the same piece of territory. This, however, failed to materialize, as nationalist 
elites were aware of the risk associated with a strictly ethnic or linguistic definition of 
national membership.  
 
4.2.2.  Boundary-making strategies in the pre-transition period 
 
 
Nationalist elites self-consciously sought to project a political conception of the nation 
beyond linguistic considerations and encompassing everyone living within the territory. 
                                               
117. Here I carefully distinguish ethnic and linguistic divisions, which are not congruent but overlapping. A number of 
native Catalans deliberately shifted to Castilian and educated their children in Castilian prior to the transition, 
especially among the higher bourgeoisie. In 1996, a study carried out by the CIS reported that 55 percent of 
respondents in Catalonia identified Spanish as their mother tongue, a proportion which far exceeds that of 
immigrants,  i.e. individuals who were not born in Catalonia residing in the region, suggesting that linguistic data is a 
rather crude and ultimately useless indicator for distinguishing immigrants from natives. Regarding the relationship 
between the place of birth and socio-economic situation, CIS (1997) reported that in 1995, in the Barcelona 
metropolitan area, 78% of individuals belonging to the middle class were born in Catalonia, while this figure 
decreased to 39.3% for the working class, and exactly the opposite for individuals born outside of Catalonia, 
respectively 22 and 60.7%.  
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In the period that preceded the transition, those who spoke on behalf of the Catalan 
people and were later to negotiate far-reaching territorial autonomy with the central 
state as an essential component of the democratization process, were pursuing the 
seemingly irreconcilable task of blurring ethnic boundaries within the homeland, while 
strengthening the meaning of the territorial boundary with the rest of the state. Indeed, 
invoking a narrow conception of membership would have jeopardized their chance to 
negotiate far-reaching territorial autonomy through democratic means for two inter-
related reasons. First, a strictly ethnic basis would have mechanically excluded a large 
proportion of the population, thus undermining the internal legitimacy of an 
autonomous government. Second, this would have provided reluctant central elites with 
a blueprint for exploiting internal divisions as a means of opposing their claims. In the 
1960s, many Catalan nationalists had turned into Pancatalanists, defending the political 
unification of the Catalan-speaking countries from the French département of 
Languedoc-Roussillon to Valencia, on the basis of their putative cultural unity118. 
However, this demand was gradually abandoned as the prospect of recovering political 
autonomy grew closer, and there is seldom evidence that it has ever been seriously 
considered. While it still officially figures among the propositions of ERC and is 
regularly denounced by the Valencian section of PP that associates it with the supposed 
imperialist aspirations of the Generalitat, the Pancatalanist ideology has had few 
implications beyond the realm of political rhetoric and parties’ electoral strategies. In 
fact, Francisco Candel’s premonition that the “New Catalans, with their clean souls, 
loving passionately the country, would be drawn towards the curious task of 
revalorizing the New Catalonia,” was recuperated by the most prominent nationalist 
leaders of the time (Candel 1972: 324). Speaking on Spanish public television in 1976, 
Jordi Pujol argued that being Catalan was “neither a linguistic nor a genealogical issue.” 
Likewise, the ERC leader Heribert Barrera declared that  “one can be Catalan and speak 
in Castilian everyday, or not be able to speak in our language, this makes no difference 
whatsoever” (1980: 212). 
 
Actually, the most pressing concern was to achieve the unity of all anti-Francoist groups 
in Catalonia, in spite of their profound divergences along the ideological and territorial 
axes. After the Civil War, the vanquished camp, internally divided among factions 
                                               
118. The Pancatalanist ideology had some historical antecedents. In an influential book published in 1905, Prat de la 
Riba’s spoke of the national destiny of ‘Greater Catalonia’. See Josep Colomer, 1984: 162-79.   
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blaming the responsibility for the defeat on one another, sought to organize the 
opposition in exile and to a lesser extent in Spain. However, the gradual acceptance of 
the dictatorship by the international community after World War II119 and the inherent 
difficulty of organizing the contestation beyond symbolic actions precipitated anti-
Francoist groups into a state of crisis that was to last until the beginning of the 1960s. 
Even then, it did not take the form of a mass protest, mounting an imminent threat 
capable of overthrowing the regime. Yet, the Basque Country and Catalonia became the 
most significant bastions of resistance. In Catalonia, the movement remained by and 
large pacific120, a surprising development considering the degree of polarization and 
violence achieved during the Civil War. The unity of opposition forces was formally 
achieved in 1969 in the Comisió coordinadora de Forces Politiques de Catalunya and 
culminated in 1971 with the creation of the Assemblea de Catalunya121. The outcome 
was a short document that demanded a) the amnesty for all political prisoners and 
exiles, b) the return of fundamental democratic liberties, c) the right of self-
determination and the provisional re-establishment of the Generalitat. Hence, their 
demands were not strictly speaking the manifestation of a nationalist ideology. Instead, 
political autonomy and the recognition of Catalonia’s national character were envisaged 
as an essential component of the democratic struggle, assuming that one could not come 
about without the other. The project envisaged in Cadiz, equating liberal democracy 
with a centralized state, had been entirely discredited with the Franco experience when 
the concentration of power at the centre in the name of Spanish unity went hand-in-hand 
with authoritarianism (Ysàs 1994: 84-89, Linz 1991).  
 
Consequently, democracy/autonomy and autocracy/centralism came to be seen in the 
pre-transition context as two mutually exclusive forms of government. While the 
Assemblea de Catalonia gathered a broad coalition of opposition groups divided along 
and cutting across left/right and centre/periphery cleavages, they were nonetheless all 
                                               
119. Acceptance of the Franco Regime by the international community reached a peak in 1953 with the signature of a 
Defence Agreement with the US government, who saw in Franco a valuable ally in the Cold War. In December 1946, 
the United Nations “condemned the Franco regime in Spain and decided that, as long as that regime remains, Spain 
may not be admitted to the United Nations” in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, thus provoking great 
hope in the anti-Francoist camp. However, the country was officially accepted as a member in 1955. 
120. In 1981, the terrorist organization Terra Lliure undertook a series of minor violent attacks but was rapidly 
disintegrated.  
121. The Assemblea de Catalunya gathered the communists of PSUC, the socialists of Moviment Socialista de 
Catalunya, the nationalists of the Front Nacional de Catalunya, the Christian Democrats of Unió democràtica de 
Catalunya, ERC, the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional, Bandera Roja, the Catalan federation of PSOE, 
Workers’ Commissions, the Assemblea de Intellectuales (Ysàs 1994: 86).  
 131 
 
driven by the same objective of overthrowing the regime and initiating the democratic 
transformation of the state. Besides, the document carefully avoided elaborating on a 
number of issues that were to re-emerge after the re-establishment of the Generalitat, 
where they could be contained and mediated within the framework of liberal democratic 
institutions. Hence, the degree of linguistic convergence, the scope of political 
autonomy, and the manner in which class divisions should be addressed were not even 
mentioned. On September 11, 1977, the national day of Catalonia commemorating the 
fall of Barcelona in 1714, the greatest protest in the history of contemporary Spain was 
organized. Again, the rallying cry of the million protesters marching in the streets of 
Barcelona was ‘Llibertat, Amnistia, Estatut d’Autonomia’, a consensual slogan that 
could accommodate everyone, be they native or immigrants, behind a democratic 
banner, without entering into potentially divisive questions.  
 
More importantly for our purpose, immigrants were directly involved in the democratic 
struggle through the PSUC, which was by far the largest and most well-organized group 
within the anti-Francoist constellation. Indeed, it could rely on dense networks in the 
industrial areas of Barcelona and its outskirts, characterized by a high presence of 
immigrant workers. This predominance was the heritage of the Second Republic, when 
PSUC, the historical party of the Catalan Communists founded in 1936, enjoyed 
considerable resources, having absorbed at the time the Catalan federation of PSOE 
(Colomé 1996: 9). While significantly diminished, this heritage still conferred a 
privileged position upon the PSUC in the 1960s, enabling it to “retain much more 
influence among the working class than other prominent parties” (Balcells 2004: 162). 
As the main opposition group, it attracted a number of activists beyond the narrow 
circles of Communist militants, which in turn reinforced its predominance (Greer 
2007b: 10-13). Most importantly, the PSUC was not only the heir of greater 
organizational capacity, enabling it to aggregate different movements, but also of a 
strong Catalanist identity. This differentiated it markedly from the state-wide PCE, to 
which it was only loosely affiliated (Lardin i Oliver 2006). Hence it played a key role in 
linking working class demands and nationalist aspirations, dragging into its orbit a 
sizeable proportion of immigrants for whom the Catalan right to self-determination was 
at best a secondary concern.  
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At the 1977 parliamentary elections, more than one elected MP out of five was not a 
native-born Catalan, a proportion which rose to 25% in 1979 (Pitarch 1980: 81). 
Furthermore, the proportion of militants and representatives who were not born in 
Catalonia in the main Catalanist parties almost matched their relative weight in the 
population. There was, in Ismaël Pitarch’s words, a “quasi-equality of opportunities”, 
albeit with considerable variations across parties (ibid.: 82). While close to half the 
delegates attending the 4rth Congress of PSUC in 1977 were born elsewhere in Spain, 
the figure dropped to 20% in the case of PSC, and merely 5% for the Pujol-led CDC122. 
The PSC came first at the 1977 and 1979 general elections, followed by PSUC, while 
Pujol’s group obtained the same proportion of votes as the state-wide centrist party 
UCD. The relatively low score of non state-wide nationalist parties led some pundits to 
downgrade the salience of the centre/periphery cleavage, neglecting the fact that PSC 
and PSUC, which together obtained more than 50% of the votes, had played a key role 
in the revitalization of Catalanism in the late-Franco period and its diffusion to the 
middle and lower social strata (Blondel 1981). As PSC and PSUC were to play a key 
role during the negotiations, working class immigrants in Catalonia could reasonably 
assume that their interest would be represented and taken into account at the time of 
setting a constitutional path for a democratic Spain and a politically autonomous 
Catalonia.  
 
4.2.3. Catalan citizenship in the 1979 Statute 
 
 
The MPs who were elected in Catalonia in 1977 enjoyed an electoral legitimacy which 
transcended the immigrant/native cleavage and were united around the common aim to 
recover political autonomy. In consequence, they approached the constitutional debate 
in a relatively strong position. The 1978 constitution struck a fragile balance between 
the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of 
all Spaniards”, and “the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that form 
it…”123 Josep Taradellas, the leader of the Catalan government in exile, was invited to 
return and appointed as the provisional president of the Generalitat, charged with the 
task of elaborating a new Statute of Autonomy. Its terms were not to be imposed from 
the outside, but negotiated with political elites deemed as sufficiently legitimate to 
                                               
122. The data is taken from the 1st Congress of the PSC held in 1978, and the 2nd Congress of the CDC held in 1976.  
123. 1978 Spanish constitution, article 2, my emphasis.  
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speak on behalf of the Catalan ‘nationality’, however moribund Catalan institutions in 
exile were at the time.  
 
The 1979 Estatut provided that Spanish nationals who have taken up administrative 
residence in one of the municipalities located within the jurisdiction of the Generalitat 
should be considered as Catalans for a ‘political’ purpose. One year earlier, the second 
Congres Juridic de Catalunya decided that the term ‘ciutadania’ (literally citizenship) 
should be preferred to that of ‘regionalidad’ to designate the legal bond between the 
Generalitat and individual citizens (Raluy 1980). Hence, the Statute consecrated a 
definition of Catalan citizenship based on residency, and derived from Spanish 
nationality according to a clear hierarchy of legal norms. The Catalan condition was 
defined according to the veïnatge administrativo, which translated a conception of 
political membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of 
birth and their degree of attachment to the land. As a result, those born elsewhere in 
Spain could become ‘political Catalans’, in very much the same way as the 1997 
establishment of a democratically elected Parliament in Edinburgh allowed Britons born 
in England to become ‘political Scots’.  
 
While this decision proved to be instrumental in building a broad coalition of support 
cutting across ethnic lines, it nonetheless did not go unchallenged, as some sought to 
derive the political condition of Catalan from civil rather than administrative residency. 
In accordance with the Catalan civil code, the status of civil resident is granted to 
everyone born in Catalonia and extended to their spouses, but not to immigrants, who 
are nonetheless eligible after two years of residence. Defining Catalan citizenship on the 
basis of the veinatge civil would have meant that a sizeable proportion of immigrants 
would have been entitled to vote in their province of origin, but not in Catalan elections. 
Reciprocally, individuals born in Catalonia and residing elsewhere in Spain would have 
retained their electoral rights in their community of origin. The amendment was 
supported by a handful of politicians who, while agreeing on the means, differed 
radically in their motivations. One of them was the leader of the Andalusian nationalist 
party PSA, who defended the right of those living in what he referred to as the “9th 
province of Andalusia” to vote in their municipality of origin. On the other hand, some 
among the Catalanist party UDC feared that this arrangement would primarily benefit 
PSUC, whom they accused of “forcing immigrants to become Catalans with the sole 
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aim of getting their votes.”124 But the mainstream media, intellectuals and politicians 
accused them of Lerrouxisme, a term that made its way into the political idiom to 
denounce any attempt to divide Catalan society on ethnic lines, which proved to be 
particularly useful after the transition when the need came  to defend the Generalitat 
policy of ‘linguistic normalization’.125 Eventually, the amendment was rejected and the 
political and democratic idea of the Catalan nation prevailed, recognizing the civil unity 
of a plural territory, blurring to a considerable extent the antagonism between natives 
and immigrants.  
 
4.3. 1980 – 1998: integration into a single bilingual community 
 
 
Defining the boundaries of Catalan citizenship on the basis of residency was the 
consequence of a self-conscious strategy, facilitated by the instrumental role of PSUC 
and to a lesser extent PSC in bringing together working class interests with nationalist 
demands for political autonomy. However, an inclusive conception of citizenship 
represented only one side of the equation, as the linguistic issue was carefully left aside 
during the debate that preceded the re-establishment of the Generalitat. This concern 
was soon to re-emerge in the Catalan political arena, as CiU, controlling the Catalan 
government for 23 consecutive years, consistently considered ‘linguistic normalization’ 
as the backbone of its broader nation-building agenda, with important ramifications in 
the cultural, economic and political realms. In his investiture speech in 1980, Jordi Pujol 
announced his ambition in unequivocal terms: “[w]e are a people in danger of 
denationalisation and internal, deep and radical rupture. One of the fundamental 
objectives of the programme of this government will be the normalization of the Catalan 
language”, the long-term objective being to ensure that “in Catalonia, the own language 
and culture of the country are Catalan.”126 Likewise, the 1980 CiU Manifesto explicitly 
listed among its priorities the “Recatalanization of Catalonia.”127 The policy of 
linguistic normalization has intervened along four axes. First, in the toponymy of the 
                                               
124. ‘El Lerrouxismo tampoco concurrirá el 1-M a las urnas’ in Triunfo, Manuel Campo Vidal, February 12, 1978 
125. Rafael Aracíl defines Lerrouxism with these words: “political doctrine based on the diffusion of Anticatalanism 
among the working class and immigrants, with the aim of driving Catalonia into two distinct linguistic communities” 
(2000: 389).  
126. First Acceptance Speech of Jordi Pujol, April, 24, 1980. Original text available at: 
http://www.lavanguardia.com/19800424/54068046330/discurso-de-investidura-de-jordi-pujol-i-legislatura-24-de-
abril-de-1980.html 
127. CiU Party Manifesto, 1980, p. 100.  
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territory, by changing streets names and indicators in order to multiply the “unwaved 
flags” of nationalism in all possible settings, “which are easily forgettable and yet at 
least as important as the memorable moments of flags waving” (Billig 1995: 10-11). 
Second, in the cultural realm, the Generalitat pursued an ambitious arts policy meant to 
turn Catalan into a language of high culture (Crameri 2008: 110-13). Third, linguistic 
policy-makers intervened in the administration by making eligibility to the civil service 
contingent upon applicants’ ability to speak Catalan. Last, Catalan became the dominant 
language of instruction, so that in a few years, pupils went from receiving education in 
Castilian with Catalan taught as a second language, to a system of maximum 
‘Catalanization’.  
 
The literature has emphasized three complementary arguments to account for the rapid 
diffusion of the Catalan language in the 1980s and 1990s. First, Catalan and Castilian, 
as two Romance languages, grammatically and phonetically close to one another, can be 
understood and learnt without great difficulty. The Catalan case is usually contrasted 
with the Basque Country, where becoming proficient in Euzkadi requires a much greater 
investment (Conversi 2002). Second, Catalan carried significantly greater prestige than 
Castilian, an unusual characteristic for a minority language deriving from the superior 
economic position of native Catalan speakers, which provided immigrants with an 
incentive for second language acquisition (Woolard 1989, Woolard et al. 1990). In a 
slightly different vein, David Latin applied game theory to the socio-linguistic 
landscape of Catalonia, and identified a pattern of “competitive assimilation” (2007: 35-
38). In his account, language entrepreneurs made credible the “threat that all future job 
openings would require facility in the Catalan language […] through a solidarity pact 
among businessmen that the language of all big businesses would be conducted in 
Catalan” (ibid: 37). In turn, immigrant families, fearing that their children would be 
discriminated on the labour market and expecting that their neighbours would 
strategically shift to Catalan for the same reason, faced compelling incentives to invest 
in the acquisition of a second language.  
 
While these theories convincingly account for the diffusion of the Catalan language 
among non-native speakers, they only partially explain why linguistic divisions never 
turned into a salient boundary, in spite of the ever-more coercive institutional pressures 
aimed at privileging the Catalan language and those who were able to speak it. The 
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argument I wish to deploy here has to do with the specificities of the party system and 
the dynamics of party competition. In particular, I contend that PSC has been 
instrumental in keeping the linguistic issue away from competitive politics, by 
channelling and partially resolving conflicts within its own party structure. Furthermore, 
the only party that actively sought to exploit these divisions has been the right-wing 
PPC, which never managed to mobilize more than a fraction of the electorate. 
Paradoxically, it strengthened the solidarity of Catalanist parties, who consistently put 
aside their ideological differences in defence of the linguistic arrangement.  
 
4.3.1. The political context 
 
 
In 1980, the results of the first elections to the Catalan Parliament were to have crucial 
consequences for the institutional structuring of the Generalitat, setting an unexpected 
path that shaped and conditioned later developments to a considerable extent. PSC and 
PSUC emerged as the dominant forces in Catalonia in the first two rounds of general 
elections held in 1977 and 1979. Hence, PSC, although its campaign had been 
punctuated by a series of minor incidents between its Catalanist and more Madrid-
inclined wings, could reasonably expect a large victory and the privilege of setting up 
autonomous institutions. Pujol’s narrow victory came as a surprise for most, and a rude 
awakening for an excessively confident PSC. In 1984, in the second Autonomous 
elections, CiU obtained an absolute majority in the Catalan Parliament and became the 
dominant political force until 2003. 
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Table 6: Election results to the Catalan parliament (1980-1999) 
 
 
Source: My own compilation from the official site of the Generalitat, www.gencat.cat 
 
 
PSC's relatively low score in 1980 can partly be attributed to the fierce competition on 
the political space of the left. The Andalusian nationalist party PSA obtained close to 
3% of the immigrant vote and PSUC was still remarkably strong, while ERC was able 
to attract 9% of the Catalanist vote. But the reason why the Catalan electorate has 
consistently voted for PSC-PSOE at general elections where CiU has been the most 
successful party in autonomous elections lies in what has been referred to as a 
differentiated turnout (Riba 2001). On the one hand, while political participation in 
general elections has matched the state-wide average, turnout for Catalan elections has 
been lower. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of those who abstain from 
voting in Catalan elections are PSC voters and internal immigrants in particular. For 
instance, 34% of immigrants who voted for PSC at the 1979 general elections abstained 
in 1980, a pattern which repeated itself over subsequent elections (Colomé 1996: 18). 
This creates an asymmetric pattern, whereby the interests of active Catalan speakers, 
Year 1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 
 
Parties % Seats % Seats  % Seats                                         % Seats % Seats % Seats 
UCD 10.1 18           
AP   7.7 11 7.7 6       
PPC       5.97 7 13.1 17 11.9 12 
PSC 22.4 33 30.1 41 30.1 42 27.6 40 24.9 34 37.9 52 
CiU 27.8 43 46.8 72 46.8 69 46.2 70 41 60 37.7 56 
PSU
C 18.8 25 5.58 6         
IV     7.76 9       
IcV       6.5 7 9.71 11 2.51 3 
ERC 8.9 14 4.41 5 4.41 6 7.96 11 9.49 13 8.67 12 
PSA 2.66 2           
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who constitute CiU’s core electorate, are over-represented by comparison with youth 
and immigrants, who predominantly support PSC and tend not to vote.  
 
However, the ambivalent position of PSC along the centre-periphery axis constitutes a 
crucial difference between Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the PSOE 
federation, although it took the name of PSE – Partido Socialista de Euskadi – to polish 
its Basque credentials, is much more oriented towards Madrid, and the degree of 
polarization along the centre-periphery cleavage more pronounced. The PSC was 
founded in 1978 out of the fusion of three existing parties: PSC-Congrés, PSC-
Reagrupament and the Catalan federation of PSOE. The first two were autochthonous 
parties, created a few years earlier out of the fusion of dispersed organizations operating 
exclusively within Catalonia with strong nationalist leanings. Unlike all other Spanish 
Autonomous communities where socialist parties were incorporated into the PSOE, the 
PSC was the only party federated with the Spanish socialists at state level (Colomé 
1989). According to its 1978 Statutes, the PSC is both committed to “create a classless, 
self-managed and socialist society, in which all signs of class and national oppression 
have vanished”, and to “assert the national personality of Catalonia.”128 This ambiguous 
position has fed a constant tension with the PSOE. Well aware that they pay a high 
electoral price for tolerating the PSOE's rejection of genuine federalism, the Catalan 
Socialists have pressed for regional power to be fully developed under the existing 
Constitution (Gillespie 1992: 8). In addition, these tensions are not only visible 
externally, between PSOE and PSC, but also internally, between native Catalans and 
immigrants within the PSC: “In Catalonia, the continuous tensions between the 
historical members of the Catalan federation of PSOE and the former leaders of PSC 
mirrored the basic tensions existing between native Catalans and immigrants. The 
federal structure of the party only partly managed to regulate the ongoing conflicts 
between the centre and the periphery.”129 The PSC was allegedly a “party of 
professionals and intellectuals with Catalanist backgrounds from the lower and middle 
bourgeoisie, while the Catalan federation of PSOE was the “party that overwhelmingly 
receives the votes of immigrants from other parts of Spain,” well-entrenched in the 
Barcelona outskirts with a more traditional working class identity (Jacobson 2010: 75). 
But these tensions have been managed within the party itself.   
                                               
128. Estatuts del Partit Socialista de 1978, Art. 1.  
129. Gunther et al. quoted in Gabriel Colomé (1989) p. 80.  
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Ultimately, the PSC took over the role formerly played by PSUC during the pre-
transition period, which the latter was no longer able to fulfil as a result of its inexorable 
electoral decline. By appealing to working class interests and avoiding positioning itself 
clearly along the centre-periphery axis, the PSC has been able to bring a large number 
of internal immigrants into Catalan politics. Far from confining itself to being the ‘party 
of immigrants’, it actively sought to cultivate its Catalanist identity. In regard to the 
linguistic conflict, it acted as a moderator by seeking both a consensus with CiU and 
carefully preventing it from becoming a salient membership boundary.  
 
4.3.2. ‘Linguistic normalization’ and PSC’s moderating role 
 
 
The linguistic provision in the 1978 Constitution was sufficiently vague to leave 
significant scope for interpretation. The inherent tension of the constitution, between the 
indissoluble unity of the Spanish state and the recognition of its nationalities, is also 
embedded in article 3, which states that “Castilian is the official language of the state; 
all Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it”, and yet specifies that “the 
other languages of Spain shall also be official in their respective Autonomous 
Communities.” The 1979 Statute enshrined an equally vague provision. In fact, the 
Catalan language, relegated to menestralia during the dictatorship, was relatively weak, 
including among natives. Besides, the virtual absence of institutions able to rapidly 
regain the ground that had been lost in the past forty years meant that nationalists had a 
vested interest in drafting a disposition that would remain ambiguous enough to be 
accepted by the majority of the electorate and leave sufficient room for later 
interpretations, according to the political conjuncture. The linguistic provision 
comprises three elements130. The first one consecrates Catalan as the “lengua propria” 
of Catalonia, following the proposition made by PSC and PSUC of resurrecting the 
idiom used in the 1932 Statute. This presented the advantage of stressing the symbolic 
significance of Catalan, by contrast with the somehow impersonal “language of the 
state.” The second one establishes Catalan as Catalonia’s official language, as is 
“Castilian which is official in the whole of the Spanish state.” While seemingly putting 
both languages on an equal footing, it formalized the right of citizens to speak Catalan, 
                                               
130. Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya de 1979, art. 3.  
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as opposed to their right and duty to speak Castilian, a formal inequality that has 
remained contentious until today. The third one guarantees the normal and official use 
of both languages, by “taking the necessary measures to ensure that they are known, and 
creating the right conditions for them to become fully equal in terms of the rights and 
duties of the citizens of Catalonia.” Hence, to the great satisfaction of nationalists, the 
third disposition gave the Generalitat a blueprint to privilege the use of Catalan, which, 
at this stage, was relatively disadvantaged and could not be equalized with Castilian 
without massive public intervention.   
 
The Constitution has allowed for the development of two distinct models of education 
in bilingual autonomous communities. The first one is the so-called model of partial or 
‘total separation’, applied in the Basque Country, Navarra and Valencia and based on 
individuals’ right to choose the language of instruction. By contrast, the model of 
‘linguistic conjunction’, based on the principle of non-separation, is meant to ensure that 
all students become proficient in both languages by the end of the period of compulsory 
education (Huguet 2004). By constraining individuals’ ability to choose their preferred 
option, the system is necessarily more conflictive. Catalonia is, with the partial 
exception of Galicia, the only Community that opted for the second option. As the 
system is mainly the result of administrative practices and decrees left at the discretion 
of the executive, it can potentially be modified without major legislative reforms and is 
consequently more subject to political changes. However, after 23 years of CiU 
leadership, the model is solidly anchored in stable institutions. The main source of 
inspiration of policy-makers was the Carte de la langue française, the infamous bill 101 
adopted by the Québec Assembly in 1977, meant to turn the French language into the 
dominant vernacular of education. But unlike in Québec where nationalists have been 
forced to recognize the historic rights of Anglo-Quebeckers, effectively protecting their 
linguistic rights as well as those of immigrants who already integrated the Anglo-
Québec community (Magnet 1990: 5-9), the legal framework in Catalonia has remained 
much more ambiguous.  
 
Catalanist parties agreed on minimal parameters. First, the linguistic conflict should not 
be used for an electoral purpose. Second, all students should become proficient in both 
languages by the end of the period of compulsory education. However, within these 
broadly defined parameters, there were important disagreements across parties in regard 
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to the long-term aims and the means to achieve them. The first objective seemed 
especially far-fetched as the debate was being appropriated by civil society associations. 
One of the first actions taken by the newly elected CiU government in 1980 was to pass 
a decree making Catalan the normal vehicle of expression in all the administrative 
organs affiliated to the Generalitat131. This disposition has successively been expanded, 
so that access to the civil service rapidly became conditional upon an applicant’s ability 
to speak Catalan132. In order to be eligible for entry in the Catalan administration, 
applicants must provide a certificate delivered by the Junta Permanente del Catalan 
officially sanctioning their linguistic abilities. The selection procedure is regulated by a 
competitive examination and the accreditation of candidates’ linguistic skills, 
independently of their examination results. The autonomous administration generates 
directly around 5% of the jobs on the Catalan labour market and immigrants from the 
rest of Spain were largely excluded from the public administration in the 1980s 
(Alarcon 2005: 64). For CiU, this early disposition presented the advantage of giving 
privileged access to individuals who were proficient in Catalan in the early-1980s and 
hence were more likely to share the Generalitat’s nation-building agenda, while 
encouraging non-Catalan speakers to learn it. With a civil service by and large 
sympathetic to its aims and financially dependent upon it, the CiU-led Generalitat found 
reliable support for its ‘Recatalanization strategy’.  
 
This decision prompted the publication of the Manifesto de los 2,500, denouncing the 
discrimination suffered by Castilian speakers and defending the right to receive 
education in one’s mother tongue133. This group was mainly constituted of pre-transition 
civil servants from the Department of Education, who rightly feared that the new 
linguistic regulations might endanger their position. At the same time, the Crida a la 
Solidaritat was founded in defence of the “Catalan language, culture and nation”134, and 
                                               
131. This decision was in fact the realization of a long-standing nationalist demand that can be traced as far back as the 
early days of political nationalism. In 1885, prominent figures of the Renaixenca and political Catalanists issued the 
Bases de Manresa, a short document that was supposed to serve as the basis for the regional constitution of Catalonia. 
Although the boundaries of the citizenry were not strictly delimited and the rules of naturalization unspecified, the 
text mentioned that “only Catalans, by birth or by virtue of naturalization, shall be eligible to work in the public 
administration (Base de Manresa No. 3).” 
132. As the Generalitat is formally a bilingual administration, applicants are also required to speak Castilian to be 
eligible for the Catalan civil service. 
133. The Manifesto reads: “This initiative has not been motivated by a primary Anticatalanism, but by a series of 
measures taken in recent years, limiting the official and public use of Castilian, constraining the right of receiving 
education in one’s mother tongue, and violating the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of one’s language…” 
Manifiesto de los 2.300, in reference to the number of “intellectuals and professionals who live and work in 
Catalonia” who signed the petition, published on January 25, 1981.  
134. Encyclopèdia.cat, entry ‘Crida a la Solidaritat’.  
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demonstrated the same intransigence, which led some to fear that the linguistic conflict 
may become intractable and spill over to politics. In this context, the need to reach a 
consensus as broad as possible became more pressing. On the one hand, CiU and ERC 
sought to achieve a maximal Catalanization of the education system, even if this came 
at the price of creating a two-track scheme, whereby individuals would have the right to 
choose the dominant language of instruction (Ardelaguët 1996: 112-9). On the other 
hand, PSC was in favour of a bilingual system and committed to the principle of non-
separation, not least because the party feared that institutionally entrenching the 
linguistic division would make the task of bridging linguistic communities increasingly 
difficult. CiU enjoyed a better position than its socialist rival, as the latter could easily 
be accused of Anticatalanism if a consensus failed to be reached. Besides, the recently-
voted LOAPA135 Law in the Spanish Parliament, passed with PSC support, made this 
risk particularly acute. The party was originally opposed to fully-fledged and exhaustive 
legislation. However, it soon came to realize that CiU would not compromise and 
sought to negotiate a middle-ground, engaging in the difficult task of simultaneously 
polishing its Catalanist credentials, containing the influence of the PSOE in Madrid, and 
defending the interests of working class immigrants. Ultimately, PSC consented to the 
gradual Catalanization of the education system, and CiU endorsed the principle of non-
separation. The Law of Linguistic Normalization was unanimously voted by all Catalan 
MPs in 1983, with the aim of consolidating the use of the Catalan language in “all 
settings and guarantee the normal and official use of Catalan and Castilian.”136 This 
remarkable consensus has meant that the linguistic issue has remained largely 
disconnected from politics, especially as the law was brought to the constitutional court 
which ruled out some of its dispositions in a legal battle that lasted until 1995. 
Throughout this period, the divide between the central state and the Generalitat 
overshadowed internal dissensions within Catalonia. Indeed, “the defence of the Catalan 
language, when it comes under attack, homogenizes the ideological diversity of political 
parties, as there is, at this very moment, one single enemy” (Cabré et al. 1986: 142).  
 
                                               
135. The LOAPA – Organic law for the harmonization of the autonomous process – was passed in the Spanish 
Parliament in 1982, as a result of a pact between PSOE and UCD, with the aim of slowing down the devolution 
process. PSC MPs voted in favour of the law, although the negotiations saw some important dissensions between the 
PSOE and the Catalan Federation. The Catalan socialists paid a high electoral price for this decision at the 1984 
Autonomous elections and have, ever since, carefully sought to emancipate themselves from the PSOE, at least in the 
Catalan political arena.   
136. Law 3/1983 of Linguistic Normalization, passed in Catalan parliament on June 15, 1983. 
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Initially, the system allowed for a significant degree of flexibility, as the language mix 
could be tailored according to the sociolinguistic landscape of each locality. While all 
schools were obliged to provide a bilingual education, individuals were in theory free to 
choose among three paths: maximal, medium and minimum Catalanization. However, 
the balance was rapidly tipped in favour of Catalan, especially after the programme of 
linguistic immersion was introduced in 1984. This decision came in response to a recent 
report which indicated that in schools with a high concentration of Castilian speakers, 
the objective of guaranteeing that all pupils would be proficient in both languages by the 
end of the period of compulsory education would most likely not be met. From a 
psycho-linguistic point of view, it was justified by the fact that language acquisition is a 
function of its meaningful use in context (Arnau et al. 1995).. Accordingly, the purpose 
of the programme was to provide an environment where Catalan functions as the 
exclusive means of communication. Instead of specifically targeting pupils whose 
parents were not born in Catalonia, the programme was applied to all schools where the 
proportion of ‘non-native Catalan speakers’137 exceeded 70%. In 1992, another decree 
was passed, further decreasing the degree of individual choice. By 1993, 88.8% of 
schools had reached a maximum level of Catalanization, whereas schools in which the 
language of instruction was predominantly Castilian had by then almost disappeared. 
 
4.3.3. Fluctuat nec mergitur: the failure of PPC’s challenge 
 
 
In the 1980s, no political party actively sought to politicize the language issue apart 
from the Catalan section of Alianza Popular, whose direct link with the Franco Regime 
– the party was founded by no less than seven former ministers – considerably 
diminished its credibility. Besides, the collapse of UCD in 1983, and the difficult re-
composition of the electoral space of the state-wide right throughout the 1980s seriously 
limited its capacity to play a prominent role in Catalan politics (Hopkin 1999). From 
1989 onwards, the Catalan section of PP, whose first leader, Alejo Vidal-Quadras, was 
notoriously known for his uncompromising Anticatalanism, took the lead of a virulent 
campaign against the Generalitat’s linguistic policy. He was assisted in his crusade by 
some conservative newspapers of the Madrid press. In 1993 ABC joined the fight with 
an unambiguous and provocative headline: “Como Franco pero al revés: la 
                                               
137. ‘Non-native Catalan speakers’ is the official category used in the bill.  
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Persecución del Castellano en Cataluña.”138 In 1995, Vidal-Quadras published a 
pamphlet in which he denounced how “linguistic nationalism, in its segregating 
obsession, finds itself confined in cultivating an impoverished, vacillating, unsatisfying 
and insecure identity, and cannot accept that what constitutes the best and most noble 
aspect of Catalonia, is what we share with the rest of Spain, and beyond with Europe” 
(1995: 8). However, Vidal-Quadras was evicted from the leadership in 1996 after a 
series of increasingly virulent rows over the linguistic rights of Castilian speakers in 
Catalonia, a concession made by José-Maria Aznar to Jordi Pujol against its 
parliamentary support in Madrid. Paradoxically, the intransigent position of PPC has 
served nationalists’ interests rather than undermined them. Indeed, to date, the PPC has 
never managed to depart from its pro-Madrid reputation, partly because of its internal 
organization, more centralized than PSOE (Astudillo et al. 2010). Hence, the Catalan 
leadership is more dependent upon central elites for whom a reasonable degree of 
Anticatalanism serves an electoral purpose, by keeping alive the old separatist fear and 
alleged Catalan conspiracy against the integrity of the Spanish nation state. But in the 
Catalan political arena, its regular attacks against the policy of linguistic normalization 
are immediately criticized by all political parties, whose ideological differences 
suddenly evaporate and who sing the century-old ‘Lerrouxisme’ tune with one voice and 
coherence. In other words, it provides nationalists with tangible evidence that the 
survival of the Catalan language is still hypothetical, subject to the twin challenges of 
internal dissenters adopting the language of the state, and the remnants of Spanish 
nationalism – embodied in PPC – that has not abandoned its assimilationist ambitions. 
In Michael Billig’s idiom (1995), these are the sporadic and yet necessary moments 
when ‘banal’ nationalism turns ‘hot’, when the flags are being waved again, when 
differences are being put aside and national unity momentarily restored to face a 
common challenge.  
 
By the mid-1990s, the progression of the Catalan language seemingly hit a glass ceiling 
(Crameri 2008). This pressed the CiU government to deepen the strategy of linguistic 
normalization. However, some cracks in the consensus became noticeable, and the law 
passed in the Catalan Parliament in 1998139 only brought cosmetic changes to the 
                                               
138. Meaning literally ‘Like Franco but the other way around: How Castilian is being persecuted in Catalonia’, ABC, 
November 12, 1993.  
139. Law 1/1998 of Linguistic Normalization. For a normative critique from a liberal standpoint, see Costa 2003.   
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existing legislation. Besides, the reform failed to gain the support of ERC, for which the 
law was not going far enough, and PPC, for which it was going too far. On the other 
hand, a civil society association – foro Babel – was created and achieved much greater 
visibility than its predecessors had. However, its explicit aim is to defend bilingualism 
and its members have endorsed most existing policies and institutions aiming at 
diffusing the use and knowledge of Catalan. One of its most prominent members defines 
what ought to constitute a ‘Catalan’ in terms that most nationalists would have no 
difficulty appropriating themselves: “a Catalan is a citizen who lives in Catalonia, freely 
uses the language he or she wishes to use, and respect the language used by others.”140 
 
In fact, whether or not there exists a linguistic conflict in Catalonia is unclear, as the 
overwhelming majority of its residents are bilingual and see no inconvenience in 
shifting from one language to the other according to the audience in a situationist mode. 
Besides, Catalan nation-builders have not employed coercive means to achieve their 
aims, but have successfully encouraged and provided adequate opportunities to 
Castilian speakers, who by and large consented to assimilate. Catalonia has officially 
remained a bilingual territory where opportunities to speak Castilian in most social 
fields are not constrained. Last but not least, the main virtue of the principle of non 
separation resides in the fact that, as the pool of bilingual speakers ineluctably grows, it 
becomes very difficult to identify two mutually exclusive communities, separated from 
one another by the insurmountable wall of incomprehension. Ultimately, the 
development of stable and democratic institutions over the past decades consolidated a 
territorial conception of membership, which competes, cuts across, overlaps and at 
times supersedes linguistic and ethnic criteria. By the turn of the twenty-first century, 
the question of ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ was little more than an episode of 
the collective memory, providing institutional and discursive opportunities and 
constraints to political elites and policy-makers now confronted with the large-scale 
settlement of ‘immigrants from abroad’, a phenomenon discussed at length in 
subsequent chapters.   
                                               
140. Francesc de Carreras, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Universita Autonoma de Barcelona (UAB) and 
member of the Foro Babel . ‘La verdadera normalización del Catalan’, in El País, May 1, 2003.   
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5. Regulating Immigration in a Plurinational Context 
 
 
 
 
Who wants to be responsible? Whenever 
anything goes wrong, the first thing they ask is: 
‘who's responsible for this?’ 
        
 
– Jerry Seinfeld, the Blood, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Research examining the impact of territorial politics on immigration policy-making is 
still scarce. However, recent developments in a number of federal states suggest that 
regional governments are increasingly keen to influence immigration policy outputs, 
making demands upon the state to take territorial disparities into account. This is 
particularly true in plurinational democracies, where control over immigration came to 
be seen as an important feature of self-government and an instrument of cultural 
reproduction, economic development and social cohesion. In both Catalonia and 
Scotland, nationalists have looked to the example of Québec, where the provincial 
government has sought and gained significant leverage in administering its own 
immigration policy, allowing it to explicitly favour French-speaking immigrants. For 
the purpose of this chapter, I examine how the Catalan and Scottish governments have 
sought to gain some control over the regulation of immigration into their own 
jurisdiction and how these demands were largely unfulfilled. Scottish and Catalan elites 
have perceived the need to control the number and provenance of people entering their 
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respective territories in very different ways. For the former, immigration has been 
portrayed as a potential response to population ageing, a problem made particularly 
acute in Scotland by the combined effect of sustained emigration and low immigration. 
For the latter, the sudden and rapidly accelerating influx of international migrants to 
Spain affected Catalonia more than the rest of the country and reawakened deeply 
rooted concerns about the compatibility of immigration with the nation-building project. 
In both cases, political elites sought to run their own autonomous policy within the 
framework of a regionalized system. However, their respective central states proved 
equally reluctant to share their prerogatives in a matter they saw as closely associated 
with their sovereignty.  
 
The conclusion is twofold: 
 
First, the review of empirical developments over the past ten years suggests that the 
Scottish and Catalan administrations have used their competencies to further 
territorialize their nation-building projects. Indeed, by defining, naming and counting 
immigrants entering their territorial jurisdiction and invoking distinct needs and 
preferences in matters of immigration, sub-state administrations have reinforced the 
meaning of the territorial boundary separating them from the rest of the state. Their 
attempt to gain further control over immigration policies has not only been intertwined 
with claims of self-determination, but also integrated into a broader strategy of 
economic development which sees immigrants bringing desirable skills essential to 
generating endogenous growth, boosting internationalization and ultimately decreasing 
reliance on the domestic market.  
 
Second, the ‘frustrated policy transfer’ (Davis 2009) is not necessarily at odds with 
nationalist preferences, as they retain the opportunity to blame the centre for policies 
that are hardly ever translated into electoral gains and characterized by an ever-
widening gap between policy goals and outcomes, two phenomena which will be 
discussed at length in the conclusion. While nationalists cannot take credit for 
controlling their borders according to voters’ preference, they can nonetheless blame 
their respective central governments for failing to take into account the sectional 
interests of Scotland and Catalonia. 
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5.1. Scottish immigration policy: devolution and the limits of 
control 
 
 
In Britain, the Conservative immigration policy between 1979 and 1997 was as 
restrictive as it was effective (Hussein 2001). Social unrest in some cities with a high 
proportion of non-white residents together with the governments’ zero-immigration 
ideological inclinations laid the ground for a restrictive policy framework. Since the 
implementation of the first Immigration Act in 1962, the British government has 
consistently managed to keep immigration at a significantly lower level than most 
Western European countries. As Joppke put it, “if Fortress Europe is being built on the 
foundation of its lowest common denominator, it is the Fortress Britain turned inside 
out” (1999: 133-4).  After seventeen years of Conservative rule and an electoral victory 
that looked like a plebiscite, New Labour took office with an open borders agenda for 
those bringing desirable skills, although it had little idea of how this could be achieved 
in practice (Somerville, 2007). From 1997, the net migration balance grew sharply, 
stabilized in 2000, and rose again in 2004 with EU enlargement and subsequent flows 
of East European migrants into the fast expanding British labour market. With a net 
migration rate above the 250,000 threshold in 2004, it seemed the executive was no 
longer able to control borders effectively. However, New Labour’s ideological stance 
combined with business pressures have played a much greater role than the supposed 
loss of sovereignty resulting from globalization or Europeanization (Duvell & Jordan 
2003). Until the middle of the decade, the government still perceived immigration as 
essential for the country’s continuing prosperity. But in 2005, the publication of the 
five-year strategy for asylum and immigration, Controlling our borders: Making 
Migration Work for Britain, came as a response to rising public141 concerns in the 
aftermath of the 2004 EU-enlargement142. In 2008, a points-based immigration system 
was introduced, with the aim of simplifying the current framework and considerably 
tightening the channels of entry for low-skilled migrants. While some observed how 
immigration policy-making was gradually being ‘securitized’ in the very cradle of 
liberalism, others attempted to explain why, despite increasingly anxious public 
                                               
141. A Yougov survey in December 2004 found that 75% of Britons think “there are too many immigrants coming 
into the country.” Another survey carried out in 2005 found that 58% of Britons thought the government’s policies on 
immigration and asylum were “not tough enough” (Migration Policy Group 2005a).  
142. Interestingly, EU migrants, who constitute the great bulk of immigrants over the past decade, enjoy free mobility 
throughout the UK and fall beyond the scope of successive immigration reforms.  
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opinion, Downing Street only marginally constrained the entry of economic migrants to 
the British market (Boswell 2008). In line with Freeman’s institutionalist account of 
immigration policies in Europe (1995), there are reasons to believe that the British 
government has been reluctant to annihilate support of business interest groups that 
New Labour sought and gained when it came to office. This resulted in a two-track 
strategy, reinforcing control for ‘unwanted’ migrants, while broadening the channels of 
entry for skilled and highly-skilled ones. 
 
5.1.1. Immigration and the ‘population crisis’ 
 
 
Like any political concern, immigration come on and off the political agenda, 
intermittently climbing up and down the ladder of priorities. Yet, in most instances, 
public interest is awakened by social unrest in one form or another occurring in 
neighbourhoods, cities, or regions hosting a substantial proportion of immigrants. In 
France, the 2005 riots following the death of two teenage youths of North African 
descent while they were escaping a police control in Clichy-sous-Bois ignited an 
intense and emotional debate, eventually leading to the adoption of more restrictive 
legislation a few months later (Waddington et al. 2009). In Spain, the 2000 migrants’ 
revolt in El Ejido encouraged the Spanish government to curtail the African route and 
widen channels of entry from Latin America and nurtured the widespread popular 
belief that borders can no longer be controlled effectively (Bujan & Perez 2005).  
 
By contrast, in devolved Scotland, immigration has not become a ‘hot’ topic as a 
response to a traumatic episode shedding light on the failure of current immigration 
policies, the perceived incompatibility of essentialized migrant groups with liberal 
democratic values143, or a popular belief that there are just ‘too many’ of them. Instead, 
it gained currency in the wake of the publication of the 2001 census figures144, and was 
framed as a population crisis145 as opposed to a societal one, following the pre-
established cognitive path closely associating emigration with national decay. Failing 
                                               
143. This is not a normative statement but an argument that is never so far from the surface of migration-related 
debates in liberal democracies, and is no longer circumscribed to radical right-wing parties. See for example, a press 
article by Francis Fukuyama published in the Guardian, ‘The West has won: Radical Islam can’t beat democracy and 
liberalism’ October 11, 2001.  
144. In Britain, census figures are released every ten years. The organization in charge of collecting and gathering the 
data in Scotland is the General Register Office for Scotland (GROS). The figures were officially released in October 
2002.  
145. ‘The Birth of a population crisis’ in the Scotsman, September 14, 2002.  
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fertility, life expectancy that remains low by West European standards, and sustained 
emigration coupled with weak immigration were some of the most worrying issues 
made explicit in the Report on Scotland’s Population in 2010146. While Britain’s 
population was expected to grow from 59.8 million to 64 million by 2025, that of 
Scotland, with current trends remaining constant, would soon start to decrease, down to 
4.5 million by 2050 (Lisenkova et al, 2008). With compelling evidence that the 
Scottish population was ageing147 faster than that of England and Wales, the report left 
little room for optimism. For the vast majority of Scottish politicians, it constituted 
nothing less than “an illustration of the failure of Scotland’s economy over the past 
decades.”148 Longitudinal and spatial comparisons were particularly influential in the 
rise of the population crisis. Indeed for the first time, the report provided a “concise and 
easily digested description of Scotland’s population […] and presented comparisons 
over time and between countries in the UK and beyond” (Graham et al. 2003: 378). 
This new layout corresponded with the first time the Census was taken under full 
domestic control as part of the devolution package. Besides, the psychological 
significance of the ‘5 million threshold’, under which the Scottish population might fall 
also played a crucial role149. But the ‘crisis’ did not erupt solely as a result of 
comprehensive evidence that Scotland’s demographic difficulties were more acute than 
its neighbours’. Indeed, they found particular resonance in Scottish politics, where 
depopulation is a long-standing trend that at least since the 1960s has been perceived as 
a brain drain and a symptom of increased dependence on London. Although the great 
bulk of Scottish emigrants over the past two centuries were primarily driven by ‘pull’ 
rather than ‘push’ factors, the memory of the Highland clearances and their idiomatic 
contagion to the Lowlands in the 1980s remained vivid and kept informing political 
practices in devolved Scotland150.   
                                               
146. Publication of the General Register Office for Scotland, 2002.  Substantial inflows of East European migrants 
since 2004 raised the number of residents to 5,116, 900 in 2006. But this positive trend shall not overshadow the fact 
that the number of deaths have exceeded the number of births since the early 1990s (McQuaid et al 2008: 5). 
Demographic projections foresee that the population may start to decline from 2019 onwards , whereas that of the 
rest of Europe is expected to rise by 2.7% by 2031. Between 1995 and 2001 Scotland’s population fell by 1%, while 
the UK population rose by 2.8%, at a time when no other Western European country experienced such a demographic 
decline. 
147. Although the extent to which population ageing actually constitutes a handicap is not clear, the negative effects it 
would engender, chief among them sky-rocketing pensions and state-subsidized healthcare for a ‘greying’ electorate 
– are nevertheless worrying.  
148.  In The Official Report published by the Scottish Administration, March 2003. 
149. The reference to the ‘5 million threshold’ is widespread and often cited in the media. For instance, Frank 
O’Donnell wrote in the Scotsman that “in 1939, before the outbreak of war, Scotland’s population broke through the 
significant five million mark for the first time.” (April 14, 2002).  
150. See Chapter 3. 
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Once firmly established in the political landscape, the population crisis could not 
remain unanswered. The alleged sky-rocketing cost of the new Parliament151 and the 
misadventures of the McLeish administration encouraged the media to speculate on the 
failure of devolution152. Within this context, the Labour–Lib/Dem coalition 
government, under the leadership of Jack McConnell, could not ignore the numerous 
challenges raised by the census figures. But “it was rather easy, before devolution, to 
invoke the Scottish cultural stereotypes […] since these statements in general had few 
consequences” (Keating et al, 2003: 152). It eventually became more difficult after 
devolution to systematically blame Westminster for taking decisions portrayed as 
damaging to Scotland and adopting rhetorical postures which have no consequences for 
actual policy-making. The systematic opposition to Conservative rule that provided a 
convenient common bond across the eclectic home-rule coalition was no longer 
sustainable in the light of the new constitutional settlement, or at least had to be 
accompanied with credible alternatives. Consequently, political actors have had to 
adapt to new rules and address ‘Scottish questions with Scottish answers’153, thereby 
running the risk of annihilating “the village story of consensualism” carefully 
cultivated throughout the long road to home-rule (ibid.: 153). The Scottish electorate 
could legitimately expect the devolved government to address “the single biggest 
challenge facing Scotland as we move further into the 21st century”154.  
 
But demographic upheavals are complex phenomena combining socio-economic, 
cultural and political concerns which can hardly be reconciled (Weil 1997). 
Demographic engineering is more often than not a hopeless task, the relative success or 
failure of which can only be measured in the long run. A common tool among 
demographers to assess demographic growth is the so-called Population Growth 
Identity (N), where N = Birth – Death + Immigration – Emigration. Government 
alternatives to impact upon N are fourfold. They can seek to (i) stimulate fertility; (ii) 
limit mortality; (iii) stimulate immigration and (iv) limit emigration. These are not 
                                               
151. The Scottish Parliament, located in the heart of Edinburgh, ended up costing much more than the initial forecast, 
although the ‘10 times higher’ slogan is more of a media myth and is far from reflecting actual figures. For an 
exhaustive reconstruction of the controversy, see Mc Crone, 2006b.  
152. Henry McLeish (Labour), resigned as Scotland’s First Minister after allegations made over the sub-letting of his 
constituency office in Glenrothes. See BBC News, ‘McLeish steps down’, November 8, 2001. 
153. This slogan was a rallying cry in the 1990s for the partisans of devolution.  
154. New Scots, attracting Fresh Talents to meet the challenge of Growth, published by the Scottish Executive, 
February 2004. 
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mutually exclusive, and can be found to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all 
governments’ demographic strategies across the industrialized world. Yet some have 
deliberately placed emphasis on boosting fertility, while others have favoured inward 
migrations (Calwell et al. 2002). In Scotland, political initiatives undertaken in the 
aftermath of the GROS report suggest that efforts at stimulating fertility have been 
marginal. Rather, the Scottish executive, supported by a broad consensus cutting across 
party lines, identified enduring emigration together with low inward migration as being 
the main determinants of population decline. Consequently, the policy response has 
largely consisted in attempting to ‘square the migration circle’ rather creating the 
conditions for a new baby-boom through generous family-oriented welfare 
programmes. While this does not constitute evidence enough to label the government’s 
boundary-making strategy as being fundamentally territorializing, it does suggest that 
its ethnic components are rather weak. I now turn to the immigration policy framework 
introduced in Scotland in the aftermath of the population crisis.  
 
5.1.2. Squaring the migration circle 
 
 
Successive Labour-led governments in Scotland between 1999 and 2007 came under 
severe criticism. Notwithstanding a few ambitious initiatives in education and 
healthcare (Keating 2005), the belief that the Scottish executive did not sufficiently 
depart from its London counterpart has been widespread. This led some to argue that 
devolved administrative powers in Britain are “contingent, dependent on the passive 
restraint and non-opposition of the UK government or its active cooperation” (Trench, 
2007: 12). Yet, immigration has been one area where, at least until the introduction of 
the UK-wide points-based system in 2008, intergovernmental relations appeared 
reasonably fruitful and cooperative. The collaboration between the Home Office in 
London and the Scottish executive resulted in the adoption of the Fresh Talent 
Initiative, based on the assumption that long-standing demographic decline could be 
reversed, or at least mitigated, by “promoting Scotland as an attractive location to live, 
work, study and do business.”155 The Scottish National Party (SNP) 2003 manifesto 
proposed the devolution of immigration competences and the creation of a Green Card 
aiming at attracting up to 50,000 highly-skilled migrants per year. By contrast, Scottish 
                                               
155. Ibid.  
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Labour initiative focused on ‘softer levers’, not radically conflicting with the UK-wide 
framework156. The overarching policy purpose was to raise awareness abroad and 
promote Scotland as a welcoming and dynamic nation. The Scottish executive-funded 
website has ever since provided exhaustive information to potential migrants, “offering 
warm encouragement to migration to Scotland which is not matched by the equivalent 
UK-wide websites” (Shaw, 2009a: 7). On the homepage, available in Chinese and 
Polish, Scotland is described as “a multicultural mix of 5 million people. People have 
been coming to live here from all over the world since centuries. So you can be sure of 
a warm welcome.”157 The campaign was complemented by the creation of a Relocation 
Advisory Service (RAS), with offices in Glasgow, providing personalized information 
about business and academic opportunities in Scotland in order to ease the relocation 
process.  
 
But the most emblematic initiative of the Scottish government is the Fresh Talent: 
Working in Scotland Scheme (hereafter FTwiss), which entitled international graduates 
from Scottish universities to live and work in Scotland for two years without the need 
for a work permit158, whereas international students in English and Welsh universities 
saw their visa expire immediately after graduation. To be sure, its explicit focus on 
highly-skilled workers does not substantially differ from Westminster’s “welcoming 
attitude towards those bringing desirable skills to the UK as a virtuous Dr Jekyll [as 
opposed] to the vicious Mr Hyde of asylum policy” (Migration Policy Group 2005a: 
11). The initiatives undertaken to “Attract Fresh Talents to meet the Challenge of 
Growth” were directly inspired by Richard Florida’s pioneering book, in which it is 
argued that attracting the creative class, whose members choose to live in stimulating, 
tolerant and ‘bohemian’ environments, was key to boost economic growth in the era of 
the knowledge economy (Florida 2002). While his demonstration may be flawed – 
numerous inquiries have shown that economic factors remain by far the most 
significant determinant cause of labour mobility (Houston et al. 2008) – it nonetheless 
encountered great success among policy-makers and influenced immigration policies in 
a variety of local or regional governments. Inward migration is a crucial component of 
                                               
156. Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC). Room for Manoeuvre? The Options for Addressing 
Immigration-Policy Divergence between Holyrood and Westminster. Report prepared by Sarah Kyambi, 2009.  
157.  See scotlandistheplace.com, [accessed September 18, 2009].   
158.Fresh talent: Working in Scotland Scheme, an evidence review, Scottish Government Social Research, a report 
prepared by Luke Cavanagh and Franca Eirich, 2008.  
 155 
 
the broader economic strategy later adopted with the Smart, Successful Scotland plan 
(Scottish executive 2004), closely associating economic growth with Scotland’s ability 
to attract and retain highly-skilled labour. Until not so long ago a fervent opponent to 
Thatcher’s repeated assaults on heavy industries and manufacturing, New Labour, on 
both sides of the border, abandoned once in office its former interventionism and 
committed itself to market modernization. This is by no means a British idiosyncrasy, 
but rather a normative inclination that has gained currency throughout post-industrial 
countries eager to boost economic growth in an increasingly competitive 
environment159.  
 
While the policy output clearly shows the Scottish government’s willingness to foster 
immigration, the outcome failed to meet the policy goals. With a total of 8,000 
international students having participated in the scheme up to 2008160, the initiative 
hardly impacted upon demographic trends. Although inflows have consistently 
exceeded outflows over the past 10 years, 72,000 individuals have left Scotland each 
year161 since 2001. As for the recent wave of East European migrants, their impact on 
economic growth has been noteworthy. However, despite the fact that the level of skills 
and qualifications in the [A8] migrant workforce is extremely high, the majority of them 
work in low-skilled, low-paid segments of the labour market, with four in five of them 
earning on average between GBP 4.50 and 5.99 per hour in 2007 (Brown et al 2008: 
44). On the other hand, the initiative targeted potential migrants in China and Poland 
while making virtually no effort to attract economically active individuals from the rest 
of the UK, either from the native or immigrant population. Several interviewees have 
acknowledged that more could be done to attract UK residents, although suggesting that 
such strategy would be ‘politically sensitive’.  
Besides, the Lowlands urban belt has attracted the great bulk of recently-settled 
immigrants, and voices were raised in the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) to encourage more even distribution of migration across the territory. Indeed, 
the struggle for skilled migrants is not circumscribed on either national or regional 
                                               
159. The adoption by EU member-states of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 ushered in a new era of optimism across the 
continent, even though a decade later, the commitment to turn the European Union into “the most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” has to say the least remained unfulfilled. 
160. Fresh talent: Working in Scotland Scheme, an Evidence Review, Scottish Government Social Research, a report 
prepared by Cavanagh and Eirich, 2008. 
161. Scotland Diaspora and Overseas-born Population, The Scottish Government Social Research, report prepared by 
Carr and Cavanagh, 2010, p.18. 
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levels, and cities located within the same region also compete for attracting and 
retaining talents. Indeed, a report for Scottish Enterprise concluded that Edinburgh and 
Aberdeen, which run their own recruitment campaigns, have performed better than 
Dundee and Glasgow162. But as the government’s demographic objective is exclusively 
quantitative and not disaggregated to take into account territorial disparities, no tangible 
initiative has been undertaken to address this problem. More importantly, the Scottish 
government’s claim that immigration can address the problems raised by an ageing and 
shrinking population is not backed by sufficient scientific evidence in the literature. In 
fact, demographers usually agree that if sustained immigration can potentially ease the 
effects of the demographic transition, notably through contributions to social security 
and pension schemes, it is by no means sufficient (de Santis et al. 2001, UNPD 2006). 
Some warned against the somehow naïve belief that inward migration could reverse 
demographic decline and argued that it should in any case be complemented with 
ambitious policies aiming at increasing fertility (Wilson & Rees 2003).  
 
Ireland was until recently unanimously praised in nationalist circles for its ability to 
attract skilled migrants despite its peripheral location. Yet the Scottish economy never 
quite matched the dynamism of the Celtic tiger at its peak. Like other old industrial 
regions across Europe, Scotland at the turn of the century suffered from a variety of 
economic weaknesses, often inherited from its nineteenth century industrial golden age, 
its “past splendours” sitting uneasily with “contemporary mediocrity” (Coyle et al 2005: 
19)163. Besides, the global economic crisis shed a new light on the sustainability of 
economic models once seen as the high road to development. The so-called ‘arc of 
prosperity’ of small nations running from Ireland to Iceland abruptly lost its appeal to 
nationalist leaders eager to convince their electorate of the benefits of independence. 
The collapse of the construction sector combined with skyrocketing deficits have cast 
doubts on the viability of the Irish path to development, based on low corporate taxation 
and a deregulated labour market. There is now compelling evidence that highly skilled 
                                               
162. The Place Race: The role of place in attracting and retaining talent in Scottish cities, DEMOS: London, report 
prepared by Bound et al, February 2008. 
163. Along with the rest of the UK, Scotland exhibits a low productivity rate, partly stemming from poor records in 
private research and innovation. Besides, entrepreneurship lags behind the UK in terms of new firm formation, a 
structural feature inherited from the country’s longstanding specialization in heavy industries (Keating, 2001a). The 
prevalence of branch factories is also symptomatic of regional development strategies implemented in the 1960s and 
1970s, which focused on attracting inward investment (Mitchell 1997: 407). To be sure, the Scottish economy also 
exhibits a number of strengths. With 27% of the workforce educated to degree level and the world’s highest rate of 
academic papers per capita, Scotland enjoys key assets to compete in the knowledge economy (Rice et al. 2000).  
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Irish graduates have their eyes on overseas destinations, like their ancestors before 
them164. But despite these limitations, the dominant view in Scotland is that, as the 
Scotsman’s editor commented: “Scotland has different needs from the rest of the UK, 
and it would be far easier for us to influence population and economic growth by having 
the ability to set our immigration policy.”165 
 
5.1.3. Devolution and the limits of control 
 
 
With the SNP victory in May 2007, radical changes in immigration policy were to be 
expected, especially since raising the demographic growth rate to the EU average by 
2011 was one of the party’s main campaign promises166. The Aberdeen and Grampian 
Chamber of Commerce ordered a report in 2009 to be submitted to the Office of 
National Statistics to evaluate the pros and cons of the Canadian and Australian 
regionalized systems. The author of the report concluded that “evidence gathered from 
Canada clearly shows that a points-based system with regional elements works better 
and more effectively than country-wide procedures. Bespoke factors for Scotland could 
easily be factored in through bonus points or lower thresholds for those who agree to 
work, live and stay here for a minimum period of time, a process that could not only 
help us to find skilled people for jobs but will also help to boost the declining 
population in a targeted and controlled way.” 
 
Professor Robert Wright (2008) from the University of Glasgow repeatedly advocated 
this solution on the grounds that the pool of talent coming from A8 countries who 
reversed the long-standing demographic trend in Scotland since 2004 will soon dry up, 
as a consequence of the relative decline of the value of the pound and increasing 
competition for skilled migrants from countries like Germany or France, which are set 
to lift EU migration restrictions by May 2011. But the Scottish proposal was firmly 
rebuffed by the Home Office, where it was argued that creating “a two tier system for 
Scotland at the same time as the Irish and British governments are working to close the 
existing ‘back doors’ does not make sense.”167 Undeniably, the newly-created Skills 
                                               
164. ‘Irlande, le chant du départ’, in Le Monde, March 8, 2010. The reportage argues that young graduates have been 
fleeing en masse to Australia and Canada since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. 
165.   Alex Orr, ‘Damaging to Scotland’ in the Scotsman, April 2, 2008.  
166. SNP Party Manifesto, p. 7.  
167. Managing migration: A public sector dialogue on migration into Scotland, published by COSLA, 2008.  
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Advisory Board (SAB) and Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), charged with the 
task of assessing the optimal number and skills of migrants to the UK economy did 
issue a distinct and exhaustive list of jobs to be filled by migrants in Scotland, 
including very specific activities such as ballet dancer and sheep shearer. In relative 
terms, their 2007 report revealed that the Scottish economy had almost three times as 
many vacancies for skilled workers as companies in England.168 Besides, the March 
2008 Green Paper A Points-Based System (Home Office) did touch upon the issue of 
territorial disparities and specified that “skilled and highly-skilled migrants [could be 
encouraged] to stay in Scotland in the longer-term, for example through a reduced 
qualifying period for some Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants who can demonstrate they have 
lived and worked in Scotland for an appropriate period of time.”169 But these 
concessions, apart from the fact that they are still to be implemented, are far from 
incorporating a fully-fledged regional dimension similar to the Canadian Provincial 
Nominee Immigration Programme, in operation since 1967 and allowing provincial 
governments to select immigrants according to their economic needs. In 2008, FTwiss 
was mainstreamed into the UK-wide points-based system, Scotland de facto losing its 
competitive advantage. For the Scottish Labour party, this also proved the success of 
devolution, portrayed as a catalyst for policy innovation, and of its own policy, which 
encouraged London policy-makers to expand it to the rest of the UK. Conversely the 
SNP saw it as another illustration of Westminster’s pernicious attitude towards 
devolution and long-standing inability to take into account Scottish sectional interests.  
 
One of the first decisions made by the Conservative/Lib-Dem coalition after they took 
office in May 2010 was to impose an ‘immigration cap’ on the influx from outside the 
EU. In response, Alex Salmond pleaded that Scotland should be exempt from UK 
immigration rules, and that a wave of migrant workers should be allowed north of the 
border in order to “flood the recession and boost the country’s economy.”170 The SNP 
External Affairs Minister also argued that Scotland be exempt from the “damaging” and 
“negative” cap. But their demands were firmly rejected by the British Immigration 
Minister Damien Green, for whom the government was “committed to getting 
                                               
168. ‘You’re welcome to come and live in Scotland, but only if you can…’ in the Scotsman, January 29, 2007.  
169. A points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, March 2006.  
170. ‘David Cameron rejects Salmond’s bid to flood recession hit Scotland with migrant workers’ in EU Times, June 
22, 2011. 
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immigration back to sensible levels, after it had been “allowed to get out of control for 
too long.”171  By 2011, the gap between Westminster’s obsession with border control 
and Holyrood’s fear of another brain drain exacerbated by adverse economic conditions 
had grown wider than ever.  
 
5.2.  Catalan immigration policy: much ado about nothing? 
 
 
 
In sharp contrast with Britain where the regulation of immigration has intermittently 
appeared on the political agenda since the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the 
first piece of legislation in Spain was issued as late as 1985, one year before the country 
joined the European Community (EC). To that date, there were less than 250,000 
foreign nationals living in Spain, a figure about 10 times below that of Spanish nationals 
living abroad. The initiative was taken in response to the pressures of some member-
states who feared that Spain may become a backdoor into the continent while they were 
simultaneously trying to tighten their immigration policies. Until the mid-1990s, the 
concomitant processes of democratic consolidation and economic opening were not 
translated into a sharp rise in inward migration flows. Compared to its continental 
neighbours, Spain had little to offer potential immigrants but an obsolete productive 
apparatus, wages way below the EC average, weak productivity and an embryonic 
welfare state. In 1993, the Spanish economy went through a deep recession, so that by 
1996 the unemployment rate had reached a record high of 22.4%. The combination of 
poor economic prospects and the multiplication of corruption scandals among socialist 
ranks put an end to the PSOE hegemony, already eroded since 1993 when it lost its 
absolute majority of seats, at the 1996 general elections. Felipe Gonzalez, Prime 
Minister and charismatic leader of the Socialist party failed to contain the popular tide 
of discontent and the PSOE was relegated to the opposition bench for the first time 
since 1983. The PP, born a few years earlier out of the ashes of Alianza Popular (AP) 
and rejuvenated by José-Maria Aznar’s leadership, formed a minority government 
relying on a parliamentary pact with the Catalan nationalists CiU, a support which was 
reciprocated in the Catalan Parliament where CiU also lost its absolute majority at the 
1996 autonomous elections. The Spanish economy initiated a period of unprecedented 
                                               
171. Ibid. 
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growth, boosted by the labour intensive construction and tourism sectors. Accordingly, 
the number of immigrants rose sharply towards the end of the decade.  
 
In Catalonia although inward flows from abroad started relatively earlier than in the rest 
of the country, the phenomenon remained largely unnoticed until the early-1990s. 
Internal migrations had stopped abruptly in 1975, and the net migration rate was 
consistently negative in the 1980s. This trend, unseen since at least the mid-nineteenth 
century172, can be attributed to a combination of two factors. First, while the Catalan 
economy was temporarily penalized by its old industries and the profound structural 
reforms undertaken to make it more competitive in European markets, other Spanish 
territories were growing at a fast pace. Hence, the territorial gap that had characterized 
Spanish economic development ever since the nineteenth century was gradually being 
plugged (Garrido Yserte et al. 2009). Second, a number of internal migrants who had 
settled in Catalonia were now returning home, encouraged to do so by the pre-pension 
schemes implemented at the time by the Spanish government as a means of fighting 
unemployment by decongesting the labour market. 
 
Table 7: Net migration rate – Spain and abroad (1980-2010) 
 
Decade 
Net Migration/rest of 
Spain Net Migration/abroad Total Population 
1981-90 (-)27,034 30,504 5,923,594 
1991-00 (-)113,015 299,884 6,261,999 
2001-10 (-)41,203 1,060,650 7,511,319 
   
Source: Pablo Alcaide Guindo et al. (2007) and IDESCAT 2010.  
 
  
In the 1980s the great bulk of international migrants residing in Catalonia were in fact 
waiting to find a passage across the Pyrenees to France, Belgium and Germany (Miret 
1997). But progressively, Catalonia went from being a springboard to more appealing 
and yet seemingly unreachable destinations as Western European states were tightening 
their immigration policies, to a land of attraction in the wake of its economic recovery. 
As the stock of internal migrants willing to move away from their homes and accept 
                                               
172. In 1982 for instance, there were 17,762 more exits than entries. These figures do not differentiate internal and 
external flows, but merely calculate the difference between the number of entries from the rest of Spain and beyond 
and the number of exits to the rest of Spain and beyond.  
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poorly-paid jobs had dried out as a result of economic growth and falling birth rates, 
immigration channels from abroad were progressively institutionalized. By 1995, 30% 
of all foreign nationals in Spain were settled in Catalonia.   
 
5.2.1. Spanish immigration policy 
 
 
From 1999 onwards, immigration to Spain has increased at an extraordinary pace. In the 
1990s, the great bulk of immigrants were either Spanish nationals or their descendants 
returning from abroad, West European pensioners or highly skilled workers. However, 
the period from 2000 to 2010 saw a dramatic change in the volume and composition of 
immigration. In 1999, the Institute of National Statistics (INE) recorded 127,365 entries. 
Five years later, this figure had risen to 684,348, came close to a million in 2007, and 
was then divided in two in 2009 in the turmoil of the economic crisis. In 2010, the 
number of foreign nationals figuring on local registries amounted to 5,708,940, 
converting Spain into one of the main recipients of international migration in the course 
of a single decade. The fairly expansive policy framework regulating immigration 
cannot be dissociated from elite efforts to integrate the country within the great 
international economic flows, underlined by a liberal economic consensus cutting across 
party lines (Benedicto 2005: 107). Yet this ambition, mainly driven by ideological 
inclinations, equating the commitment to the globalized market-economy with 
prosperity and modernity, has not been matched by sufficient means. The lack of 
resources dedicated to the effective recruitment of workers abroad and to border control 
has been an enduring feature of Spanish immigration policy over the past 15 years. 
Ultimately, the “cheap” approach prevailed, “allowing immigrants to come in 
irregularly, as ‘bogus tourists’, and then regularizing their status, either through 
collective amnesties or administrative arrangements” (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2009: 144). 
Indeed, since 1986, successive Spanish governments have decreed ‘extraordinary’173 
regularizations in order to contain the rise of the underground economy, and reap the 
benefits of this sudden influx of additional tax payers and contributors to social security 
(Gala 2007: 376).  
 
                                               
173. One may question the extent to which these regularizations are ‘extraordinary’. Indeed, they occurred 
periodically, in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005.  
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The General Regime of entry, negotiated at a time of severe economic recession and 
mass unemployment, was rightly perceived as unable to address the needs of a booming 
economy, characterized by a substantial labour shortage. Within this framework, 
Spanish businesses could not recruit abroad until it was formally acknowledged that no 
native worker could fill the position. This administrative constraint appeared legitimate 
in a country where mass unemployment has long been a structural feature and remains 
high in times of economic growth. However, by 2000, policy makers came to realize 
that new arms were needed to feed in the new phase of economic expansion. The 
Organic Law 4/2000 provided for the creation of a parallel track of entry – the so-called 
Quota Regime – based on functional evaluation of needs, and granting Autonomous 
Communities a key role in determining the contingent. But this proved to be ill-suited to 
Spanish businesses, and in particular for Catalan SMEs that have been unable to 
anticipate their needs (Roig, 2007: 293). Besides, the scheme was far from covering the 
overall demand, at least during the boom years. In 2004, 30,978 foreign workers were 
granted a work permit through the quota system, while there were 687,138 applicants 
for the extraordinary regularization which took place a year later (Migration Policy 
Group 2005b)174. The decision to complement the quota system with a list of hard-to-fill 
positions issued by respective provinces and targeting skilled labour shortages was 
equally disappointing, not least because the visa system managed by Spanish consulates 
was essentially ineffective.   
 
In 2000, The Aznar-led PP was re-elected with an absolute majority. The government 
immediately transferred immigration responsibilities from the Ministry of Labour to the 
Ministry of the Interior, thus tightening the legal channels of entry and mechanically 
making the need for mass regularization more pressing. From then on, the emphasis was 
put on border control and disconnected from labour market needs. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
174. Likewise, Alejandro Aja and  Jordi Nadal (2003: 70-71) concluded that the quota system had to date not 
significantly broadened the legal channels of entry, not least because of the lack of resources and subsequent 
administrative failures. In the year 2001 – 2002, merely 20% of the 20,000 permanent positions offered within the 
framework of the quota regime were filled, a figure which reinforces the cheap model thesis highlighting the ever-
growing gap between immigration policy aims and objectives.   
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5.2.2. The Catalan response 
 
 
The Generalitat has figured among the most virulent critics of the central administration 
immigration regime. Catalan elites’ discontent with the way things were ‘being done in 
Madrid’ in matters of immigration took various forms. One strand focused on the 
implicit preference for Latin American nationals embedded in Spanish immigration 
policy175. Indeed, as a result of the perceived over-reliance on Moroccan immigrants, an 
‘ethnic filter’ has been gradually built into the immigration policy framework, thus 
fostering the ‘Latinoamericanizacíon’ of immigration in Spain. This came in response 
to “the preference of Spanish society, reflected in the government’s decisions, for 
immigration coming from Latin American countries” (Bujan & Perez 2005: 51). In the 
authors’ view, the cultural links between Spain and its former colonies has led political 
elites to believe that their integration would be “less problematic” and “less conflictive” 
(ibid. 56). This belief was exemplified in the words of the PP spokesperson in matters of 
immigration who declared in 2002 that Latin Americans, “because they are Catholics 
and speak Castilian, integrate more easily than Moroccan nationals.”176 The interests of 
Catalonia, which defines itself in linguistic terms, seldom received attention from a 
central state which has favoured the entry of co-ethnics on the premise that they can be 
integrated more easily. Shortly before the end of his last term at the head of the 
Generalitat, Jordi Pujol publicly pressured the central government to demanding visas 
for all Latin American nationals177. Another strand of critique explicitly targeted the 
Conservative government, whose immigration policy appeared so inefficient that it was 
at times interpreted as a deliberate attempt to make the action of the Generalitat more 
difficult. The belief that the central state purposely used immigration as a means to 
exacerbate social unrest in Catalonia was reawakened in the wake of the 2003 pateras 
crisis in the Canary Islands178, and then again in 2006 when asylum seekers were 
diverted179 to other Autonomous Communities. For Ricard Zapata-Barrero, this 
                                               
175. To be sure, this normative inclination could be identified as early as 1994 in the first government plan which 
already stated that “the cultural and historical links of Spain with Latin America should be taken into account in our 
immigration policy.” Far from being a mere cognitive disposition with no incidence on actual policies, this preference 
became increasingly visible in the set of institutions and policies regulating immigration. This can be observed in 
bilateral agreements, exemption of visa requirements, and most importantly in the Spanish nationality code, so that 
between 2001 and 2010, the number of Bolivians, Uruguayans, Ecuadorians and Colombians residing in Spain 
increased at a much faster pace than that of Moroccans.  
176. Quoted in El Mundo, March 21 2002.  
177. ‘Pujol propone exigir visados a todos los Sudamericanos’ in El Mundo, July 20, 2002.  
178. ‘La llegada a Canarias de inmigrantes en pateras se cuadruplica en solo dos años’ in El País, January 28, 2001.  
179. In Spanish legal jargon, the expression ‘derivación’ designates this decision. In the United Kingdom, it was 
referred as ‘dispersal policy’.  
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reflected no less than the Conservatives’ “intention to put pressure on the Catalan 
government that does not have the tools to handle such immigration leading to social 
and public order conflicts” (2009: 27ff). In response to this, a mechanism of ‘burden-
sharing’ was introduced in 2005 to deal with the dispersal of asylum seekers throughout 
the territory (Santolaya 2008: 93). But for most stakeholders, the central state’s inability 
to order migration flows and the negative consequences of the “cheap model” that 
affected Catalonia more than the rest of the Spanish territory appeared particularly 
damaging. The considerable strain upon public services that it came to represent in 
certain areas, the high degree of improvisation together with the virtual impossibility of 
reconciling immigration with labour market needs were perceived as clear evidence of 
the central state’s failure to implement appropriate public policies.  
 
Table 8: Foreign nationals resident in Catalonia (2000-2010) 
 
Year Foreign Nationals Total Population % of foreign nationals 
2000 181,590 6,261,999 2.9% 
2001 257,320 6,361,365 4.0% 
2002 382,020 6,506,440 5.9% 
2003 543,008 6,704,146 8.1% 
2004 642,846 6,813,319 9.4% 
2005 798,904 6,995,206 11.4% 
2006 913,757 7,134,697 12.8% 
2007 972,507 7,210,508 13.5% 
2008 1,103,790 7,364,078 15.0% 
2009 1,189,279 7,475,420 15.9% 
2010 1,241,525 7,571,319 16.4% 
 
Source: My own compilation from figures provided by GENCAT, 2010.  
 
 
In an official visit to Montréal in May 2001, the representative of the Generalitat180 
signed the Québec-Catalonia Agreement on Immigration and returned to Spain with the 
intention of advocating a regionally-differentiated immigration policy along Canadian 
lines. The CiU administration formalized its proposal, and lobbied the Conservative 
                                               
180. Fundación CIDOB (2001) Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2000, edición 2001. 
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government to introduce a mechanism of shared competences as part of a broader 
reform of the legislation under scrutiny. But besides the fact that PP no longer needed 
CiU’s parliamentary support, PSOE was equally reluctant to share power over a matter 
commonly understood as an “act of sovereignty” (Santolaya 2007: 67). Pujol responded 
to this is in an admittedly dramatic vein, insisting that the Generalitat had “to be able to 
run [its] own immigration policy, because immigration […] is, for Catalonia, a question 
of being or not being.”181 The degradation of intergovernmental relations between 
Barcelona and Madrid combined with a Maragall-led PSC far ahead in the polls during 
the 2003 Catalan election campaign pushed the Generalitat to bypass the central state by 
opening immigration offices in Poland, Morocco and Colombia. This initiative officially 
aimed to link Catalan employers with foreign candidates182, and make sure, in Artur 
Mas’ terms, that “newcomers know the reality and the culture of Catalonia.”183 The 
‘Catalan embassies’ were mandated to provide Catalan language classes to prospective 
immigrants, in order to familiarize them with the “cultural specificities” of Catalan 
society.184 
 
Like France, the Netherlands and others (Guild et al. 2009), the Generalitat seemingly 
sought to incorporate its integration agenda into its immigration policy. Yet, this is only 
the tip of the iceberg, as the Generalitat was mainly using its para-diplomatic network to 
pursue a more targeted immigration policy in order to mitigate the deficiencies of the 
state-wide framework, build up friendly relations with sending countries and facilitate 
the recruitment of skilled workers. But the Spanish consulates in charge of delivering 
visas were unwilling to cooperate and were in any case already overloaded (Moya 
Malapeira 2007: 65). Besides, the Catalan initiative was taken to the Constitutional 
Court by the central government, and partially struck down in October 2003185, on the 
grounds that it constituted an invasion of state competencies. A few weeks later, CIU, 
despite its narrow advance over the Socialists, was not able to constitute a coalition with 
                                               
181. Jordi Pujol, speaking soon after the end of his last term at the head of the Generalitat, quoted in el Pais, ‘Pujol 
pide el traspaso de competencies sobre inmigracion’, August 23, 2004. Interestingly, Jordi Pujol used the exact same 
terms as in 1980, in his analysis of the consequences of internal migration on Catalonia’s “national reconstruction” 
(See chapter 4, section 4.3.2). The path-dependent character of institutions and discourses directed to immigrants in 
the past and today are in fact significant, a point that is developed at length in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2   
182. ‘Cataluña contratará inmigrantes a través de nuevas oficinas de empleo en el extranjero’ in El Mundo, Janurary 
10, 2002. 
183. Press release by CDC, ‘Artur Mas: El nou estatut perpetra contractar immigrants desde Catalunya’, November 
6, 2002.  
184. Ibid.  
185. ‘Mas asegura que mantendrá las ‘embajadas’ catalanas pese a la medida del Constitucional’ in El Mundo 
November 2, 2003.  
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fellow nationalists in ERC, committing it to pay a high price for its earlier alliance with 
PP. The tripartite coalition made up of PSC, ERC and ICV took control over the 
Generalitat, putting an end to Pujol’s six consecutive terms in office (1980-2003).   
Shortly after, the decision was made to close the existing offices and not establish new 
ones. 
 
5.2.3. A new start 
 
 
The 2003 change of leadership in Catalonia was soon followed by the no-less surprising 
return of the PSOE to office in Madrid at the 2004 general elections, when the terrorist 
attacks perpetrated in the Madrid-based Atocha Station by a group claiming some 
connections with Al-Qaeda three days before the poll precipitated the fall of the 
Conservatives. As far as immigration policy-making is concerned, the consequences 
were two-fold. First, it marked a clear shift away from a security-driven to a socio-
economic agenda. Immigration went from the Government Office of Alien and 
Immigration Affairs, accountable to the Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. In addition, a more flexible job search visa system was 
introduced, allowing foreign nationals to enter the territory without a contract, and 
legally seek employment for a three-month period (Santolaya 2008). Second, the 
commitment of Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero during the campaign to 
back up the much-awaited reform of the Catalan Statute opened the way for a revision 
of the status quo. The New Statute, approved both by a referendum and the Catalan 
Parliament in 2006, provided the Generalitat with a new set of prerogatives in 
immigration matters186. As of October 2009, the Employment Services of Catalonia 
(Servei d’Occupacio de Catalunya (SOC)) can issue and renew working visas whose 
validity is limited to the four Catalan provinces of Lleida, Barcelona, Gerona and 
Tarragona187.  
 
                                               
186. Presidència del Govern del Estat. Reial Decret 1463/2009, de traspàs de funcions i serveis a la Generalitat de 
Catalunya en materia d’immigracio. DOGC 5469 – 22.09.2009.  
187. Besides, executive powers in matters of wok inspection were also devolved to the Generalitat that, at least in 
discourse, expressed its will to be tougher. But while Catalan elites have long blamed the central government for 
failing to jugulate irregular immigration, it is difficult to say whether the Catalan administration will actually be more 
efficient. Although measuring the proportion of irregular workers is arguably difficult, Colectivo IoE (2008: 50) 
suggested that they represented 15% of the Catalan workforce in 2007, a figure slightly higher than state-wide 
estimates.  
 167 
 
However, this competence is strictly administrative, thereby considerably limiting the 
Generalitat’s potential incidence of immigration other than by accelerating the 
application process (that within the existing framework took on average up to 6 
months). Besides, the central state remains exclusively competent in the delivery of 
residence permits, thus requiring a cooperative exercise of competencies which could 
potentially be counter-productive. Yet the 2009 reform states that “the coordination 
should not be made at the expense of the self-government capacity of each Autonomous 
Community”, an addition that was sought and gained by CiU in return for its 
parliamentary support for the legislation. Another significant concession was the greater 
involvement given to the Generalitat in “the state decisions in matters of immigration 
with a special interest for Catalonia188”, notably in regard to the Quota Regime. Yet the 
Autonomous Community of Madrid, whose President Esperanza Aguirre is well-known 
for her virulent opposition to Catalan nationalism, brought the case to the Constitutional 
Court, on the grounds that holders of working visas issued in Catalonia could end up 
working in Madrid189. For the CiU leader Artur Mas, this was no less than “an idea 
inherited from the Franco state denying Catalonia’s legitimate right to self-
government.”190 As of today, the decision of the Constitutional Court is still pending. 
While these long-awaited changes do alter the power of the state in setting the rules of 
entry into Spain, they can hardly be compared with the far-reaching competencies that 
were sought and gained by Canadian provinces. Overall, there is a broad consensus 
cutting across party lines in Catalonia that the Generalitat would be better off running its 
own immigration policy. Carles Campuzono, CiU MP in charge of immigration at the 
Spanish Parliament, summarized this frustration as follows: “one thing we can blame 
the central government for is the absence of control over migration flows. The 
mechanisms of entry into Spain have overwhelmingly favoured irregular channels.”191   
 
Where the Scots have looked to Ireland for answers, Catalan elites have found 
inspiration in Canada where Québec enjoys considerable leverage in controlling the 
volume and provenance of immigrants. However, there are at least two structural 
                                               
188. Catalan Statute, 2006, art. 138.2.  
189. ‘Aguirre recurre que Cataluña pueda dar permisos de trabajo a extranjeros’ in La Vanguardia, October 7, 2009. 
Esperanza Aguirre is the President of the Madrid Autonomous Community, and notorious for her conservative 
postures and fierce opposition to Catalan and Basque nationalism. She is a PP prominent figure and was appointed 
Minister of Education and Culture during Aznar’s first legislature between 1996 and 1999.  
190. Ibid.  
191. Interview published in elsingulardigital, October 27, 2009. 
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elements that make both cases hardly comparable. First, the Canadian immigration 
regime is very efficient at attracting highly skilled migrants. Unlike most EU countries, 
where inward flows are mainly the consequence of family reunion, the Canadian points-
based system aimed from its very conception at matching migrants’ profile with labour 
market needs (Beaujot et al. 2007). By contrast, the skills element hardly features in the 
Spanish policy framework and public debates have mainly revolved around the 
perceived need to control Spain’s natural border with North Africa. Second, the Québec 
national movement seeks to preserve the use of an exoglossic language in an otherwise 
English-speaking North American environment. The priority given to French-speaking 
immigrants is made possible by the vast reservoir of Francophone candidates seeking to 
enhance their economic utility while not having to renounce their mother tongue192. By 
contrast, Catalan is an endoglossic language only spoken by a substantial share of the 
population in the Catalan countries. As a result, the underlying rationale of the Québec 
policy framework cannot be transposed to Catalonia. Nationalists, who have 
traditionally considered language as a significant marker of Catalan identity, have not 
been able to define a clear immigration strategy, unlike the Spanish central state that has 
clearly favoured Castilian-speaking Latin American nationals.  
 
Yet it would be a mistake to interpret the Generalitat’s attempt to run a differentiated 
immigration policy through a strictly cultural lens. There is of course an audible voice 
in the nationalist camp, instrumentalizing the fear of being overwhelmed by hordes of 
Castilian-speakers in the very homeland, claiming that “it is evident that anyone 
wanting to españolise Catalonia has a vested interest in making sure that immigrants 
settle here.”193 But beyond the nationalist rhetoric, immigration plays a key role in 
Catalonia’s broader strategy of economic internationalization. The Catalan economy, 
although more competitive than other Spanish regions, has pursued a ‘low-cost model’ 
on the international stage until the 1990s. However, important efforts have been made 
ever since to upgrade human capital. The introduction of the Euro meant the demise of 
the low-cost model, and precipitated a shift from the Spanish market to the European 
                                               
192. Actually, Québec immigration policy is so successful at recruiting highly-skilled French-speaking migrants that it 
is fiercely criticized by some developing countries which have feared the detrimental consequences of this brain 
drain. This is for instance the case in Haiti, where educated elites have migrated en masse to Québec over the past 20 
years.    
193. Heribert Barrera, historical leader of ERC, first president of the Catalan Parliament and prominent figure of 
Catalan nationalism, published a book in 2001 with clear racist overtones (Que pensa Heribert Barrera, Editorial 
Proa: 2001). Like Jordi Pujol, he belongs to the old guard of Catalan nationalism and his opinions are no longer in 
tune with those of the new generation.  
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and to an increasing extent the global market (Parelleda & Alvarez 2007). Hence, the 
external opening of the Catalan economy has grown significantly. The weight of trade 
with the rest of Spain has slightly decreased, where as international trade is twice as 
high, so that they were by 2006 equally significant in the Catalan economy, thus 
diminishing its reliance on the domestic market (Alonso 2007: 39-72). 
The decline of the fertility rate which became more pronounced in the 1980s had a 
severe impact on the labour market from the 1990s onwards. Between 1996 and 2001, 
the unemployment rate went from 18.7 to 8.3%, which combined with the decline of the 
working age native population, attracted a considerable number of immigrants (Cabré & 
Domingo 2007: 124). While immigrants have unquestionably contributed to economic 
growth in the past decade, their relatively low-skilled profile, and concentration in low-
productivity sectors such as tourism, catering and construction, has meant that overall 
productivity has decreased in absolute terms between 2001 and 2006 (Fernandez-
Huertas Moraga et al 2006). Immigration also had detrimental effects on the 
diversification of the Catalan economy, whose over-reliance on the construction sector 
put considerable strain on the housing market, and made the region more vulnerable to 
global economic cycles. In recent years, significant efforts have been undertaken to 
upgrade the skills of those already settled and develop a more targeted immigration 
policy. This strategy, however, may be undermined by the ever growing number of 
individuals immigrating within the framework of family reunion, an unavoidable 
development now that immigration is a structurally consolidated phenomenon in Spain. 
 
5.3. Analysis of results 
 
 
This review of empirical developments in Catalonia and Scotland highlighted their 
respective central governments’ unwillingness to draw the consequences of the 
recognition of the plurinational nature of the state. By neglecting sub-state preferences, 
their attitude brings further legitimacy to the advocates of independence, who consider 
secession as the only remedy to ensure the cultural, economic and ultimately political 
flourishing of the national community. The decisions made by central administrations 
reflect their inability to find innovative ways of reconciling objectives pulling in 
opposite directions. Indeed, the growing securitization of immigration policies in Britain 
conflicts with Scottish economic and demographic preferences. Similarly, Catalan 
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nationalists have good reason to denounce the outstanding inefficiency of Spanish 
bureaucracy in opening more channels of regular migration and its reluctance to 
cooperate with stakeholders on the ground. More fundamentally, sub-state 
administrations and nationalist parties in particular have consistently stressed the 
inadequacy of the state-wide framework in addressing their territorial interests, which 
mechanically contributes to the construction of a distinct territorial identity. By running 
their own procedures for counting movers and distinguishing them from non-movers, by 
framing the issue in distinct terms and putting it in perspective with their own historical 
experiences as well as their own future aspirations, the Catalan and Scottish 
governments increased the significance of the territorial boundary separating them from 
the rest of the state. Yet they did not do so by contracting the boundary, presenting 
prospective immigrants as a threat to the nations’ cultural integrity, but consistently 
integrated immigration into their broader strategy of socio-economic development, 
giving prominence to endogenous growth and the consolidation of competitive 
advantage.  
 
Second, the British and Spanish administrations’ reluctance to share their prerogatives 
in the regulation of immigration does not constitute an indisputable infringement upon 
sub-state elites’ preferences for two interrelated reasons. First, immigration policy-
making is characterized by an ever-widening gap between policy aims and outcomes. 
Second, the positions of state-wide parties from both sides of the electoral spectrum 
have hardly ever been translated into electoral gains. Hence, who wants to be 
responsible for a public policy field that consistently fails to deliver the expected 
outcome and is more often than not electorally damaging?  From this perspective, 
immigration policy-making can be seen as an exercise of blame-avoidance rather than 
credit-claiming, and non state-wide parties and governments in Scotland and Catalonia 
skilfully used their privileged position to criticize their respective central governments 
for failing to take into account sub-state territorial interests.   
 
On the one hand, studies questioning the capacity of the state to accept or reject 
migrants as it sees fit usually begin from a puzzling paradox. Despite increasingly 
anxious public opinion and notwithstanding the growing popularity of radical right wing 
parties, immigration policies in industrialized countries have remained broadly inclusive 
and expansionist. In a seminal study examining immigrant claim-making in Europe, 
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Soysal (1994) argued that an international human rights regime came to play an ever-
widening role in the regulation of immigration and should ultimately replace the state as 
the main locus of authority. Joppke offered a more nuanced version and concluded that 
constraints on sovereignty are self-imposed rather than externally inflicted” (1999: 162). 
For him, such limitations stem from the interpretation of liberal norms by judicial courts 
that increasingly strengthen a ‘rights-based’ approach to immigration. As a result, 
liberal democratic states have found their ability to enforce restrictions being internally 
challenged and came to accept a growing number of ‘unwanted migrants’. In a slightly 
different vein, Freeman (1995) argued that the discrepancy between popular preferences 
and policy outcomes stemmed from the logic of client politics and mirrors the existence 
of power asymmetries among stakeholders. The bearers of the costs are under-
represented in the decision-making process, while beneficiaries are well organized and 
therefore better able to make their voices heard. Because the latter enjoy greater 
organizational capacities, policy outputs come closer to their preferences.  Lastly, 
Hollifield (2004) focuses on the structural changes brought about by globalization. 
Hence, the ever-widening gap between political discourses and policy outcomes reflects 
a “liberal paradox”, which governments in post-industrial societies may find 
increasingly hard to resolve194.  
On the other hand, the burgeoning literature on immigration and party politics has 
established that unlike radical right wing parties owing their popularity to their populist 
critique of immigration policies, mainstream parties have rarely benefited from their 
decisions in matters of immigration. While left-of-centre parties usually see immigrants 
as a source of electoral support, they have no option but to constrain migration flows to 
avoid a working class backlash. Furthermore, the moderate right is torn between its 
business wing, which sees immigrant labour as a means to lower wages and boost 
international competitiveness, and its identity wing which sees them as a challenge to 
national identity. Consequently, “the differences between left and right on this issue 
may be less important than the differences within each camp” (Schain 2008: 468). In 
addition, these tensions have been exacerbated by the fact that mainstream parties from 
both right and left have been increasingly vulnerable to the threat of radical right wing 
parties. Indeed, if moderate right parties neglect their identity wing, this strand of their 
                                               
194. On the one hand, governments need sustained immigration in order to boost their economic growth. On the other 
hand, they fear that immigrants may feed xenophobic sentiments among the native population, and thus undermine 
the very fabric of liberal democracies. 
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electorate is likely to defect to the extreme right. Left-of-centre parties failing to take 
into account working class preferences have faced a similar threat (Schain 2006). Seen 
from this perspective, the “frustrated policy transfer” (Davies 200) is not necessarily at 
odds with minority nationalist preferences, as they retain the opportunity to shift the 
blame on the central government which jealously retained an exclusive competence 
over a matter which offers limited electoral rewards and is characterized by an ever-
widening gap between political discourse and policy outcomes. This blame-shifting 
strategy is encapsulated in the words of Alex Salmond: “I long for the day, as First 
Minister in the Scottish Parliament, that we can legislate for an immigration system that 
reflects the priorities, the needs and the attitude of this country.”195 Similarly, Catalan 
nationalists repeatedly contended that the Generalitat would be able to run an 
immigration policy that comes closer to voter preferences if given the means to do so. 
For the newly-elected president of the Generalitat, “Catalonia is a diverse and complex 
society. Immigration should be managed by the Generalitat rather than from some 
distant Madrid-based office.”196 While the PSC and Scottish Labour found it harder to 
blame their party comrades in power at the centre, non-state-wide parties have not faced 
similar constraints and have exploited this privileged position. By reiterating their 
demands for devolution without the burden of responsibility, minority nationalist parties 
have given some substance to their claim of being the sole representatives of the 
territorial interest.  
                                               
195. Quoted in the Scotsman, September 28, 2009.  
196. Interview with Artur Mas, ‘partidario de un “itinerario de integración” para inmigrantes’, in Amo Dominicana, 
November 22, 2010.  
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VI 
 
 
6. Immigrants into Scotsmen 
 
 
 
 
Being Scottish in the twenty-first century is not 
about ethnicity; it’s just about being here. 
 
 
– James Hunter, speaking at the  
2009 Scottish Diaspora Forum 
 
 
 
 
A brief overview of migration-related political developments in Britain since 1999 may 
seem quite puzzling to the advocates of a long-standing orthodoxy. Indeed, as the 
British government became increasingly concerned with the political cost of 
immigration, the Scottish executive has been particularly keen to portray devolved 
Scotland as “a country where all […] communities are recognized as threads which 
make up the tartan of our nation’s life.”197 After 2001, the most violent ‘race’ riots in 
English cities since 1982 and the subsequent backlash against multiculturalism have 
cast some doubts on the viability of what has been loosely referred to in the European 
press as the ‘British model of immigrant integration’. Despite Gordon Brown’s call to 
celebrate “the fact that our nation has shunned fanaticism and extremism”, the latest 
legislative developments and discourses underpinning them sit uneasily with the British 
                                               
197. Race Equality Statement issued by the SNP minority government, November 2008. 
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“traditions of openness and internationalism, tolerance and respect for liberty” (Brown 
2009: 12). Throughout the period, the dominant discourse has shifted quite 
dramatically to the right. As a journalist in the Economist put it, the idea of ‘Cool 
Britannia’ promoted during the first term of the Blair government has been replaced by 
the fearful image of ‘Londonistan’198. British mosques no longer symbolize the 
country’s commitment to tolerance and celebration of difference, but a potential nest of 
radicalism and internal threats (Joffé 2008) where, in the words of David Cameron, 
“preachers of hate can sow misinformation about the plight of Muslims elsewhere, 
[and] promote separatism by encouraging Muslims to define themselves solely in terms 
of their religion.”199 The economic turmoil has lent the British National Party (BNP) 
renewed vigour, and Gordon Brown’s commitment to create “British jobs for British 
workers”200 turned into a disaster when popular protests were organized against the 
French-owned company Total for employing 2,500 Italian nationals, as opposed to 
native Britons, in its Killingholme-based oil refinery in January 2009. With the 2010 
change of government in Westminster, the gap in style and substance between the 
Tory-led government in London and the SNP government in Edinburgh has grown 
deeper than ever. In February 2011, the Prime Minister delivered a speech in Munich, a 
few months after Angela Merkel officially announced the failure of ‘Multikulti 
Deutschland’ which marked another step in the pan-European backlash against 
multiculturalism: “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged 
different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to 
belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run 
completely counter to our values [and] this hands-off tolerance has only served to 
reinforce the sense that not enough is shared.”201 In sharp contrast, Alex Salmond’s 
acceptance speech, following the victory of the SNP at Scottish elections with an 
absolute majority of seats in May 2011, was the occasion to reiterate the nationalist 
vision of Scotland as “open to all, whether they come from England, Ireland, Pakistan 
or Poland.”202 
 
                                               
198. ‘London’s other names, and what they say about Britain’s recent history’ in the Economist, January 29, 2009.  
199. Prime Minister’s David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2011.  
200. Gordon Brown’s speech at the Labour Party Annual Conference, November 2007.  
201. Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 5, 2011.  
202. Alex Salmond’s Acceptance Speech at the Scottish Parliament, May 10, 2011.  
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This chapter explores the boundary-making strategy of the Scottish government in 
relation to immigrants since devolution. By adding a democratic tier to existing 
institutions, devolution marked a critical juncture in Scottish politics, allowing for a 
greater degree of policy divergence and creating another electoral arena in which state-
wide and non-state-wide parties compete at sub-state level. Actions taken in the fields 
of citizenship and integration are successively and critically reviewed, paying particular 
attention to public policies and associated frames on both sides of the border. I 
conclude that there is compelling evidence that the Scottish government, and more 
forcefully the SNP, have pursued a territorializing boundary-making strategy. They 
sought to gain further support among internal minorities and challenged the 
Westminster government in its own normative space by breaking the alleged monopoly 
of the state over the constitutional establishment of liberal democratic values. In the 
Scottish context, this has been facilitated by favourable dimensions in the opportunity 
structure: the new institutional context, historical heritage, and patterns of party 
competition, each of them being discussed at length in the third and last section.   
 
6.1. The evolving boundaries of Scottish citizenship 
 
 
Although the Scotland Act 1998 explicitly states that nationality constitutes an 
exclusive competence of the Westminster Parliament, devolution has provided new 
opportunities in Scotland to strengthen a legal definition of political membership 
distinct from the rest of the UK, chiefly as it required drawing the boundaries of 
electoral suffrage for the 1999 referendum and subsequent Holyrood parliamentary 
elections. Besides, it provided the Scottish government with enhanced instruments to 
contest and challenge the central administration’s boundary-making strategy in relation 
to immigrants.  
 
6.1.1. The historical transformations of British citizenship 
 
 
The evolution of British citizenship cannot be understood without reference to the 
tremendous geopolitical changes that occurred in the course of the twentieth century. In 
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1900, the UK controlled the major trade routes across the world, ruling one of the 
largest empires in history. Today, while still a major player on the international scene, 
it is heavily dependent upon its permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its 
special relationship with its transatlantic partner. When Common Law jus soli was first 
codified in 1914203, British nationality was granted to everyone born on Empire soil, 
irrespective of one’s race, religion, or class. In sharp contrast, the current trend is to 
further restrict naturalization for many categories of people. In Sawyer’s words “the 
scope of British citizenship has shrunk from including everyone born in a vast empire 
to excluding even some people born in the territory of the UK itself” (2009: 1).  
 
Although this change came gradually, three critical junctures in its historical 
development can be identified204. The first episode of retrenchment came in 1962,205 
when the Commonwealth Immigrants Act subjected Commonwealth citizens to 
immigration control. In 1968, the clause of patriality was introduced, restricting the 
right to abode to descendants of individuals born in the UK up to the third generation. 
From this date onwards, Commonwealth citizens, while still entitled to the same rights 
as British citizens after taking up residence in the UK, including the right to vote in 
general elections, have been subject to the same rules to enter and stay as any other 
categories of economic migrants.206 The second major drawback occurred in 1983, 
under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, when the automatic 
acquisition of British citizenship became restricted to individuals whose parents were 
settled in the UK. The third major revision came progressively from 2002 onwards, 
through subsequent reforms strengthening the rules of acquisition of citizenship. 
Although many of the ideas put forward by a moribund Labour government towards 
the end of Gordon Brown’s mandate, whether in the Goldsmith report Citizenship: Our 
Common Bond (2008) or in the Green Paper A Path to Citizenship (2008), are unlikely 
to be adopted in the exact same terms, the Conservative-led government showed no 
intention of abandoning the aim of accentuating the divide between citizens and 
aliens207.  
                                               
203. British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914.  
204. For a good review of legislative developments in a historical perspective, see Faulks (1998).  
205. Prior to 1962, there was no distinction made between those who hold a British passport issued in the 
Commonwealth and in the UK.  
206. Here, it is important to distinguish the categories of economic migrants and refugees, who are not subject to the 
same legal channels of entry.  
207. Although one of the first decisions of the new government was to dispose of the ongoing and highly controversial 
reform requiring Third-Country Nationals to carry an identity card.  
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There is much confusion between the term nationality and citizenship in British politics 
and law. Indeed, prior to the legislative changes brought about by the 1948 British 
Nationality Act, British nationals were formally subjects of the Crown;208 The category 
of Citizens of the UK and Colonies (CUKC) came about at this time, not in response to 
domestic pressures but in the wake of decolonization and the corollary need for the 
now fully sovereign states of Canada and India to define the boundaries of their 
citizenry (McCrone & Kiely 2000). The legal category of British citizens was first 
introduced in 1983. While that of British nationals is to date still meaningful, only the 
former necessarily entails the unconditional right to enter and stay in the UK. Besides, 
residents of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland209 tend to use the term  ‘nationality’ 
to highlight their sense of belonging to the small nations making up the United 
Kingdom, while reserving the use of the term ‘citizenship’ to the legal bond with the 
British state. But the two idioms are so intertwined in practice that their conceptual 
differences are blurred to a considerable extent. It would be misleading to believe that 
Scots use the term nationality to stress their emotional attachment to their nation, and 
citizenship to designate the cold-hearted and impersonal relationship binding them to 
the British state. Indeed reality proves to be much more complex, the United Kingdom 
being itself a nation that, although explicitly multinational, comprises its share of 
emotional ties and bonds going beyond the set of rights to which its citizens are 
entitled. Unlike (most of) its Continental counterparts, a sense of common British 
identity was gradually instilled from the nineteenth century onwards while allowing for 
the permanence of distinctive features across the constituting nations (Asari et al. 
2008). But British citizenship shall not be interpreted as a strictly legal notion emptied 
of any affective content. T.H. Marshall (2006/1948) compellingly highlighted the 
intimate link between successive development of civil, political and social rights and 
British nation-building. From this perspective, the gradual democratization process and 
the consolidation of the welfare state in the aftermath of World War II, underlined by 
the state’s commitment to provide assistance to Britons ‘from cradle to grave’ played a 
role no less significant than warfare and imperialism in the construction of an 
                                               
208. The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 stated that “any person born within His Majesty’s 
dominions and allegiance was a natural-born British subject” (Goldsmiths report 2007: 13). 
209. In many ways, the sense of belonging to the English nation is much more problematic, although Englishmen and 
women have long tended to use the category of English and British interchangeably. For an insightful account of the 
evolving notion of Englishness, see Mc Crone (2003).  
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overlapping British identity, in which ethnic and national differences could sit 
alongside common citizenship.  
 
Yet, this arrangement came under severe strain in recent decades, as a result of the 
resurgence of peripheral nationalism on the one hand, and sustained immigration on the 
other hand. Devolution marked a critical juncture, increasingly accentuating differences 
in citizenship rights within the UK (Mitchell 2006: 153). There is now compelling 
evidence that the demise of the welfare state in the wake of Margaret Thatcher’s 
neoliberal agenda contributed to the rise of peripheral dissent (Béland et al. 2008, 
McEwen et al. 2005). Since devolution, the Scottish and Welsh governments have used 
their competencies to promote a distinct social citizenship, clinging to a more universal 
and social democratic approach to welfare provision. In parallel, the acceleration of 
inward flows since 1997 mechanically increased the proportion of resident aliens. But 
unlike much of the post-war era in the course of which the status of resident has 
overshadowed that of citizen, and entitlement to citizenship rights have been largely 
detached from nationality (Favell 1998), the last decade has been marked by a 
deliberate attempt to reassert the value of full membership. In the remainder of this 
section, I examine how the Scottish administration has responded to these changes 
since devolution.  
 
6.1.2. Defining the Scottish citizenry on the eve of devolution 
 
 
Between the 1707 Act of Union with England and the re-establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament in 1999, the rules of acquisition of Scottish nationality have not been 
formally defined nor translated into law. Prior to the Union of the Crowns in 1603, 
whereby King James VI of Scotland became King James I of England as well, Scottish 
subjecthood was acquired at birth, in accordance with the medieval norm stating that 
everyone born on the soil controlled by the monarch was subject to his rule.210 In 1608, 
the court was asked to determine whether Robert Calvin, a man born in Scotland before 
the Union of the Crowns and now resident in England, shall be considered as an alien, 
hence not subject to the “proper rights, laws, and statutes of the Kingdom of 
                                               
210. In Scotland, this rule was embodied in the Latin proverb infra ligeantiam domini Regis regni sui Scot.  
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England.”211 Sir Edward Coke, then Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, 
concluded that “every subject that is born out of the extent and reach of the laws of 
England cannot by judgment of those laws be a natural subject to the King.”212 As a 
result, Robert Calvin was denied the right to own property in England, a privilege then 
reserved to English subjects. Yet the decision also enshrined into law that individuals 
born after the Union either in Scotland or England would be subject to the rules of the 
same monarch. By contrast with most continental states (Weil 2001), this decision 
remained unchallenged, thus setting a path for the acquisition of British nationality, and 
later citizenship, through jus soli, as opposed to jus sanguinis.  
 
But apart from this admittedly distant episode,213 the formal boundaries of Scottish 
nationality were not systematically discussed until the eve of devolution.214 As shown 
in Chapter III, the long road to home rule enabled Scottish elites to put aside their 
differences in defence of a common if poorly-defined territorial interest, underpinned 
by broad political and popular support for the re-establishment of a democratically-
elected Scottish Parliament. The creation of the Scottish office in 1885, together with 
the permanence of a distinct parliamentary group for Scottish Westminster 
constituencies, consolidated a territorially-defined administrative and electoral arena in 
which issues of direct concern to the residents of Scotland could be discussed, thus 
keeping alive a frame of reference maintaining a ‘banal’ and self-reproducing territorial 
identity. However, by adding a ‘democratic tier’ to administrative devolution (Mitchell 
2006), the Scotland Act 1998215 raised the need to define the boundaries of the electoral 
franchise, an issue extensively debated in the House of Commons in June 1997. 
Ultimately, the decision was made to use the registry of local government electors for 
both the referendum on devolution and subsequent elections for membership of the 
                                               
211. Calvin's Case 7 Coke Report 1a, 77 ER 377. 
212. Ibid. 
213. Although it occurred almost four centuries ago, the Calvin case is well-known and influential in the jus solis 
jurisprudence, especially as most European countries adopted the jus sanguinis principle following the French 
Revolution, jus soli being associated with the Ancien Régime. The 1805 Napoleon civil code provides a telling 
example, although Napoleon himself was opposed to the reform of the French nationality code which he saw as 
draining away resources for warfare (Weil 2001). This however, shall not hide the fact that Catholics and Jews were 
formally excluded from British nationality until 1778.   
214. The issue was hardly mentioned during the parliamentary debates preceding the first referendum over devolution 
in 1979.  
215. Until 1985, UK legislation did not provide expatriates with external voting rights. Besides, there were no local 
voting rights for EU citizens before 1997 either. Accordingly the issue was not systematically discussed prior to the 
1979 referendum on devolution. Under the Scotland Act 1978, the persons entitled to vote as electors at the elections 
for the Scottish Assembly would have been those who had their names on the register of parliamentary electors, plus 
peers (Jo Shaw 2009a: 14).  
 180 
 
Scottish Parliament.216 In consequence, EU citizens resident in Scotland, who under the 
provisions of the 1992 Maastricht treaty are entitled to vote at local elections in any 
member states, were given the right to have their say in the ‘settled will of the Scottish 
people’, unlike Scots-born emigrants no longer registered at an address within the 
constituency. While prior to the 2004 eastward enlargement the proportion of EU 
citizens living in Scotland was marginal, this highly symbolic decision considerably 
strengthened the national movements’ civic credentials, by giving English-born and 
EU-born immigrants alike the opportunity to become ‘political Scots’ (Kiely et al. 
2005).  
  
On the one hand, Labour’s support for using the local government franchise and 
electoral register as the basis for determining who could vote and stand for elections 
expressed an intuition that “devolution mark[ed] the extension of what constitutes ‘the 
local’ within UK constitutional politics” (Shaw 2009a: 11). In the run-up to the 1979 
referendum, the party failed to overcome its internal divisions over Scotland’s 
constitutional future. While some saw devolution as the best way to contain the rise of 
the SNP, others, mainly among the industrial wing, fiercely opposed it on the grounds 
that nationalism undermined UK-wide class solidarity (Keating & Jones 1985, Mitchell 
2009). Hence, 1997 New Labour, committed not to repeat the same mistakes as Old 
Labour buried a few years earlier in the turmoil of Tony Blair’s ascension, carefully 
emptied the devolution settlement of its nationalist connotations. Instead, emphasis was 
placed on the democratic benefits that bringing decision-making processes closer to the 
people would entail. By contrast, the Tories’ stance was in tune with their traditional 
conception of the Union. For the Conservative MP Peter Luff, this decision meant no 
less than the “government intending to give a Greek waiter temporarily working in a 
backstreet café in Edinburgh the right to vote in an election about Scotland’s future, but 
denying it to a Scottish journalist working here in Westminster for the Scotsman.”217 
But the party, worn down after seventeen consecutive years in power, was no longer 
able to mobilize its traditional Scottish electorate. As it did not return a single MP in 
Scotland at the 1997 general elections, its capacity to alter the ongoing reform had 
                                               
216. The Scotland 1998 Act does not comprise a clear legal definition of Scottish citizenship holders. However, article 
11.1 states that “the persons entitled to vote as electors at an election for membership of the Parliament are those who 
would be entitled to vote as electors at a local government election in an electoral area falling wholly or partly within 
the constituency, and are registered in the register of local government electors at an address within the constituency.”  
217. House of Common Hansard Debates. June 17, 1997, vol 295 cc247-79.  
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reached an all time low. As for the SNP, Alex Salmond’s reply to Peter Luff’s 
intervention captures well how his stance was in fact intertwined with the party’s 
territorializing strategy: “Is [the Hon. Gentleman] incapable of understanding why, as 
leader of the Scottish National Party, I am perfectly comfortable with the idea of people 
from England, Wales, France, the rest of Europe, or Timbuktu, who are resident in 
Scotland and contribute to the community there, voting on the future of the country? Is 
he totally incapable of understanding why residents who contribute to a community 
should have rights of determination, regardless of where they are from?”218 
 
6.1.3. The citizenship rights of asylum seekers and the path to citizenship 
 
 
The SNP, and for different reasons, Scottish Labour’s commitment to envisage the 
boundaries of citizenship “based on the territorial and political entity of Scotland, not 
on place of birth, or ethnic group”,219 is especially striking when compared to UK-wide 
legislative developments. This is equally true in regard to the citizenship rights of 
asylum seekers and the rules of acquisition of citizenship, successively examined in the 
remainder of this section.  
 
The citizenship rights of asylum seekers 
 
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 marked a radical shift in British asylum policy. 
The National Asylum Support Agency (NASA) was set up and charged with the 
mandatory dispersal of all asylum seekers, away from the pressurized housing areas of 
the South-East to areas of surplus elsewhere in Britain, in order to “spread the burden” 
across the territory (Robinson et al. 2003). Glasgow was designated as a ‘cluster area’ 
so that by 2002 about 4,500 asylum-seekers had been dispersed there, with hundreds 
more arriving daily. Initially, the issue received little attention, whether from the media 
or the Scottish administration. However, this changed dramatically in August 2001 
when the murder of Firsat Dag in Glasgow, a Turkish asylum-seeker, hit the national 
headlines. As a result, the relatively positive media reporting, “representing Glasgow 
and its people as welcoming and open to new residents,” (Coole 2002: 842) gave way to 
a series of articles built around the “stereotype of the racist, knife-wielding Glaswegian 
hooligan” (ibid. 846). This in turn forced the Scottish administration and local 
                                               
218. Ibid.  
219. Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation, part 7, published by the Scottish Government, 2007.  
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governments to step in. The Scottish Refugee Integration Forum (SRIF) was created and 
immediately endowed with significant resources provided through the government’s 
Race, Religion and Refugee Integration fund, with the aim of enabling “the successful 
integration of refugees in Scotland and the provision of more accessible, coordinated 
and good quality services.”220 Hence the asylum agenda in Scotland has seen some 
divergences from the rest of the UK. For example, asylum seekers are entitled to 
funding of integration activities, unlike the Home Office integration funding which is 
only available to those granted refugee status, humanitarian protection or discretionary 
leave. Besides, as of June 2011, the Scottish Trade Union Congress decided to accept 
them as trade union members. However, as asylum, like immigration, is a reserved 
matter, initiatives taken in Scotland were closely dependent upon the increasingly harsh 
UK-wide legislative framework. The Scottish Trade Unions, the Scottish Refugee 
Council and above all the Labour/Lib-Dem coalition government have campaigned hard 
to change the rules restricting the employment of asylum-seekers and refugees. First 
Minister Jack McConnell personally sought to negotiate some kind of differentiated 
framework in Scotland, following a row over the treatment of families of failed asylum-
seekers who were forcefully deported.221 But he was firmly rebuffed by the Home 
Office, despite compelling evidence that asylum-seekers were put at risk by the 
government’s dispersal policy.222 The SNP immediately took this as an opportunity to 
blame the Labour administration on both sides of the border. For the SNP MSP Linda 
Fabiani,223 “where the Scottish people accept asylum seekers into our communities and 
the Scottish government works to ensure full integration, the Westminster Government 
wants to introduce isolation. Where the Scottish Parliament wants to deliver social 
justice, the Home Secretary wants to introduce social exclusion.” In 2008, the British 
government announced it would opt into the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, 
thus putting an end to the incarceration of asylum-seekers’ children. But there is no 
reason to believe that the ‘Scottish lobby’ played any part in this sudden U-turn. Instead, 
this raised doubts about the Scottish government’s capacity to achieve any radical shift 
                                               
220. Scottish Refugee Integration Forum: Draft Action Plan, published by the Scottish Administration (October 2002).  
221. ‘McConnell defiant in Asylum row’ in news.bbc.co.uk, November 25, 2005.  
222. In 2002, the Home Office commissioned a team of researchers from Oxford Brookes University to evaluate the 
policy outcome of the dispersal policy. However, the report, extremely critical of the government’s action, was not 
published by the Home Office until 2007 under the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act.   
223. Linda Fabiani, Scottish Parliament Official Report, October 31, 2001, Column 3463. Linda Fabiani was then the 
SNP MSP for Central Scotland. She became the Minister for Europe, External Affairs and Culture after the 2007 SNP 
victory.  
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in policy areas perceived as strategically relevant for Westminster (Williams et al 2006: 
513).  
 
The path to citizenship 
  
Since 2002, citizenship has increasingly become the cornerstone of the British 
government’s migration agenda, and been particularly topical in public debates. The 
naturalization procedure has been profoundly transformed and tightened, the 
government deliberately requiring much more from those who wish to become citizens, 
who “must pass a residence test; be intending to make the UK their home; be of good 
character; and pass an English language requirement and a test of knowledge of life in 
the UK.”224 Prospective citizens are now required to pronounce an Oath of Allegiance 
to the Queen,225 a duty that was to date reserved for a small category of high-ranking 
civil servants, and a US-style Pledge of Commitment to the UK226 created from scratch 
for this occasion. Citizenship ceremonies are broadly identical across the UK, although 
they are “to be tailored to reflect the part of the United Kingdom in which they are 
performed, with the Scottish flag and the anthem Flower of Scotland being given 
prominence north of the border.”227 There are virtually no territorial provisions in the 
content of the Life in the UK test that aliens have to pass in order to become fully-
fledged citizens. Although some questions do stress national variations, the 
examination is clearly unionist in its outlook.  
 
Furthermore, the Brown government in 2007 charged Lord Goldsmith with the implicit 
task of rationalizing the patchwork of membership categories inherited from the 
Empire. The Citizenship: Our Common Bond report published shortly after lamented 
the “blurring in the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, especially in terms of 
rights and entitlements.”228 Moving away from the long-standing focus on residency as 
the most meaningful criterion for eligibility to the great bulk of citizenship rights, it 
                                               
224. Controlling our Borders, published by the Home Office, February 2005. 
225. Oath of allegiance to the Queen: “I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will be 
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to 
law”. Alternatively, new citizens can pronounce an ‘affirmation of allegiance’: I (name) do solemnly, sincerely and 
truly declare and affirm that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law”. (Sources: UK border agency, 
www.ukba.gov.uk, [accessed March 1, 2009]. 
226. United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), 2008.  
227.  ‘Immigrants to swear Oath in front of the Saltire’ in the Scotsman, December 10, 2003.  
228. Goldsmiths Report – Citizenship: Our Common Bond, p. 26.  
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proposed to draw a sharper line between UK citizens and foreign residents, notably by 
limiting “the right to vote in Westminster elections to UK citizens”,229 against the 
general trend in Europe which tends to expand the boundaries of suffrage rather than 
tighten it230. The suggestions contained in the Goldsmith report were reformulated in 
the Green Paper Path to Citizenship published in April 2008, and formalized in the 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act passed in Parliament in January 2009. The 
points-based system formerly introduced to manage immigration was forced into the 
citizenship agenda, resident aliens now being required to ‘earn’ their right to 
citizenship. The system comprises three stages: temporary residence, probationary 
citizenship and British citizenship. Only immigrants who entered the UK through tier 1 
and 2 of the points-based system, the categories of highly-skilled and skilled migrants, 
shall be given access to citizenship. But the reform was fiercely criticized in Scotland, 
where it was feared that this could act as a disincentive for potential migrants, and 
consequently undermine the economic and demographic objectives pursued by the 
Scottish government.231 In response, the Home Office agreed to modulate the system 
according to territorial specificity, thus enabling migrants who settle in Scotland to get 
extra citizenship points232. 
 
Overall, these repeated attempts to strengthen a ‘Common Bond’ among British 
citizens have largely failed to produce the expected outcome in Scotland. Alex 
Salmond qualified Gordon Brown’s citizenship agenda as being “smacked of 
desperation”,233 “Monthy Pythonesque”, and “Basil Fawlty.”234 The SNP constitutional 
proposal for a free Scotland (2002) states that “citizenship shall be open to anyone who 
is permanently resident in Scotland at the date of independence, to anyone who was 
born in Scotland or either of whose parents was born in Scotland, and to such other 
persons as the Parliament of Scotland may prescribe.”235 Protracted migration patterns 
between Scotland and England, nurtured by three centuries of intense economic, 
                                               
229. Ibid. p. 76. For a well-argued account of the practical impossibilities of bringing about these changes, see Shaw 
(2009a). 
230. Although this point is debatable in relation to immigrants, there is no doubt that in the past century the electoral 
franchise has been expanded to categories of citizens traditionally excluded, notably women, and in the UK the 
working class as late as 1918. Besides, a number of countries have extended the right to vote to aliens at local 
elections and, in the case of Scotland, Wales, and the Greater London area, to meso-level elections as well. For an 
legal analysis of aliens’ electoral rights in Europe, see Shaw (2009b).  
231. ‘The Citizenship Agenda in Scotland’ published by COSLA, (2009).  
232. ’Migrants who settle in Scotland will get extra citizenship points’, in the Herald, July 27, 2009.  
233. In The Scotsman, March 11, 2008.  
234. In the Scotsman, March 12, 2008.  
235. A Constitution for a Free Scotland, published by the Scottish National Party (September 2002).  
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cultural and political exchange within a single highly centralized state, suggest that a 
very large proportion of residents could be entitled to dual citizenship, thus 
undermining the rationale for independence (Peter Jones 2002). But despite this 
limitation, the Draft Referendum Bill published by the Scottish government in January 
2010 reiterated that the local registry, together with the Parliamentary and European 
ones, shall be used as a basis to determine the franchise, the party committing again to 
a territorial conception of citizenship with voting rights based on residence, not 
ethnicity. Accordingly, EU-citizens living in Scotland would not be expected to take a 
test, nor swear an oath before casting their vote. They are nonetheless invited to 
pronounce themselves in a hypothetical referendum over the Scottish people’s right to 
self-determination, on the basis of their residency. 
 
6.2. One Scotland, many cultures? 
 
 
In 1999, the quasi absence of an integration strategy in Scotland was at odds with the 
dominant discourse of civic nationalism. The relatively low concentration of 
minorities, a broad discourse of tolerance together with the predominance of 
constitutional issues had produced a neglect of integration issues. Despite the scarcity 
of evidence-based research on minorities in Scotland, the murders of Imran Khan and 
Surgit Singh Chokhar in Glasgow in 1998 challenged the understanding of Scotland as 
a non-racist nation. Although racial equality is a reserved matter, the Scottish 
government has been committed to ‘encourage’ its diffusion throughout Scottish 
society236. Besides, the integration agenda cuts across a number of policy areas that are 
devolved such as education, lifelong learning, health, social services and housing. 
While devolution has enabled the Scottish government to establish a set of institutions 
that do not significantly depart from the rest of the UK, the differences in discourse are 
striking. Political parties north of the border, and chiefly the SNP, have clung to a 
vibrant celebration of diversity, while at the same time the London government was 
trying hard, although with mitigated success, to assert the value of Britishness across 
multinational and multicultural Britain. 
                                               
236. To be sure, Scottish Labour has pursued a multicultural agenda since the 1960s. However, the passage from 
administrative to political devolution reinforced this trend.  
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The Labour government which took office in 1997 sought in its first term to modernize 
Britain, which, after seventeen years of Conservative rule, was seen in progressive 
circles as ill-prepared to step into the new millennium. Tony Blair in particular missed 
few opportunities to share his vision of Britain as a ‘young country’, while former 
Home Secretary Robin Cook famously coined the expression ‘Tikka Massala’237 
nation, confident in its dynamism and at ease with its pluralism. This re-branding 
exercise was in tune with the preponderant role occupied by spin doctors in the Blair 
government. As late as 2000, the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain report chaired by Lord 
Professor Bhikhu Parekh recommended with the blessing of the Labour government 
moving beyond a conception of Britishness imbued with “systematic, largely 
unspoken, racial connotations”, towards a “multicultural post-nation.” 238 More than 
ever before, diversity was to be recognized and celebrated in the public sphere, and 
Britain to be conceived of as “a community of communities and individuals.”239 But the 
multicultural ecstasy was short-lived, as the most violent race240 riots in England for 20 
years erupted in the Northern cities of Bradford and Oldham in August 2001. In 
response Ted Cantle, a local councilor in Bradford, was charged with the task of 
investigating the root causes of the riots. The conclusions of the Cantle Report pointed 
out a series of unintended effects produced by a seemingly well-intentioned idea. The 
fierce competition for public resources between groups institutionally divided on racial 
and ethnic lines had had the adverse consequence of cementing communities operating 
on “the basis of a series of parallel lives [that] often do not seem to touch at any point, 
let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges.”241  
 
 
 
 
                                               
237. Robin Cook’s Speech to the Social Market Foundation in London, April 19, 2001:  “Chicken Tikka Massala is 
now a true British national dish, not only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect illustration of the 
way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences.”  
238. Runnymede Trust – The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000, p.38 
239. Ibid. p. 7, my emphasis.  
240. The riots in Bradford and Oldham were immediately and unproblematically qualified in the press and by the 
government as race riots. However, a brief comparison with subsequent riots – and far more dramatic ones – in the 
French suburbs since the 1980s highlights the constructedness of these categories. South of the Channel, pundits have 
been very reluctant to introduce an ethnic or racial element and have consistently emphasized the social dimension, in 
line with the Republican frame of reference, racial or cultural interpretations being left to the radical right.  
241. Cantle Report, 2001: 9.  
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6.2.1.  Community cohesion in the devolved policy context 
 
 
At UK-level, the coexistence of three distinct commissions – the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Disability Rights 
Commission – appeared counter-productive now that the explicit aim was to foment 
community cohesion. They were then merged into a single Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) in 2007. Encompassing issues related to race, disability, age, 
sexual orientation, human rights, and gender, the EHRC embraced a holistic view of 
equality promotion. While competent in the UK as a whole, regional branches in Wales 
and Scotland were nonetheless created to take into account territorial specificity. In 
parallel, the Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC) was set up with the Scottish 
Commission for Human Rights Act (2006). Although the Scottish Parliament 
committed to its creation as early as 1999, the actual institution, the purpose of which 
being to promote “all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural”,242 
was not operating until 2008. Within the Scottish administration, the Equality unit, part 
of the Department of Communities, also covers issues of age, disability, gender, race, 
religion and sexual orientation, reflecting a similar intention to integrate race-related 
concerns within a more broadly defined ‘Community Cohesion’ agenda. The Equality 
Unit identified two race equality organizations – CEMVO243 and BEMIS244 – which 
were given privileged access to the decision-making process. They received funding 
through the Race Equality, Integration and Community Support Fund to facilitate the 
development of networks and structures within minority ethnic communities and 
voluntary associations across Scotland. Significant resources were invested in order to 
plug the research and information gap. In addition, the government initiated a wide-
ranging review of race equality work in Scotland, suggesting that the evidence-based 
new public management paradigm that has deeply transformed policy-making in 
Whitehall since 1997 has crossed the border and spilled over to the devolved 
administrations245.  
 
                                               
242. Scottish Human Rights Commission (SHRC), Building a Strategic Plan, 2008. 
243. Council of Ethnic Minority Voluntary Sector Organizations.  
244. Black and Ethnic Minority Infrastructure in Scotland. 
245. Although for Michael Keating (2005), the penetration of the new public management paradigm has not been as 
far-reaching in Holyrood as in Whitehall.  
 188 
 
The year devolution came about saw a series of minor sectarian incidents targeting the 
Catholic community. This immediately prompted a passionate national debate which, 
because of the scarcity of data, relied mainly on anecdotal evidence and personal 
impressions. In the summer months of 1999, members of the national football team and 
the vice-chairman of Rangers Football club were accused of singing anti-Catholic 
songs. In August, James MacMillan, a famous Glaswegian Catholic composer, 
denounced in his speech at the opening of the Edinburgh Festival the “sleep-walking 
bigotry” and “visceral anti-Catholicism”246 that in his view had undermined everyday 
life in the Western Lowlands for too long. Soon after, the decision was made to include 
two voluntary questions on religion in the 2001 Scottish census, including a breakdown 
of Christians, as well as an Irish category (Walls 2001: 60). The 2001 Census form for 
England and Wales does not comprise a specific category for Roman Catholics, where 
the issue has not spurred much interest. Instead, the public debate has focused on 
whether or not the current racial monitoring form should be complemented with a set 
of questions on religion in order to evaluate the proportion of self-identified Muslims. 
This decision came in response to those who criticized the existing framework that, 
although broadly perceived as effective in tackling discrimination on the grounds of 
race, had failed to address those directed against the Muslim community (Modood et al. 
1997, Modood 2008). By expanding the scope of current race relations legislation to 
questions of faith, the argument goes, policy-makers would be better equipped to 
address the consequences of Islamophobia, on the rise since the Satanic Verses 
controversy in 1989, and reaching a record high after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York. But in Scotland, the Muslim community amounted to merely 0.8% of the 
population in 2001. Hence residual sectarian tensions have been framed as the most 
significant impediment to social cohesion. The issue prompted the publication of a 
series of academic studies covering different aspects of the life of what was now 
recognized as a sizeable portion of the Scottish population (Devine et al 2000, Rosie & 
Bond 2004).  
 
In February 2005, the decision was made to organize a Summit on Sectarianism, in 
order to, in the words of the then (Labour) First Minister Jack MacConnell, tackle “the 
bigoted attitudes and behaviours of a minority that have scarred Scottish life for too 
                                               
246. ‘James MacMillan: the bigotry that shames Scotland’, in the Independent, August 31, 1999.  
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long.”247 The Labour party, increasingly challenged in its Glasgow strongholds by a 
reinvigorated SNP, sought to reaffirm its historical role as the incontestable champion 
of the Catholic community’s sectional interests.  Besides, its century-old ties with the 
representatives of the Catholic Church had recently been undermined by the campaign 
over the repeal of clause 28 of the Local Government Act 1988248. Again, the initiative 
has been profoundly influenced by the main findings of the Cantle Report. Chief 
among them was the perceived need to bring communities together and encourage 
mutual understanding. The Scottish administration‘s Action Plan on Tackling 
Sectarianism in Scotland was published after the Summit was organized around the 
four key themes of education, sports, faith and parade.249 Besides, the government 
dared to tackle the question of denominational schools inherited from the 1918 
Education (Scotland) Act that, despite their instrumental role in integrating the Catholic 
community, have often been criticized for cementing impenetrable boundaries between 
religious groups250. As Elinor Kelly put it, it is difficult to think of any issue more 
likely to divide opinion in Scotland into “mutually incomprehensible and, on occasion, 
abusive camps than national debate about religion and especially denominational 
schools” (2003: 686). This statement is equally valid concerning the public debate in 
England in relation to publicly-funded Muslim schools, although the relative proportion 
of self-reported Muslims living in England is considerably lower (Flint 2007).251 The 
most emblematic action of the Plan, perceived by some as an attack against the 1918 
arrangement,252 consisted in encouraging ‘twinning’ between denominational and non-
denominational schools, by organizing common events, creating common facilities and 
promoting joint activities in order to “enrich the experience of their pupils and give 
them an opportunity to meet together.” Religious leaders were also encouraged to meet 
                                               
247. Foreword of the Action Plan on tackling Sectarianism in Scotland, Scottish Executive, 2005.  
248. The single biggest political battle in the short history of the Scottish Parliament occurred when the Labour-led 
Scottish Executive unveiled its plan to repeal Clause 28 Section 2A of the Local government Act 1988, the law 
prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality as a form of family life in schools. The Catholic Church launched a 
crusade against the government’s plan, which rapidly affected its long-standing alliance with Labour. For an 
interesting view on the place of religion in devolved Scotland, and the enhanced power of the Churches in general 
and the Roman Catholic Church in particular, see Martin Steven, 2007.  
249. The Marches and Parades Section provided that parades organized by Orange Lodges should be notified 28 days 
before, against 7 days in the current legislation.  
250. In her study of multiculturalism in school-age education, Suzanne Audrey found that “it is unofficially 
acknowledged that many local councilors feel ‘stuck’ over the issue of publicly funded Catholic Schools”  (2000: 
121). 
251. Although as Flint rightly notes, there are 418 state-funded Roman Catholic schools in Scotland against 25 state-
funded Koranic schools in England (2007).  
252. There may actually be some truth in it, although the Labour party never seriously considered bringing the reform 
to Parliament. Indeed the former (Labour) Education Minister Sam Balgraith and his Lib-Dem peer Lord Steel both 
argued in the Sunday times that “denominational schools were the root of sectarianism and bigotry” and called for 
them to be scrapped. See ‘the great faith School debate’ in the Sunday Times, January 7, 2007.  
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more regularly through an empowered version of the Scottish Inter-Faith council.253 
Lastly, Labour's Lib-Dem coalition partners pushed for the addition of a new clause in 
the Criminal Justice Act creating a new offence on Sectarianism,254 passed in the 
Scottish Parliament in 2006.  
 
In institutional terms, actions taken at the Scottish level have closely followed the UK-
wide paradigmatic shift, although they were framed in a Scottish context, giving 
prominence to anti-Catholic sectarianism over Islamophobia. Civil servants in 
Edinburgh feared that the 2007 SNP victory would bring about major organizational 
changes. However, they were quickly reassured, as most of the existing institutions 
remained. The SNP government, far from rejecting the heritage of its predecessors, 
took a number of initiatives to expand it. In 2007, the government signed a Concordat 
with local authorities strengthening inter-governmental cooperation in matters of race 
equality. It also created a series of indicators aimed at assessing the government’s 
activities, and actions taken in the realm of race equality and integration fell into 
National Outcome 13 entitled: “We take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national 
identity.” The differences in style and discourse between Holyrood and Westminster, 
however, have grown deeper than ever.   
 
6.2.2. Multiculturalism and the growing discursive gap 
 
 
Far from being an SNP idiosyncrasy, the vibrant celebration of cultural pluralism cuts 
across the entire Scottish political spectrum. Even the Scottish Tories have been 
reluctant to embrace the multicultural assault of their fellow party members south of 
the border. The most illustrative initiative of the Labour-led Scottish Executive is 
without doubt the One Scotland, Many Cultures campaign launched in 2002, the 
purpose of which being to “raise awareness of racism among the general public, draw 
attention to its negative impact on society, and to promote the benefits of a diverse 
population to Scotland.”255 The campaign is emblematic of the government’s eagerness 
                                               
253. Sectarianism: Update on Action Plan on Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland published by the Scottish Executive, 
December 2006.  
254. Similar legislation on incitation to religious hatred was passed the same year in Westminster, with the aim of 
protecting the Muslim community, increasingly stigmatized in the aftermath of the 2005 terrorist attacks in London.  
255. One Scotland, Many Cultures 2005/06 – Waves 6 and 7 Campaign Evaluation, published by the Scottish 
Executive (2007).  
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to promote an overlapping Scottish identity, able to accommodate individuals and 
communities irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations. But from 2007, the 
SNP, in office for the first time, sought to promote its own version of a multicultural 
Scotland, simultaneously pursuing the electoral objective of making inroads into the 
Catholic and Muslim vote, and the nationalist aim of challenging the British 
government in its own liberal democratic space.  
 
As for the first objective, the SNP sought to strengthen its relationship with the 
Catholic community. Alex Salmond reiterated his unconditional support for Catholic 
schools and their “first rate record in Scotland” 256 and insisted that the priority was 
rather to remove “the state sectarianism that is institutionalized in the Act of 
Settlement.”257 While the importance given to this matter certainly flattered the 
representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, it fell short of addressing the not 
negligible sectarian tensions (still) punctuating everyday life in Glasgow. More 
strikingly, Alex Salmond invested much of his time rallying the small yet growing 
South Asian community to his cause. The Muslim population in Scotland of just over 
48,000, 65% of which are Pakistani (GROS Census 2001), exhibits distinct socio-
economic features, the proportion of self-employed being higher than south of the 
border, and tend to identify more strongly as Scottish than their peers in England 
identify as English (Amir et al. 1999, Hopkins 2007). Miller and Hussain (2006) have 
shown how the majority of them voted yes in the 1999 referendum, and how they 
shifted en masse from Labour to the SNP following the 2004 Iraq invasion, the latter 
clinging to its pacifist tradition by vigorously opposing the intervention of British 
troops. In 1997, Mohammed Sarwar became the first Pakistani-born Muslim to be 
elected as a (Labour) MP in Westminster, but the first one to sit in the Holyrood 
Parliament was elected in 2004 under the SNP banner.258 The SNP-affiliated 
association Asian Scots for Independence was given more visibility, and the Scottish 
Islamic Foundation (SIF) was created with the government’s blessing. It gained 
backing from the SNP for state-financed Muslim schools, a project that so far has not 
                                               
256. In 2008, Alex Salmond declared in his speech at the Cardinal Winning Education Lecture, University of 
Glasgow: “I have long been a supporter of the quality of faith-based education in this country - and a particular 
admirer of the contribution of Scotland's Catholic schools... my advocacy for faith-based education extends beyond 
Catholic schools. I believe that here we are in full agreement on the tremendous role that faith schools can play in 
Scottish society.” 
257. Alex Salmond, Comment in the Sunday Times, January 7, 2010.  
258. It is in this respect interesting to highlight that, despite the fact that the Scottish Muslim community is relatively 
small, the first Muslim MP ever to be elected in Westminster represented the Glasgow-Govan circumscription.   
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come to fruition. The head of the Scottish Foundation, Osama Saeed, who acquired a 
sulfurous reputation by taking a number of radical positions in the public debate, was 
the SNP candidate for Glasgow Central at the 2010 Westminster elections.259 In 2008, 
the group received GBP 215,000 from the government, infuriating prominent members 
of the Muslim community who accused the First Minister of “just helping his own 
party members”, and “ignoring established organizations.”260 In a similar vein, the 
SNP’s initial reaction to the failed terrorist attack against Glasgow airport in 2007 was 
interpreted by some as an illustration of the SNP’s uncritical stance on radical Islam 
(Gallagher 2008). Indeed, the day after the attack, the Minister of Justice Kenny 
McAskill stressed that they had not been perpetrated by “home-grown” terrorists and 
the suspects were not “born or bred here but had only lived in Scotland for a period of 
time”,261 thereby suggesting that no such thing could happen in Scotland. Tom 
Gallagher, in a virulent pamphlet against the SNP, found a paradox between the rather 
non-religious support base of the SNP and the party’s apparent support for a Muslim 
organization that is “committed to a Europeanized version of Islam that is highly 
evangelical and wishes to live according to Sharia precepts within Europe today” 
(Gallagher 2010: 141). Gallagher concludes that “as a devotee of radical forms of 
multiculturalism, the SNP emphasizes group rights over the exercise of individual 
citizenship”, while at the same time Downing Street is trying to fix the negative 
consequences of 30 years of “wrong-headed public policies that created a segmented 
society and fixed identities that played down individualism and concentrated powers in 
the hands of community leaders” (ibid. 227, my emphasis). But Gallagher’s critique of 
SNP-style multiculturalism overemphasizes policy divergences, and downplays the fact 
that the broader discursive environment has been considerably more open to diversity 
than south of the border. In no circumstances can the SNP efforts to cultivate the 
Muslim vote be interpreted as pandering to Islamic extremism.  
 
 
                                               
259. In a similar vein, the widely-respected Scottish Health Secretary Nicola Sturgeon was almost forced to resign 
after she acknowledged having lobbied a court to give a member of her constituency a non-custodial sentence 
although he admitted a GDP 80,000 fraud. While her contrition helped fend off demands for her resignation, she 
failed to “dispel strong suspicions that she had been pressured by senior Asian Community figures within the SNP 
who have played a crucial role in her election in Glasgow Govan.” ‘Scottish deputy first minister apologizes over 
fraudster letter’ in the Guardian, February 24, 2010.  
260. ‘Salmond hit by ‘cash for cronies’ row’ in Scotland on Sunday, July 13, 2008.  
261. In bbcnews.co.uk, July 1, 2007. 
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6.2.3. Britishness versus Scottishness 
 
 
As the National Conversation on Scotland’s Future was being launched in Edinburgh 
by the SNP, Gordon Brown opened a national debate on Britishness, the Prime 
Minister hoping to use his period of consultation to build an idea of Britishness “that 
would leave Alex Salmond’s Scottishness parochial and irrelevant.”262 The way in 
which Canadian national identity has been renegotiated to accommodate the 
nationalisme Québécois together with successive waves of immigrants is well known 
(Gagnon & Iacovino 2005). Likewise, the Australian version of multiculturalism was 
meant to address the aboriginal question and immigration-induced pluralism 
simultaneously (Joppke 2004). The UK is no exception. While for a long time the two 
issues have been treated separately, the recent debate on Britishness, initiated under the 
Blair government and enthusiastically pursued under the leadership of his successor 
Gordon Brown, was meant to kill two birds with one stone. The Scots-born Prime 
Minister, equally concerned with the growing popularity of the SNP in Scotland as 
with successive cracks in the ‘British model’ of immigrant integration, sought to 
address the multicultural and multinational challenges simultaneously. This strategy is 
encapsulated in the Prime Minister’s conception of Britishness: “what makes us feel 
British is our values, what we share in common. It was perhaps because we had to find 
a way for all the countries of the UK to live together, that we came to believe in 
tolerance, liberty, fairness to all and decency.”263 Likewise, the General Secretary of 
the Fabian Society sought to merge within a single narrative the great postwar identity 
debates, “over the union of Britain’s four nations; post-war immigration and 
multiculturalism and Britain’s reluctant Europeanism.”264 
 
However, Gordon Brown’s hope that his initiative would leave a lasting imprint on 
British politics was soon disappointed, as Britishness proved to be too complex and 
contentious a matter to be settled once and for all around a few consensual values. 
Some argued that ‘liberty for all, responsibility for all and fairness to all’ are virtues to 
which many nations may legitimately lay claim, and therefore cannot constitute the 
essence of the British people. Others pointed out, not without irony, how trying to 
                                               
262. Peter Oborne in Holyrood Magazine ‘Clash of the Titans’, September 25, 2007. . 
263. Gordon Brown’s speech at the Fabian Society, January 13, 2006. 
264. ‘What must be done’, Comment published in the Guardian, December 12, 2005.  
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define Britishness was in itself a very un-British exercise. Still others argued, in tune 
with Robin Cohen’s assertion that British identity has been shifting throughout history 
while always remaining “vague and hazy” (1994: 35), that the ultimate secret of its 
resilience was to be found in its fuzzy qualities. From a Scottish perspective, Tom 
Nairn (2006) published an essay in which he referred to Gordon Brown as the ‘bard of 
Britishness’, a figure representing in his view no more than the fading echo of the 
Empire and the ultimate symptom of the state’s deliquescence. More tempered pundits 
warned against the danger of conflating multinationalism with a multiculturalism that 
bears little in common, and pointed to the absence of a debate as to how a common 
citizenship could operate after devolution (Keating 2009a).  
 
The main instruments supposed to instill and diffuse a sense of common purpose have 
either failed or are not applicable in Scotland. On the one hand, Gordon Brown’s 
attempt, following Lord Goldsmith’s recommendations, to establish a UK-wide 
national day modeled on the American celebration of July 4th, or the French 
commemoration of the storming of the Bastille on July 14th, and, although it has rarely 
been pointed out, reminiscent of Empire Day, failed dramatically. But in Scotland, the 
SNP proposal to establish Saint Andrews Day as the national day has been 
unanimously praised.  For Alex Salmond, “national days in Britain have been clouded 
in uncertainty. They perhaps reflect precisely that uncertainty of what it means to be 
‘British’. […] That sense of an inclusive Scottishness [supposedly embodied in St 
Andrew’s life] one which does not simply tolerate diversity but rather celebrates it, is at 
the heart of what I want St Andrews to become.”265 On the other hand, the introduction 
of a compulsory citizenship subject in the school curriculum in 2002 was meant to be 
the cornerstone of the government’s citizenship agenda. The issue was discussed at 
length in the Goldsmith report, the author seeing it as a formidable instrument to 
strengthen a common set of values among British pupils. Yet Lord Goldsmith seemed 
to overlook the fact that, as education is devolved in Scotland, citizenship is not taught 
as an autonomous subject but figures among the National Priorities in Education 
adopted in 2001, alongside Achievement and Attainment and Inclusion and Equality, 
and cuts across the entire curriculum.266 Apart from the difficulties entailed in 
                                               
265. Alex Salmond’s speech at the National Day Conference, Glasgow Caledonian University, November 30, 2007.  
266. Control over education is commonly portrayed as a fundamental tool of nation-building. For A.D. Smith, it is 
through compulsory, standardized public mass education that “state authorities hope to inculcate national devotion 
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introducing such a subject in England, where it has historically been regarded as a 
potential catalyst for radicalism (Heater 2001), the devolved administrations have been 
reluctant to follow the UK-wide guidelines. This has especially been so in Scotland 
where, together with the established Church and the legal system, education is one of 
the three institutions that contributed to sustain distinctive social and cultural features 
ever since the 1707 Act of Union. Hence, citizenship education has indeed become an 
important issue, but one which is increasingly associated with Scottish rather than 
British concerns and linked to the devolved policy context (Andrews et al. 2008: 146). 
Hence, the policy Plan in Scotland contends that “greater national autonomy is to be 
matched by an enhanced sense of social and political responsibility in the 
population.”267 But unlike in England where the introduction of citizenship classes has 
been framed as a means to foment an enhanced sense of Britishness among pupils, the 
Scottish approach understood citizenship in its universal sense, and refrained to use it 
as an instrument of nation-building.  
 
 Overall, it seems that, despite the SNP’s allegedly excessive multiculturalism, the 
Westminster government’s attempt to reconstruct a national narrative largely failed to 
meet its objectives, either in Scotland or in the rest of the country. Indeed, as British 
politics seem to find no way out of Euro-scepticism, parochial unionism and ailing 
multiculturalism, the central government may find it increasingly hard to portray a 
Europhile nationalist party that celebrates a version of multiculturalism, that until 
recently represented New Labour’s greatest pride and  to which a substitute urgently 
needs to be found, as “narrow-minded and irrelevant”. 
 
6.3. Analysis of results 
 
 
The analysis of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants in Scotland 
confirms to a great extent the main hypothesis. Nationalists seeking to expand their 
means of territorial self-government have a vested interest in adopting a territorializing 
boundary-making strategy in relation to immigrants. Indeed, by doing so, they can 
acquire further internal legitimacy, by reducing the political salience of ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                   
and a distinctive homogenous culture, an activity that most regimes pursue with considerable energy under the 
influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity” (1991: 16).  
267. Education for Citizenship in Scotland, report published in 2002, Scottish executive.   
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boundaries in the homeland. In the Scottish case, the adoption of progressive 
citizenship and integration policies and discourses has also been the occasion to acquire 
further external legitimacy by showing that the Westminster government was not the 
sole carrier of liberal democratic norms. These findings are especially remarkable when 
contrasted with developments in Westminster, where immigration has increasingly 
been framed as a danger to social cohesion and a security threat. The strengthening of 
the rules of acquisition of British citizenship, the ever-widening gap between aliens’ 
and citizens’ right and ever harsher treatment of asylum-seekers find no equivalent in 
Scotland, where these developments have been systematically criticized for being 
counter-productive, detrimental to Scotland's socio-economic interests, and 
incompatible with Scottish values. Although the notion of Scottish citizenship remains 
ill-defined, the use of the local registry at devolved elections and the SNP’s 
constitutional proposal for a free Scotland all point in the same direction: citizenship in 
devolved Scotland should as much as possible derive from residence, and under no 
circumstances from narrowly-defined ethnic or cultural criteria. Likewise, actions taken 
in the realm of integration mark a clear departure from the UK-wide politics of 
‘Britishness’ that gained currency since 2001. The self-reassuring discourse that racism 
was ‘not a problem around here’ prior to devolution could no longer hide the absence 
of a genuine national strategy. The institutional framework that was gradually set up 
has been underlined by a ‘Community Cohesion’ paradigm, and does not show 
significant divergence from the rest of the UK, although it has increasingly been linked 
with the devolved policy context. But while Gordon Brown has been desperately 
looking for common values to keep Britons together, Alex Salmond has promoted his 
vision of Scottishness in terms that are reminiscent of the old multicultural doctrine, 
clinging to the celebration of cultural pluralism as an element of national pride.  
 
In both the British and Scottish political arenas, immigrant policies and discourses have 
been used as instruments of boundary-making, although this took radically different 
forms. The shifting attitude of the Labour government in Westminster reflects how 
immigrants have been used as a scapegoat to (re)assert the value of British citizenship, 
not only understood as a legal status entitling its holder to a set of rights, but also as a 
bond linking individuals sharing distinct values, which together constitute the basis of 
the national community. These developments, far from being a British idiosyncrasy, 
have actually occurred to a varying extent all over Western Europe, as the proliferation 
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of path to citizenship schemes and integration tests, as well as the celebration of 
increasingly exclusive European values illustrate (Guild et al. 2009). But the British 
case sticks out in one important respect, as the 1997 series of constitutional change in 
the periphery mechanically fueled territorial variations in citizenship rights. The 
government sought to reinvent the British nation along explicitly multinational lines, 
and to merge immigration-induced and territorial pluralism into a common narrative. 
While the Labour government can be praised for at least trying to take the measure of 
the radical transformations induced by devolution, its attempt to reconstruct a common 
bond across multinational and multicultural Britain has been undermined by at least two 
factors. First, the Labour party kept functioning with the old unitary state paradigm. 
Consequently, it failed to acknowledge that, with the re-establishment of the Welsh and 
Scottish Parliaments, citizenship policies and discourses targeting immigrants would be 
increasingly territorially-differentiated, reflecting the distinct historical experiences, 
socio-economic landscapes and patterns of party competition shaping public policy- 
making in the devolved administrations. In many ways, the Labour government has 
been blinded by the erroneous belief that Britishness could still accommodate ethnic and 
national identities sitting alongside one another without meeting at any point, but 
bounded together by a common British citizenship. ‘Scots’ and ‘Welsh’ would remain 
‘Scots’ and ‘Welsh’, denying the possibility that some could and actually do identify as 
‘Asian-Scots’ or ‘Black-Welsh’. These mixed categories emerged as a result of 
institutional and policy variations, and more prominently of the banal instruments of 
nation-building and identity-shaping that have been strengthened by devolution. 
Second, this occurred at a time of rising suspicions and fears for the political, social, and 
territorial integrity of the British state: In political terms, the Labour government has 
had to cope with the renewed vigour of the BNP and scepticism of the Conservatives in 
opposition. Immigration has become an increasingly divisive and polarizing issue in the 
British political debate, which precluded the emergence of a consensus. In social terms, 
immigrants and their descendants born in Britain have increasingly been reified as a 
homogenous group, poorly integrated into a fantasized British society, and potentially 
constituting a security threat. With the economic crisis, the twin challenges of welfare 
chauvinism and competition on the labour market were added to this already long list of 
grievances. At last, the SNP victory at the 2007 devolved elections was interpreted as a 
serious territorial threat, which may precipitate the ‘break-up’ of Britain, a concern to 
which the Scots-born Prime Minister Gordon Brown proved to be particularly receptive. 
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Hence, the attempt to reconstruct a common bond has been driven by mutually 
reinforcing fears, and largely failed to produce the expected outcome.  
 
By contrast, the review of actions taken in the field of citizenship and integration during 
the first ten years of devolution show the Scottish administration’s concern with 
blurring boundaries within the homeland, by promoting an overlapping Scottish 
identity, sufficiently thin to accommodate individuals and communities irrespective of 
their ethnic or religious affiliations. A thin national identity, however, is to be 
distinguished from a weak one. In fact, the contrast between the British and Scottish 
contexts contributed to strengthening the meaning of the territorial boundary. In the 
remainder of this section, I explain how these developments were eased by favourable 
dimensions of the political environment, which provided incentives for more 
progressive action.  
 
6.3.1. The new institutional context 
 
 
The new institutional context resulting from devolution provided favourable grounds for 
the Scottish administration to be recognized as legitimate over the totality of its 
jurisdiction. The re-establishment of a democratically-elected Scottish Parliament was 
meant to achieve three aims that the existing institutional arrangement, in the form of 
administrative devolution, could no longer fulfill: 1) addressing the ‘democratic deficit’ 
by creating an electoral arena reflecting the preferences of Scottish voters; 2) providing 
‘Scottish answers to Scottish questions’ by tailoring policies and institutions to the 
needs of the Scottish electorate; 3) providing the administration with sufficient financial 
resources and legislative scope for the residents of Scotland to enjoy meaningful 
political autonomy in a broad range of domestic matters. 
 
Between 1999 and 2007, Labour formed a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats and sought to consolidate the devolved institutions. Although its leadership 
has often come under fire, successive governments have created institutions of direct 
concern to immigrants and minorities, such as the Equality Unit cast in the Ministry of 
Communities, and the Scottish Refugee Council. After the release of the 2001 Census 
figures, a number of evidence-based reports have been commissioned and roundtables 
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gathering stakeholders and experts regularly organized. Prominent minority or 
immigrant associations have been identified and funded by the Race, Religion and 
Refugee Integration Funding Stream.268 However, initiatives taken in Scotland have 
often clashed with the UK-wide agenda or been constrained by increasingly harsh 
legislation over asylum, nationality and immigration, which have remained exclusive 
and jealously guarded competences of the central administration. After the SNP victory 
in 2007, the issue took a new direction, as the perspective of independence was added to 
the equation. From then on, the government was no longer only seeking legitimacy for a 
devolved administration while ultimate sovereignty lies with the Westminster 
Parliament, but for a potentially independent state in Europe. On the one hand, the SNP 
government invested considerable resources to make further inroads into the Catholic 
and South Asian votes, and to challenge the Labour party in its traditional bastions. On 
the other, hand, the SNP, and more especially its charismatic leader Alex Salmond, used 
their time in office to challenge the nation state in its own normative space in an effort 
to acquire further external legitimacy. This task was made easier by the difficulties 
encountered in Westminster in presenting the UK as an archetypal liberal democracy 
while simultaneously downgrading aliens’ status, making the gate to full membership 
ever harder to penetrate. But while devolution has indeed provided the Scottish 
administration with new tools to institutionalize and frame a membership boundary that 
is distinct from the UK-wide framework, the inclusive and progressive consensus 
predates the establishment of a democratically-elected Scottish Parliament. Hence, there 
is no evidence that territorial self-government and the development of a territorializing 
boundary-making strategy are correlated. Instead, the distribution of competences 
across multiple tiers of government provides the means through which membership 
boundaries can be contested within a single state. Immigrant politics are not only fought 
out across ideological cleavages embodied by state-wide parties, but also across 
territorial cleavages. This form of politics manifests itself in intergovernmental tensions, 
representing one dimension of a broader pattern of rival nation-building projects 
interlocked within the same state.   
 
 
                                               
268. In the period from July 1, 2008 to March 31, 2010, the fund allocated GBP 5.5 million to a variety of projects in 
the field of integration.  
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6.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency 
 
 
The explanatory power of path-dependency is hard to establish in the Scottish case, not 
least because the membership boundary has been consistently ambiguous across time. 
The creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 and the permanence of a Scottish 
Parliamentary group in Westminster enabled the persistence of a territorial frame of 
reference. It also provided an arena where issues of immediate concern to the resident 
population could be debated. Yet,  Chapter III showed how conceptions of Scottishness 
have evolved, if not shifted, throughout the twentieth century, from a predominantly 
conservative perspective, equating Protestantism, Unionism and imperial pride, to a 
territorially-based conception of membership, cemented against the England-dominated 
British state. Besides devolution represents a critical juncture which makes any attempt 
to trace institutional evolutions and clearly identify institutional path-dependency over 
extensive periods of time extremely difficult.  
 
6.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition 
 
 
The most determinant dimension of the opportunity structure in providing fertile ground 
for the adoption of progressive policies and discourses towards immigrants can be found 
in the specificity of the sub-state party system and dynamics of party competition. Since 
1970 when the SNP obtained 11.4% of the vote in Scotland at Westminster elections, 
the Scottish party system has increasingly diverged from the rest of the UK. In 1997, the 
adoption of a proportional system of representation enabled the development of a party 
system characterized by moderate pluralism, which clearly leans towards the left of the 
electoral spectrum (Bennie & Clarke 2003). Unlike in Britain where parties can 
reasonably expect to govern alone, parties competing in Holyrood have had to adopt a 
competitive-cooperative attitude as the executive must rely on a parliamentary majority.  
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Table 9: Election results to the Scottish parliament (1999-2011) 
 
Election Year 1999 2003 2007 2011 
Parties % votes Seats %votes Seats %votes Seats % votes Seats 
Labour 38.8 50 34.6 56 32.9 46 31.7 37 
SNP 28.7 27 23.8 35 32.2 47 45.4 69 
Cons 15.5 18 16.6 18 16.6 17 13.9 15 
Lib/Dem 14.2 17 15.3 17 16.2 16 7.9 5 
Other 2.7 17 9.7 3 2.1 3 1.1 3 
 
Source: My own compilation from www.scottish.parliament.uk 
 
As a result, political parties, until then unaccustomed to the complex and skilful art of 
coalition-building, have adapted reasonably well to the new rules of the game. But as 
the table above suggests, Scottish Labour and the SNP consistently dominated the post-
devolution political scene, with the Conservatives experiencing difficulty maintaining 
themselves at the third rank. In a few years, the SNP ascent has been irresistible. First, 
the party went from having blackmail power at general elections, to coalition power at 
Holyrood elections. By 2007, it was able to form a minority government, and obtained 
an absolute majority of seats in 2011. In Westminster, the Labour government’s 
boundary-making strategy came under pressure from two fronts. On the one hand, the 
Conservatives actively sought to politicize the issue and return to the heyday of 
Margaret Thatcher’s tough stance on immigration.  On the other hand, the BNP, which 
won two seats at the 2009 European elections, represented a non negligible challenge in 
specific constituencies. This tension is reflected in Gordon Brown’s row with a widow 
and lifelong Labour voter during the 2010 electoral campaign whom he called a 
“bigoted woman” after she expressed her concerns about the rising number of East 
European immigrants.269 No such thing has occurred in Scotland, where the Labour 
party and the SNP have had strong incentives to compete for the vote of minorities and 
immigrants, as opposed to the anti-immigrant vote, as they face very limited 
competition on the right. Hence, successive actions of the Scottish government have 
been neither externally imposed, nor has the administration been forced by an 
‘international human rights regime’ in-the-making to adopt minority-friendly policies. 
                                               
269. ‘Gordon Brown calls Labour supporter a “bigoted woman”’ in the Guardian, April 28, 2010.  
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Nationalists have not embraced a progressive approach at the price of their alleged aim 
of homogenizing their populations in order to differentiate themselves from other 
national movements the claims of which are ethnically rooted. Instead, their left-of 
centre ideological identity encouraged them to engage in the politics of recognition, in 
the same way as other state-wide left-of-centre parties in Europe, with the important 
difference that they have not faced compelling pressures from the right, nor from their 
electorate, to adopt a tougher stance.  
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VII 
 
 
7. Immigrants into Catalans 
 
 
 
 
In Catalonia, the only stranger is the one who wants to be so. 
 
 
–Artur Mas, speaking at a public event, 
November 2010 
 
 
 
Ultimately, the main question is to know whether immigrants 
should be integrated in Catalonia, or in the Catalanist ideology, 
inoculating into their mind the belief that to be a genuine 
Catalan is merely about speaking Catalan.  
 
 
–Carme de Rivera I Pla, speaking at a Catalan 
Parliamentary session, October 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past ten years, Spain has undergone a series of profound transformations that 
can hardly be summarized in a few lines. The decade opened amid a euphoric 
atmosphere, boosted by economic expansion and social progress in a country where 
memories of harsher times inherited from a not-so-distant past remain vivid. But by 
2010, the “party seemed definitely over”270, as the global recession lifted the veil on the 
economic weaknesses of the Iberian Tiger. In May 2010, the unemployment rate 
                                               
270. Expression coined in ‘A test of Spain’s prime Minister’, in the Economist, November 9, 2008.  
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crossed the 20% threshold against 7.6% in 2007, while at the same time an IMF report 
highlighted the “tremendous challenges” and “profound structural reforms” the Spanish 
government was urged to implement in order to move away from the spectre of 
bankruptcy271. The recent collapse can under no circumstances be attributed to 
immigrants. Conversely, there is no doubt that the formidable inflow of foreign labour 
into Spain since the mid-1990s considerably bolstered economic growth. The figures are 
indeed vertiginous and marked the rapid transformation of Spain from a self-perceived 
country of emigration into one of the main recipient of international migration, with an 
average of 575,000 newcomers per year between 2001 and 2008, accounting for 81% of 
population growth. With 46 million inhabitants against 41 seven years earlier, the 
Spanish population now comprises close to 6 million immigrants registered on the local 
census, and 5.2 million foreign nationals. Spanish politics are still haunted by the 
experience of the Civil War and subsequent four decades of dictatorship. But unlike 
what might have been expected from a (still) convalescent political system not entirely 
acquainted with the experience of democracy, state-wide elites have not turned their 
back on their liberal commitments. This strikingly contrasts with what can be observed 
elsewhere, and chiefly in Italy. There, immigration has given a new impetus to the 
extreme right – whether in its state-wide neo-fascist form with Alleanza Nazionale, or in 
its regionalist variant with the Lega Nord – against the backdrop of a failing party 
system (Salvatore Palidda 2009). 
 
In Catalonia, the process through which immigration gained currency in the public 
debate has been incremental and its exact terms are still difficult to pin down. To a 
considerable extent, it followed the pre-established path in relation to internal migrants 
constructed at the time of the democratic transition. The ‘other Catalans’ became the 
‘new Catalans’, the conception of citizenship based on residency has been reasserted, 
and the policy of ‘linguistic normalization’ has been adapted and expanded to 
newcomers. However, the analogy between ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ and 
‘immigrants from abroad’ rapidly showed its limits. By the turn of the century, it 
became evident that international migration raised distinct challenges in at least two 
ways. First, policy-makers were drawn to the fact that foreign residents were not 
entitled to the same rights as Spanish nationals and that the Catalan government enjoyed 
                                               
271. ‘El FMI pide a España reformas urgentes en el mercado laboral y el sistema bancario’ in El País, May 24, 2010.  
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very limited room to intervene in these matters. This gave new impetus to the debate 
over the boundaries of Catalan citizenship that had been more or less settled at the time 
of the transition. Second, the formidable variety of sending countries made the depth as 
well as breadth of immigration-induced diversity much greater than earlier, thus calling 
for a renewed approach to immigrant integration.   
 
This chapter critically examines the Generalitat’s boundary-making strategy in relation 
to immigrants between 2000 and 2010. It is divided into three sections: First, I 
scrutinize the developments of the citizenship agenda in Catalonia. I show how the 
initial reaction of the Catalan government has consisted in upgrading the rights of 
resident aliens, in a deliberate effort to challenge the central state in its own normative 
space and expand the boundaries of the Catalan political community to a new category 
of residents. But this aim has only been partially met, as the Catalan administration was 
being encouraged to counterbalance migrant rights with duties. In the second section, I 
review how the ‘Catalan way of integration’ has been gradually institutionalized. I 
successively examine efforts undertaken to expand the national boundary by actively 
seeking to diffuse the Catalan language among immigrants, to blur the boundary by 
promoting an intercultural approach to cultural diversity, and to contract the boundary 
in relation to Muslims, increasingly essentialized as a homogeneous group whose 
values cannot be reconciled with liberal democratic norms.   
 
Overall, the review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade corroborates the 
main hypothesis. Nationalists can use immigrant policies and institutions as a means to 
acquire further internal legitimacy and challenge the central state in its own normative 
space. However, the Catalan case is less-clear-cut than the Scottish one. In the last 
section, I discuss these findings in the light of the dimensions of the opportunity 
structure – the institutional context, historical heritage, and the party system – and 
conclude that the dynamics of party competition made the definition of a common 
territorial interest bringing together old and new Catalans more difficult than during the 
democratic transition.   
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7.1.  Catalan citizenship and the limits of expansion 
 
 
The 1979 Statute legally entrenched a conception of Catalan citizenship based on jus 
domicilii and deriving from state-wide nationality according to a clear hierarchy of legal 
norms. Article 6.1 states that “Spanish citizens, who, in accordance with Spanish law, 
are administrative residents of any municipality of Catalonia, will be considered as 
Catalans for political purpose.” This encompassing definition played a key role in the 
incorporation of internal migrants in the 1980s, as it allowed Catalan nation-builders to 
mitigate the salience of linguistic and ethnic boundaries by not distinguishing the rights 
and duties of natives and immigrants from other parts of the Spanish state. But the 
rising number of international migrants settling in Catalonia fell into a distinct legal 
category, defined in article 7.2 of the 1979 Statute, according to which resident aliens 
can only become Catalan citizens after they have been naturalized as Spanish citizens. 
This distinction is confirmed by article 149.2 of the 1978 Spanish constitution, which 
consecrates the central state’s exclusive power in matters of nationality and alien status. 
The insignificant proportion of resident aliens at the time of the transition meant that the 
question of their status in what was to become a highly decentralized state, explicitly if 
reluctantly acknowledging its national pluralism, was altogether ignored. But with the 
sudden and large influx of foreign nationals from the 1990s, the existing arrangement 
came under severe strain. As the Spanish government tried to adapt its legal framework 
to a new and rapidly evolving socio-demographic landscape, the regulation of the legal 
status of resident aliens became intertwined in the nationality question. In the Spanish 
context, it became the means through which the governments of the ‘historic 
nationalities’ sought to assert their authority over their territory and resident population. 
However, they did not do so by engaging in a race to the bottom, downgrading the 
rights of foreign nationals and contracting the membership boundary on ethnic lines. 
Instead, they consistently sought to challenge the central state in its own normative 
space, by locating their actions and discourses in a liberal democratic space and 
providing tangible evidence that their territorial claims would not undermine the rights 
of newcomers.  
 
In January 2000, the law 4/2000 on Aliens’ Rights and their Social Integration was 
passed in the Spanish Parliament – with the support of CiU, ICV, ERC and PSOE, 
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while PP abstained. Amid progressive circles, the initiative was celebrated as a 
significant step towards the recognition of Spain as a country of immigration and the 
emergence of a rights-based integration agenda. The most ambitious – and controversial 
– decision was to disconnect access to social rights from legal residence and extend it to 
undocumented migrants, provided they were registered on the local registry (thereafter 
padrón). It also enshrined immigrants’ civil rights to protest, form an association and 
strike independently of their legal status. But in the run-up to the 2000 legislative 
elections, immigration turned into an increasingly salient and polarizing issue (Perez 
Diaz et al. 2002: 87-103). Soon after its re-election with an absolute majority of seats, 
PP made good its campaign promise and revised the legislation, using the recently 
drafted Tampere Agreements and the need to comply with EU regulations as a pretext. 
The new legal framework drew a sharper line between undocumented and documented 
Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and limited foreign nationals’ access to housing 
benefits and post-obligatory education272. In Catalonia, the CiU-led Generalitat took this 
as an opportunity to mark its difference in a highly symbolic matter, and released a 
second Interdepartmental Plan (2001-2004) for immigration which went “against the 
grain of standard migration policy and differ[ed] greatly from the Immigration Law 
approved by the Spanish parliament - or more precisely the Popular Party 
steamroller.”273 While the 1993-2000 Plan coined the category of ‘foreign immigrants’ 
to distinguish them from ‘internal immigrants’, its successor now referred to ‘Catalans 
born outside of Catalonia’ and ‘Catalans from an immigrant background’ to dissipate 
any doubt as to the inclusiveness of the nation-building project. Meanwhile, the Catalan 
parliament adopted the decree 188/2001 on Aliens and their Integration in Catalonia, 
which went against some provisions of law 8/2000, by re-introducing aliens’ rights to 
housing benefits and post-obligatory education. But these dispositions were ruled out in 
2004 by the High Court of Justice of Catalonia, which considered the central state to be 
exclusively competent in determining aliens’ status, irrespective of their place of 
residence. Pablo Santolaya, a well-known professor of constitutional law legitimized 
this decision on the grounds that “despite the terminological difficulty implied in the 
expression ‘all Spaniards’ in these matters, there is in my view no other forms of 
conceiving citizenship but as a bundle of rights, and the state, any state for that matter, 
                                               
272. More importantly, the law 8/2000 limited the right to reunion and to form an association to legally resident aliens, 
although this disposition was ruled out by the Spanish Constitutional Court in November 2007 (STC236/2007).   
273. ‘Del muticulturalisme al interculturalisme’, Avui, March 20, 2001.  
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must be able to decide the degree of convergence between aliens and nationals, and 
consequently to determine basic standards of rights” (2007: 167). But in Catalonia, this 
decision was interpreted as creating an “incoherent situation whereby the government of 
the Generalitat must administer undesirable situations” in devolved policy areas, hence 
infringing upon its self-governing capacities (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 180). Jordi Pujol’s 
famous assertion that “everyone who lives and work in Catalonia is Catalan” seemed 
far-fetched now that a growing number of residents were subject to the legislation on 
alien status tightly regulated by the state.  
 
At the 2003 Catalan elections, the change of government after 23 years of CiU 
leadership marked a historic shift in Catalan politics. The left-wing coalition made up of 
PSC, ERC, and ICV (hereafter referred to as the Tripartite) profoundly renewed the 
Generalitat’s approach in matters of immigrant integration. The 2005-2008 Citizenship 
and Immigration Plan issued by the newly-established Immigration Secretariat now 
referred to immigrants as the ‘New Catalans’, and proposed “a new conception of 
citizenship moving towards the full recognition of the rights and duties of all Catalans, 
irrespective of their nationality or legal status […]. Accordingly, all residents shall be 
considered as citizens for an administrative purpose, a definition which is disconnected 
from nationality in its conventional sense.”274 In consequence, immigrants’ inscription 
on the local padrón constitutes “sufficient evidence of their willingness to settle down 
and become part of Catalan society.”275 Although the Plan recognized that the Catalan 
administration cannot expand foreign nationals’ political rights beyond the limits fixed 
by the state-wide legislation, it nonetheless created a category of practice that was 
incontestably more inclusive than the state-wide legal category. Since language is 
performative, it soon penetrated the fabric of public discourse. The Catalan section of 
the TV channel TV2 has been running a weekly show dedicated to the Nous Catalans 
since 2006, an idiom that is also widely used in the media and in the external 
communication of local and autonomous administrations. CiU incorporated it into its 
communication strategy, while American-style hyphenated identities of ‘Afro-Catalans’ 
and ‘Latino-Catalans’ have also gradually emerged276. Besides, Catalan parties and 
                                               
274. Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2005 – 2008, p. 33.  
275. Ibid., p. 50.  
276. In 2009, the CiU-funded website www.nouscatalans.cat was created within the framework of the Gran casa del 
Catalanisme, an initiative launched a few months earlier by the CiU leader Artur Mas to bring together all nationalist 
forces of the country, irrespective of their ideological inclinations.  
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institutions committed themselves to push for a massive regularization of undocumented 
migrants and to lobby the central government to grant all foreign residents the right to 
vote at local elections after 5 years of residence, as well as to liberalize the rules of 
acquisition of Spanish nationality.  
 
A similar disposition was adopted simultaneously in the Immigration Plan of the 
Basque government, in which citizenship was not only dissociated from nationality, but 
also from “any other identity considerations and exclusively acquired on the basis of 
residence.”277 By doing so, the Basque and Catalan administrations showed the same 
willingness to challenge the sovereignty of the central state and project themselves in a 
liberal and democratic space where the ‘right to have rights’ is not the privilege of those 
sharing common descent, but is extended to all individuals living within their 
jurisdiction. However, their approach also differs in a fundamental way. In Catalonia, it 
was based on the questionable premise that immigrants, through the simple act of 
registering on the local padrón, manifest their will to become part of the Catalan 
political community. Hence, the extension of rights is grounded in a voluntary 
commitment to join the nation à la Renan, and is thus derived from national 
membership. By contrast, the Basque Plan makes no reference to the ‘New Basques’, 
and legitimates its decision on the basis of “an extensive recognition of human rights” 
and “the human dignity of all persons”, thereby embracing a discourse that is much 
closer to post-national membership à la Soysal, whereby rights are derived from 
universal personhood and truly disconnected from nationality.  
 
7.1.1. The Vic controversy 
 
 
As with earlier potentially divisive issues related to internal migrants, political elites 
have consistently sought to “work with political and social consensus on actions and 
measures dealing with immigration.”278 All political parties from right and left – apart 
from the PPC and Ciutadans – have participated in and contributed to the consultation 
process that preceded the release of successive policy Plans and collectively agreed 
                                               
277. Basque Immigration Plan 2003 – 2005. The government explicitly stated that its approach marks a clear shift 
from earlier experiences with internal migrants. As the Head of the Immigration Department of the Basque 
Government, Omer Oke, argued in 2002, the main aim of his Department has been “to approach the phenomenon of 
immigration with a totally different attitude and style to that shown in the past, basing our actions on the respect and 
recognition due to individuals and their particular situations” (quoted in Ibarrola-Armendariz 2009: 237).  
278. Resolution on the Policy of Foreign Immigration, adopted by the Catalan Parliament in 2001.  
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upon their terms and conditions. This strategy, which culminated with the publication of 
the National Pact for Immigration released in 2008, presented at least two advantages. 
First, by maintaining close contacts and a broad coalition cutting across the ideological 
cleavage, Catalanist parties could present PPC as working against the territorial interest. 
Second, by agreeing not to use immigration as an electoral device, they believed the 
issue could be kept apart from party politics. However, cracks in the consensus 
gradually appeared, and the well-known Catalan tradition of pactisme and consensus-
building found its limits in the multiplication of anti-immigrant protests at local level 
which turned immigration into an increasingly salient and polarizing issue.  
 
The law 2000/4 made access to social services conditional upon registration to the local 
padrón, irrespective of individuals’ legal status. But in 2003, the decision was taken to 
authorize the services of the Ministry of the Interior to consult local registries in order to 
facilitate the central government’s energetic commitment to fight illegal immigration. 
The reform was initiated by the PP parliamentary group and passed with the support of 
PSOE. However, the new disposition contradicted the rationale of the previous 
legislation, which was meant to avoid a situation whereby local administrations would 
be unable to effectively evaluate the size of the resident population and be forced to 
actively participate in the ‘clandestine hunt’ officially pursued by the state (Sala 2005). 
The law 4/2000 should not be interpreted only as a means to foster integration, but also 
as a pragmatic response to the exceptionally high proportion of irregular immigrants de 
facto residing and working in Spain, a direct consequence of the 'cheap model' of 
immigration policies discussed in Chapter IV. In this light, the Spanish legislation on 
alien status can be interpreted as a balancing act between the awareness that expelling 
all irregular immigrants is neither feasible nor desirable, and the electoral need to take 
into account public preferences. In practice, the new disposition was never enforced279, 
although the confusing legal framework has meant that the rules of registration have 
varied considerably from one locality to another280. By employing the idiom of 
                                               
279 . In 2004, the Ministry of the Interior ordered 74.467 expulsions of illegal immigrants and communicated 
extensively on this figure. However, less than 20,000 were actually carried out. In 2003, 53,778 expulsions were 
ordered and 14,404 actually carried out (Kleiner-Liebau 2009: 91) 
280. As stated in the resolution 21-07-01 issued by the Ministry of the Presidency and in accordance with article 18.2. 
of the Local Regime Legislation,  local authorities cannot  intervene in the delivery of residency permits, and do not 
have the competence to control whether residents reside legally or not on Spanish territory. Yet, According to a study 
carried out by the provincial authorities of Barcelona in 2001, 90 municipalities out of a total of 121 required foreign 
applicants to show their residency permit prior to registration. For a more extensive discussion of this disposition, see 
Lurbe y Puerto 2005, pp. 291-93.   
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citizenship irrespective of immigrant status, the Catalan government sought to turn an 
unpopular decision, driven by pragmatic considerations and hidden from public 
scrutiny, into a political stance.  
 
Bearing in mind that evaluating the number of irregular migrants residing in Catalonia 
is no easy task, Colectivo IoE (2008b: 27) estimated that there were 226,491 to be 
registered locally in January 2008 against 329,678 a year earlier, amounting to 22% of 
the total number of foreign nationals who settled in Catalonia since 2000. The 
Generalitat’s commitment to lobbying the central state to “regularize all undocumented 
migrants through social and work-related rules in an efficient and flexible way”,281 lost 
credibility in January 2010 when the city of Vic hit the headlines of virtually all the 
newspapers in the country, an unusual attention for a town in the Catalan hinterlands 
with a mere 40,000 inhabitants. The day before, the Municipal Council decided to 
modify the rules of inscription to the local padrón, so that undocumented migrants 
could no longer register, and were thus deprived of basic social rights282. Hence, the 
vibrantly celebrated notion of residential citizenship was not challenged from the top by 
a central administration eager to reassert its sovereignty, but from the bottom by a very 
Catalan locality. Vic is emblematic of the contradictions, difficulties, and ultimately the 
limits of the Generalitat approach to immigrant integration. In the 1980s, it was one of 
the few cities controlled by a CiU majority which, in spite of its supremacy in rural 
areas, was unable to challenge the PSC in its urban strongholds. In 1983, Vic was 
defined by its CiU Mayor as “the Capital of Catalan Catalonia”, and “became the 
guiding light of the rural vision that CiU, unaccustomed to governing the Generalitat, 
cultivated in the first years of government” (Macià 1998: 32).  In 2009, 23% of its 
residents were non-Spanish citizens, mainly coming from Morocco. The city, which in 
2007 pioneered the introduction of the Aula de Accollida in education centres,283 was 
regularly praised as a laboratory of progressive integration policies (Noguer 2007). But 
it also hosts the headquarters of Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), a radical right wing 
party created in 2002 which defines itself as “an independent Catalan party focused on 
citizen’s security, the control of immigration, and common sense.”284 PxC, which to date 
has carefully avoided positioning itself along the centre-periphery axis, made its first 
                                               
281. Pla de ciutadania I immigracio 2005-2008.  
282. ‘El linchamiento de Vic’ in La Vanguardia, January 20, 2010.  
283. See section 7.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of the Aula de Accollida.  
284. www.pxcatalunya.com, [accessed on November 12, 2010], my emphasis. 
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breakthrough in Vic in 2003 and obtained 18.5% of the votes at the 2007 local elections. 
A cordon sanitaire was soon erected around it, and PSC, CIU and ERC formed a 
Catalanist municipal coalition in a desperate attempt to contain its influence.285 But they 
nonetheless felt compelled to incorporate some of its propositions, and their decision to 
prohibit irregular migrants from registering on the local padrón marked a watershed in 
the Generalitat’s vision of an all-inclusive citizenship.  
 
The central government immediately stepped in, arguing that localities had the duty to 
register all their residents irrespective of their legal status. Prime Minister Zapatero, 
who had just  taken the chair of  the rotating EU presidency, declared in the European 
Parliament: “We shall not accept that, because of a city hall trick, human beings find 
themselves without assistance or unable to attend school (…). We will not let them 
downgrade the rights of immigrants.”286 The Generalitat timidly condemned the 
initiative and the Vic Council regulation was withdrawn, but Catalonia was for a time 
perceived as the main bastion of xenophobia in Spain. This was especially so as CiU in 
opposition supported the municipality’s decision, and accused the central state of failing 
to take into account legitimate claims. 
 
7.1.2. The Llei de acollida 
 
 
The multiplication of incidents at local level provided incentives for the Generalitat to 
renew its strategy. As late as 2008, “all Catalan administrations [were] committed to 
promote the extension of rights to everyone living in Catalonia.”287 But in May 2010, 
the Catalan Parliament approved the Llei d’Acollida de les persones immigrades I de les 
retornades a Catalunya (literally Reception Law for immigrants and returnees), as 
reception policies figured among the migration-related competences that were sought 
and gained in the New Statute288. Unlike previous plans the scope of which was limited 
                                               
285. This is reminiscent of the first local breakthrough of the Front National in the French city of Dreux, although the 
initial reaction of the mainstream right RPR-UDF was to integrate four FN representatives into their list for the 
second ballot. For David Art the introduction of a cordon sanitaire prohibiting alliances at local level came too late to 
contain the phenomenon, which became a defining feature of French local politics throughout the 1990s. (David Art, 
forthcoming).  
286. Prime Minister Zapatero, quoted in El País, ‘Zapatero advierte que no se permitirá trucos para dejar a 
inmigrantes sin escuela o sanidad’, January 20, 2010.  
287. Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2009-2011.  
288. See article 138 on immigration, 2006 Statute of Catalonia: the Generalitat has exclusive power over a) the initial 
reception of immigrants, which includes socio-sanitary attention and guidance; b) the development of integration 
policy for immigrants in the framework of its powers; c) the establishment and regulation of the required measures 
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to the administrative and political realms, the Llei de Acollida was legally-binding and 
articulated the relationship between the Generalitat and foreign residents in a much less 
impressionistic way. It officially aimed to promote the autonomy and equal 
opportunities of immigrants and returnees by removing the obstacles to their integration, 
identified by the legislator as “the lack of linguistic competencies and the lack of 
knowledge of the host society and its administrative organization.”289  
 
The reform symbolizes the shift away from a fairly liberal and expansive approach to 
another emphasizing conditionality and introducing integration requirements. The 
Generalitat is now in charge of issuing an individual report accrediting applicants’ 
“integration efforts” for the attribution or the renovation of a residency permit. The 
regularisación por arraigo290 shall be attributed not only on the basis of the length of 
residence and labour-related and/or family considerations, but also of the applicant’s 
completion of “work-related and cultural training programmes.”291 The report should 
also be taken into consideration in the procedure of residency-based naturalization. 
Although the exact terms are still to be elaborated, the National Pact for Immigration 
suggests that this could be made conditional upon the applicant ‘s basic knowledge of 
the Catalan language and attendance at the classes that were agreed upon with the 
reception services. A similar conditionality clause has been introduced in regard to 
resident aliens’ political rights. Originally, all Catalan parties except PPC committed to 
pressure the central government to reform the existing legal framework by advocating 
change in the current legislation, so that an immigrant could be entitled to vote at local 
elections after 5 years of permanent residence. But these changes did not come to 
fruition, and there is scarce evidence that Catalan parties actually intended to translate 
their promises into actions. Chiefly, CiU reconsidered its position and proposed instead 
that the right to vote should be conditional upon the status of permanent residence and 
an accreditation delivered by the Generalitat confirming the “applicant’s integration 
efforts.”292 In a similar vein, The Tripartite coalition was in favour of including in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
for social and economic integration of immigrants and for their social participation and d) the Establishment by law 
of a referential framework for the reception and integration of immigrants. 
289. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat deCatalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida de les persones 
immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya..  
290. Since 2000 (Law 4/2000) irregular migrants can be regularized if they can justify that they have been living for at 
least three years in Spain, have a work contract, or have meaningful social ties established in Spain.  
291. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat deCatalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida de les persones 
immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya..  
292. Internal party document, CiU Argumentari ! El Perquè de la signatura de CiU del Pacte Nacional de Immigracio, 
January 26, 2009.  
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National Pact the right of TCNs to join the Catalan civil service, but again this 
disposition was opposed by CIU.  
 
These developments are in tune with the European-wide trend of pursuing “liberal aims 
through illiberal means” by shifting the burden of integration from the administration to 
the migrant him/herself (Joppke 2007). By contrast with most Western European 
governments who have consistently incorporated their integration agenda into the 
regulation of immigrants’ legal status and naturalization (Guild et al. 2009), the Spanish 
government has only timidly started to do so. Catalan nationalists are well-prepared to 
negotiate far-reaching autonomy to impose their own conditions, and make sure that the 
Spanish “path to citizenship” that will eventually be introduced will reflect its national 
pluralism. When compared with recent developments in the rest of Europe, the Catalan 
approach remains fairly liberal, not least because all classes provided by the Generalitat 
are free and – at least for the time being – not compulsory. Besides, PPC's proposition 
of evaluating integration efforts through a formalized test has not been included, and all 
other political parties have agreed that attending classes was sufficient. This however is 
already far more demanding than earlier claims that the simple act of registering on the 
padrón constituted evidence enough of immigrants’ willingness to become Catalans.  
 
7.1.3.  The anti-immigrant vote and the vote of immigrants 
 
 
The early reaction of the Generalitat closely followed the pre-established path of 
defining membership on the basis of residency. In the remainder of this section, I argue 
that the relative failure of this strategy is a consequence of the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of resident aliens have not been entitled to vote. This is 
especially detrimental at municipal elections, as it provides local elites with incentives 
to compete for the anti-immigrant vote, as opposed to the vote of immigrants. 
  
The table below indicates the rate of naturalization in Catalonia over the past seven 
years. Again, these figures show how the frequency of naturalization has remained 
slight when compared with the number of foreign nationals inhabiting the territory, 
estimated at 16.4% of the resident population in July 2010. Besides, they obscure the 
fact that the frequency of naturalization for individuals who do not fall into any of the 
 215 
 
special categories is to date insignificant. Hence, while close to 20,000 foreign residents 
acquired Spanish nationality in 2009, there were less than 3,000 Moroccan nationals, 
although they constitute by far the largest collective in Catalonia293. 
 
 
Table 10: Number of acquisitions of Spanish nationality in Catalonia (2003-2009) 
 
Year Numbers 
2003 6,152 
2004 10,153 
2005 9,314 
2006 11,335 
2007 16,809 
2008 19,806 
2009 19,604 
Total 93,173 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2011 
 
 
On January 1st 2008, the proportion of immigrants registered on the local padrón 
represented 26.4% of the resident population in Alt Empordá, a majority of them being 
Moroccan nationals, 21.4% in Baix Empordá, 20% in Girona and 18.7% in Tarragona, 
to name just a few294. The small town of Guissona, located in the province of Lleida, is 
the first municipality where the number of foreigners registered on the electoral padrón 
exceeds that of Spanish citizens. Hence, the restrictive legislation on nationality, 
combined with the extraordinary suddenness of international settlements in Spain, 
create a situation whereby a significant proportion of the resident population is not 
entitled to vote at local elections. On the other hand, the autochthonous population, 
concerned with potential strains on public services and the rapid transformation of their 
immediate surroundings in a receding economic context, may turn to PxC, or at least 
expect their local leaders to adopt a tougher stance. Consequently, the latter, irrespective 
                                               
293. Secretaria de Inmigracion y Emigracion, estadisticas, 2010. 
294. The figures for all Comarcas are available in the first issue of the Immigration Newsletter published by the 
Immigration Secretariat of the Generalitat and entitled Distribució territorial I diversitat comarcal, June 2009.  These 
figures refer to comarcas, not localities.   
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of their ideological inclinations, have a clear interest in seeking to attract the anti-
immigrant vote as opposed to the vote of immigrants. However, the situation may 
gradually be evolving and having an impact upon party strategy as the number of 
naturalized citizens and foreign residents entitled to vote is expected to grow sharply in 
the immediate future. According to the Immigration Secretary of the Generalitat, the 
number of registered voters of non-Spanish origins who have been naturalized has 
reached 150,000295 in 2010, representing about 3% of the total electorate. Besides, the 
high concentration of immigrants in certain electoral districts suggests that their vote 
may be decisive in key constituencies. At the latest round of local elections in May 
2011, the number of TCNs and European citizens entitled to vote rose to 338,000296, 
amounting to 6,1% of the Catalan electorate297.  The political behaviour of these new 
voters has to date not been systematically studied, although pundits have suggested that 
they would be more inclined to vote for parties on the left, and the PSC in particular. 
This would see the continuation of a long-standing pattern in Catalonia whereby 
immigrants tend to vote for PSC, although CiU and to a lesser extent ERC have made 
some significant inroads into the vote of second generation immigrants (M.J. Hierro 
2006).  
 
7.2. A ‘Catalan way of integration’?   
 
 
The emergence of an integration agenda in Catalonia can be traced back to the release 
of the informe de Girona in 1992, a civil society initiative that greatly informed 
subsequent political practices. In 1991, the PSOE-led Spanish government proceeded to 
an unprecedented regularization of foreign workers. Catalonia turned out to be the main 
recipient of international flows among Spain’s seventeen ACs, while Madrid ranked 
second and the rest of the territory remained largely unaffected until the second half of 
the decade298. In Girona, the cooperation between local politicians, immigrant 
                                               
295. This estimate includes foreign nationals who were naturalized elsewhere in Spain and then moved to Catalonia.  
296. This includes i) non-Spanish citizens, residing legally in Spain for at least 3 years, (only 2 in the case of Norway), 
and who are nationals of countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral agreement: Colombia, Ecuador, Norway, 
New Zealand, Peru and Chile. Similar agreements have recently been signed with Bolivia and Iceland, although the 
Bill has to date not been published and ii) EU citizen residents.   
297. Departament de Benestar Social I Familia, Actualitat published on November 30, 2010.  
298. ‘600,000 extranjeros regularizaron su situación en seis procesos extraordinarios entre 1991 y 2001’, El Mundo, 
June 2, 2005.  
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associations and academics proved exceptionally fruitful and led to the publication of a 
report comprising 50 propositions meant to “facilitate and strengthen immigrant 
integration.”299 The report found a significant echo in Catalonia and prompted the 
publication of a policy Plan – the first of its kind in Spain – and the creation of a 
commission whose purpose was to coordinate the initiatives taken by different 
departments of the Catalan government in the realm of integration. But while the 
Spanish government comprehended the phenomenon as a strictly administrative matter, 
the Generalitat immediately saw it through a nationalist lens, explicitly envisaging 
immigrant “participation in the national construction of Catalonia”, and their 
“contribution to the Catalan identity and patrimony”300 as long-term objectives. Yet the 
issue receded from the political agenda until it re-emerged with renewed vigour at the 
turn of the century. The year 2000 marked a critical juncture, as the number of 
immigrants coming from abroad exceeded for the first time the number of immigrants 
coming from the rest of Spain (Cabré et al. 2007: 115). For Jordi Pujol, Catalonia now 
found itself, once again in its history, facing “the great challenge of immigration”, 
which required all Catalanist forces to agree upon a ‘national model of integration’: 
“The Americans do have a doctrine […] based on the promise of progress, a vision 
towards the future, the philosophy of borders and open society, the American pride. The 
French as well have a doctrine. I don’t know whether it is a good or bad one […], my 
purpose here is not to defend the French model, but to highlight the fact that we too 
must have a doctrine.”301  
 
The tenets of the ‘Catalan Way of Integration’ were spelled out for the first time in the 
second Pla Interdepartamental de integració covering the period 2001 – 2004. In the 
words of Artur Mas, the designated successor of Jordi Pujol and then Conseller en Cap 
of the Generalitat, “one of the principal novelties of this plan is to articulate a Catalan 
way of integration, seeking to find an optimal balance between respect for diversity and 
the feeling of belonging to a single community. This model is based on the need for 
immigrants to respect the democratic convivencia, the Catalan language and culture that 
developed across centuries and were successively enriched by external elements, while 
simultaneously respecting immigrants’ own origins and identities.”302 But apart from 
                                               
299. Informe de Girona, p. 1. The text is available in La Factoria, June-September 2002, number 18.  
300. Preamble of the Pla Interdepartmental de immigracio 1993 – 2000.  
301. Jordi Pujol, ‘Ante el gran reto de la inmigracion’, 2000. 
302. Pla interdepartamental de Integració 2001-2004, p.7. 
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heated discussions about the formal distribution of competencies and symbolic 
references to an idealized past, the CiU government showed little political will to build 
an institutional apparatus able to coherently bring together the different fields of 
integration-related public policies. The election of the Tripartite in 2003 introduced a 
great deal of fresh thinking to the policy-making process. It was accompanied by the 
creation of ambitious institutions specifically dedicated to immigrant integration and 
endowed with considerable resources. In 2003, the immigration dossier went from the 
Department of the Presidency to the Department of Families and Welfare, a clear 
indication of the social approach embraced by the new government. The victory of CiU 
at the latest autonomous elections in November 2010 has not led to a major 
organizational change. Although the Immigration Secretariat took the name of the 
General Office for Immigration for strictly political reasons, it is still cast within the 
Department of Families and Welfare and retained the essential features formerly 
established by the Tripartite. Speaking of a fully-fledged Catalan model of immigrant 
integration would be misleading. However, three guiding principles orienting public 
policy-making can be identified, and will be successively discussed in the remainder of 
this section: the linguistic controversy; interculturalism; and compliance with European 
norms.  
 
7.2.1. Reframing the linguistic controversy 
 
 
During the Pujol years, the Generalitat legitimized its linguistic policy by presenting the 
language as an essential component of the Catalan identity, victim of an attempt at 
‘cultural genocide’303 during the Franco era and facing a real threat to its survival over 
subsequent generations. The belief that the language constitutes an essential determinant 
of the national personality finds its roots in the early years of the Conservative strand of 
Catalan nationalism, when cultural and political claims were closely intertwined (Vilar 
1976: 62-8). As early as 1906, Enric Prat de la Riba304 proclaimed that “the language is 
the nationality”, as “peoples who have reacted against their absorption by others, who 
have felt the need to affirm their individuality, to proclaim their personality, have clung 
                                               
303. The expression was popularized in the Catalan context by Josep Benet, 1995.  
304. Enric Prat de la Riba is considered to be one of the fathers of Catalan nationalism. He conceived of the Catalan 
nationality in primordial and essential terms, partly as a result of his proximity with the romantic writers of the 
Renaixença. He belonged to the Catalan bourgeoisie, and was the leader of the Lliga Regionalista. He presided over 
the Mancomunitat from 1914 until his death in 1917 (See Chapter 4).   
 219 
 
to their linguistic unity as the fundamental and salutary principle of their right.” 305 
Almost a century later, Jordi Pujol gave his own interpretation in no less romantic 
terms: “The identity of Catalonia is first and foremost a linguistic and cultural one. Our 
claims have never been ethnic, religious, based on geographic considerations, or strictly 
political. There are many elements making up our identity, but language and culture are 
its backbone.”306 Unsurprisingly, the initial reaction was to make sure that the New 
Catalans would not damage the country’s vital organ but join the community of Catalan 
speakers. In another speech, Jordi Pujol explained how immigrants constituted a danger 
to the preservation of the language, shedding light on the Generalitat’s balancing act 
between rights and duties: “The other day, an Argentinean immigrant got upset when he 
heard that his son had to learn Catalan at school. However, this is our right and our law. 
And I believe we have to say these things clearly. He then told me: ‘Right now, I am in 
Barcelona, but within a few years I might go to Madrid or Saragossa. Then what would 
my kid have learnt Catalan for?’ And me to answer: ‘you have the same rights as us in 
matters of health, education, labour… But you also have the same duties with regards to 
language…’”307  Hence, the linguistic boundary, established as a significant marker of 
Catalan identity since the democratic transition, remained the focal point of attention. In 
the 1980s and 1990s the Generalitat’s strategy of linguistic normalization targeted ‘non-
Catalan-speaking pupils’ through the Service of Catalan Instruction (hereafter SEDEC), 
notoriously known as the cultural arm of CiU (Palandrious 2006). In 1997, the rising 
number of non-Spanish pupils joining the school system in the middle of the academic 
year prompted the creation of the Programme of Later Incorporation, monitored and 
managed by the SEDEC. Children falling into this category were redirected to the 
Classes of Academic Adaptation (hereafter TAE). Their purpose was to create a parallel 
education system, where pupils could spend up to 20 hours a week with 50% dedicated 
to intensive Catalan classes, until they acquired a level of Catalan deemed sufficient to 
be incorporated into the mainstream school system.  
 
After 2003, the Tripartite sought to renew this approach. In particular, the PSC was 
given the opportunity to dissociate the Catalan language from national identity and shift 
the frame from an intrinsic to an instrumental conception of language. To be sure, the 
                                               
305. Enric Prat de la Riba, 1985: 667, my emphasis.  
306. Jordi Pujol, ‘Que representa la llengua a Catalunya’, 1996, my emphasis.   
307. Jordi Pujol, ‘Ante el gran reto de la inmigracion’, 2000.   
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aim of overcoming “the risk of accommodation to the State language and identity and 
make Catalan into the vehicular language of immigrants”308 was reasserted at least as 
vigorously by the Tripartite. However, unlike earlier policy documents which placed 
emphasis on the cultural and identity dimensions of language, successive Plans from 
2003 onwards have presented the role of language in terms of “social cohesion in a 
multilingual society”309, and “socio-economic integration and mobility”310 for 
individual migrants (Pujolar 2009). Between 1980 and 2003, language planning and 
policy came under the remit of the Departament de Cultura. One of the first actions 
taken by the Tripartite when it came to power was to transfer these functions to the 
Departament de la Presidencia, as “a direct response to what they saw as an unhealthy 
link between language and culture that had become institutionalized during the previous 
twenty-three years” (Crameri 2008: 74). In 2004, the TAE was replaced by the much 
more ambitious programme de Taula de Acollida (literally hospitality rooms), no longer 
exclusively run by the SEDEC but co-administered by the newly created Service of 
Interculturalism and Social Cohesion and specifically targeting non-Spanish pupils. 
While in 2002 there were merely 39 TAE in all four provinces, 643 hospitality rooms 
were initially set up in 2003, and their number rose to 1081 in 2005, and 1234 in 
2008311. In addition to the objective of establishing a homogeneous network covering 
the entire territory, this sharp increase was also a consequence of the growing number of 
non-Spanish pupils enrolled in Catalan-schools, from 2.5% in 2002 to 13.7% in 2008. 
All hospitality rooms have been located within the premises of existing schools and 
pupils cannot spend more than 12 hours a week segregated from their fellow students. 
Hence, the Catalanist consensus around the need to pursue the “normalization of the 
Catalan language” has remained, and immigrants have been used as a means to expand 
it. The 2010 Llei de Acollida justifies the exclusive use of Catalan on the ground that 
“the first image, the first contact, the first relationships condition the newcomer’s vision 
of the place in which he arrived.”312 However, Catalan is no longer presented as a mark 
                                               
308. Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2009-2012, Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 65.  
309. Pla per a la llengua I la Cohesio Social, Departament de Educacio, 2008, 5. 
310. For example, in the Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2005-2008 (p. 138) Catalan is exclusively presented as  “a 
language of opportunity”, which is no longer the vehicle through which Catalan identity acquired its unique 
character, but rather a medium maximizing individual autonomy and upward social mobility. See also Consolidar la 
Cohesio Social, l’Educacio Intercultural i la Llengua Catalana, Caixa d’Eines. Report prepared by Xavier Besalu 
and Ignasi Vila, 2008.  
311. Pla per a la llengua i la cohesio social, 2008: 6. By 2008, 14% of pupils enrolled in public schools and 4% in 
private schools were non-Spanish citizens.  
312. Pla de Ciutadania i Immigracio 2009-2011, p. 145.  
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of achieved status and full membership in the national community, but as the “common 
language for immigrant integration and social mobility.”313  
 
The shift from an intrinsic to an instrumental conception of language serves at least 
three purposes. First, while Catalan nationalists could reasonably associate the language 
with the democratic impulse and thirst for freedom of the pre-transition period, as 
opposed to the ‘language of the state’, the situation has dramatically changed. Indeed, 
institutional pressure for diffusing the knowledge and use of Catalan, the ‘language of 
the Generalitat’, have grown. Second, unlike internal migrants who shared with natives 
the experience of the dictatorship and settled permanently in Catalonia, today’s ‘trans-
migrants’ are mainly driven by the lure of opportunity and more likely to move 
according to shifting economic circumstances. They are in any case less receptive to the 
past-oriented nationalist discourse that keeps commemorating the 1714 fall of Barcelona 
and subsequent suppression of the Catalan language on the national day. Nevertheless, 
they are at least as concerned as their predecessors with upward social mobility and 
equal opportunity, whether for them or their children. In consequence, some of them 
will eventually cross the linguistic boundary in order to benefit from the ‘Catalan 
premium’, whereby the probability of being employed increases between 3 and 5 
percentage points if individuals know how to speak and read Catalan (Rendon 2005).  
Last but not least, decoupling the language from the militant and ethnic overtones to 
which it was closely associated brings it closer to liberal norms. From this perspective, 
linguistic policies and discourses directed at immigrants are indeed used as an 
instrument of boundary-making, but one of a particular kind, as it aims to blur ethnic 
boundaries within the homeland by uniting a linguistically diverse population around a 
common medium of communication. 
 
However, this strategy did not go unchallenged. The role of systematic opposition to the 
Generalitat’s linguistic policy were distributed among the usual suspects: the PPC 
opposed the Llei de Acollida because of the priority given to Catalan. For the PPC MP 
spokesperson in matters of immigration, addressing immigrants in Catalan is like 
“imposing upon them a toll”, and making a “fool out of them”314 while the PPC leader 
                                               
313. Press release of the Generalitat, ‘El Parlament aprova la llei d’acollida de les persones immigrades i les 
retornades a Catalunya’, April 28, 2010.  
314. ‘El PP i el grup mixt s’oposen a la prioritat des català com a llengue vehicular de la llei d’acollida’ in El Punt 
Avui, October 10, 2009.  
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saw it as a means to “turn immigrants into nationalists.”315 As in the 1990s, the party 
was assisted in its crusade by right-wing newspapers, for whom “[The Catalan linguistic 
policy] strikingly illustrates the way in which the Catalan nation-building project runs 
against citizens’ real interests and necessities. By requiring immigrants to speak 
Catalan, Catalan nationalists put an extra-burden on a population already facing the 
challenge of integrating into a new country...”316  
But the PPC failed to get the support of immigrant representatives. An important reason 
for this is the fact that the Tripartite skilfully used its time in office to consolidate a 
network of publically funded immigrant associations whose leaders enjoy privileged 
access to the policy-making process. Successive Plans from 2003 onwards were the 
result of a vast consultation, in which stakeholders and representatives from civil 
society were actively encouraged to participate. This was formalized in 2008 with the 
creation of the Taula de Ciudadania de Immigracio – substituting itself to the former 
and considerably weaker Consell assessor de la immigracio. This enabled the 
Generalitat to create a network of Catalan-specific organizations, loosely connected to 
similar entities operating in other parts of the state and bringing legitimacy to the 
devolved administration’s actions in the realm of immigrant integration.  
In July 2010, the defensor del pueblo – the highest jurisdiction in Catalonia – brought 
the recently-voted Llei de Acollida to the Constitutional Court on the ground that the 
exclusive use of Catalan put an extra burden on immigrants wishing to relocate in 
another part of the state. The Taula de Ciudadania, with the support of all its members, 
immediately took “the defence of the Catalan language and the decisions democratically 
undertaken in Catalonia, in the name of the esteem and sense of compromise towards 
their host country”317 in a letter made public.  Hence, by co-opting immigrants’ 
representatives into its own structures, the Generalitat found a powerful ally to 
legitimize its linguistic normalization strategy. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
315. Interview with Alicia Sanchez-Camacho: ‘Los votos de los residentes en el exterior pueden contribuir a un 
cambio en la forma de hacer política en Cataluña’, in España Exterior, October 19, 2010.  
316. ‘Competencias sobre inmigración al servicio de un proyecto de construcción nacional’ in El Mundo, February 
13, 2006, my emphasis.  
317. The letter is available on the website of the Generalitat, http://premsa.gencat.cat, [accessed on January 4, 2011].  
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7.2.2. Interculturalism: a convenient middle-ground 
 
 
The analogy with internal immigrants found its limit in the increasing awareness that 
“although much of the current processes find their origins in the past, they exhibit a 
number of new elements: of particular significance in the demographic dynamic is the 
strengthening of a new immigration coming from foreign countries.”318 As a result, the 
integration agenda gradually gravitated around the perceived need to ‘manage cultural 
diversity’ in a society perceived as much more plural than in the past. 
 
 
Table 11: Main foreign nationalities residing in Catalonia (January 1st 2010) 
 
Nationality Population % of total foreign population 
Moroccan 243,691 19.6% 
Romanian 99,879 8.0% 
Ecuadorian 78,765 6.3% 
Bolivian 57,864 4.7% 
Italian 50,295 4.1% 
Colombian 49,750 4.0% 
Chinese 48,818 3.9% 
Pakistani 41,092 3.3% 
French 35,030 2.9% 
Peruvian 35,802 2.9% 
             
Source: IDESCAT, 2010. 
 
 
The term ‘Interculturalism’ officially appeared in policy documents soon after the 
Tripartite took office, a clear indication of the impact of parties and their ideological 
inclinations in immigrant-related public policy-making. The genesis of the term itself is 
hard to track down. It has appeared in Spanish policy documents since the early-1990s, 
when the need to find innovative ways to integrate Gypsy pupils into the school system 
became more pressing (Calvet et al 2008). The intercultural approach in relation to 
                                               
318. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat deCatalunya, Núm. 5629 – 14.05.2010, Llei d’acollida  de les persones 
immigrades i de les retornades a Catalunya. 
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immigrants has also been promoted at state-wide level, a large section of the state-wide 
Plan de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007-2010 being exclusively dedicated to it. In the 
Catalan context, it seems that the concept was imported from Québec where it has 
become the official doctrine of immigrant integration since 1993. Indeed, the Canadian 
province has long been a key source of inspiration for Catalan policy-makers who 
communicate extensively with their opposite peers across the Atlantic through official 
and informal channels. On the other hand, what is actually meant by ‘Interculturalism’ 
is equally hard to pin down. It is successively defined as “a behaviour based on empathy 
and mutual discovery”319, an approach “based on equality, solidarity and respect for 
cultural diversity in a context of dialogue and convivencia,”320, or a “doctrine aiming at 
constructing an open and more democratic model of society, respectful of minority 
rights.”321 Policy-makers and stakeholders themselves are most often unsure about the 
exact meaning of the term and its actual implications. However, they see it as a 
convenient middle-ground between a caricatured version of ‘British multiculturalism’ 
and ‘French Republicanism’, both perceived as having failed.322 Hence, the Generalitat 
sought to navigate within these broad and ill-defined parameters. This, however, had 
significant implications for policy-making. On the assimilationist side, the Generalitat 
proved particularly reluctant to categorize the population on ethnic lines. Successive 
policy plans explicitly dismissed “the categorization of the population on ethnic or 
cultural lines” and encouraged the 'New Catalans’ incorporation and participation into 
the associations, political organizations, corporate and trade unions, avoiding the 
constitution of parallel networks.”323 Be they Catalans or Gallegos, Basques or 
Murcians, Spaniards have inherited from the Franco era the kind of scepticism and 
defiance towards the state commonly observed in post-authoritarian societies 
(Encarnacion 2004). Besides, in Catalonia, the memory of the Lerrouxist peril has left a 
deep scar and is to this date regularly evoked, mainly with the express aim of 
denouncing inflated attempts by the PPC to exacerbate linguistic and ethnic divisions in 
the homeland.  
 
                                               
319. Pla de Ciudadania i Immigracio 2009 – 2012.  
320. Pla per la Llengua e la Cohesio Social, Departament d’Educacio de la Generalitat, 2005: 5. 
321. Ibid. p. 12.  
322. A similar willingness has been observed in Italy. The Commissione per le politiche di integrazione degli 
immigrati issued a report in 2000 stating that the terms of “reasonable integration” should be “less assimilationist 
than the French model and less multiculturalist than the British one.” (Roux et al. 2009: 9) 
323. Pla de Ciudadania i Immigracio 2009 – 2012, art. 12.2, p. 25.  
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On the other hand, the Generalitat has not been dogmatic. For instance, most immigrant 
associations selected as members of the Taula de Ciutadania are organized on national 
rather than on functional lines. Hence, the powerful Fede Latina, notorious for its 
proximity with PSC, claims to speak on behalf of Latin Americans and is itself sub-
divided into sections representing different countries of the area. The association Ibn 
Batuta is to a great extent considered as the voice of Moroccans while the Romanian 
association of Catalonia can reasonably claim to represent the interests of Romanian 
nationals. To be sure, the Taula also comprises institutions the purpose of which goes 
beyond defending the interests of a single community, SOS racisme being perhaps the 
best example. This balancing act is also visible within parties. The PSC rapidly 
transformed its organizational structure to expand its traditional grip over internal 
immigrants to international immigrants by creating internal branches targeting 
distinctive groups. The xarxa Latina was created as early as 2005, followed by the 
Arabic, African and Romanian equivalents. By contrast, internal organization of the 
CiU does not separate immigrants according to their geographical area of origin, 
clinging to the more traditional view that immigrants should integrate into the web of 
existing organizations and institutions, as opposed to parallel ones. Besides, while PSC 
sees no inconvenience in addressing immigrants in Castilian or even their native 
languages – thus breaching the rule of linguistic immersion – immigration-related 
events organized by CiU are consistently held in Catalan. On the multiculturalist side, 
significant efforts have been undertaken to train intercultural mediators, appoint 
representatives to administrative boards, involve immigrant associations in the policy-
making process and adapt the school curriculum to a culturally-diverse population. 
Overall, the intercultural paradigm illustrates what Brubaker called the return of 
assimilation in liberal democracies, no longer associated with “the school-teachers of 
the third Republic” (Brubaker 2004: 532), and understood as a unilateral move towards 
a monolithic national society implying complete acculturation, but opposed to long-term 
structural “ghettoization, segregation and marginalization” (ibid. 543).  As such, it 
represents a clear attempt to blur the cultural boundary by acknowledging the value of 
immigration-induced pluralism while considering social cohesion as the main long-term 
objective.  
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7.2.3. The European shadow and the ‘Muslim question’ 
 
 
A striking feature of policy plans published at various levels of government in Spain 
and more generally in the public debate is the pervasive reference to the European 
Union as the main basis of legitimacy. Integration is invariably defined as “a dynamic, 
two-way process of mutual accommodation”324 and diversity-friendly policies find their 
limits in the need for immigrants to “respect the basic values of the European Union”325, 
and not in particularistic values supposedly embodied in the national spirit. Policy-
makers appropriated themselves the EU-sponsored notion of “civic integration”, which 
was re-framed as “civic citizenship” in the Spanish plan, and the “norm of civism”, or 
the “importance of civic-mindedness” as a guiding principle underlying the 
government’s actions in Catalonia.  This eagerness to conform to EU norms could be 
interpreted as a clear illustration of the post-national thesis, reflecting the emergence of 
an integration model disconnected from nationhood and embracing the increasingly 
legally-binding rules of an international human-rights regime finding its most 
compelling incarnation in the European Union (Soysal 1994). Alternatively, this could 
indicate that Western European states' policies on immigrant integration are 
increasingly converging beyond national models – provided that the latter ever existed 
(Joppke 2007). However attractive these two interpretations may be, they fail to account 
for the specificities of the Spanish case, where Europe and the ideas it supposedly 
embodies have played an ambivalent and yet no less fundamental role in the 
construction of nationhood, which took a new direction in the aftermath of the 
democratic transition.  
 
The role of Europe in providing a frame of reference for actors involved in the 
construction of a Spanish national identity can be traced far back in the past, 
successively embodied in the nineteenth century struggles opposing liberals and 
Carlists/Monarchists,  in the 1930s fratricidal war between Red and Black Spains, and 
continuing today in tensions between the Euro-enthusiastic PSOE and the incontestably 
more Euro-sceptical PP, more concerned with consolidating the Atlantic Alliance than 
                                               
324. These are the exact words of the definition coined by the Council of Europe in the List of Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU in 2004. Actually, this definition of integration has been used in 
virtually all policy Plans issued by Spain’s 17 Autonomous Communities. For a full review, see Cachon Rodriguez, 
2008.  
325. Plan Estratégico de Ciudadania I Integracion (PECI), published by the Spanish government, 2007: 23- 24.  
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with supporting a Franco-German dominated Europe326. The group of intellectuals who 
gained prominence after the loss of the last colonies in 1898 – known as the Generación 
del 98 – found in Europeanizacíon the ultimate remedy to national decay327 and the 
means through which national revival could be achieved. While the Franco ideology has 
sometimes wrongly been perceived as anti-European, it was in fact the fervent defender 
of a vision of the European continent as the cradle of the Christian civilization, 
threatened by the twin evils of communism and liberalism (Preston & Smith 1984). 
  
In 1986, at a time when the transition to democracy was hardly consolidated328, entry 
into the European community was interpreted as the realization of a long-awaited 
national vocation, frustrated throughout the twentieth century. For Felipe Gonzalez, it 
was no less than a “historic occasion to participate in the ideals of liberty, progress and 
democracy”329, which also fulfilled the instrumental purpose of diffusing centre-
periphery tensions into the European post-national project. In the Catalan 
historiography, the reference to Europe is no less present. For the famous and celebrated 
historian Vicens Vives, “the Hispanic task undertaken by Catalonia in the 19th century 
constituted one of the most serious efforts to configure Spain to its own image, which 
was itself a reflection of the image of Europe” (1995: 139). Jordi Pujol rarely missed an 
occasion to stress the Catalans’ openness to European ideas of liberty and progress. In 
his words, joining the EC was for Catalonia “like going home” (quoted in Guibernau 
1997: 14). 
 
But as regards immigration, the reference to Europe cuts both ways. On the one hand, 
policy-makers and political actors appropriate the liberal idiom of equality, respect for 
cultural pluralism and tolerance, as a sine qua non condition for immigrant ‘civic 
integration’. These concerns do not hollow out in a transnational space awaiting capture 
                                               
326. The firm commitment of Prime Minister Aznar to back the American intervention in Iraq by sending Spanish 
troops in spite of the diplomatic pressures of its European allies, and the decision of Luis Rodriguez Zapatero 
immediately after he took office to withdraw them illustrates this enduring tension.  
327. This has perhaps been expressed most forcefully by José Ortega y Gasset in a public lecture delivered in Bilbao in 
1910: “To feel the ills of Spain is to desire to be European… Regeneration is indissociable from Europeanization; for 
this reason, from the moment in which the reconstructive emotion was felt – the anguish, the shame and the desire – 
the idea of Europeanization was conceived. Regeneration is the desire; Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It 
has been clear from the beginning that Spain was the problem and Europe the solution.” (quoted in Pablo Jáuregui, 
1999: 172-73). 
328. Indeed, Spain joined the EC five years after the failed 1981 military coup d’état, a watershed in the democratic 
transition. Although the victory of the Socialist party in 1983 is often taken as the official date of the end of the 
democratic transition process, most would agree that its actual consolidation lasted longer.  
329. Quoted in Benedicto 2005: 42.  
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by legitimacy-seeking politicians. They resonate particularly well among progressive 
parties and were naturally promoted and institutionally entrenched by the Tripartite 
government, which combined its Catalanist agenda with a left-of-centre concern for 
minority rights. However, they also provide the basis for an anti-immigrant discourse, a 
means to exclude specific categories of immigrants on the grounds that they do not 
share the very liberal values presumably constituting the backbone of the political 
community. Too often, the scholarly community defines ‘Europeanisation’ as a 
unilateral and unproblematic phenomenon, whereby liberal norms and values are being 
diffused from the top to lower tiers of government. However, this neglects the fact that 
behind the progressive credentials of the European Union lays another Europe, whose 
historical record in the protection of minority rights is to say the least mitigated and in 
which radical right wing parties have proliferated over the past decades. They skillfully 
adapted their discourse to the minimum requisites of the liberal mainstream, sharing 
‘good practices’ of another kind by meeting regularly (Art, forthcoming). In Catalonia, 
both Europes have coexisted and simultaneously influenced and shaped discursive 
frames and public policy-making in matters of immigrant integration.  
The 2010 Llei de Acollida made numerous references to the European Union, and 
rooted its legitimacy in the Manual of Good Practices published by the DG Justice, 
freedom and security in 2004, and drafted by the influential Brussels-based Migration 
Policy Group330. It mentions as its main source of inspiration the List of Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU, approved by the Council of 
Europe in 2004. But as in other EU countries, the official aim of promoting immigrant 
autonomy sits uneasily with the unofficial objective of mitigating the native backlash 
against immigrants, by introducing “highly symbolic obligations reflecting abstract 
arguments about national identity and cohesion and overlooking more basic and 
practical concerns” (Penninx 2009: 7).  
  
More dramatically, the references to Europe impregnating the Catalan debate have fed 
the backlash against the Muslim community, essentialized as a homogeneous group 
whose collective values cannot be reconciled with liberal democratic norms. Catalonia 
is the Autonomous Community with the highest proportions of immigrants coming from 
predominantly Muslim countries. Arvi Astor (2009) estimates the size of the Muslim 
                                               
330. A second updated edition was published in 2007, and a third in 2010.  
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population residing in Catalonia in 2008 at 326,667, or 4.4% of the total population. 
According to the Generalitat, the total number of mosques in the four provinces 
amounted to 169 in 2009. Astor found that opposition to the construction of mosques 
was much more widespread and virulent in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain – it 
occurred in more than 30 municipalities against none in Madrid. He attributes this 
phenomenon to the self-reinforcing spatial and social divisions of Barcelona and its 
outskirts. Indeed, immigrants tend to be concentrated in economically-deprived areas, 
neglected by local authorities and characterized by a high presence of Spanish-speaking 
internal immigrants employed in lower-status occupations. But while tensions may 
indeed be more pronounced at grassroots level, they were also politically exploited by 
right-wing parties.  
In September 2010, the French debate over the integral veil, replacing the long-standing 
affaire du foulard, crossed the Pyrenees and ignited an intense controversy in Catalonia. 
Although the Generalitat evaluated that merely six women were actually wearing an 
burka throughout the entire territory, the municipality of Lleida prohibited it in all 
public administrations. PPC presented a similar motion in Barcelona, but was firmly 
rebuffed by the PSC-led local government. Although the Generalitat officially qualified 
this decision as disproportionate and inefficient, the debate monopolized the headlines, 
until a Bill presented by PP at the Spanish Parliament was eventually countered by all 
other parliamentary groups. In February 2011, the Constitutional Court of Catalonia 
ruled out the local initiative on the grounds that prohibiting entry to public services 
represented a clear prejudice against a narrow category of women331. Interestingly, no 
political party legitimized their position on explicitly Islamophobic grounds. Instead, 
they framed it either as a gender-friendly, or a security initiative. The PPC leader Alicia 
Sanchez-Camacho expressed her fear that mosques may turn into “nests of 
fundamentalism” and presented the burka ban as an “essential and brave measure to 
fight against gender discrimination.”332 Likewise, the radical-right wing party PxC 
immediately embraced the neo-populist discourse in defence of a liberal democratic 
Europe, internally challenged by immigrants from the Muslim world and their 
descendants who inherited the burden of what is portrayed as a parochial and backward 
civilization. In its manifesto, the party advocates “another immigration policy and the 
                                               
331. ‘El TSJC ratifica la suspensión de la prohibición del ‘Burka’ en Lleida’, in El País, February 18, 2011.  
332. ‘Els Candidats a la Generalitat opinen sobre l’Islam’, in El diari de la Catalunya Central, November 19, 2010.  
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necessity to fight against the systematic violation of women’s rights.”333 Beyond the 
rhetorical posture, the party is an avatar of the archetypical neo-Francoist Spanish 
Extreme-Right. Its leader Josep Anglada was a member of Fuerza Nueva in the 1980s 
and reportedly claimed: “we’re not interested in building a link with Francoism (…) 
although I have it in my mind, I cannot use it politically: it doesn’t sell.”334 While the 
party has so far failed to reach the 5% threshold of votes necessary for parliamentary 
representation, it successively multiplied spectacular initiatives at local level, and 
managed to challenge the hegemony of mainstream parties in a number of localities. In 
the latest round of local elections held in May 2011, 67 PxC councilors were elected, 
against 17 four years earlier.  
 
These developments are consistent with the argument presented earlier in this chapter, 
which attributes the rise of anti-immigrant initiatives at local level to the fact that most 
foreign nationals are not entitled to vote335. This local phenomenon is gradually spilling 
over to Catalan politics, encouraging mainstream parties to adopt a tougher stance. In 
2009, the left-wing coalition passed a law in Parliament, with the support of CiU, the 
purpose of which being to facilitate the construction of mosques across the territory. 
The llei dels centre de culte addressed the issue in overtly technical and administrative 
terms, considering that the construction of such premises was exclusively contingent 
upon “the respect of technical conditions of safety and hygiene,”336 accredited by a 
licence delivered by the Generalitat. However, this arrangement has recently been 
challenged by a bill passed in September 2011, under the impulse of PPC and with the 
support of CiU. The new bill states that “Catalan tradition and history”, as well as the 
“rootedness of each confession” should also be taken into account when delivering the 
licence337. Hence, the Catalan case evokes a similar paradox as in other European 
countries. The decline of religious beliefs and practices among the population sits 
uneasily with the consolidation of a kind of nationalism rediscovering its Christian roots 
and instrumentalizing its attachment to supposedly European values of liberty and 
                                               
333. “Plataforma Per Catalunya: Declaración Programática”, http://www.pxcatalunya.com/web/declaracion.htm 
[accessed on January 14, 2011].  
 It is also interesting to note that the party is not fundamentally anti-European. Point 10 of its manifesto reads: 
“Europe shall be constructed from its localities: we want a Europe of citizens, for its citizens”. 
334. Josep Anglada, quoted in Xavier Casals Meseguer 2009: 14.  
335. Cf. Section 7.1.3. 
336. Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Number 5432-30.7. Llei 16/2009 del 22 de juliol, dels centres de 
culte. 
337. ‘Musulmanes y Evangélicos critican la ley de culto de la Generalitat’, in El País, September 1, 2011.  
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democracy to contract the national boundary against recently-settled Muslim 
populations.  
 
7.3. Analysis of findings 
 
 
Successive plans issued by the Generalitat have invariably defined Catalonia as a 
paradigmatic “land of hospitality” whose culture has been enriched by a constant influx 
of people throughout its history, and “whose actions are influenced by its collective 
memory as a society with a long-standing history of immigration.”338 Significant efforts 
have been made to revamp the myth of the Terra de Pas and adapt it to a fast-moving 
demographic landscape. Although there is clear evidence that Catalan nationalists 
sought to reconcile immigrant integration with their territorial nation-building project, 
the review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade reveals that this aim has 
been only partially met. First, attempts to bypass the central administration by 
expanding the boundaries of citizenship to all residents irrespective of their legal status 
did not resist the multiplication of anti-immigrant grievances in a number of 
municipalities. With the 2010 Llei de Acollida, the objective of challenging the central 
administration in its own normative space has been overshadowed by the aim of 
consolidating a Catalan path to citizenship. While the linguistic boundary remained an 
important marker of membership, immigrants have been encouraged to cross it and its 
ethnic and militant undertones have been mitigated. The ill-defined intercultural 
doctrine represents a clear attempt to blur ethnic boundaries within the homeland by 
acknowledging the virtues of cultural pluralism. However, this strategy found its limits 
in the increasing stigmatization of the Muslim population, portrayed as a threat to the 
Catalan nation’s attachment to European values of liberty and democracy.  
 
To a certain extent, the Generalitat could reasonably claim to pursue a more progressive 
agenda than the central government as long as the Conservatives were in power in 
Madrid, neglecting and at times being outspokenly hostile to immigrant integration. 
However, the election of the PSOE in 2004 marked a radical shift of perspective and the 
beginning of a progressive approach to immigrant policy-making. At least until the 
                                               
338. Citizenship Plan 2005-2008, preamble.  
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outbreak of the global economic crisis, the economic strategy pursued by successive 
central governments whether from right or left has remained remarkably stable. Indeed, 
socialists and conservatives have not competed on the socio-economic axis but 
consensually agreed upon a broad liberal agenda, only differentiating at the margin 
(Benedicto 2005). As a result, post-materialist issues have dominated government 
actions during the first legislature. The PSOE pursued an ambitious progressive agenda 
strengthening minority rights, illustrated by a series of symbolically charged and highly 
controversial legislations aiming in the words of the Prime Minister at “constructing a 
more decent country”. A law passed in 2005 made Spain one of the first European states 
allowing homosexual couples to marry and adopt children. In 2008, the Parliament 
adopted an ambitious bill addressing the scourge of conjugal violence, while the Prime 
Minister polished his progressive credentials by appointing more women than men in 
his first government. The consolidation of one of the most liberal legislations on alien 
status in Europe – in sharp contrast with the highly restrictive legal framework 
regulating the acquisition of nationality – must be examined and understood in this 
light. Like other left-of centre parties in the post-industrial world, PSOE shifted from a 
politics of redistribution aiming at consolidating the welfare state in the 1980s to a 
politics of recognition. The supremacy of neo-liberal economics, combined with the 
perceived failure of Keynesian policies and the emergence of new concerns encouraged 
the left to seek support among ‘minority groups’. The Spanish socialists have been 
particularly eager to present themselves as the champions of liberalism and immigrant 
politics provided them with an ideal opportunity to do so. 
 
 In the remainder of this section, I examine these findings in the light of dimensions of 
the opportunity structure identified in chapter 1: the formal distribution of power; 
historical heritage; the sub-state party system. I conclude that the changing dynamics of 
party competition are the most significant factor explaining the outcome.  
 
7.3.1. The institutional context 
 
The settlement of international migrants occurred at a time when the institutions of the 
Generalitat were already consolidated. Yet, the distribution of competencies across the 
state-wide and sub-state level of governments initiated an ongoing battle opposing state-
wide and sub-state elites.  
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By contrast with what could be observed in Canada and in the United Kingdom, efforts 
at bringing together the multinational and multicultural challenges into a single Spanish 
narrative have been marginal.339 This neither means that Spanish nationalism abruptly 
ceased in 1978 with the ratification of the Constitution, nor that nationalism is the 
exclusive prerogative of ‘historic nationalities’, as is often suggested in the writings of 
some Spanish intellectuals340. Yet considering PP’s attachment to Spain’s glorious 
imperial and Catholic past, the virtual absence of historical references in immigrant-
related policies and discourses may seem quite puzzling. But as memories of the Civil 
War and four decades of dictatorship are still vivid and potentially divisive, the 
Conservatives have a vested interest in clinging to the 1977 ley de Amnistia collectively 
agreed upon in the early years of the transition, and broadly perceived as one of the keys 
to its success341. In the Spanish debate, explicit demonstrations of ‘Españolismo’ are 
seldom and are in any case wrapped into the less-divisive rhetoric of ‘Patriotismo 
Constitucional’. Repeated calls for a strict application of the 1978 Constitution have 
served to legitimize the Conservatives’ aversion to Catalan and Basque nationalists and 
discredit their claims to further autonomy. Actors usually limit their debates to the 
constitutionality of specific norms, and take the issue to the Tribunal Constitucional 
instead of formulating it in ideological terms and using references to past conflicts and 
positions342. In the realm of immigrant integration and citizenship, a legal approach 
assessing the compatibility of the legislation with constitutional and European norms 
also prevailed. This enabled the Socialists to differentiate themselves from the 
Conservatives while mitigating and diffusing tensions arising from rival conceptions of 
nationhood in an overtly legalistic fashion, with the Constitutional court acting as the 
ultimate arbitrator. Likewise in Catalonia, the ongoing controversies over the formal 
distribution of power between multiple tiers of government exacerbated by the 
concomitant negotiations over the New Statute have at times overshadowed identity 
concerns. This enabled Catalan elites to put aside their ideological differences and to 
                                               
339. While Prime Minister Zapatero did try in its first term to promote his idea of ‘España plural’, the concept was 
abandoned after the failure of the negotiations with ETA and the row over the Catalan New Statute. 
340. In a well-argued pamphlet against peripheral nationalisms in Spain, Alberto Perez Calvo (2005) meticulously 
deconstructed the notions of nationalities, nation, and people in Spanish law. The prevalence of law over social 
science disciplines leads to a situation in which the normative content of the ‘nationality question’ is hidden behind a 
legal-positivist and supposedly neutral approach.  
341. The Law 46/1977 figures among the most important factors of the ruptura pactada, whereby political elites 
agreed to “amnesty all political acts, irrespectively of their consequences, undertaken before December 15, 1966” 
(article 1).  
342. See also Linz (1991), who makes a similar point. 
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commonly oppose the perceived intransigence of the central administration and 
infringement upon the Generalitat’s self-governing capacities. Although the link with 
national identity  has unquestionably been more pronounced in Catalonia, political elites 
have also repeatedly framed the immigration debate as a matter of competencies, 
evoking how the central administration was betraying the spirit of the Constitution 
which, as the sociopolitical landscape has evolved, should be modified accordingly. 
  
Ultimately, there is little evidence that the formal distribution of competencies 
influenced the location of the boundary. Instead, ongoing quarrels over the allocation of 
power in matters of citizenship and immigrant integration reflect the way in which rival 
nation-building projects in Spain have manifested and have been partly defused by the 
growing judicialization of politics.   
 
7.3.2. Historical heritage and path-dependency 
 
 
Boundary-making strategies towards ‘immigrants from abroad’ over the past decade 
followed to a considerable extent the path established during and after the transition in 
relation to immigrants ‘from the rest of Spain’. Calls for rejuvenating the “militant and 
welcoming Catalanism of the 1970s”, (Ros 2001), or to “look in the rear-view mirror” 
to rediscover the Catalan tradition (Zapata Barrero 2009) were often made. However, 
the mere extension of existing policies and institutions has been undermined by the 
combination of two factors. 
 
First, the legal distinction between Spanish nationals, acquiring Catalan citizenship 
automatically when taking up residence, and resident aliens, subject to the Spanish 
naturalization procedure, made both phenomena barely comparable. Immigrants from 
other parts of Spain were, at least in institutional terms, invisible. While their children 
were targeted in the school system as ‘non-Catalan speakers’, they nonetheless enjoyed 
the same rights and duties as natives. Consequently, the Generalitat did not seek to 
establish a fully-fledged integration model, but rather subjected them to the relatively 
banal instruments of cultural reproduction which have been strengthened over several 
decades of nation-building. By contrast, ‘foreign immigrants’ fell into a distinct legal 
category, which enabled the Generalitat to multiply policies and institutions specifically 
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targeting them and meant to foster their incorporation into what has been framed as a 
pre-existing and socially integrated national community. 
The second factor is sociological. The analogy with internal migrants found its limits in 
the cultural, religious and racial composition of international immigrants. In 
consequence, linguistic concerns have competed, and at times been superseded by the 
perceived need to manage cultural pluralism in an increasingly diverse society.  
 
7.3.3. Party system and patterns of party competition 
 
 
Over the past ten years, immigration has turned into an increasingly divisive and 
polarizing issue, encouraging political parties to mark their differences from one 
another. By contrast with the 1980s and 1990s when successive linguistic legislations 
were only indirectly related to immigrant integration and systematically taken out of the 
realm of competitive politics by consensus-building among the main Catalanist parties, 
immigration has consistently remained a salient concern since 2000.  
Unlike in Scotland, where nationalism leans clearly towards the left, the Catalan case is 
characterized by the presence of more relevant actors and nationalist alternatives on 
both sides of the electoral spectrum. The table below shows the results at Catalan 
elections between 1999 and 2010. CiU saw its vote share eroded from 1995 and was 
relegated to the opposition for the first time in 2003. 
 
Table 12: Election results to the Catalan Parliament (1999-2010) 
 
Year 1999 2003 2006 2010 
Parties % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats 
PPC 11.9 12 11.9 15 10.6 14 12.37 18 
PSC 37.9 52 31.2 42 26.8 37 18.38 28 
CiU 37.7 56 30.9 46 31.5 48 38.43 62 
IcV 2.51 3 7.28 6 9.52 12 7.37 10 
ERC 8.67 2 16.4 23 14 21 7.01 10 
C's   3.02 3 3.03 3 3.39 3 
 
Source: My own compilation from www.gencat.cat  
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Until well into the decade, CiU’s strategy in regard to immigration has, to say the least, 
been ambivalent, oscillating between the electoral need to address conservative voters’ 
preference by playing the anti-immigrant card, and the nation-building necessity of 
clinging to a territorial conception of national membership. As the main party in the 
opposition, the CiU discerned compelling incentives to harden its discourse: In 2006, it 
fought the autonomic campaign with the unofficial slogan ‘No hoi cap tothom’, literally 
‘There is no room for everyone’. But the eruption of an outspokenly racist political 
formation since 2002 (PxC) and the ever harsher position of PPC have dissuaded the 
party from capitalizing on a native backlash. In 2008, Artus Mas officially launched the 
Gran Casa del Catalanisme, which explicitly aimed to create a ‘transversal nationalist 
space’ cutting across the left-right axis, and building a broad coalition of support in 
defence of a common territorial interest. Within this framework, Jordi Pujol’s successor 
at the head of the party sought to get its share of support among immigrants and 
appointed Angel Colom, a high-profile figure and former president of ERC, as the 
party’s immigration secretary. This prompted the creation of a section dedicated to the 
Nous Catalans, reminiscent of the SNP-affiliated association New Scots for 
independence, in order to dissipate any doubts regarding the party’s commitment to 
civic integration, but also as a strategic response to the need to make some inroad in the 
immigrant vote. During the 2010 campaign for Catalan elections, Artur Mas invited 
them to “embrace the values of Catalanism and share the Catalan dream.”343  
 
On the other hand, the PSC clearly demonstrated its intention to remain the party of 
immigrants and defuse within its own party structure potential conflicts that could arise 
between international immigrants and its traditional electorate. Since 2006, the party has 
been led by José Montilla, himself an immigrant from Andalusia whose Catalan is far 
from being fluent. In parallel, PSC embraced a more Catalanist platform as a result of 
two factors (Ridao 2007). First, Pascal Maragall, who was the head of the party between 
1997 and 2006, created a parallel platform called Ciutadans Pel Canvi to insulate the 
party from the PSOE influence, and ran an autonomous campaign, more centred on 
Catalan matters. Second, the PSC formed a coalition ‘Catalanista i d’Esquerres’, 
literally Catalanist and left-wing, in 2003 with two Catalanist parties; ERC, advocating 
                                               
343. Artur Mas gave a speech in front of 2,000 persons (“the overwhelming majority of whom were extra-
communitarians” dixit the Barcelona-based newspaper La Vanguardia) on November 20, 2010, a week before CiU 
won the elections.  
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outright independence, and ICV-EUiA, the heir of the Communist party PSUC which 
shifted from Marxism to ‘eco-socialism’ (Barbera et al. 2009). Both coalition partners 
have also pursued an unquestionably territorializing boundary-making strategy in 
relation to immigrants. On the one hand, ERC inherited the leadership of the 
Immigration Secretariat and has been at the forefront of the preparation of successive 
Immigration and Citizenship plans. On the other hand, ICV initiated the most 
progressive legislations both in the Catalan and Spanish parliaments, and consistently 
defended immigrants’ right to vote at general elections after 3 years of legal 
residence344.   
 
The only political parties which consistently sought to compete for the anti-immigrant 
vote have been the newly-formed PxC and PPC. In spite of a steady progression and an 
incontestable blackmail power at local level, PxC failed to obtain parliamentary 
representation at the latest Catalan elections, with barely 2% of the vote. On the other 
hand, PPC’s leader Alicia Sanchez-Camacho gradually toughened the party’s anti-
immigration stance, using an idiom and formulating propositions that are more akin to 
radical right-wing parties than to the European Conservative mainstream. The Catalan 
section of PP, which never found in internal immigrants a reliable ally in their linguistic 
crusade, will most likely equally fail to make inroads in the vote of international 
immigrants345. Ultimately, the anti-immigrant posture of PPC reinforces the hypothesis 
more than it undermines it. Indeed, PPC is the only relevant party which has positioned 
itself clearly on the Españolista side of the centre/periphery axis, and systematically 
opposed the Generalitat linguistic policy. It is emphatically presented by Catalanist 
parties as the internal enemy, the emissary of the intransigent Spanish right, and 
legitimate heir of its repressive and authoritarian tradition. Although its vote share rose 
sharply at the latest Catalan elections, it still serves the instrumental purpose of 
maintaining an artificial division between an uncompromising state-wide nationalism 
and a more liberal Catalanist alternative. In practice, the Catalan nation-building project 
is much more ambivalent regarding the language issue, as it is about its long-term 
constitutional endeavour. It is perhaps in these ambiguities that the secret of its strength, 
                                               
344.  ICV escenifica el apoyo de la inmigración que anhelan PSC y CiU’ in El País, October 15, 2010.   
345.  The PPC appointed Susana Clerici Lopez, a naturalized Spanish citizen of Argentinean origin, in charge of 
immigration (Secretaria Area Inmigración).  
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resilience and continual support among an ideologically, linguistically, socially and 
culturally divided population lies. 
  
In 2010, 27.3% of the resident population aged between 16 and 29 were non-Spanish 
citizens, the majority of them being Moroccan, Romanian or Ecuadorian nationals346. 
Hence, “tomorrow’s ancestors”347 will ineluctably have different ethnic phenotypes than 
yesterday’s, and will retain transnational ties in one form or another with their country 
of origin. Many of them may choose to speak Castilian, Catalan, or primarily 
communicate in their language of origin. Although it would be naïve to believe that 
tensions do not and will not arise at grassroots and elite level, the ‘new Catalans’ are 
also tomorrow’s voters and recent trends indicate that Catalanist parties are prepared to 
compete for their hearts. They also seem willing to leave them with sufficient space to 
cultivate several affiliations and allegiances, in a country where having multiple 
national identities that are nested and overlap in less than tidy ways has long been the 
norm and continues to inform political practices today.  
 
  
                                               
346. Butlletí del Secretariá per a la Immigració: La Immigració en xifres, Número 8, La joventut extranjera a 
Catalunya, Published by the Secretaria de Immigracio, December 2010.  
347. This very appropriate expression was coined by David McCrone in his book, The Sociology of Nationalism: 
Tomorrow’s Ancestors. London: Routledge, 1998.  
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VIII 
 
 
8. Emigrants into Ambassadors 
 
 
 
 
Scotland’s Diaspora population around the world and across other parts 
of the UK consists of large numbers of people with a good will towards 
Scotland, who have the potential to improve our reputation and drive 
economic growth by acting as ambassadors for Scotland. 
 
 
–Scottish Government International Framework, 2008 
 
 
 
The Catalan Communities abroad contribute to create an associative 
network in the areas where they are located, and through the activities 
they organize and the relationships they establish, act as civil diplomats 
of Catalonia.  
 
 
–Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter systematically compares boundary-making strategies in relation to 
emigrants and their descendants in Catalonia and Scotland in the light of their respective 
nation-building projects. In both instances, national movements successfully sought to 
acquire significant means of self-government over a territory and the population 
residing within its boundaries. In both cases, those who once emigrated from the 
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homeland and their descendants have been identified as potential resources and their 
relationship with homeland governments gradually institutionalized. The review of 
transnational engagement policies suggests that Catalans and Scots living outside the 
homeland have been used mainly as a means to contribute to the cultural and economic 
flourishing of the homeland. While this strategy has been reasonably successful in a 
Scotland that can rely on a vast pool of individuals claiming Scottish ancestry, the 
historically small number of Catalan emigrants militated against the development of 
fully-fledged initiatives beyond the realm of political rhetoric. Accordingly, emigrants 
and their descendants have primarily been associated with the 1939 exile and served the 
symbolic purpose of maintaining the link between Catalan nationalism and the liberal 
and democratic impulse of the transition. By contrast, homeland elites have been more 
reluctant to exploit them as a political resource by limiting their ability to play a 
prominent role in homeland politics. In Scotland, this was facilitated by the historically 
low interest of Scots abroad for the nationalist cause as well as UK-wide institutional 
constraints limiting electoral incentives for competing for their votes. In Catalonia, the 
solid political links established between the homeland and exiles abroad during the 
dictatorship combined with the ‘vote abroad for home district’ (Collyer et al. 2007) 
Spanish electoral system made this task perhaps harder. However, the absence of a 
special electoral representation for absentee voters has limited electoral incentives for 
competing for their votes. 
 
8.1. The Scottish diaspora, a ‘Kingdom of the Mind’? 
 
 
According to David McCrone, about 2 million people left Scotland in the nineteenth 
century, and at least as many did so in the twentieth (2001: 101). In relative terms, the 
phenomenon reached a much greater scale than in England, and among European 
countries was only exceeded by Norway and Ireland. What is meant by the ‘Scottish 
Diaspora’ today is hard to pin down, let alone to quantify, estimates oscillating between 
20, 40 and even up to 100 million members,348 depending upon the audience. 
                                               
348. Alex Salmond declared: "I've heard various estimates of the size of the Scottish diaspora, what I prefer to think of 
as the Scottish family, and it won't be far short of 100 million people around the face of this planet", quoted in The 
Herald, June 16, 2008 ‘Salmond urges ex-pat Scots to return home to Scotland’. Yet, in a speech at Trinity College 
(Dublin), he mentioned the figure of 25 million, and 30 million in a later speech at Georgetown University.  
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Identifying when the term ‘diaspora’ came about to qualify the amazingly diverse 
population of Scottish emigrants and their descendants disseminated across the world, 
particularly  in the United States, Canada , Australia and the rest of the UK is equally 
difficult. However, the term itself captures well the scale and protractedness of the 
phenomenon as well as the resilience of a highly recognizable Scottish identity349 
among individuals living beyond its territory, despite the fact that many of them never 
set a foot in their homeland. In the words of David Armitage, “in their far-flung 
wanderings, their diverse settlements, and their well-tended nostalgia, the Scots are a 
diasporic people” (2006: 225). While the term diaspora may be analytically flawed 
(Brubaker 2005), its unanimous appropriation by the media and politicians alike, and 
its far-reaching penetration into the popular idiom makes it a potent category of 
practice, as well as a highly topical concern in post-devolution Scottish politics. 
 
Efforts at diaspora-building were virtually non-existent prior to devolution, not least 
because British expatriates had no external voting rights until the 1985 reform of the 
electoral suffrage by the Conservative government and have only enjoyed a very limited 
opportunity to cast a ballot ever since.350 More importantly, emigrants and their 
descendants hardly ever manifested a genuine interest in homeland politics in general 
and in the nationalist cause in particular. In 1934, the future SNP leader Arthur 
Donaldson travelled to the United States in an attempt to gain support for home-rule 
from his fellow-countrymen. However, he soon came to the conclusion that “we [the 
SNP] should not appeal further for members in the US and the dominions [as] Scots 
who do have money (…) are not interested in our movement.”351 Repeated attempts to 
establish overseas branches of the SNP were equally frustrated, and regular tours across 
the Atlantic inciting expatriates to follow the example of their Irish counterparts in 
advancing the struggle for self-determination were received with benign indifference. 
This does not mean that emigrants were rapidly and fully incorporated into the receiving 
society and refrained to cultivate their sense of Scottishness. On the contrary, the 
permanence of an ethnic identity among emigrants was consolidated by the proliferation 
                                               
349. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Scottish brand’, see for instance McCrone (1995). 
350. The absence of external voting rights in Britain was until then a direct heritage of the Empire, throughout which 
‘internal migrants’ were acquiring the right to vote in the colonies while taking up residence there. The 
Representation of the People Act (1985) allowed British citizens who are resident outside the United Kingdom to 
qualify as ‘overseas elector’ for the constituency in which they were last registered, initially for a period of five years, 
extended to 20 years in 1989 and down to fifteen years today.  
351. Quoted in Christopher Harvie (1977: 245).  
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of Presbyterian churches, the St Andrews society and Burns clubs. But as there was no 
Scottish political arena to which they could relate, political initiatives directed to the 
homeland remained rare. Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, emigrants 
constructed a single and powerful Scottish identity overseas, using the cultural emblems 
of the Highlands to preserve a traditional culture, but also in pursuit of their economic 
and social advancement in their country of adoption rather that for the sake of the 
country they left. The consequence of this was the “misleading – but persistent – 
application of the powerful highland memories and definition of diaspora to the overall 
Scottish exodus” (Harper 1998: 408).  
However, since devolution changed the political landscape, the Scottish government has 
taken a variety of initiatives in the cultural, economic and political realms that by 2010 
formed a reasonably coherent boundary-making strategy towards those who left. 
Relations with the Scottish diaspora fall under the remit of the Department of Europe 
and External Affairs, and the SNP government sees no contradiction in seeking to 
“represent Scotland through a lens of independence” while at the same time “making 
full use of the UK resources at [its] disposal,”352 chiefly the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Network around the World. In this section, I review the most 
emblematic actions undertaken by successive Scottish governments since 1999 and 
conclude that seeking to tap into the economic resources of persons living abroad who 
have an affinity with Scotland has consistently overshadowed political concerns. While 
this renewed interest in ‘Scots abroad’ sits uneasily with the territorial project so vocally 
pursued in the homeland, expansion of the membership boundary has had no other 
purpose but to advance the economic, cultural and ultimately political interest of the 
territory and those who happen to inhabit it.   
  
8.1.1. Negotiating electoral rights 
 
 
Devolution has not only been the occasion to delimit the scope of the electoral 
franchise in relation to resident aliens, but also to expatriates and their descendants. 
The question did not even pose itself for the first referendum held in 1979, a time when 
                                               
352. Scottish Government International Framework (2009). The Scottish Government International Framework has a 
demographic, economic and political agenda: i) creating the condition for immigration so that Scottish population 
growth matches the EU average; ii) creating the conditions for sharp economic growth so that GDP growth matches 
the UK’s by 2011; iii) managing Scotland’s reputation as a distinct global identity, and an independent-minded and 
responsible nation.  
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British expatriates were not entitled to vote in parliamentary elections. In tune with 
Labour’s and the SNP’s vested interest in territorializing political membership – albeit 
for different reasons –, expatriates were deliberately excluded from the suffrage of the 
1997 referendum and successive Holyrood elections.353 But as “stories of peoplehood 
do not merely serve interests but also help to constitute them” (R. Smith 2003: 36), 
rational motivations were couched in deeply-rooted resentments towards those who left, 
draining away national strength. This view was made particularly explicit by a Labour 
MP speaking at a parliamentary session: “[emigrants] have made their choice to leave 
Scotland and to seek fame and fortune elsewhere. They earn big money for living 
outside Scotland. If that is their decision, one of the penalties they have to pay is that 
they cannot vote in elections in Scotland. That is an important distinction.”354 While 
associations of overseas emigrants have lobbied the Scottish government to extend 
expatriate voting rights, their demands have been systematically frustrated. The 2010 
Independence Referendum Bill proposed to use the registry for European, 
parliamentary and local elections to determine the boundaries of the franchise, thus 
mechanically entitling emigrants who left their parliamentary constituency less than 15 
years ago to vote. On the other hand, the exclusion of Scots-born emigrants registered 
in an English, Welsh or Northern Irish constituency has hardly been noticed. Although 
Scots-born residents in England represent by far the largest and closest transnational 
community – with 735,000 for the first generation alone, against 250,000 established 
overseas – they have not been targeted by any of the successive initiatives undertaken 
by the Scottish government to reinvigorate the link with the diaspora.355 Besides, the 
fact that Scots living in England are geographically dispersed and never cultivated the 
kind of nostalgia and ethnic identity so widespread in North America, the Scottish 
government deliberately avoided appealing to them as a group, involving them in 
Scottish politics or encouraging them to contribute to the nation-building project. As 
Derek Urwin already observed in the 1980s, “in the United Kingdom, with its plural 
electoral system, only Irish nationalists have ever looked – and that to an insignificant 
extent – beyond their own bailwick to attempt to tap the potential ‘ethnic vote’ support 
within England” (1982: 428).   
                                               
353. Interestingly, the question did not even pose itself in 1979, a time when British expatriates residing overseas were 
not entitled to vote in parliamentary elections. 
354. John McAllion, (Labour) MP for Dundee (East), Hansard Debates,June 3, 1997, Col. 259, my emphasis.  
355. Scotland’s diaspora and overseas-born population, Scottish Government Social Research, the Scottish 
government. report prepared by Carr and Cavanagh, 2009, p. 8. These estimates are based on the 2001 Census 
figures.  
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In elite discourses, the intrinsic diversity of individuals identifying themselves as 
Scottish in one way or another is rarely acknowledged, the diaspora being instead 
reified in elite discourses as a homogenous group. There have been few attempts to 
discriminate between first generation emigrants who left the Lowlands in the 1980s and 
those whose connection with Scotland is little more than a distant ascendance on a 
dusty genealogical tree or a self-declared ethnicity on a US or Canadian census form. 
This is partly due to the inherent difficulty of drawing the boundaries of a community-
in-the-making whose potential members are dispersed across the world and had until 
recently almost no formal ties with the homeland or among themselves. But this 
discursive frame contrasts sharply with the government’s actual initiatives, which have 
primarily targeted individuals from the ancestral diaspora, as opposed to members of 
the lived diaspora.356 Ultimately, the government’s diaspora strategy has been mainly 
directed at the American ancestral diaspora.  
 
8.1.2. Reaching out to the ‘ancestral’ diaspora 
 
 
In nineteenth century America, external signs of  ‘Highlandism’ were, as in the 
homeland, mainly adopted by urban individuals of Lowlands descent settled on the East 
Coast, and the first Highland games were organized by the Highland society of New 
York in 1836 (Berthoff 1982: 8). They gradually lost their appeal and almost 
disappeared until the 1960s, when they became more popular than ever. However, they 
did not re-emerge in the East, following the traditional pattern of settlement of Scottish 
migrants. Instead, they regained prominence in Southern states, where folkloric events 
associated with a distant Scottish ethnicity flourished in spite of the few participants 
who could claim genuine Scottish ancestry. In fact, almost all American clans were 
created in the 1970s and had virtually no ‘old-country tie’, a phenomenon which cannot 
be understood without bearing in mind the “general American fashion for ethnic roots” 
and return of the hyphenated identities including among the white middle-class 
population (ibid. 13). Besides, most individuals with an interest in the Scottish revival 
in the United States are in fact descendants of immigrants from Ulster, translated into 
                                               
356. A 2010 government research paper establishes for the first time a typology, distinguishing members of the lived 
diaspora, who were born or lived in Scotland, the ancestral diaspora, who have Scottish ancestry, and affinity 
diaspora, who have a connection with Scotland. See Engaging the Scottish Diaspora: Rationale, Benefits and 
Challenges, Scottish Government Social Research, July 2009. 
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the category of ‘Scots-Irish’ in the American census, a term virtually unknown in the 
British Isles.  
 
Perhaps because of the new geographical distribution of self-identified Scots in the US, 
the myth of the ‘Mongrel nation’ which has become so pregnant in Scottish politics has 
not crossed the Atlantic. Instead, Scottish symbols and narratives dragged in its rich 
usable past have been used to bring legitimacy to a radically different political project, 
far less committed to liberal democratic principles and even leaning towards a nasty 
form of nationalism. The rise of the neo-Confederate movement in the United States, 
exhibiting a clearly anti-modernist ideology, virulently opposed to civil rights, using 
Scotland as their mother country and Scottish nationalism as their second nationalism, 
provides a striking illustration.357 According to two of its most prominent ideologues, 
“American Southerners have much in common with the Scots and the Welsh in Britain 
[…]. All have made enormous economic, military and cultural contributions to their 
imperial rulers, who rewarded their loyalty with exploitation and contempt.”358 The neo-
Confederacy ideology is impregnated with the belief that the United States has 
historically been divided between the English Northern states and Celtic Southern 
states. The Civil War is presented as the continuation of the ancient antagonism of the 
Celts and the English. The defeat of the South, which made the United States abandon 
the ideas on which the country was built, parallels the supposed internal colonialism of 
the Celtic fringes by the English core. The promotion of equal rights for women, ethnic 
minorities and non-Christian religious groups are, the argument goes, symptoms that 
prevent the reconciliation of America with its original values359 (Hague et al.  2008).   
 
In 1998, a Bill was passed in the US Congress declaring that April 6 would be 
‘National Tartan Day’ to “honour the major role that Scottish Americans played in the 
founding of this Nation, such as the fact that almost half of the signatories of the 
Declaration of Independence were of Scottish descent.”360 But the proposal was carried 
                                               
357. Euan Hague advances the figure of 50,000 members at the height of the movement (2008). Rowland Berthoff 
(1982) tells how a kilted clansman he interviewed said he had joined the SNP on the supposition that the party, like 
the BNP, wanted to keep “Blacks and Pakistanis out of Britain”, a mere anecdote that nonetheless reveals the manner 
in which Scottishness is being perceived and instrumentalized in contemporary American politics.  
358. ‘The New Dixie Manifesto: States’ rights will rise again ’, first published in the Washington Post, October 29, 
1995.  
359. Another example of the use of Scottish symbols can be found in the landscape and Gaelic preservation 
movements in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, which legitimize their socially conservative inclinations with 
parochial imagery of the pre-modern Highlander.   
360. National Tartan Day Resolution passed by the U.S Senate, 1998.  
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forward by Trent Lott, a Republican senator known for his radically conservative 
positions in social matters and his sympathy for the views of the neo-Confederate 
movement. The event survived Lott’s later resignation after a series of outspokenly 
racist interventions, but the “unwholesome link between clans and klans was quickly 
made by detractors.”361 While these incidents embarrassed a Labour-led executive 
eager to promote devolved Scotland as a multicultural nation at ease with its diversity, 
they were rapidly overshadowed by the economic potential that the flood of bagpipers 
parading down the streets of New York could bring. As a result, the Scottish 
government has not only financially supported the initiative, but also sent a large 
delegation of representatives ever since, although MSPs from both sides of the electoral 
spectrum have expressed reservations about “those bekilted politicians, most of whom 
should never bare their knees to the elements, marching through Manhattan in the fond 
belief that doing so somehow promotes Scotland.”362 The initiative was re-branded 
Scotland Week in 2008 by the SNP government, and is apprehended from Scotland in 
strictly instrumental terms, as an opportunity to “showcase Scotland” in Canada and the 
US, the “focus of Scotland Week 2010 [being] to maintain confidence in Scotland as an 
internationally competitive business location and promote Scotland as a must-see, 
must-return visitor destination.”363  
 
8.1.3. An economic resource, a cultural liability?  
 
 
The economic rationale underlying the government’s approach appears more forcefully 
in the Globalscot initiative, launched in 2001. This international business network of 
Scots and people with an affinity for Scotland (the latter are often stressed so as to 
dismiss ethnic allegations) is financed and managed by Scottish Enterprise, Scotland’s 
economic development agency accountable to the devolved government. With an 
annual budget of GBP 45 million in 2006, the initiative has been unanimously praised 
as a formidable competitive advantage for Scottish businesses, although its outcomes 
are arguably hard to quantify (MacRae et al. 2006). Far from being a Scottish 
idiosyncrasy, GlobalScot is part of a broader shift of academic thinking in regard to the 
                                               
361. ‘Can Scotland save Tartan Day on Tuesday’ in The Scotsman, April 3, 2004, my emphasis.  
362. (Conservative) MSP Ted Brocklebank, in Scottish Parliament Official Report, November 28, 2008, 
Column12911.  
363. ‘Scotland Week 2010’, News release of the Scottish government, March 28, 2010.  
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relationship between emigration and development. The brain drain of home-grown 
highly-skilled labour that has long inhibited economic growth in mainly (but not only) 
developing countries is now seen as a potential strength. Concepts such as “circular 
migration” (Vertovec 2007364), “knowledge transfer”, “diaspora engagement policies” 
(Gamlen 2006), or “Brain bank” (Kapur & McHale 2008), have made their way into 
the policy jargon of international organizations. Beyond the academic fashion, this shift 
has inspired a variety of transnational initiatives aiming at “tapping on expatriate 
Nationals”,365 and GlobalScot figures among the list of good practices published by the 
World Bank Institute in its 2006 report on Diaspora Networks366. Its members, by 
offering “their time, experience, contacts, knowledge and skills”,367 have for the most 
part been particularly keen to contribute, notably because they received a personal 
invitation from the First Minister Jack McConnell who masterminded the initiative. If 
anything, this strategy has been extended since the SNP came to office, as Alex 
Salmond, who showed a keen interest in international affairs during time spent as a 
Westminster MP, used his diplomatic skills to communicate extensively with 
GlobalScot members. With about 800 participants in 2010, the network exclusively 
targets a narrow economic elite in the corporate world, its members being 
predominantly white middle-aged men based in North America and Western Europe. 
To address this imbalance, Scottish Enterprise is now aiming to “extend its reach to 
growth markets”368, notably in India and China.  
 
The GlobalScot initiative is part of a broader strategy aiming at reconstructing the 
image of Scotland from an ailing economy to a knowledge-based and globalized 
business hub. In this respect, nationalism is not essentially cultural and/or political, but 
is also a potent device to reconcile historic national characteristics with contemporary 
economic needs and aspirations. Today’s perceived economic interests are put into 
perspective with historical events, ‘repudiating’ those that no longer fit the current 
                                               
364. Of course, Vertovec did not coin the term, but international organizations and scholars have in recent years shown 
renewed interest in this phenomenon which in the past was commonly referred to as seasonal migration, although the 
concepts are slightly different. 
365. The best illustration is probably the UNDP-funded TOKTEN initiative (Transfer of Knowledge through 
Expatriate Nationals). Active in a variety of countries, the programme pursues the objective of using the “expertise of 
expatriates in order to reinforce national developments efforts” (http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/tokten.htm, 
November 1, 2011). However, the case of Scotland is interesting insofar as it has long been an industrialized country 
and yet experienced very high levels of emigration. 
366. Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries can Draw on their Talent Abroad, 
WBI Development Studies, 2006.  
367. ‘About GlobalScot’ in www.globalscot.com [accessed on June 5, 2010].  
368. GlobalScot: Building International Business Networks for Scotland, Scottish Enterprise, 2009.  
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priorities while ‘reinterpreting’ those that do under a new light (Bond et al. 2003). The 
GlobalScot network provides a good illustration, as it intends to instill a culture of 
entrepreneurship among Scottish businesses by reconstructing Scotland as an 
“innovative, outward-looking nation” thriving to “break into overseas markets”369, 
eluding the Red Clydeside episode370 and successive strikes under the government of 
Margaret Thatcher which could damage the image of Scotland as a business-friendly 
environment. Speaking at a parliamentary session in 2008, Alex Salmond 
unambiguously spelt out the objective of the government’s renewed interest in the 
diaspora established in the United States and Canada, which is “as much, if not more, 
about enhancing economic and cultural ties in the future as it is about celebrating 
historic ties of country and kin. The government’s message to our friends all across 
North America is that Scotland is a country on the move.”371 The international 
campaign of the Labour-led Scottish executive was meant to promote Scotland as “the 
Best Small Country in the World”372. In a similar and yet paradoxically less overtly 
nationalistic vein, the SNP government international framework published in 2008 
intended to present Scotland as “a Responsible and Independent-minded Nation.”373 In 
both cases, the idea that Scotland has changed, that it is no longer unable to provide its 
population with rewarding opportunities, is at the core of the government’s external 
communication strategy374. 
 
Galvanised by the rapid and unexpected success of GlobalScot, the executive sought to 
establish a similar network in the cultural realm. Global Friends of Scotland was 
created in 2005 with the aim of “reaching out to our extended family and friends 
around the globe and showing them this contemporary image of Scotland.”375 
However, the initiative has not met the success of its economic model, not least 
                                               
369. ibid.  
370. Red Clydeside designates an era of working-class agitation in Glasgow. It has strong symbolic significance for 
the Labour party, notably in Scotland, and is sometimes used to legitimize the left-wing inclinations of Scottish 
nationalism.  
371. Scottish Parliament Official Report, November 27, 2008, col. 12892, my emphasis.  
372. Building the Best Small Country in the World: Attracting Fresh Talent to Scotland, Scottish Government, 
February 28, 2005.  
373. Scottish Government, International Framework, January 2009, emphasis in the original.  
374. The Homecoming TV advertisement, broadcast on US, Canadian and British national channels, provides a telling 
example. With its sentimental overtones, the spot stages the most prominent Scots-born stars –  including Sir Sean 
Connery and Chris Hoy – singing A Scottish folk ballad defined by Alex Salmond as  “one of the great Scottish 
anthems, its words capture perfectly the opportunities that the year of Homecoming offers Scotland and our 
economy ’.“I don’t know if you can see, the changes that have come over me. […] Caledonia, you're calling me and 
now I'm going home. And if I should become a stranger, you know it would make me more than sad. Caledonia's 
been everything I've ever had." 
375. Friendsofscoltand.gov.uk homepage [accessed online February 26, 2009]. 
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because spurring its members’ interest in Scotland’s contemporary cultural scene, 
which has largely turned its back on Kailyardism and Tartanry, the traditional cultural 
markers of Scotishness overseas,376 proved to be a difficult task. Hence, the 
government’s vision of a modern and multicultural Scotland cannot easily be 
reconciled with the predominantly ethnic and romantic identity that has been 
constructed overseas. Hence, encouraging “millions of people in Canada and the 
United States to celebrate and view Scotland as a successful, vibrant and modern 
nation”377 seems ineluctably undermined by the enduring fact that, as the President of 
the Scottish American Association to the Promotion of Scotland worldwide put it, “the 
traditional image of Scotland are what tug at the heartstrings over here.”378 
 
The diaspora strategy reached a peak in 2009 with the launch of the Homecoming year, 
meant to be the in the words of the First Minister the “biggest celebration of Scotland’s 
achievement and culture.”379 The idea of organizing a series of events involving the 
diaspora on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of Robert Burns’ birth had already 
spurred the interest of the previous administration and took on much greater scale 
under the impulse of the SNP government. Again, despite the sentimental appeal of the 
promotional campaign, the initiative has mainly been discussed as an economic 
opportunity, targeting 100,000 additional international visitors. Ultimately there were 
72,000, half having family ties in Scotland in a way or another, exclusively drawn by 
the celebrations which generated GBP 53.7 million of additional tourism revenue, 22% 
above the target set for the year.380 The most emblematic events have been the world’s 
biggest clan gathering, the biggest celebration of Scottish whisky, and the most 
extensive exhibition of Golf Memorabilia. While appealing to overseas visitors eager to 
explore their Scottish roots, it is hard to see how such events could possibly help to 
project Scotland as a vibrant place hosting a buoyant cultural scene. This provides 
another illustration of the inherent contradiction of the Scottish government’s 
international strategy, the re-branding of which being almost systematically frustrated 
by the all-time best-selling products of “Scotland – the Brand” (McCrone et al 1995).  
                                               
376. Tom Nairn (2003/1977) famously saw Tartanry and Kailyardism as the ultimate manifestations of Scotland’s 
cultural decay in the nineteenth century.  
377. Scotland Week 2008. Evaluation Report by the Scottish Government, External Affairs, Culture and Tourism 
Analytical Unit, March 2009, p.11. 
378. Quoted in the Scotsman, ‘Whisky, haggis and shortbread take a back seat as Tartan Week becomes Scotland 
Week’, March 8, 2008. 
379. ‘Homecoming 09: Scotland’s call to the world’ in The Scotsman, June 17, 2009. 
380. Report on the Economic Impact of Homecoming 2009 carried out by EKOS Ltd, March 2010.  
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8.1.4. A country of five million, or a community of thirty million? 
 
 
The Homecoming year was also the occasion to discuss the future of the government’s 
diaspora strategy with prominent representatives of Scottish associations overseas. The 
Scottish Diaspora Forum organized in June 2009 at the Holyrood Parliament was 
meant to be “only the beginning of what could be a long-term conversation.”381 Some 
expressed their concerns about the potential contradiction between the diaspora’s 
predominantly ethnic attachment to the homeland, and recent immigrants who built 
their Scottish identity on very different premises, share the accent and experiences that 
makes modern Scotland for indigenous Scots. In other words, the powerful image of 
the Mongrel nation may be contradicted, and ultimately undermined, by the 
government’s attempt to reach out to people whose connection to Scotland is 
necessarily ethnic. But Mike Russell, SNP Scottish minister for Culture, External 
Affairs and the Constitution, reflecting on Homecoming 2009, may have found an 
ingenious way to square this circle. In his words, “this ‘Mongrel Nation’ to quote one 
novelist (William McIlvanney) can be taken worldwide, as, to quote another (the 
Canadian Frederick Niven), Scotland is a true ‘Kingdom of the mind.’”382  
 
The parallel has repeatedly been drawn between Scotland as a country of emigrants and 
Scotland as a country of immigrants, brought together as two sides of the same coin. In 
a rather intriguing way, the image of the Scottish emigrant has been used in the ‘One 
Scotland Many Cultures’ campaign to stimulate empathy among the native population 
for the fate of immigrants. The 2006 ‘Canada’ TV advertisement staged a man and his 
son of seemingly Asian descent walking down the street. A voice-over, recognizably 
tainted by a Glaswegian accent, utters these words:  “When we arrived in this country, 
we were not sure what to expect. We wanted to play our part, learn about the culture 
but also retain our own. People were unsure at first. But before long, we settled down, 
and we never looked back.”  Shortly after, the spot reveals that Prendush Lleishi was in 
fact speaking the words of Dan McLaughlin, a Scot who migrated to Canada in 1952. 
In this ode to multicultural Scotland, emigrants and immigrants are portrayed as 
                                               
381. The Scottish Diaspora Forum: Ways Forward from 2009, Scottish Diaspora Report, September 2009, p.2. 
382. ‘Mike Russell: ‘The Challenge is to keep alive the feeling of being one big family’’’, in Scotland on Sunday, July 
19, 2009.  
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sharing “the common and universal experience of the migrant.”383 This link is perhaps 
more compellingly embodied in the words of SNP Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill, 
for whom “as a nation of emigrants we wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland 
dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression.”384  
 
8.2. The Principate, and beyond? 
 
 
The politics of trans-border membership in Catalonia is not limited to the question of 
emigrants and their descendants but is also concerned with kin-minorities belonging to 
the imagined community of the Catalan countries. Although the scholarships on kin-
state and migrant-sending state politics have evolved in relative isolation from one 
another, calls have been made to bridge the analytical divide separating them 
(Waterbury 2010). However, the scope of this dissertation is already broad enough and 
can hardly be expanded to the institutional and political relationship between the 
Generalitat and the Autonomous Community of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and 
Catalunya-Nord ‘annexed by France in the eighteenth century’, according to the official 
jargon of the Catalan administration. In this section, I first briefly discuss the ties of 
emigrants and the homeland in a historical perspective, before focusing more 
extensively on the Generalitat’s boundary-making strategy towards ‘Catalan 
Communities abroad’ over the past fifteen years.   
 
8.2.1. Catalonia, a country of (forced) emigration?  
 
 
The overview of historical patterns of immigration presented in Chapter IV suggests 
that the myth of the ‘Terra de Pas’ is far from being fraudulent. Likewise, there is also 
some truth in the widespread belief that Catalonia is a country in which those who were 
born stay, except when they are forced to leave. This sharply contrasts with the rest of 
Spain and, by declining order, the autonomous communities of Galicia, Andalusia and 
the Basque country in particular. Using the data of the 1991 Census, Graciela Sarrible 
(2005: 41-2) found that individuals born in Catalonia have on average migrated three 
                                               
383. This is a quote from a key speaker and representative of the Scottish diaspora, Scottish Parliament, Scottish 
Diaspora Forum, A Future for Our Past, July 25, 2009.   
384. Kenny MacAskill, ‘It’s time for Scotland to have Immigration Powers’, October 26, 2006.  
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times less than those born elsewhere in Spain. In 1991, merely 6.% of persons born in 
Catalonia resided in another autonomous community, against 20% for Spain as a whole. 
Likewise, more than two million Spanish citizens lived abroad, amounting to 5.4% of 
the Spanish population, against 0.8% for Catalonia.385 A brief overview of emigration 
patterns over the past two centuries reveals a similar pattern, the volume of emigrants 
from Catalonia paling in comparison with other territories. Notwithstanding sporadic 
economic difficulties in the course of the nineteenth century, the domestic labour 
market has been able for most of the period to absorb the large influx of immigrants 
from the rest of Spain as well as the native population who moved en masse from the 
hinterlands to Barcelona, but rarely beyond. Thanks to the spectacular industrialization 
of its economy, at least when compared with the rest of the Peninsula, and the sharp 
drop in the fertility rate registered during the period, the Catalan population never 
experienced the protracted outflow of forces vives that characterized other territories 
destabilized by the tidal wave of modernization.   
 
Until 1767, Catalan merchants were officially barred from trading with the colonies and 
overseas emigration was reserved to Castilian subjects. As soon as the ban was lifted 
under the reign of Carlos III, commercial links across the Atlantic increased 
exponentially (Vilar 1978, 300-304).386 The trade route with Cuba was already well 
developed in the 1780s, and the volume of exchange continuously grew until the 1870s 
(Tornero 1989). The consolidation of commercial networks went hand-in-hand with 
significant outflows of mainly male and young Catalans, who returned regularly to the 
homeland and maintained strong transnational ties across the Atlantic. Increasingly 
aware of their distinct territorial identity, Catalan emigrants in Cuba were the first of all 
Spaniards abroad to establish a region-specific mutual aid society – the Sociedad de 
Benefencia de Naturales de Catalonia – founded as early as 1840. In 1898, the loss of 
Cuba following a short war against the United States represented a major blow to the 
export-oriented Catalan industries heavily reliant on the Caribbean trade route for their 
raw materials. The rapid diffusion of political nationalism among homeland elites 
                                               
385. In Catalonia, the figure comprises the sum of all Spanish citizens residing abroad whose last residence while in 
Spain was in one of the four provinces making up today’s Autonomous Community of Catalonia. The recent adoption 
of the Historical Memory Act, entitling the descendants of those who emigrated during the Franco dictatorship to 
Spanish citizenship, and the sharp rise of emigration in the aftermath of the economic crisis substantially increased 
the number of Spanish citizens living overseas.  
386. Pierre Vilar argued that in spite of the formal rule – A Castilia y a Leon, Nuevo Mundio Colon – the limited 
participation of Catalonia in the colonial project mainly resulted from the regions’ relative demographic and 
economic weaknesses.  
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spilled over to the former colonies. The proliferation of Catalan associations at the turn 
of the century can only be understood in the light of Spanish politics, and in particular 
the emergence of Catalan nationalism, and of the acceleration of emigration flows as a 
result of adverse economic conditions (Jensen 2008: 133). From this date, institutions 
with an explicitly political and militant character mushroomed in various locations, and 
especially in Cuba with the creation of the Centre Catala and the Grop Nacionalista 
Radical in 1905. Both pursued a more radical agenda than the Lliga Regionalista and 
were from an early age committed to outright secession (Harrington 2001: 104). In fact, 
the evolution of Catalan associations abroad closely followed changing patterns of 
nationalism in the homeland, embracing a more conservative stance during the Lliga 
hegemony, and later moving towards the left in reaction to Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship.387 
  
However, the Casals only acquired a critical role after the Civil War, when the 1939 
exile suddenly increased the pool of potential members. More importantly, the 
dictatorship provided them with a new and more explicitly political mission, in defence 
of the motherland subject to a ‘cultural genocide’. Balcells evaluates the number of 
Catalan exiles who did not return to Catalonia a few months after the end of the civil 
war as 60,000 (2004: 155). While the figure may seem low – it barely represents 1% of 
today’s Catalan population – intellectuals or prominent union and political party 
members were over-represented. In consequence, many were to maintain intense 
political ties with the homeland (Pigenet 2005). Unlike Basque elites who successfully 
relocated the autonomous government to Paris, the attempt to establish a Catalan 
government in exile has been undermined by the mutual hostility between ERC and 
PSUC, who blamed one another with responsibility for the defeat. However, the fierce 
repression that characterized the early years of the dictatorship meant that, in spite of 
the difficulties in agreeing upon a common objective, activists in exile were to take the 
lead in the contestation. Whether in London, Paris or Mexico, the period from 1945 to 
1960 represents the Casals’ golden Age, as they could count on the support of 
competent and dedicated members. Their direct experience of the Civil War encouraged 
them to dedicate a considerable amount of time and energy to maintaining the 
nationalist flame and diffusing the Catalan culture and language that could no longer 
                                               
387. See Chapter IV section 4.2. for an exhaustive discussion of the evolution of the nationalist movement at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  
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flourish in the homeland. However, by the 1970s the once young and motivated activists 
had grown older and were permanently settled in their country of destination. Their 
descendants, although nurtured by emotional family narratives and cultivating to 
varying degrees the memories of their Catalan roots, rarely spoke the language (Caballé 
2005). They manifested less interest in the Casals, which subsequently saw their 
membership sharply reduced.  
 
Besides, the Casals increasingly faced the competition of reinvigorated anti-Francoist 
groups in the homeland. The latter were determined not to let the old guard of the 
Second Republic, who fought and lost the Civil War and found a shelter abroad, hijack 
the contestation. Their representatives were unable to keep up with the rapid 
transformation of Catalan society in the wake of economic expansion and under the 
influence of protest movements spreading throughout Europe in the 1960s. The folkloric 
and past-oriented writings painfully disseminated across a shrinking pool of Catalan 
speakers abroad were insignificant when compared with the vibrant cultural scene of the 
homeland, revitalized by a new generation of artists and thinkers. When Josep 
Taradellas, the president of a moribund government in exile, was invited to return by 
Adolfo Suarez to chair the comisió dels vint, the illusion of continuity with the Second 
Republic could hardly hide the fact that little remained of the country exiles had left 
close to forty years ago. Taradellas was already 81 years old when the first elections to 
the Catalan Parliament were held in 1980. By then, it was clear in the minds of all that 
the priority for the decade to come was not to strengthen links with the descendants of 
exiles born and bred in other countries, but to (re)construct the nation – fer país – at 
home, and consolidate legitimate and democratic institutions across the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Autonomous Community.    
 
8.2.2. A boundary-making strategy still looking for its purpose 
 
 
From the 1980s onwards, the CiU government actively sought to develop Catalonia’s 
‘international presence’388 through a number of ambitious paradiplomatic initiatives. 
However, the Generalitat strategy mainly consisted in reinforcing the Catalan influence 
in traditional diplomatic arenas such as the European Union and the UNESCO, and 
                                               
388. Jordi Pujol consistently referred to Catalonia’s ‘international presence’ as opposed to diplomacy in order to 
mitigate conflicts with the central administration in the international arena (Keating 2001a: 190).  
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creating public-private partnerships and bodies in strategically-relevant areas with a 
clear emphasis on economic development. Until the turn of the century, the ‘Catalan 
Communities abroad’ were at best a secondary concern. In other Autonomous 
Communities, emigrants and their descendants were identified as a key economic 
resource from an early stage. The Stabilisation Plan initiated in 1959 by the Franco 
regime provoked a massive wave of emigration, and the total amount of remittances 
went from representing USD 55 million in 1960 to 1 billion in 1972. Besides, in the 
economic peripheries, mass-exit mechanically provoked a rise of productivity while 
mitigating pressures on the labour market.389 In 1971, with the new ley de emigración, 
the right to emigrate became a cornerstone of the Regime’s economic strategy 
(Gonzalez Temprano 1975: 25-7). However, in Catalonia, emigration mainly served the 
instrumental purpose of exporting political dissent. The region’s endogenous economic 
development meant that economic outflows were remarkably low when compared with 
other provinces. 
 
The first initiative targeting Catalans abroad came as late as 1996. The Llei de relacions 
amb les comunitats Catalanes de l’Exterior was intended to institutionalize the 
relationship between the autonomous administration and Catalan associations located 
beyond its frontiers, whether in the rest of Spain or abroad, although the former received 
relatively much less attention. While the Bill was proposed by the ERC parliamentary 
group, it was unanimously supported by all parties, including PPC. Parliamentary 
transcripts suggest that its purpose was twofold. First, it was framed as an “act of justice 
and recognition of the abnegation, tenacity and patriotism of Catalan entities and 
individuals [who were] forced into exile in the wake of the Civil war.” 390 Second, 
associations abroad were identified as a strategic economic and cultural resource which 
could be exploited as part of the government’s internationalization strategy: “[t]he aim 
is not only to pay homage to those who left in difficult times, but above all to increase 
our collaboration, so that they can both divulge abroad what Catalonia is, and contribute 
to the process of national reconstruction in the homeland.”391 However, the legislation 
                                               
389. Gonzalez Temprano quotes a chascarillo on emigration from Andalusia, which, while anecdotal, gives an idea of 
the 1960s mass-exit from the region: “A villager went to Cordoba to get his papers before emigrating. In the office, 
he was told that he needed the signature from the mayor of his village. He went out and came back five minutes later 
with the document signed. The civil servant asked him how on earth he could have travelled all the way back to his 
village in such a short time. And the man to answer: ‘there was no need to do so, the mayor as well is waiting in the 
queue’” (1975: 27). 
390. Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, Sèrie P-Núm 34, December 17, 1996, p. 2151-52. 
391. Ibid. p. 2158.  
 256 
 
was hardly implemented, the Generalitat showing little political will to use Catalan 
institutions located beyond the homeland as a fully-fledged paradiplomatic instrument. 
The project of creating a Census of Catalan Residents Abroad never came to fruition 
and overall expenses remained marginal. While Casals across the world were identified 
and linked with one another through an official network, the consell de comunitats 
catalanes del exterior, which was created to coordinate their actions and liaise with the 
Generalitat, never came to play a prominent role. Instead, the agenda was for a time 
hijacked by a civil society organization. Unlike in Scotland where associations of Scots 
abroad are decentralized and loosely connected with one another, the Federacio 
Internacional d’Entitats Catalanes is a powerful institution aggregating the majority of 
Casals and Catalan centres across the world. As such, it has been able to claim to speak 
in the name of the interests of Catalans abroad, lobby the Catalan Parliament and enjoy 
a privileged position in the decision-making process. In 1998, it created the diada 
internacional de Catalunya Exterior, which became recognized as an official day by the 
Catalan Parliament in 1999, and has been celebrated every year ever since.  
 
In November 2002, the Department of Governance and Institutional Relations of the 
Generalitat organized the ‘Week of Homage to Exile’. This series of commemoration 
events saw the creation of an Exile Museum in La Jonquera, and was the occasion to 
revive the link between Catalan nationalism and the democratic aspirations of the 
transition, as well as to remind younger generations how the road to political autonomy 
had been a long and tenuous one. At the same time, the Catalan Parliament pioneered 
the adoption of a law aiming at providing financial and logistical assistance to the 1939 
Catalan exiles and their descendants, by facilitating their return and reinsertion into 
Catalan society. Again, the Law of Support to Catalan Exiles and Their Descendants392 
was proposed by ERC and passed with the unanimous support of all political parties. In 
addition to the symbolic aim of acknowledging a “historical debt” towards those who 
left for a political purpose, the legislation was also meant to encourage the return of 
those who were identified as “a reservoir of skilled labour close to the country.”393 
Beneficiaries could receive up to EUR 4,500 a year as well as personalized guidance. 
Between 2004 and 2009, the total number of beneficiaries amounted to 900, 90% of 
them coming from Latin American countries. However, most have been second or, 
                                               
392. Llei de les mesures de support al retorn dels ciutadans catalans i llurs descendents.  
393. ‘El Parlament aprueba la ley para facilitar el retorno de los exiliados’, in La Vanguardia, October 13, 2002.  
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since the Historical Memory Act was passed in the Spanish Parliament, third generation 
immigrants, with little or no personal connection with the 1939 exile. While the law 
targeted heroes, those who came mainly saw it as an opportunity to migrate to Catalonia 
with privileged conditions. Given the financial strain on all public administrations since 
the beginning of the economic crisis, the initiative saw its overall budget significantly 
curtailed. Initially, the Generalitat committed itself to facilitate their insertion into the 
labour market by giving them priority access to 5% of jobs advertised by unemployment 
services. However, this disposition was never implemented, mainly because the overall 
influx of returnees remained insignificant, especially compared with that of foreign 
immigrants.  
 
The Tripartite coalition, which took power in 2003, sought to revitalize the link with 
Catalan institutions abroad. The main reason for this renewed interest lies in the fact 
that ERC, which has long advocated a more determined attitude towards expatriates, 
took control of the Department of External Affairs. The 2006 Statute enshrined this 
ambition into law by committing the Generalitat to “foster social, economic and cultural 
links with Catalan communities outside Catalonia and provide them with any necessary 
assistance.”394 By 2010, the Generalitat officially recognized 124 ‘Catalan Communities 
Abroad’, established in 40 countries and strong of 15,000 active members. However, 
these figures have to be taken cautiously as the number of affiliated members plays a 
crucial role in the accreditation process and allocation of resources, thus providing 
applicants with incentives for over-estimating their size and significance. Casals and 
Catalan centres abroad are officially meant to project Catalonia in the world by acting as 
‘civil diplomats’ and sharing their knowledge of the region in which they are located 
with homeland institutions. They can be habilitated by the Institut Ramon Llul to 
provide language classes and deliver linguistic accreditation. In 2010, the Commission 
of External Affairs published a five-year strategic plan395 in which the potential role of 
the Catalan Communities Abroad in the projection of a better image of Catalonia was 
made more explicit. The government expressed some concerns with the fact that 
members tend to be on average older than the general population and mainly interested 
in the “folkloric aspects of Catalan culture”. Hence, the government officially 
                                               
394. 2006 Catalan Statute, Article 13.  
395. Plan de Acción  Exterior del Gobierno de Cataluña 2010 – 2015 Published by the Generalitat de Catalunya, 
Comisionado de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, September 2010.  
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encourages their “modernization, and the enhanced participation of younger and more 
dynamic segments.”396 They are encouraged to diffuse “not only the Catalan traditional 
and popular culture”, but also “the new trends in cultural production.”397 However, this 
objective is far from constituting a priority in the government’s broader aim of 
“projecting Catalonia as a global and responsible actor, influential and prestigious, 
committed to the construction of a more just and fair global order”,398 an objective that 
shares striking similarities with the SNP government’s aim of promoting Scotland as a 
“responsible and independent-minded nation.” In the economic realm, the Plan 
acknowledges that the internationalization of Catalan businesses is constrained by the 
lack of expertise of and networks established in foreign markets and identified the 
Casals as a potential instrument to remedy this weakness. In 2007, the Generalitat 
launched an Internet portal, ecatalunya.gencat.net, with the aim of maintaining and 
strengthening the bonds among Catalan expatriates and the homeland. However, a brief 
look at the website three years after its creation clearly shows that the objective of 
generating a sustained and vibrant dialogue across multiple actors has not been met. In 
the preliminary budget presented by the CiU government in June 2011, resources 
allocated to Catalan Communities Abroad were curtailed by 41%. The Generalitat’s 
unprecedented policy of financial austerity in response to the economic crisis forced the 
government to reconsider its priorities, and the latter made clear that providing 
assistance to Catalans residing abroad does not figure among them.  
 
On January 1, 2011, there were 170,909 Catalans registered in Spanish consulates 
abroad. In addition, 398,000 individuals born in Catalonia resided in another 
Autonomous Community.399 The number of Catalans residing abroad increased by 
23,000 in two years, half of them as a result of the economic crisis, and the other half as 
a consequence of the increased number of naturalizations abroad in the wake of the Ley 
de Memoria Historica.400 Between January and July 2011 alone, more than 100,000 
individuals, whether Spanish or foreign citizens, have emigrated abroad. However, 
unlike other Autonomous Communities, concerns for a potential brain drain have not 
yet emerged in Catalonia. In  2007, in the Basque Country, the Department of 
                                               
396. Ibid. p. 32.  
397. Ibid.p. 34. 
398. Ibid. p. 4.  
399. Padron de residentes en el Extranjero (PERE), published by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, June 1, 2011.   
400. Press release of the Federacio Internacional d’Entitats Catalans, May 5, 2011, available online at 
http://www.fiecweb.cat/docs/poblacioExterior.pdf 
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Innovation and Economic Development launched a programme aimed at “establishing 
favorable conditions to retain and attract highly-skilled workers in the context of a 
knowledge-based and innovative society” (Ibarrola Amendariz 2009: 240). But 
Catalonia’s ability to attract immigrants in times of economic growth makes the 
elaboration of a fully-fledged economic strategy directed at emigrants rather unlikely 
for the foreseeable future.   
 
8.2.3. Campaigning abroad: a limited electoral incentive 
 
 
Unlike the United Kingdom where expatriate voting rights are limited to general 
elections, the Spanish electoral system offers meaningful means of political 
participation to Spanish citizens abroad. As such, it provides political parties with 
incentives for competing for their votes, whether at local, autonomous, or general 
elections. State-wide parties have enjoyed an advantage over non state-wide parties to 
fund and organize campaigns abroad as they can retrieve the cost of their international 
network by using it for multiple levels of elections. In Catalonia, the 1978 Statute 
provided that “Spanish citizens resident abroad whose last administrative residence was 
in Catalonia and who can provide accreditation of this situation at the corresponding 
Spanish consulate enjoy, as Catalans, the political rights defined in this Statute.”401 
However, the limited number of registered voters combined with the absence of a single 
electoral constituency for expatriates makes the incentives for competing for their votes 
fairly low. Indeed, merely 133,487 were registered on the Electoral Census of Absentee 
Voters in 2010. Besides, turnout for autonomous elections has traditionally been 
extremely low, reaching only 13% in 2010 against 21% in 2006. On the other hand, 
while ERC has long campaigned for the establishment of a ‘vote abroad for direct 
representatives system’,402 providing citizens abroad with their own directly elected 
representation in Parliament, the 2011 Spanish reform of the electoral system does not 
contemplate this possibility. On the contrary, the legislation, passed with the support of 
PSOE, PP and CiU, prohibited external voting rights at local elections and strengthened 
the rules of registration.  
                                               
401. 1978 Catalan Statute, article 6. This definition excludes Catalan-born citizens residing elsewhere in the Spanish 
state. 
402. In Spain, the ‘vote abroad for home districts system’ allows citizens abroad to vote in consulates or through the 
post in their last municipality of residence, or that of their parents/grandparents for second and third generation 
naturalized citizens (Collyer et al. 2010).  
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Table 13: Election results for expatriates at Catalan elections, (1999-2010) 
 
Year 1999 2003 2006 2010 
Registered voters 87,235 100,042 108,851 133,437 
Number of Votes 15,516 18,639 22,658 17,435 
Turnout 17.8% 18.6% 20.8% 13.1% 
          
CiU 36.7% 33.6% 30.1% 26.6% 
PSC 35.6% 27.1% 27.4% 27.7% 
PP 9.7% 14% 12.6% 14.9% 
ERC 6.4% 12.2% 10.2% 5.9% 
ICV/EUiA 2.9% 5% 5.7% 5.6% 
 
Source: FIEC, data available at http://www.fiecweb.cat/index02.php?id=68 [accessed 
on June 10, 2011] 
 
 
The table above shows that CiU and PSC have traditionally been the most popular 
parties among expatriates, who have adopted similar voting behaviour as domestic 
voters. During the 2010 campaign in the Catalan elections, the PPC organized 52 events 
abroad, relying extensively on the PP network across 25 countries. ERC organized 
political meetings in Uruguay and Argentina while all political parties campaigned in 
France which hosts the most important community of Catalan voters abroad.403 
However, the political stake is limited as the expatriate vote hardly ever tipped the 
electoral balance, with the exception of the 2008 general elections when CiU lost a seat 
to the benefit of PP in Barcelona, bringing the number of CiU MPs from 11 down to 
10.404 
 
8.3. Analysis of findings 
 
 
While institutions and policies targeting Scots abroad were non-existent prior to 
devolution, the Scottish government has launched a number of ambitious initiatives 
since 2001, culminating the 2009 Homecoming year. The government’s diaspora-
                                               
403. ‘CiU y PSC se llevan el 75% de los votos de los votos emitidos desde el extranjero’, in La Región Internacional, 
November 25, 2010.  
404. Interview with Alicia Sánchez-Camacho: ‘Los votos de los residentes en el exterior pueden contribuir a un 
cambio en la forma de hacer política en Cataluña’, in España Exterior, October 19, 2010.  
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building strategy has taken three forms, with the economic agenda proving to be 
successful. The Homecoming year and above all the GlobalScot network have both 
integrated the Scottish brand into a broader economic strategy aiming at promoting the 
homeland as a business-friendly environment and raising awareness among distant 
relatives interested in rediscovering their Scottish roots. The cultural purpose of 
marketing Scotland as an ideal place to live and work has only partially been met, as it 
had to compete with the romantic idealization of the homeland at the core of the 
diaspora identity. In the political realm, the diaspora has rarely ever been used to press 
the case for independence. The 2009 Scottish Diaspora Forum was meant to address 
the following question: ‘Is Scotland a country of five million inhabitants, or a potential 
community of thirty million?’ It seems that the response goes as follows: political 
membership is limited to the territorial boundaries of the ‘Mongrel Nation’, to which 
diaspora Scots are welcome to return under the same conditions as other migrants. By 
contrast, the devolved government envisions a cultural and economic Scotland that 
reaches out to the ‘Kingdom of the Mind’, the boundaries of which being deliberately 
hard to draw. People having an affinity with Scotland are being used as a 
paradiplomatic resource in order to project ‘Scotland: the brand’ overseas. They are 
invited to contribute to its nation-building project, which emphatically prioritizes the 
economic, cultural and ultimately political flourishing of its territory and of those who 
happen to inhabit it.    
 
The review of emigrant policies in Catalonia shows important variations from the 
Scottish case, not least because of the much lower number of individuals abroad who 
can claim a blood link with Catalonia. Throughout the dictatorship, Catalans in exile 
acted as the keepers of the nationalist flame and took the responsibility of diffusing the 
Catalan language at a time when its survival was put at risk in the homeland. During 
the transition, the return of Josep Taradellas provided an illusion of continuity between 
the First Republic and the reestablishment of a democratically-elected Catalan 
parliament. From 1996 onwards, a number of initiatives targeting Catalans abroad have 
been undertaken. The Casal network has been framed as an economic instrument to 
break into foreign markets, and emigrants and their descendants as a potential source of 
culturally similar labour. However, the policy goals have hardly been met. In spite of 
significant efforts undertaken to institutionalize the relationship between the 
Generalitat and associations abroad, the boundary-making strategy thirty years after the 
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reestablishment of self-governing institutions has hardly gone beyond the realm of 
political rhetoric. Indeed, immigrants and their descendants have mainly served the 
symbolic purpose of commemorating the 1939 exile and subsequent forty years of 
dictatorship, through a series of initiatives such as the Week of Homage to Exile, the 
creation of the Exile Museum and the establishment of the International day of External 
Catalonia.  
 
Overall, there is hardly any evidence, whether in the Scottish or Catalan case, that 
emigrants have been used as a means to “export ethnic divisions” (Lafleur 2011) by 
encouraging their political participation and contribution to the national struggle. The 
argument of path-dependency is equally disappointing, as boundary-making strategies 
have undergone significant changes in both cases. While the formal distribution of 
power has mattered, it provided a framework within which political boundaries could 
be contested beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Scottish and Catalan governments 
and their respective states rather than an explanation as to why political elites and 
governments embraced a predominantly territorializing boundary-making strategy. 
Instead, their boundary-making strategies towards those who left must be understood as 
a means to project the nation as a responsible actor onto the international scene and to 
strengthen the meaning of the territorial boundary delimiting their jurisdiction.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
According to the data collected by the Catalan Institute of Statistics (IDESCAT), the 
population of Catalonia comprised 1,488,123 residents ‘born in the rest of the state’ and 
1,314,367 residents ‘born abroad’ in 2010. At the same time, there were 170,234 
‘Catalan citizens residing abroad’ and 394,294 ‘in the rest of Spain’. IDESCAT also 
discriminated between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ flows and provided estimates of 
linguistic proficiency among the immigrant and native population. Likewise, in 
Scotland, the General Register Office (GROS) established that 45,007 persons came to 
Scotland ‘from the rest of the UK’ in 2010, against 41,132 who took the opposite path, 
while 46,100 came ‘from overseas’. The 2001 Census already monitored ethnic and 
religious data of the resident population. In addition, the 2011 Census included a 
question asking what respondents ‘feel their national identity is’ and proposed the non-
mutually exclusive categories of Scottish, English, Welsh, Northern Irish, British and 
others405.  
The process through which migrants are being counted and categorized as such is the 
fundamental way in which the territorial nation establishes itself and affirms its 
supremacy over a specific geographic space (Favell 2006). The very existence of the 
terms immigrant and emigrant cannot be dissociated from ongoing nation-building 
projects, whether they are deployed by political elites speaking on behalf of nation 
states or of stateless nations. By running their own procedures for counting movers and 
distinguishing them from non-movers, framing public policy-making in their own terms 
and putting it into perspective with their own historical experiences as well as their own 
future aspirations, nationalist elites and governments both in Catalonia and Scotland 
sought to incorporate migration-related concerns into their respective nation-building 
projects. Those who came and those who left have been the lens through which political 
elites have sought to reinvent the nation and reinforce the meaning of the territorial 
boundary separating the homeland from the rest of the state. Far from being the 
reflection of a ‘narcissism of minor differences’, it is as much the consequence of 
                                               
405. 2011 Census Question Testing: The National Identity Question (2009), IPSOS Mori Scotland, report prepared by 
Steve Treanor.  
 264 
 
political entrepreneurs seeking to fulfill their autonomy goals as of the resilience of a 
territorial arena in which issues of direct concern to the resident population can be 
debated.  
 
The systematic comparison of boundary-making strategies in relation to immigrants and 
emigrants in Catalonia and Scotland corroborates to a great extent the main hypothesis. 
Nationalists who seek to establish, maintain and expand a stable structure of power over 
a territory have a vested interest in predominantly defining their people in territorial 
terms in order to gain internal legitimacy among the totality of the resident population 
and to defuse counter claims of self-determination within the homeland. On the other 
hand, polishing their external legitimacy enables them to break the state’s monopoly 
over the enforcement of liberal democratic norms and to discourage reluctant state-wide 
elites from using internal divisions as a means to oppose their claims. In consequence, it 
becomes much harder for the state to accommodate a nation-building project the 
legitimacy of which is not rooted in narrowly-defined ethnic criteria but grounded in a 
culturally plural population inhabiting a common homeland. This, however, shall not be 
interpreted as a teleological endpoint, an irresistible movement towards the formation of 
a fully territorialized political community. The empirical investigation made clear that 
this ambition had been subject to ongoing contestations, has been shifting through time, 
and can be constrained or enhanced by changing conditions in the political environment. 
The results also show that the Catalan case has been more ambiguous than the Scottish 
one. Indeed, immigration has spurred more anxiety and the boundary between natives 
and immigrants has consistently been more politically salient there than in Scotland. To 
be sure, this can partly be explained by the much larger settlement of immigrants 
throughout Catalonia’s contemporary history. However, these contrasted outcomes are 
also the consequence of variations along the three dimensions of the territorial 
opportunity structure identified in Chapter I. By way of conclusion, I briefly summarize 
the findings, confront them to the three dimensions of the territorial opportunity 
structure and open an agenda for future research.  
 
Catalonia 
In the Catalan case, the historical chapter paid particular attention to political elites’ 
boundary-making strategies in relation to internal immigrants throughout the period that 
preceded and followed the democratic transition and the re-establishment of political 
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autonomy in 1979. Prior to the transition, the large proportion of residents who were 
born in the rest of Spain encouraged nationalists to define national membership in 
territorial terms. The 1979 Statute gave legal substance to this claim by defining Catalan 
citizenship on the basis of residency, thus translating a conception of political 
membership that could accommodate residents irrespective of their place of birth and 
their degree of attachment to the land. Accordingly, those who were born elsewhere in 
Spain could become political Catalans. After the re-establishment of the Generalitat, 
Catalan nation-builders have conceived of integration in an ambivalent way. Whilst the 
institutional framework officially entrenched bilingualism, it also actively gave 
preference to the Catalan language and conferred a clear advantage on those who could 
actively speak it. Under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, the Generalitat actively sought to 
‘re-Catalanize Catalonia’ while carefully preventing the linguistic conflict from 
becoming politicized.   
 
This outcome can best be understood as the consequence of a self-conscious elite 
strategy, facilitated by favourable dimensions of the opportunity structure. First, in the 
years preceding the democratic transition, repression by a highly centralized and 
authoritarian state provided incentives for fragmented and ideologically divided 
opposition groups to reach a minimal consensus, equating the democratic struggle with 
the restoration of political autonomy. Second, left-wing parties established strong links 
with immigrants who were over-represented among the working class, and dragged 
them into the national movement. The communist party PSUC was particularly 
instrumental in this respect during the pre-transition period, but this role was gradually 
taken over by PSC in the 1980s. Both parties have contributed to blurring ethnic 
boundaries within the homeland by maintaining an ambiguous relationship with the 
Catalan nation-building project and fusing together working class and national claims. 
Furthermore, the only party that actively sought to exploit linguistic and ethnic divisions 
has been the right-wing PPC, which never managed to mobilize more than a fraction of 
the electorate. Paradoxically, it strengthened the solidarity of Catalanist parties which 
consistently put aside their ideological differences in defence of the linguistic 
arrangement. 
 
The settlement of international immigrants became significant at a time when self-
governing institutions had already been consolidated after two decades of steady nation-
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building under the leadership of CiU and his charismatic leader Jordi Pujol. The year 
2000 marked a critical juncture, as the number of immigrants coming from abroad.  
The Generalitat sought to gain some leverage to run its own immigration policy within 
the framework of a regionalized system. However, this demand remained largely 
unfulfilled as the Spanish government proved reluctant to share its prerogatives over a 
field of public policy it perceived as an ‘act of sovereignty’. In regard to immigrant 
policies, the initial reaction of the Generalitat closely followed the cognitive path 
established in response to earlier settlements of immigrants from the rest of Spain. 
However, the analogy between ‘immigrants from the rest of Spain’ and ‘immigrants 
from abroad’ found its limits in the fact that, unlike internal migrants who have acquired 
Catalan citizenship by taking up residence there, foreign nationals saw their legal status 
tightly regulated by the central state. Second, the formidable variety of sending 
countries made the depth as well as breadth of immigration-induced diversity much 
greater than earlier, thus calling for a renewed approach to immigrant integration. The 
CiU government, worn down after six consecutive terms in office, appeared unable to 
find innovative ways of addressing this new challenge. The election of the left-wing 
Tripartite coalition in 2003 brought a great deal of fresh thinking into the policy-making 
process. The Tripartite created an immigration secretariat cast in the Department of 
Welfare and Families and endowed with considerable resources. It initiated a large 
consultation process involving all immigration-related stakeholders and turning the 
Generalitat into the focal point for immigrants’ claim-making. 
 
Although there is clear evidence that Catalan nationalists have sought to reconcile the 
presence of immigrants in the homeland with their territorial nation-building project, the 
review of boundary-making strategies over the past decade reveals that this aim has 
been only partially met. First, attempts to bypass the central administration by 
expanding the boundaries of citizenship to all residents irrespective of their legal status 
did not prevent the multiplication of anti-immigrant rows at local level. By 2010 the 
objective of challenging the central administration in its own normative space had been 
overshadowed by the aim of consolidating a Catalan path to citizenship, conditioning 
the entitlement to social and political rights on the completion of courses accrediting 
immigrants’ integration efforts. On the other hand, the Catalan language remained an 
important marker of full and equal membership and immigrants were used as a means of 
extending institutional pressures to learn it over a new category of residents. However, 
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the Tripartite actively sought to emphasize its instrumental dimension by framing it as a 
means of communication contributing to social cohesion in a culturally plural society 
and enhancing immigrant socio-economic mobility. In parallel, the Generalitat 
embraced an intercultural doctrine of immigrant integration, presented as a middle-
ground between caricatured versions of ‘French Republicanism’ and ‘British 
multiculturalism’, both perceived as having failed. While this strategy reflects a clear 
elite-driven attempt at blurring cultural boundaries within the homeland, it found its 
limits in the increasing stigmatization of Muslims. As in other European countries, the 
Catalan case evokes a paradox. The decline of religious beliefs and practices among the 
native population sits uneasily with the consolidation of a kind of nationalism 
rediscovering its Christian roots and instrumentalizing its attachment to supposedly 
European values of liberty and democracy to contract the national boundary towards 
recently-settled Muslim populations, reified as a homogenous group who carry with 
them the burden of what has increasingly been framed as a parochial and backward 
religion.  
However, these developments are a poor reflection of the broader discursive and 
institutional environment. Indeed, the recently founded anti-immigrant party PxC, 
which has carefully avoided positioning itself on the centre/periphery axis, failed to 
obtain parliamentary representation in the latest Catalan elections held in 2010. In 
addition, the fact that the PPC has been at the forefront of the anti-immigration crusade 
strengthens the main hypothesis more than it undermines it. Indeed, it is emphatically 
presented by Catalanist parties as the emissary of the intransigent Spanish right and heir 
to its repressive and authoritarian tradition. Hence, it has served the instrumental 
purpose of maintaining an artificial division between an uncompromising state-wide 
nationalism and a more liberal Catalanist alternative.  
Lastly, those who once emigrated from the homeland have been identified as potential 
resources and their relationship with the Generalitat gradually institutionalized. 
However, the historically small number of Catalan emigrants militated against the 
development of fully-fledged initiatives beyond the realm of political rhetoric. 
Accordingly, emigrants and their descendants have primarily been associated with the 
1939 exile and served the symbolic purpose of maintaining the link between Catalan 
nationalism and the liberal and democratic impulse of the transition. 
 
Scotland 
 268 
 
In Scotland, the consolidation of a territorializing boundary-making strategy from the 
1970s onwards went hand in hand with the irresistible rise of political nationalism. 
Although the proportion of residents born abroad has been relatively low compared to 
Catalonia, the myth of the ‘Mongrel nation’ has also served an instrumental purpose. 
Indeed, a narrowly-defined ethnic claim would have been internally divisive in a 
country that encompasses a fundamentally plural population. With a relatively large and 
geographically diverse territory, a network of medium-sized cities without a clear 
hegemon, extensive rural areas, and a multilingual and multi-secular society, the 
intrinsic pluralism of the Scottish people can hardly be accommodated without an 
overlapping territorial identity. In addition, I argued that this was facilitated by the 
emergence of favourable factors in the political opportunity structure. First, support for 
nationalism increasingly leaned towards the left of the electoral spectrum, conflating 
class and national identity. Second, the reason invoked by home-rulers to legitimate 
their claims – in the name of a ‘democratic deficit’ – facilitated the constitution of a 
broad coalition of support cutting across religious and ethnic lines and territorially 
defined against the England-dominated state.  
 
In 2002, the publication of the 2001 Census figures highlighted how the Scottish 
population was ageing faster than the rest of the UK and had been stagnating over the 
past 100 years as a result of protracted emigration and limited immigration. The vast 
majority of Scottish politicians interpreted these trends as an illustration of the failure of 
Scotland’s economy over past decades. Instead of trying to stimulate fertility through 
generous family-oriented welfare programmes, the Labour-led Scottish government 
sought to address what it referred to as “the biggest challenge facing Scotland in the 21st 
century” by promoting Scotland as an attractive and dynamic place to live in order to 
stimulate immigration. As in Catalonia, the Scottish government sought to run its own 
immigration policy through a federalized system on Canadian or Australian lines, but 
the proposal was firmly rebuffed by the Westminster government which jealously 
retained exclusive control over a matter that was gradually turning into a major public 
concern south of the border. By 2011, the gap between Westminster’s obsession with 
border control and Holyrood’s fear of another brain drain exacerbated by adverse 
economic conditions had grown wider than ever. 
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On the other hand, the self-reassuring discourse that racism was ‘not a problem around 
here’ prior to devolution could no longer hide the absence of a genuine national strategy 
for immigrant integration. The institutional framework that was gradually set up has 
been underlined by a ‘Community Cohesion’ paradigm and does not show significant 
divergences from the rest of the UK, although it has increasingly been linked with the 
devolved policy context. But while Gordon Brown has been desperately looking for 
common values to keep Britons together, Alex Salmond has promoted his vision of 
Scottishness in terms that are reminiscent of the old multicultural doctrine, clinging to 
the celebration of cultural pluralism as an element of national pride. These findings are 
especially remarkable when contrasted with developments in Westminster, where 
immigration has increasingly been framed as undermining social cohesion and a 
security threat. The strengthening of the rules of acquisition of British citizenship, the 
widening gap between aliens’ and citizens’ rights and harsher treatment of asylum-
seekers find no equivalent in Scotland, where these decisions have been systematically 
criticized for being-counter-productive, detrimental to Scotland’s socio-economic 
interests, and incompatible with Scottish values. The review of immigrant policies in the 
devolved policy context illustrated the Scottish administration’s eagerness to blur ethnic 
boundaries within the homeland by promoting an overlapping Scottish identity 
sufficiently thin to accommodate individuals and communities irrespective of their 
ethnic or religious affiliations. While it enabled the devolved administration to acquire 
further legitimacy over its jurisdiction, it mainly served the purpose of presenting it as 
more sensitive to liberal democratic norms that the Westminster government. 
 Lastly, the Scottish government has undertaken a variety of initiatives in the cultural, 
economic and political realms that by 2010 formed a reasonably coherent boundary-
making strategy towards those who left. While this renewed interest in ‘Scots abroad’ 
sits uneasily with the territorial project so vocally pursued in the homeland, the 
expansion of the membership boundary has had no other purpose but to advance the 
economic, cultural and ultimately political interest of the homeland and those who 
happen to inhabit it.   
 
Power and the formal distribution of migration-related competencies 
While the institutional framework did influence boundary-making strategies, the 
Catalan and Scottish cases hardly support Kymlicka’s argument. As in Québec, 
nationalists adopted a predominantly territorial conception of membership prior to the 
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establishment of self-governing institutions. This has been especially striking in 
Catalonia, where the national movement which re-emerged in the 1960s promoted a 
conception of membership primarily based on residency in spite of the large-scale 
settlement of internal migrants and the Franco regime’s brutal strategy of cultural 
homogenization. In Scotland, the permanence of distinct institutions since the 1707 Act 
of Union combined with relatively low immigration made Kymlicka’s hypothesis hardly 
applicable, although the vibrant celebration of cultural pluralism preceded the passage 
from administrative to political devolution in 1999. However, the cases support a more 
general institutional hypothesis about territorial interest-formation. Prior to devolution, 
the widespread perception that the central state systematically failed to address 
peripheral concerns fostered the development of broad coalitions cutting across 
ideological and ethnic lines in defence of a common territorial interest. In Scotland, the 
rejection of Margaret Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda and the democratic deficit 
engendered by the increasing gap in voting patterns between England and Scotland 
provided the glue that kept the eclectic home-rule coalition together. In Catalonia, 
opposition to the Franco regime encouraged ideologically divided groups to reach a 
minimal consensus associating the struggle for self-government with liberal democratic 
aspirations. Besides, the consolidation of territorially-bounded institutions singularly 
mitigated opposition regarding the definition of the political community as ethnic 
cleavages associated with the national question increasingly cut across social, 
ideological and cultural ones. 
  
Ultimately, while the struggle over the location of authority in migration-related matters 
has originated ongoing tensions between state and sub-state administrations, it has not 
in itself shaped the boundary-making strategy in relation to emigrants or immigrants. 
Instead, it brought long-standing patterns of rival nation-building closer to the surface of 
politics and provided the means through which political boundaries can be contested not 
only horizontally, across ideological cleavages, but also vertically, across multiple tiers 
of government. This does not mean that Kymlicka’s hypothesis can be equally 
dismissed in all cases across time and space, although a territorial politics perspective 
casts doubt on the simplistic belief that the conquest of competencies constitutes and 
end in itself.  
 
The initial boundary and its implications for subsequent developments 
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The path-dependency hypothesis contends that boundary-making strategies are 
remarkably stable over extensive periods of time, independently of environmental 
changes. To a certain extent, public policy-making and underlying discourses in 
Catalonia and Scotland in relation to immigrants and emigrants have been conditioned 
by historical precedents. However, institutional change is an ongoing phenomenon in 
plurinational states, thus making the task of identifying a clear path over extensive 
periods of time extremely difficult. Besides, by going back into the past, this 
dissertation made clear that the dominant cultural idioms informing political practices 
have been profoundly altered over time. This is partly due to changes in the composition 
and direction of migration flows. Hence, protracted emigration from nineteenth century 
Scotland when the country took pride in being the ‘Workshop of the Empire’ turned into 
an illustration of Lowlands’ industrial decay in the interwar years and became framed as 
a symptom of the Union and over-reliance on the Westminster government in the 1980s. 
In Catalonia, there has been important similarities in the way immigration from the rest 
of Spain in the 1960s and immigration from abroad over the past decade have been 
apprehended. However, the legal distinction between internal and international migrants 
as well as the sociological reality of a kind of pluralism going beyond linguistic 
differences made the policy response significantly distinct from earlier ones. 
  
The way in which the past is being rediscovered and reinterpreted in order to address 
contemporary challenges and serve present interests is probably more striking than the 
presumed self-reproduction of institutions and cultural idioms outliving the purpose for 
which they were initially created. Of course, the extent to which the past can be 
stretched is limited, as historical arguments need to be ‘plausible’ and ‘sensible’ enough 
to resonate among and appeal to an increasingly educated electorate (Evans 1997, 
Norman 2006). Ultimately, whether or not labeling Scotland as a ‘Mongrel nation’ and 
Catalonia as a ‘Terra de pas’ constitute an accurate and objective historical observation 
is of secondary importance, at least for the purpose of this dissertation. Instead, I 
primarily sought to understand why they had been deployed by political elites seeking 
to bring legitimacy to their actions in the migration-related realm. While only parts of 
their respective histories, these contemporary understandings of the past have served the 
instrumental purpose of grounding their legitimacy in a culturally plural population 
inhabiting the same land. Similarly, portraying Scotland as a ‘Kingdom of the Mind’ fits 
well with the Scottish government’s aim of reaching out to the diaspora and exploiting 
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the economic and cultural resources of self-identified Scots abroad. In the Catalan case, 
‘Catalan Communities abroad’ have been primarily constructed as the descendants of 
the 1939 exiles, thus contributing to maintaining the link between Catalan nationalism 
and the democratic impulse of the transition. Besides, this also served the purpose of 
reminding younger generations that Spanish nationalism once sat on the wrong side of 
history, or more accurately, of the post-transition mainstream historiography. Hence, 
while limited in their ability to interpret past experiences and alter long-established 
institutional paths, nationalist elites enjoy significant room for adapting them to 
contemporary challenges and reconciling them with their autonomy goals.  
 
The dynamics of party-competition at sub-state level 
In the cases that were put under scrutiny in this dissertation, dynamics of party 
competition at sub-state level proved to be the determining dimension of the territorial 
opportunity structure in shaping the struggle over the making and unmaking of 
membership boundaries. Unlike in Scotland where the nationalist cleavage has clearly 
leaned towards the left, the Catalan case is characterized by the presence of more 
relevant actors and nationalist alternatives on both sides of the electoral spectrum. In 
both cases, political parties’ ideological identity has played a greater role than their 
position along the centre/periphery axis in determining their attitude towards 
immigrants and, to a lesser extent, emigrants. On the other hand, the empirical 
investigation has discredited the thesis according to which boundary-making strategies 
are externally-imposed and forced into public policy-making by an omnipotent 
‘international human rights regime’. Besides, nationalists have not embraced a 
progressive approach at the price of renouncing their alleged aim of brutally 
homogenizing their populations in order to differentiate themselves from other national 
movements the claims of which are ethnically rooted. Instead, the PSC’s and SNPs left-
of-centre identity encouraged them to engage in the politics of recognition in the same 
way as other social democratic parties in Europe did. However, by contrast with 
Catalonia, the SNP government has not faced significant pressure from the right or the 
Scottish electorate to adopt a tougher stance.  
As far as emigrants are concerned, the comparison clearly indicated that the rise and 
consolidation of political nationalism had significant implications for emigrant 
populations who have been solicited by political parties and governments to contribute 
to the nation-building project in the homeland and in their countries of residence. 
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However, both in Scotland and Catalonia, nationalist parties proved to be reluctant to 
emphasize ethnic affiliations. Instead, their diaspora-building strategies aimed to project 
a civic and modern conception of the national community beyond its borders, although 
this did not come without difficulties given the predominantly romantic identity 
cultivated by emigrant communities.  
 
An agenda for future research 
The study of the territorial politics of migration in a comparative perspective offers a 
promising avenue for future research.  
First, a natural extension of the current analysis, mentioned on p. 251 of Chapter VIII 
would be to bridge the analytical divide between kin-minorities and emigrant 
communities. Unlike Catalan nationalists, Québecois, Catalan and Basque nationalists 
have both appealed to emigrant communities and territories with historical and 
linguistic links to the stateless nation inside the encompassing state or in a neighbouring 
state. The territorialization of their respective nation-building projects went hand in 
hand with a deliberate effort to contract the membership boundary towards those 
populations. Hence, analyzing this process could provide significant supporting 
evidence for the main hypothesis of the dissertation.  
Second, the empirical chapters clearly identified an enduring link between migration 
patterns, be they internal or external, and concomitant processes of nation-building and 
state-formation. However, the limited number of cases put under scrutiny precluded a 
more thorough inquiry into this relationship. Covering more cases appears indispensable 
to both better understand the relationship between migration and territorial structuring 
in the past and examine more systematically migration-related policy making at regional 
level today. The comparison should primarily be expanded to other cases that show 
extensive variations in outcomes and along the dimensions of the opportunity structure. 
Indeed, the selection of reasonably successful cases inevitably introduces an empirical 
bias in the analysis. Therefore, the strength of the explanatory framework should be 
evaluated in the light of other cases where sub-state elites do not seek territorial 
autonomy or where the central is unlikely to meet their expectations. In order to address 
these limitations, the comparison should be broadened to include other cases where the 
territorialization of the boundary has been less pronounced, challenged, or reversed.  
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